ONLINE APPENDIX – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
for "Intergenerational Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution"
by Alberto Alesina, Stefanie Stantcheva, and Edoardo Teso

OA.1 Survey Information

We collected data in three waves. The first smaller pilot wave (Wave A) consisted of only the survey part (without a treatment) of about 500 respondents in February 2016. We append this wave to the main wave for the descriptive analysis of perceptions in Section 3[1] The second and main wave (Wave B) with the perception treatment was conducted in September 2016. We conducted a third wave (Wave C) in the United States in October 2016 to ensure robustness and increase sample size in the U.S. The only difference between Wave B and Wave C was that in the latter all respondents were asked the questions on mobility for very hard-working people. Follow-up surveys were conducted in the US about one week after wave B and wave C, respectively.

We report the full text of the U.S. version of the survey in Section OA.4, and the links to the survey in each country in Section OA.3.

Table OA1 reports the number of respondents for each survey wave and country. Table OA2 summarizes the 8 randomization groups of Wave B. Wave C had only 4 randomization groups (Group 1-Group 4). Table OA3 reports the share of respondents with strange answer patterns in the "ladder" mobility question. Table OA4 shows that respondents assigned to different randomization groups are not different in terms of baseline demographic characteristics.

TABLE OA1: SURVEY WAVES, DATES AND SAMPLE SIZES

	Sample size	Date
Wave A - US	499	February 2016
Wave A - US Extra	204	April 2016
Wave A - UK	550	February 2016
Wave A - France	550	February 2016
Wave A - Italy	548	February 2016
Wave A - Sweden	495	February 2016
Wave B - US	2002	September 2016
Wave B - Follow Up	423	September 2016
Wave B - UK	1598	September 2016
Wave B - France	1598	September 2016
Wave B - Italy	1595	September 2016
Wave B - Sweden	999	September 2016
Wave C - US	2000	October 2016
Wave C - Follow Up	586	October 2016

---

[1]We conducted a small additional survey in the US in April 2016, in order to collect additional responses from the less populous states. We use responses from this additional wave in section 3.4.

TABLE OA2: RANDOMIZATION GROUPS

	Treatment/Control	Saw govt. block before/after mobility questions	Effort/talent
Group 1	Control	Before	Effort
Group 2	Treatment	Before	Effort
Group 3	Control	After	Effort
Group 4	Treatment	After	Effort
Group 5	Control	Before	Talent
Group 6	Treatment	Before	Talent
Group 7	Control	After	Talent
Group 8	Treatment	After	Talent

Notes: "Before" and "After" refer to whether the block was seen before or after main perception treatment (or the equivalent place in the survey for the control group).

TABLE OA3: RESPONSE PATTERNS

	Waves A	Waves B and C
100 in any quintile	0.05	0.04
100 in quintile Q2/Q3/Q4/Q5	0.03	0.02
0 in quintile Q1/Q2/Q3	0.12	0.12
20 in each quintile	0.06	0.06

Notes: The table shows the share of respondents whose responses to the ladder question on perceptions exhibits any of the patterns described, namely: whether the respondent puts the number 100 in any of the quintiles, puts the number 100 in any of the quintiles except Q1, puts the number 0 in the quintiles Q1, Q2, or Q3, and finally, puts the same number (20) in all of the quintiles.

Table OA4: Covariates Balance Across Groups

	Treated (1)	Government Questions (2)	Effort Questions (3)
Male	0.99	0.51	0.70
Age	0.45	0.42	0.58
Married	0.35	0.70	0.45
Has children	0.60	0.13	0.33
Native	0.17	0.73	0.84
Employed	0.92	0.73	0.58
Unemployed	0.23	0.59	0.41
Not in labor force	0.79	0.86	0.79
Has university degree	0.61	0.42	0.00
Left-wing	0.91	0.98	0.12

Notes: The table shows the p-value from a series of regressions of the form $y_{ic} = \alpha + \beta Covariate_i + \gamma_c + \epsilon_{ic}$, where $Covariate_i$ is the variable listed in the row and γ_c are country fixed effects. In the column "Treated", y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent was in the treatment group and zero if she was in the control group. In column (2), y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent saw the three survey questions on fairness and government whose order was randomized (described in the text) before the main perception treatment (or the equivalent place in the survey for those not treated by the main perception treatment). In column (3), y_{ic} is a dummy equal to one if the respondent was asked about the mobility prospects of very hard-working children, and equal to zero is she was asked about the mobility prospects of very talented children.

OA.2 Variable Definitions

Demographic variables:
Male: respondent is male.
Young: respondent is younger than 45 years old.
African-American: respondent is African-American (asked in the U.S. only).
Children: respondent has at least one child.
Rich: respondent's household income is above the 75th percentile of the respondents' household income distribution in the country.
College: respondent has college degree.
Left-wing: respondent's views on economic issues are liberal or very liberal.
Right-wing: respondent's views on economic issues are conservatives or very conservatives.
Moved up: dummy equal to one if the level of status of the respondent's job is higher than his father's one.
Immigrant: dummy equal to one if at least one of the respondent's parents is not born in the country.

Mobility Perceptions:
Q1 to Q[X]: perceived probability of being in the Xth quintile as an adult for a child with parents in the first quintile.
Q1 to Q[X] Effort: perceived probability of being in the Xth quintile as an adult for a hard-working child with parents in the first quintile.
Q1 to Q4 (Qual.): qualitative question on perceived chances, on a scale from 1 to 5, of moving from the first to the fourth quintile, where 1 is "Close to zero", 2 is "Low", 3 is "Fairly low", 4 is "Fairly high" and 5 is "High".
Q1 to Q5 (Qual.): qualitative question on perceived chances, on a scale from 1 to 5, of moving from the first to the fifth quintile, where 1 is "Close to zero", 2 is "Low", 3 is "Fairly low", 4 is "Fairly high" and 5 is "High".

