Supplementary tables for "Ready for boarding? The effects of a boarding school for disadvantaged students."

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*Table A*11: Balancing checks, among students who took the math test after 2 years

	Control Mean (1)	T-C (2)	SE (3)	N (4)
Ability and disruptiveness				
Grade in French	12.75	-0.061	0.303	351
Grade in Maths	13.11	0.185	0.382	351
Studies latin or greek	0.28	-0.055	0.053	333
Studies german	0.28	-0.065	0.053	333
School behavior grade	16.25	0.387	0.432	305
Times missed school last term	5.75	0.527	0.786	310
Socio-economic background				
Parent blue collar or clerk	0.48	-0.011	0.061	350
Recipient of means tested grant	0.39	0.051	0.061	350
Number of children in the family	2.93	-0.066	0.200	350
Parents divorced	0.26	-0.039	0.056	320
Single-parent family	0.37	-0.051	0.062	321
Parent has no degree	0.09	0.026	0.040	313
Parent completed high school	0.27	-0.008	0.062	313
Only French spoken at home	0.42	0.002	0.064	321

Notes. This table reports results from OLS regressions of several dependent variables on a constant, a dummy for our lottery offer, and strata dummies, among the sample of students who took the maths test after two years. Column (1) reports the coefficient of the constant, while column (2) reports the coefficient of the dummy. Standard errors in column (3) are robust. Measures of baseline ability and disruptiveness come from application files. Socio-economic variables come from the "Sconet" administrative data set.

Table A 12: ITT effects on the share of students spending more time than allowed on the tests.

	Control mean (1)	ITT after 1 year (2)	SE (3)	ITT after 2 years (4)	SE (5)	ITT 1 = 2 (6)	N (7)
French	0.108	-0.005	0.036	-0.023	0.046	0.740	697
Maths	0.000	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.015	0.964	689

Notes. This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of dummies for whether a student spent more time than allowed on the French and Maths test on a dummy for year 1 (column (1)), the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column (2)), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with our lottery offer (column (4)), and the statistical controls listed in Section I.B interacted separately with both year dummies, within the sample of students for whom these outcomes are available at least one year. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns (3) and (5) are clustered at the student's level. In column (6), we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients in columns (2) and (4).

Table A 13: ITT effects on test scores, excluding tests taken at home

	Control mean (1)	ITT after 1 year (2)	SE (3)	ITT after 2 years (4)	SE (5)	ITT 1 = 2 (6)	N (7)
French	-0.001	-0.053	0.107	-0.105	0.126	0.651	689
Mathematics	0.031	-0.040	0.096	0.362	0.130	0.001	683

Notes. This table reports coefficients from the same regressions as those presented in Panel B of Table 6, excluding tests which were taken at home by the student.

Table A 14: Response rates to surveys

	Control Mean (1)	T-C (2)	SE (3)	N (4)
One year after the lottery				
Took the French test	0.928	-0.024	0.020	381
Took the maths test	0.922	-0.028	0.021	381
Two years after the lottery				
Took the French test	0.905	-0.019	0.022	381
Took the maths test	0.888	-0.006	0.027	381

Notes. This table reports results from OLS regressions of several dependent variables on a constant, a dummy for our lottery offer, and the statistical controls listed in Section I.B. Column (1) reports the coefficient of the constant, while column (2) reports the coefficient of the dummy. Standard errors in column (3) are robust. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata.

Table A 15: ITT effects on test scores, without controls

	Control mean (1)	ITT after 1 year (2)	SE (3)	ITT after 2 years (4)	SE (5)	ITT 1 = 2 (6)	N (7)
French	0.022	-0.097	0.122	-0.141	0.142	0.686	719
Mathematics	0.023	-0.022	0.134	0.284	0.135	0.008	712

Notes. This table reports coefficients from the same regressions as those presented in Panel B of Table 6, without statistical controls.