Perceptions of Fairness:
Economic System Fair: dummy equal to one if respondent believes that the economic system in her country is basically fair, since all have an equal opportunity to succeed.
American Dream Alive: dummy equal to one if respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement "In [country] everybody has a chance to make it and be economically successful" (equal to zero if neither agrees nor disagrees, disagrees, or strongly disagrees).
Effort Reason Poor: dummy equal to one if respondent believes that "Lack of effort on his or her own part" is a more important determinant of why a person is poor than "Circumstances beyond his or her control".
Effort Reason Rich: dummy equal to one if respondent believes that "Because she or he worked harder than others" is a more important determinant of why a person is poor than "Because she or he had more advantages than others".
Unequal Opp. Problem: dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that if children from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal opportunities in life this is "A problem" or "A serious problem" or "A very serious problem" (equal to zero if it is "Not a problem" or "A small problem").
Unequal Opp. No Problem: dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that if children from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal opportunities in life this is "Not a problem" or "A small problem".
Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem: dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that if children

from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal opportunities in life this is "A very serious problem".

Policy Preferences and Role of Government:

Tax Rate Top 1: Average income tax rate for households in the top 1% of the income distribution.

Tax Rate Bottom 50: Average income tax rate for households in the bottom 50% of the income distribution.

Support Estate Tax: Dummy equal to one if respondent is in favor of the estate tax (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "do not support at all" and 5 means "strongly support").

Budget Safety Net: share of current government budget that should be allocated to safety net policies.

Budget Opp.: share of current government budget that should be allocated to education and health.

Support Equality Opp. Policies: respondent's support, on a scale from 1 to 5, for policies to increase the opportunities for children born in poor families and to foster more equality of opportunity. The respondent was told that "to finance an expansion of policies promoting equal opportunity, it would have to be the case that either other policies are scaled down or taxes are raised".

Government Interv.: respondent's support, on a scale from 1 to 7, for government intervention to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal.

Lowering Taxes Better: dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that "lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth" would do more to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal than "raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations to expand programs for the poor".

Trust Govt.: dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that she can trust the government to do what is right "Most of the time" or "Always" (it takes value zero if the answer is "Never" or "Only some of the time").

Never trust government: dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that she can never trust the government to do what is right.

Govt. Tools: dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families the government has the ability and the tools to do "Some" or "A lot" (it takes value zero if the answer is "Nothing at all" or "Not much").

Government has no tools: dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families the government has the ability and the tools to do "Nothing at all" or "Not much."

Prefer Low Govt. Intervention: dummy equal to one if the respondent prefers a low degree of government intervention to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal (at point 4 or below on the scale from 1 to 7).

Negative View of Government: dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that she can "never" trust the government, or that to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families the government has the ability and the tools to do "Nothing at all" or "Not much," or that she supports little government intervention (less than 5 on the scale from 1 to 7 of the variable *Government Interv.*), or that "lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth" would be the better way to equalize opportunities.

OA.3 Links to surveys

- Survey U.S.: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_5dxninfErZ246X3

- Survey U.K.: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_7TCttX32sJZGUnP

- Survey France: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_55Nxjd0VSEVnHBb

- Survey Italy: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_ezmyMMB2lTJgoeh

- Survey Sweden: https://harvard.az1.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_cZxXzaGNNjn6w5L

OA.4 Detailed Survey Questionnaires

Answer options are in *italic*, separated by a semicolon.

1. See Figure OA3

   Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I AM A U.S. RESIDENT and am 18 or older; No, I would not like to participate.

2. What is your gender?

   Male; Female

3. What is your age?

4. What was your TOTAL household income, before taxes, last year (2015)?

   $0 - $9,999; $10,000 - $14,999; $15,000 - $19,999; $20,000 - $29,999; $30,000 - $39,999; $40,000 - $49,999; $50,000 - $69,999; $70,000 - $89,999; $90,000 - $109,999; $110,000 - $149,999; $150,000 - $199,999; $200,000 +

5. Please indicate your marital status

   Single; Married; Other

6. How many children do you have?

   I do not have children; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 or more

7. How would you describe your ethnicity/race?

   European American/White; African American/Black; Hispanic/Latino; Asian/Asian American; Other

8. Were you born in the United States?

   Yes; No

9. Were both of your parents born in the United States?

   Yes; No

10. Where was your father born?

    Unites States; South or Central America, or Mexico; Canada; Europe; Asia; Africa; Oceania

11. In which state do you live?

12. In which ZIP code do you live?

13. Which category best describes your highest level of education?

    Eighth Grade or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA)

14. Which category best describes your father's highest level of education?

    Eighth Grade or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA); I come from a single-parent family and my father was not present

15. Which category best describes your mother's highest level of education?

    Eighth Grade or less; Some High School; High School degree / GED; Some College; 2-year College Degree; 4-year College Degree; Master's Degree; Doctoral Degree; Professional Degree (JD, MD, MBA); I come from a single-parent family and my mother was not present

16. What is your current employment status?

    Full-time employee; Part-time employee; Self-employed or small business owner; Unemployed and looking for work; Student; Not in labor force (for example: retired, or full-time parent)

17. If you compare your job (or your last job if you currently don't have a job) with the job your father had while you were growing up, would you say that the level of status of your job is:

    Much higher than my father's; Higher than my father's; About equal to my father's; Lower than my father's; Much lower than my father's; My father did not have a job while I was growing up OR I come from a single-parent family

18. If you compare your job (or your last job if you currently don't have a job) with the job your mother had while you were growing up, would you say that the level of status of your job is:

    Much higher than my mother's; Higher than my mother's; About equal to my mother's; Lower than my mother's; Much lower than my mother's; My mother did not have a job while I was growing up OR I come from a single-parent family

19. When you were growing up, compared with American families back then, would you say your family income was:

    Far below average; Below average; Average; Above average; Far above average

20. Right now, compared with American families, would you say your own household income is:

    Far below average; Below average; Average; Above average; Far above average

21. On economic policy matters, where do you see yourself on the liberal/conservative spectrum?

    Very liberal; Liberal; Moderate; Conservative; Very conservative

22. Before proceeding to the next set of questions, we want to ask for your feedback about the responses you provided so far. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people who devoted their full attention to this study. This will not affect in any way the

payment you will receive for taking this survey. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far?

Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study; No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study.

23. Do you think the economic system in the United States is:

    Basically fair, since all Americans have an equal opportunity to succeed; Basically unfair, since all Americans do not have an equal opportunity to succeed

24. Which has more to do with why a person is poor?

    Lack of effort on his or her own part; Circumstances beyond his or her control

25. Which has more to do with why a person is rich?

    Because she or he worked harder than others; Because she or he had more advantages than others

26. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government to do what is right?

    Never; Only some of the time; Most of the time; Always

27. If children from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal opportunities in life, do you think this is:

    Not a problem at all; A small problem; A problem; A serious problem; A very serious problem

28. To reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families, the government has the ability and the tools to do:

    Nothing at all; Not much; Some; A lot

29. We would now like to ask you what you think about the life opportunities of children from very poor families.

    For the following questions, we focus on 500 families that represent the U.S. population. We divide them into five groups on the basis of their income, with each group containing 100 families. These groups are: the poorest 100 families, the second poorest 100 families, the middle 100 families, the second richest 100 families, and the richest 100 families.

    In the following questions, we will ask you to evaluate the chances that children born in one of the poorest 100 families, once they grow up, will belong to any of these income groups.

    Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below to tell us, in your opinion, how many out of 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be in each income group.

    From our experience, this question will take you at the very least 1 minute to answer.

    Please note that your entries need to add up to 100 or you will not be able to move on to the next page.

    Figure 1 here.

30. Do you think the chances that a child from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be among the richest 100 families are:

    Close to zero; Low; Fairly low; Fairly high; High

31. Do you think the chances that a child from the poorest 100 families will grow up to be among the second richest 100 families are:

    Close to zero; Low; Fairly low; Fairly high; High

32. We are still interested in the life opportunities of children from very poor families, but we now focus on a different group of poor children.

    From our experience, this question will take you at the very least 45 seconds to answer.

    Consider 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families.

    These children are very determined and put in hard work both at school and, later in life, when finding a job and doing that job.

    Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below to tell us, in your opinion, how many out of these 100 children will grow up to be in each income group.

    Please note that your entries need to add up to 100 or you will not be able to move on to the next page.

    Figure 1 here.

33. Do you think the chances that one of these hard working children will grow up to be among the richest 100 families are:

    Close to zero; Low; Fairly low; Fairly high; High

34. Do you think the chances that one of these hard working children will grow up to be among the second richest 100 families are:

    Close to zero; Low; Fairly low; Fairly high; High

35. We are still interested in the life opportunities of children from very poor families, but we now focus on a different group of poor children.

    From our experience, this question will take you at the very least 45 seconds to answer.

    Consider 100 children coming from the poorest 100 families.

    These children are very talented.

    Please fill out the entries to the right of the figure below to tell us, in your opinion, how many out of these 100 children will grow up to be in each income group.

    Please note that your entries need to add up to 100 or you will not be able to move on to the next page.

    Figure 1 here.

36. Do you think the chances that one of these talented children will grow up to be among the richest 100 families are:

    Close to zero; Low; Fairly low; Fairly high; High

37. Do you think the chances that one of these talented children will grow up to be among the second richest 100 families are:

    Close to zero; Low; Fairly low; Fairly high; High

38. How do you feel about the following statement?

    "In the United States everybody has a chance to make it and be economically successful."

    Strongly agree; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree

39. Some people think that the government should not concern itself with making the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal. Others think that the government should do everything in its power to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government should not concern itself with making the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should do everything in its power to reduce this inequality of opportunities.

    What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?

    1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7

40. What do you think would do more to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal?

    Lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth; Raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations to expand programs for the poor.

41. Do you support more policies to increase the opportunities for children born in poor families and to foster more equality of opportunity, such as education policies? Naturally, to finance an expansion of policies promoting equal opportunity, it would have to be the case that either other policies are scaled down or taxes are raised.

    I very strongly oppose more policies promoting equality of opportunity; I oppose more policies promoting equality of opportunity; I am indifferent; I support more policies promoting equality of opportunity; I very strongly support more policies promoting equality of opportunity.

42. In the next two questions, we ask you to think about the total level of funds that the government raises and spends today on various policies. For the purpose of these questions, suppose that the level of government spending is fixed at its current level and cannot be changed. We will ask about your views on two aspects:

    - First, on the fair split of the tax burden to raise this level of funds.
    - Second, on how you think the government should spend this level of funds.

43. See Figure OA1

44. We now ask you how you would like to spend the total government budget. Suppose that you are the person deciding on the U.S. budget for the next year. You can choose how you want to divide the budget (in percent) between the following 6 categories:

    See Figure OA2

45. The estate tax is a tax on the transfer of wealth from a deceased person to her heirs. This tax applies only to individuals with wealth above a certain threshold. On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rate your support for the estate tax, where 1 means do not support at all and 5 means strongly support?