Table A 16: ITT effects on test scores, clustering standard errors at the class level

	Control mean (1)	ITT after 1 year (2)	SE (3)	ITT after 2 years (4)	SE (5)	ITT 1 = 2 (6)	N (7)
French	0.022	-0.065	0.119	-0.115	0.140	0.783	719
Mathematics	0.023	-0.037	0.095	0.280	0.103	0.024	712

Notes. This table reports coefficients from the same regressions as those presented in Panel B of Table 6, clustering standard errors at the class level.

Table A 17: ITT effects on test scores, with strata dummies

	Control mean (1)	ITT after 1 year (2)	SE (3)	ITT after 2 years (4)	SE (5)	N (6)
French	0.032	-0.024	0.100	-0.041	0.123	719
Mathematics	0.017	-0.013	0.097	0.244	0.109	712

Notes. This table reports coefficients from the regressions presented in Panel B of Table 6, with strata dummies interacted with dummies for year 1 and 2 to control for lottery strata instead of propensity score reweighting.

Table A 18: ITT effects on test scores, estimated separately one and two years after the lottery

	Control mean (1)	ITT after 1 year (2)	SE (3)	ITT after 2 years (4)	SE (5)	N (6)
French	0.022	-0.065	0.107	-0.115	0.124	719
Mathematics	0.023	-0.037	0.096	0.280	0.112	712

Notes. This table reports coefficients from the regressions presented in Panel B of Table 6 estimated separately 1 and 2 years after the lottery.

Table A 19:   Ressources allocated to the school, after 1 and 2 years

	$E(Y_0|C)$ (1)	LATE year 1 (2)	SE (3)	LATE year 2 (4)	SE (5)	LATE $1 = 2$ (6)	N (7)
Class size	24.876	-6.714	1.156	-6.434	1.282	0.871	381

Notes. This table reports coefficients from a 2SLS regression of class size on a dummy for year 1, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after one year (column (2)), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after two years (column (4)), and the statistical controls listed in Section I.B interacted separately with both year dummies, using our lottery offer interacted with the year 1 and year 2 dummies as instruments. Our estimation sample is the second cohort of students, as class size is not available one year after the lottery for the first cohort. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns (3) and (5) are clustered at the class level. In column (6), we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients in columns (2) and (4). Measures of class size come from students' questionnaires.

Table A 20: Students' experience in the classroom, after 1 and 2 years

	$E(Y_0\|C)$ (1)	LATE year 1 (2)	SE (3)	LATE year 2 (4)	SE (5)	LATE 1 = 2 (6)	N (7)
Attendance over the last two weeks							
Attendance score	-0.083	0.124	0.239	-0.087	0.363	0.628	383
Missed school	0.121	-0.175	0.301	0.201	0.453	0.489	385
Skipped classes	0.130	-0.227	0.227	0.085	0.379	0.480	383
Arrived late	0.049	-0.050	0.203	-0.190	0.319	0.712	385
Disruption							
Disruption score	0.015	-0.615	0.237	-1.131	0.324	0.199	384
Teacher often waits students calm down	-0.048	-0.471	0.249	-0.637	0.344	0.695	385
Students start working long after class begins	0.146	-0.441	0.220	-0.628	0.300	0.615	385
Students cannot work well	-0.013	-0.457	0.203	-0.572	0.299	0.752	384
There is noise and disruption in the classroom	0.080	-0.436	0.232	-0.900	0.317	0.238	385
Students do not listen to the teacher	0.097	-0.681	0.229	-1.223	0.414	0.252	385
Relationships between students							
Students relationships score	0.090	0.608	0.259	0.682	0.296	0.852	353
Students are ashamed when they have good grades	-0.153	0.303	0.238	-0.236	0.362	0.214	354
Weak students make fun of strong ones	0.322	-0.608	0.216	0.446	0.353	0.011	385
Students do their homework in group	-0.018	0.639	0.224	0.399	0.391	0.594	385
Strong students help weak ones	0.186	0.788	0.245	1.278	0.305	0.210	384
Teachers' engagement							
Teachers' engagement score	-0.316	1.235	0.277	1.448	0.435	0.679	385
She cares for students progress	-0.166	0.728	0.213	0.420	0.305	0.407	385
She explains until students understand	-0.355	1.075	0.236	1.468	0.389	0.388	385
She listens to students opinions	-0.239	0.610	0.222	0.644	0.341	0.933	385
Teacher-students relationships							
Teacher-students relationships score	-0.055	0.653	0.222	0.908	0.393	0.572	352
Students get along well with their teachers	-0.001	0.450	0.198	0.712	0.326	0.491	385
Teachers care for students	-0.058	0.490	0.240	0.615	0.356	0.770	354
Teachers listen to students	-0.023	0.267	0.239	0.459	0.382	0.669	383
Teachers give supplementary help if needed	0.045	0.326	0.217	0.593	0.388	0.548	383
Teachers are fair to students	0.055	0.347	0.205	0.962	0.448	0.212	383