    1; 2; 3; 4; 5

46. Do you feel that this survey was biased?

    Yes, left-wing bias; Yes, right-wing bias; No, it did not feel bias

47. Please feel free to give us any feedback or impression regarding this survey.

The government currently raises a certain amount of revenue through the income tax in order to sustain the current level of public spending. In you view, what would be the fair split of the tax burden to sustain public spending?

The income tax* rate is the percentage of your income that you pay in federal income tax. For example, if you earn $30,000 and you pay $3,000 in income taxes, your income tax rate is 10%.

Please use the sliders below to tell us how much you think each of the following groups should pay as a percentage of their total income.

While you adjust the four sliders for each group, the fifth bar at the bottom moves in order to show you how much of the current revenue you have been able to raise so far. The bar appears red as long as you have not raised enough revenue, or if you have raised more money than what is needed.

You will only be able to move to the next question when you meet the revenue target and the bar becomes green.

The top 1% (Richest)

0%

The next 9% (Only 1% of households earn more, 90% earn less)

0%

The next 40% (Only 10% earn more, 50% earn less)

0%

The bottom 50% (Poorest)

0%

Revenue raised

0%

You have not raised enough revenue.

1) **Defense and National Security**, which refers to the costs of the Defense department and the costs of supporting security operations in foreign countries.

2) **Public Infrastructure**, which includes, among others, transport infrastructure like roads, bridges and airports, and water infrastructure.

3) **Spending on Schooling and Higher Education**, including help for children from low income families to attend school and university.

4) **Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance and Supplementary Security Income (SSI)**, which provide income support and help with health care expenses to the elderly and the disabled.

5) **Social Insurance and Income Support Programs**. This covers help to the unemployed (through unemployment insurance) and help for low income families (such as through Food stamps or the earned income tax credit (EITC), a tax credit for low-income working families)

6) **Public Spending on Health**, such as Medicaid for the poor (a healthcare program for low income families) or tax subsidies to help families buy health insurance.

Please enter the percent of the budget you would assign to each spending category (the total must sum to 100):

Defense and National Security	0
Public Infrastructure	0
Spending on Schooling and Higher Education	0
Social Security, Medicare, Disability Insurance and Supplementary Security Income (SSI)	0
Social Insurance and Income Support Programs	0
Public Spending on Health	0
Total	0

Figure OA3: First page of the survey (English version)

We are a non-partisan group of academic researchers from Harvard. Our goal is to understand how information we see and hear in the media influences views on policies. No matter what your political views are, this is an important question and by completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. You might not agree with all the information presented, and that is perfectly fine. Our survey will give you an opportunity to express your own views.

It is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. Anytime you don't know an answer, just give your best guess. However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the question. To ensure the quality of survey data, your responses will be subject to sophisticated statistical control methods. **Responding without adequate effort may result in your responses being flagged for low quality.**

It is also very important for the success of our research project that you **complete the entire survey**, once you have started. This survey should take (on average) about 10 minutes to complete.

Notes: Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your name will never be recorded. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. If you have any question about this study, you may contact us at socialsciencestudies@gmail.com

## Figure OA4: Treatment animation - introduction

Recent academic research has been exploring the link between one's family background and one's chances of making it in life. These **recent academic studies** have leveraged new large-scale datasets to explore the opportunities available to children from different family backgrounds and their chances of making it in life.

We will now show you **two short animations** that summarize the two key findings of these studies. Please proceed to the next page when you are ready.

FIGURE OA5: TREATMENT ANIMATION

(a) First screen

Children from poor families

Children from wealthy families

What does recent research tell us about how children from poor families will do when they grow up?

Children from poor families

Children from wealthy families

The Poor

The chances of a poor kid staying poor as an adult are extremely large.

Only very few kids from poor families will ever make it and become rich.

The Poor

The Wealthy

REPLAY

(b) Second screen

Children from poor families

Children from wealthy families

What does recent research tell us about how children from rich families will do when they grow up?

Children from poor families

Children from wealthy families

The Wealthy

Children born in rich families are extremely likely to remain rich themselves when they grow up, like their parents.

It is extremely rare for a child from a rich family to become poor later in life.

The Poor

The Wealthy

OA.5   Additional Tables and Figures

TABLE OA5: DETAILED PERCEIVED TRANSITION PROBABILITIES

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q2 (2)	Q1 to Q3 (3)	Q1 to Q4 (4)	Q1 to Q5 (5)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (6)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (7)	Obs. (8)
All Countries								
All	34.04	22.64	21.82	11.21	10.29	0.43	0.31	6,880
Left	37.55	23.00	20.27	10.06	9.12	0.35	0.23	2,276
Right	32.25	22.67	22.91	11.70	10.47	0.46	0.32	2,206
US								
All	32.16	21.83	22.32	11.98	11.72	0.46	0.34	2,170
Left	37.37	21.67	19.33	11.10	10.53	0.35	0.25	577
Right	29.45	21.96	24.14	12.49	11.96	0.53	0.38	652
UK								
All	37.77	22.25	19.39	10.62	9.97	0.37	0.27	1,290
Left	42.88	23.20	16.85	8.63	8.44	0.23	0.14	406
Right	36.20	22.00	19.71	11.52	10.57	0.41	0.26	304
France								
All	35.26	23.60	21.51	10.53	9.10	0.42	0.29	1,297
Left	38.36	23.07	20.48	9.56	8.54	0.40	0.26	451
Right	32.70	23.76	22.59	11.47	9.47	0.46	0.31	501
Italy								
All	33.61	23.13	21.87	11.25	10.14	0.40	0.29	1,242
Left	34.77	23.54	21.80	10.51	9.38	0.34	0.25	554
Right	33.55	22.85	22.13	11.18	10.29	0.41	0.31	402
Sweden								
All	32.00	23.10	24.52	11.16	9.21	0.47	0.33	881
Left	34.51	24.22	23.66	9.95	7.66	0.43	0.27	288
Right	31.88	22.79	24.79	11.31	9.24	0.45	0.29	347

Notes: The table reports mobility perceptions. Respondents are split according to their self-reported political affiliation. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from "Very liberal (1)" to "Very conservative (5)." "All" refers to the average across all respondents. Left-wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Right-wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." Column j for $j = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ shows the perceived probability of a child from from the bottom quintile to move to quintile j. Columns 6 (respectively, 7) shows the proportion of respondents who believe that the chance of moving from the first to the fourth (respectively, to the fifth) quintile is "fairly low," "fairly high," or "high." Column 8 reports the number of observations for each row.

TABLE OA6: THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF EFFORT

	Panel A: Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional on Effort					Panel B: % Difference Between Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional and Unconditional on Effort				
	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)
Q1 to Q5	12.47	12.54	11.39	10.86	12.57	0.06	0.26	0.25	0.07	0.36
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Q1 to Q4	14.83	15.20	15.03	14.22	17.96	0.24	0.43	0.43	0.26	0.61
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Q1 to Q3	29.33	26.38	29.39	27.61	31.82	0.31	0.36	0.37	0.26	0.30
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Q1 to Q2	21.14	22.09	20.91	22.53	19.72	-0.03	-0.01	-0.11	-0.03	-0.15
						(0.01)	(0.58)	(0.00)	(0.27)	(0.00)
Q1 to Q1	22.23	23.79	23.28	24.78	17.93	-0.31	-0.37	-0.34	-0.26	-0.44
						(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Obs.	1,735	900	908	872	656	1,735	900	908	872	656

Notes: The five rows of Panel A of the table report the average perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult if that child "works very hard," i.e., based on our survey question that asks respondents to think conditional on individual hard work. The five rows of Panel B of the table report the percent change in the perceived probability of a child born in a family from the bottom quintile to be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult conditional on effort relative to the unconditional case. P-values in parentheses.

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)
Male	2.090***	-1.034	-0.026*	-0.048***
	(0.741)	(0.669)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Young	1.858**	-0.387	0.073***	0.095***
	(0.769)	(0.693)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Has Children	-2.328***	1.749**	0.027*	0.049***
	(0.776)	(0.700)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Rich	1.694*	-0.661	-0.013	-0.032*
	(0.966)	(0.871)	(0.020)	(0.018)
College	4.843***	-4.444***	-0.034**	-0.058***
	(0.780)	(0.704)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Right	-2.468***	0.960	0.080***	0.041***
	(0.789)	(0.711)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Moved up	-1.890**	0.861	0.021	0.011
	(0.767)	(0.692)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Immigrant	-1.819*	1.249	0.044**	0.049**
	(1.028)	(0.927)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Obs.	4,290	4,290	4,290	4,290
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	34.17	20.97	0.38	0.27

Notes: The dependent variable in column 1 (respectively, column 2) is the perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the bottom quintile (respectively, in the fourth or fifth quintile) when adult. The dependent variables in columns 3 and 4 are defined as in Table OA5. Regressors are indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, right-wing political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. "Mean Dep. Var" is the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1,$$^{**}p < 0.05,$$^{***}p < 0.01$

TABLE OA8: THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF TALENT

	Panel A: Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional on Talent					Panel B: % Difference Between Perceived Transition Probabilities Conditional and Unconditional on Talent				
	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)	US (1)	UK (2)	France (3)	Italy (4)	Sweden (5)
Q1 to Q5	14.03	9.59	11.83	12.25	10.70	0.20 (0.00)	-0.04 (0.09)	0.30 (0.00)	0.21 (0.05)	0.16 (0.31)
Q1 to Q4	14.59	13.37	15.06	13.77	14.49	0.22 (0.00)	0.26 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.22 (0.00)	0.30 (0.00)
Q1 to Q3	26.96	26.84	30.83	27.82	32.02	0.21 (0.00)	0.38 (0.00)	0.43 (0.00)	0.27 (0.00)	0.31 (0.00)
Q1 to Q2	21.08	22.74	20.58	22.91	21.58	-0.03 (0.96)	0.02 (0.35)	-0.13 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.61)	-0.07 (0.14)
Q1 to Q1	23.34	27.45	21.70	23.25	21.22	-0.27 (0.00)	-0.27 (0.00)	-0.38 (0.00)	-0.31 (0.00)	-0.34 (0.00)
Obs.	435	390	389	370	225	435	390	389	370	225

Notes: The five rows of Panel A of the table report the average perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult if that child is very talented, i.e., based on our survey question that asks respondents to think conditional on individual talent. The five rows of Panel B of the table report the percent change in the perceived probability of a child born in a family from the bottom quintile to be in quintile 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, when adult conditional on talent relative to the unconditional case. P-values in parentheses.