Notes. This table reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions of several dependent variables on a constant, a dummy for year 1, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after one year (column (2)), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after two years (column (4)), and the statistical controls listed in Section I.B interacted separately with both year dummies, using our lottery offer interacted with the year 1 and year 2 dummies as instruments. Our estimation sample is the second cohort of students, as the outcomes studied here are not available one year after the lottery for the first cohort. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns (3) and (5) are clustered at the class level. In column (6), we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients columns (2) and (4). All variables come from students' questionnaires.

Table A 21: Students' experience outside the classroom, after 1 and 2 years

	$E(Y_0|C)$ (1)	LATE year 1 (2)	SE (3)	LATE year 2 (4)	SE (5)	LATE 1 = 2 (6)	N (7)
Students' schedule after the school day							
Hours spent last week in study room	2.743	2.496	0.510	4.745	0.950	0.039	693
Hours spent last Monday playing video games	0.446	-0.373	0.168	-0.251	0.204	0.541	691
Hours spent last Monday watching TV	1.471	-1.162	0.177	-1.195	0.266	0.907	697
Supervisor-students relationships							
Supervisor-students relationships score	-0.118	0.035	0.281	-0.325	0.369	0.345	351
Students get along well with their supervisors	-0.042	-0.339	0.211	-0.731	0.364	0.294	352
Supervisors care for students	-0.003	0.153	0.270	0.107	0.354	0.913	383
Supervisors listen to students	-0.027	0.155	0.266	0.191	0.359	0.927	382
Supervisors give supplementary help if needed	-0.186	0.554	0.281	-0.279	0.375	0.060	382
Supervisors are fair to students	-0.186	-0.086	0.267	-0.763	0.369	0.053	383

Notes. This table reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions of several dependent variables on a constant, a dummy for year 1, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after one year (column (2)), a dummy for year 2, the interaction of this dummy with the number of years spent in the school after two years (column (4)), and the statistical controls listed in Section I.B interacted separately with both year dummies, using our lottery offer interacted with the year 1 and year 2 dummies as instruments. For some outcomes, our estimation sample is the second cohort of students, as these outcomes are not available one year after the lottery for the first cohort. For other outcomes, we use both cohorts of students. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in columns (3) and (5) are clustered at the student's level. In column (6), we report the p-value of a test of equality of the coefficients columns (2) and (4). All variables come from students' questionnaires.

Table A 22: Students' opinion on teachers: heterogeneous effects according to maths baseline score.

	$E(Y_0|C)$ (1)	LATE (2)	SE (3)	N (4)
Teachers engagement score				
In upper tercile at baseline	-0.192	1.139	0.392	106
Out of upper tercile at baseline	-0.164	1.527	0.333	228
Teachers-students relationships score				
In upper tercile at baseline	0.104	0.807	0.342	101
Out of upper tercile at baseline	-0.076	1.198	0.301	219

Notes. The first line of the table reports coefficients from the same regression as that in Table 4 for teachers' engagement score, within students who where in the first tercile of maths scores in their lottery stratum at baseline. The second line reports the same coefficients from the same regression, within the sample of students who where not in the first tercile of maths scores in their lottery stratum at baseline. Accordingly, the following lines of the table reproduce results for teachers-students relationships score shown in Table 4, separately for students in and out of the first tercile of maths scores at baseline. We use propensity score reweighting to control for lottery strata. Standard errors reported in column (3) are clustered at the class level. All variables come from students' questionnaires.