TABLE OA9: HETEROGENEITY IN PERCEPTIONS CONDITIONAL ON EFFORT: PARTIAL EFFECTS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)	Diff Q1 to Q1 (5)	Diff Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (6)
Male	1.800**	-1.215	-0.023	-0.037*	0.894	-0.661
	(0.863)	(0.861)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.805)	(0.692)
Young	1.999**	2.358***	0.060***	0.098***	1.608*	1.716**
	(0.890)	(0.888)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.830)	(0.714)
Has Children	-0.307	0.610	0.031	0.074***	1.790**	-0.972
	(0.899)	(0.896)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.838)	(0.721)
Rich	1.344	0.532	-0.005	-0.023	-0.358	0.660
	(1.127)	(1.124)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(1.051)	(0.904)
College	-0.816	-2.584***	-0.015	-0.076***	-5.422***	2.146***
	(0.905)	(0.903)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.844)	(0.726)
Right	-3.496***	2.785***	0.057***	0.069***	-0.625	1.981***
	(0.913)	(0.911)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.852)	(0.733)
Moved up	-1.601*	1.188	0.023	0.014	0.779	-0.382
	(0.890)	(0.888)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.830)	(0.714)
Immigrant	-0.918	0.684	0.028	0.066**	1.146	-0.138
	(1.197)	(1.193)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(1.116)	(0.960)
Obs.	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543	2,543
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	23.48	25.19	0.66	0.51	-10.24	3.83

Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are defined as in Table OA7 but conditional on effort. The dependent variable in column 5 (respectively, 6) is the difference between the perceived probability conditional on effort and the unconditional probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the bottom quintile (respectively, in the fourth or fifth quintile) when adult. Regressors are defined as in Table OA7. "Mean Dep. Var" is the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.1,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)	Diff Q1 to Q1 (5)	Diff Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (6)
Male	2.793***	-2.440**	-0.030	-0.068***	-1.081	-0.622
	(1.039)	(1.015)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.946)	(0.862)
Young	3.253***	-0.576	0.044*	0.056**	-0.758	1.372
	(1.085)	(1.060)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.988)	(0.900)
Has Children	-1.741	1.106	0.031	0.019	0.932	-0.708
	(1.103)	(1.078)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(1.005)	(0.916)
Rich	0.441	-1.797	0.027	0.032	-1.120	-0.531
	(1.349)	(1.318)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(1.228)	(1.119)
College	2.560**	-3.169***	-0.027	-0.087***	-2.501**	0.903
	(1.103)	(1.078)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(1.004)	(0.915)
Right	-2.957***	3.483***	0.072***	0.085***	-1.144	2.262**
	(1.112)	(1.086)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(1.012)	(0.922)
Moved up	-1.174	-0.363	-0.011	0.001	-0.163	-0.126
	(1.080)	(1.055)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.983)	(0.896)
Immigrant	-2.703*	3.571**	0.069**	0.075**	-1.282	1.859
	(1.443)	(1.410)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(1.313)	(1.197)
Obs.	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747	1,747
Country-wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	23.53	26.18	0.66	0.52	-11.31	5.78

Notes: Notes: The dependent variables in columns 1-4 are defined as in Table OA7 but conditional on talent. The dependent variable in column 5 (respectively, 6) is the difference between the perceived probability conditional on talent and the unconditional probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in the bottom quintile (respectively, in the fourth or fifth quintile) when adult. Regressors are defined as in Table OA7. "Mean Dep. Var" is the mean of the dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.1,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

TABLE OA11: COMMUTING ZONE CHARACTERISTICS AND MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: PARTIAL EFFECTS

	Q1 to Q1 (1)	Q1 to Q4 or Q5 (2)	Q1 to Q4 (Qual.) (3)	Q1 to Q5 (Qual.) (4)
Racial Segregation	-0.075**	0.035	0.089**	0.080**
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Income Segregation	0.076**	-0.046	-0.068*	-0.077*
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Social Capital Index	0.050	-0.060*	-0.092***	-0.075**
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.037)
Gini	-0.025	0.052	-0.041	0.038
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Manufacturing Share	-0.010	0.039	-0.034	-0.001
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)
College Grad Rate	-0.006	-0.011	-0.007	0.014
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Obs.	1,635	1,635	1,635	1,635

Notes: "Racial Segregation" is a Multi-group Theil Index calculated at the census-tract level over four groups (White alone, Black alone, Hispanic, and Other) and aggregated at the commuting zone level, "Income Segregation" is measured by a weighted average of two-group Theil indices, as in Reardon (2011), at the commuting zone level, "Social Capital Index" is the social capital index from Rupasingha and Goetz (2008) at the commuting zone-level, "Gini" is the commuting zone-level Gini coefficient, "Manufacturing Share" is the share of employed persons 16 and older working in manufacturing from the 2000 census at the commuting zone-level, "College Grad Rate" is the residual from a regression of graduation rate (the share of undergraduate students that complete their degree in 150% of normal time) on household income per capita in 2000, aggregated at the commuting zone level. The regressors are from Chetty et al. (2014). Please refer to Chetty et al. (2014) for a detailed explanation of the construction of the commuting zone-level regressors. All regressions control for survey wave fixed effects and include all covariates in Table OA7. The dependent variables are defined as in Table OA7. All variables normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the estimation sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the commuting zone level. $^{*}p < 0.1,^{**} p < 0.05,^{***} p < 0.01$

TABLE OA12: MINORITIES, IMMIGRANTS, AND REDISTRIBUTIVE PREFERENCES

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
Racial Segregation × Right	-0.091**	0.037	-0.020	0.015	0.026	-0.015	-0.010	0.247**	0.097
	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.056)	(0.036)	(0.050)	(0.084)	(0.114)	(0.062)
Frac. Black × Right	0.130***	0.064	-0.005	0.073	0.027	0.082*	0.045	-0.034	-0.105**
	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.053)
Frac. Foreign Born × Right	0.039	-0.004	0.037	0.009	-0.074**	0.073*	0.027	-0.026	0.058
	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.047)
Racial Segregation × Left	0.055	-0.005	0.132***	0.053	0.077	0.120*	0.000	0.050	0.044
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.093)	(0.061)	(0.045)
Frac. Black × Left	-0.065	0.022	-0.057	0.013	-0.030	-0.025	-0.073	0.084	-0.014
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.113)	(0.069)	(0.052)
Frac. Foreign Born × Left	-0.073*	-0.060	-0.093**	-0.035	-0.115*	-0.026	0.010	0.020	-0.018
	(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.073)	(0.056)	(0.046)
Obs.	1655	1655	1655	1655	1655	1655	811	811	1655

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on commuting zone characteristics interacted with dummies for political affiliation. Interaction of commuting zone characteristics and "Moderate" is not reported. "Racial Segregation" is a Multi-group Theil Index calculated at the census-tract level over four groups (White alone, Black alone, Hispanic, and Other) and aggregated at the commuting zone level, "Frac. Black" is defined as the number of people in a commuting zone who are black divided by the commuting zone population, "Frac. Foreign Born" is the number of foreign born inhabitants divided by total commuting zone population. The regressors are from Chetty et al. (2014). Please refer to Chetty et al. (2014) for a detailed explanation of the construction of the commuting zone-level regressors. All regressions control for survey wave fixed effects and include all covariates in Table 3. The dependent variables are defined as in Table 3. Commuting zone-level variables are normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in the estimation sample. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the commuting zone level. $^{*}p < 0.1,$ $^{**}p < 0.05,$ $^{***}p < 0.01$

TABLE OA13: PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

	Trust Govt. (1)	Govt. Tools (2)	Government Intervention (3)	Lowering Taxes Better (4)	Unequal Opp. Problem (5)	Negative View of Government (6)	Obs. (7)
All Countries							
All	0.19	0.72	5.32	0.36	0.87	0.63	4,448
Left	0.21	0.79	5.79	0.20	0.94	0.49	1,442
Right	0.19	0.64	4.81	0.57	0.81	0.80	1,422
US							
All	0.23	0.75	4.95	0.32	0.83	0.59	1,731
Left	0.30	0.85	5.61	0.14	0.92	0.39	464
Right	0.17	0.63	4.10	0.56	0.74	0.78	517
UK							
All	0.17	0.82	5.50	0.24	0.85	0.50	759
Left	0.09	0.89	5.91	0.11	0.93	0.40	257
Right	0.37	0.75	5.02	0.44	0.75	0.65	167
France							
All	0.06	0.48	5.42	0.51	0.89	0.85	769
Left	0.08	0.53	5.61	0.32	0.94	0.75	249
Right	0.06	0.48	5.22	0.66	0.84	0.91	307
Italy							
All	0.08	0.73	5.92	0.44	0.94	0.71	735
Left	0.10	0.76	6.00	0.33	0.96	0.60	335
Right	0.05	0.69	5.76	0.61	0.92	0.84	238
Sweden							
All	0.50	0.81	5.28	0.29	0.91	0.53	454
Left	0.59	0.90	5.96	0.07	0.99	0.23	137
Right	0.46	0.78	4.70	0.53	0.84	0.74	193

Notes: The table reports respondents' views on the government. *Trust Govt.* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that she can trust the government to do what is right "Most of the time" or "Always", *Govt. Tools* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent answers that to reduce the inequality of opportunities between children born in poor and rich families the government has the ability and the tools to do "Some" or "A lot", *Government Intervention* is the respondent's support, on a scale from 1 to 7, for government intervention to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal, *Lowering Taxes Better* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that "lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth" would do more to make the opportunities for children from poor and rich families less unequal than "raising taxes on wealthy people and corporations to expand programs for the poor", *Unequal Opp. Problem* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that if children from poor and rich backgrounds have unequal opportunities in life this is "A problem" or "A serious problem" or "A very serious problem", *Negative View of Government* is defined as in Figure 7 of the paper. Political affiliations "Left" and "Right" are defined as in Table OA5.

Table OA14: Views on Taxes and Public Spending

	Tax Rate Top 1 (1)	Tax Rate Next 9 (2)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (3)	Share Taxes Top 1 (4)	Share Taxes Bottom 50 (5)	Support Estate Tax (6)	Budget Opportunities (7)	Budget Safety Net (8)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (9)	Obs. 1-5 (10)	Obs. 6-9 (11)
All Countries											
All	37.58	25.75	10.09	0.23	0.11	0.30	37.29	13.93	3.74	3,564	4,447
Left	40.49	27.13	8.83	0.24	0.10	0.41	39.17	15.17	4.10	1,193	1,442
Right	36.11	26.07	11.96	0.21	0.13	0.18	35.74	12.75	3.41	1,163	1,422
US											
All	25.22	14.78	7.86	0.35	0.07	0.35	32.73	13.51	3.61	851	1,731
Left	28.10	15.19	5.96	0.39	0.05	0.51	35.22	15.03	4.08	216	464
Right	22.49	14.52	10.05	0.31	0.08	0.20	29.08	11.86	3.09	261	517
UK											
All	37.15	23.06	6.50	0.28	0.10	0.32	41.30	13.36	3.90	758	758
Left	39.97	23.21	5.67	0.31	0.08	0.44	42.12	14.45	4.20	256	257
Right	34.65	22.89	6.89	0.26	0.10	0.26	41.52	12.19	3.67	167	167
France											
All	43.71	29.41	8.51	0.18	0.12	0.22	38.59	13.37	3.66	769	769
Left	47.07	30.98	6.92	0.19	0.09	0.31	39.95	14.81	3.97	249	249
Right	42.70	28.60	9.59	0.17	0.13	0.18	37.09	12.31	3.42	307	307
Italy											
All	37.75	26.35	10.37	0.19	0.14	0.23	38.99	15.70	3.96	732	735
Left	38.66	27.66	9.04	0.19	0.12	0.31	40.15	15.55	4.11	335	335
Right	34.74	25.26	11.44	0.17	0.15	0.14	38.33	15.37	3.84	235	238
Sweden											
All	50.81	43.61	22.50	0.11	0.17	0.28	43.03	14.52	3.76	454	454
Left	53.49	44.99	22.23	0.11	0.17	0.49	43.26	16.67	4.19	137	137
Right	46.99	41.39	23.32	0.10	0.17	0.16	43.25	13.07	3.53	193	193

Notes: The table reports respondents' views on taxes and public spending. Political affiliations "Left" and "Right" are defined as in Table OA5. *Tax Rate Top 1*, *Tax Rate Next 9*, *Tax Rate Bottom 50* are the respondent's chosen income tax rates for the Top 1% of the income distribution, the next 9%, and the bottom 50%, respectively. *Share Taxes Top 1* and *Share Taxes Bottom 50* convert the tax rates chosen by respondents into shares of tax revenue paid by each group. *Support Estate Tax* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent is in favor of the estate tax (defined as answering 4 or 5 on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "do not support at all" and 5 means "strongly support"). *Budget Opportunities* and *Budget Safety net* are the share of the budget the respondent believes should be allocated to education and health, and to safety net policies, respectively. *Support Equality Opp. Policies* is the respondent's support, on a scale from 1 to 5, for policies to improve equality of opportunity. Columns 10 and 11 report the number of observations for each row, for the outcomes in columns 1-5 and 6-9, respectively.

TABLE OA15: VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT AND POLICY PREFERENCES, LEFT VERSUS RIGHT

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Budget Safety Net (5)	Tax Rate Top 1 (6)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (7)
Lowering taxes better × Left-Wing	-1.907***	-0.198***	-0.607***	-0.399***	-0.987**	-7.202***	3.550***
	(0.703)	(0.030)	(0.065)	(0.090)	(0.482)	(1.183)	(0.676)
Govt. Tools × Left-Wing	0.347	-0.002	0.430***	0.810***	0.752	2.107*	-1.528**
	(0.691)	(0.029)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.474)	(1.162)	(0.664)
Trust Govt. × Left-Wing	0.912	0.058*	0.004	-0.032	-0.086	-1.418	0.704
	(0.700)	(0.030)	(0.065)	(0.089)	(0.480)	(1.249)	(0.714)
Lowering taxes better × Right-Wing	-0.642	-0.130***	-0.517***	-0.623***	-2.170***	-7.614***	1.171**
	(0.569)	(0.024)	(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.390)	(0.982)	(0.562)
Govt. Tools × Right-Wing	3.034***	0.055**	0.580***	1.075***	1.074***	0.798	-0.179
	(0.598)	(0.025)	(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.410)	(1.032)	(0.590)
Trust Govt. × Right-Wing	1.339*	0.073**	0.010	0.022	0.230	-1.686	1.800**
	(0.741)	(0.032)	(0.069)	(0.094)	(0.508)	(1.285)	(0.735)
Observations	4284	4283	4284	4284	4284	3436	3436

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on respondents' views of government interacted with dummies for the respondent's self-reported political affiliation. "Left-Wing" and "Right-Wing" respondents are defined as in Table OA5. The coefficients on the interactions between views of government and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has "Moderate" views on economic issue are not reported in the table. *Lowering Taxes Better* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent thinks that "lowering taxes on wealthy people and corporations to encourage more investment in economic growth" is better than "raising taxes [...] to expand programs for the poor" to improve mobility. *Govt. Tools* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent thinks that the government has the ability and the tools to do "some" or "a lot" to improve mobility. *Trust Govt.* is a dummy equal to one if the respondent says that the government can be trusted to do what is right "most of the time" or "always". The dependent variables are defined as in Table 3 of the paper. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3 of the paper. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.1,$ $^{**}p < 0.05,$ $^{***}p < 0.01$

TABLE OA16: CORRELATION BETWEEN VIEWS OF GOVERNMENT, POLICY PREFERENCES, AND PESSIMISM

	Government Cannot Do Much	Unequal Opp. Not Serious Problem	Lowering Taxes Better	Low Spending Opp.	Optimistic
Government Cannot Do Much	-	-	-	-	-
Unequal Opp. Not Serious Problem	0.207 (0.013)***	-	-	-	-
Lowering Taxes Better	0.156 (0.014)***	0.25 (0.015)***	-	-	-
Low Spending Opp.	0.146 (0.015)***	0.139 (0.017)***	0.093 (0.016)***	-	-
Optimistic	0.029 (0.015)**	0.123 (0.017)***	0.093 (0.016)***	0.071 (0.015)***	-

Notes: Each coefficient in the table refers to a regression of the variable in the column on the variable in the row and a constant, controlling for country and survey fixed effects. The number of observations is 4,440 for all regressions. *Government Cannot Do Much* is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent says that the government cannot do much or can do nothing to equalize opportunities. *Unequal Opp. Not Serious Problem* is a binary variable equal to one if unequal opportunities are not perceived to be a serious problem. *Lowering Taxes Better* is defined as in Table OA15. *Low Spending Opp.* is a binary variable equal to one if the share of budget allocated by the respondent to education and health policies is below the 20th percentile in the variable distribution. *Optimistic* is a binary variable equal to one if the respondent believes that the chances of moving from the bottom to the top quintile are neither "close to zero" nor "low". Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

TABLE OA17: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: US

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
A. Unconditional Beliefs									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.036*	0.000	0.004**	0.001	0.002***	0.045***	0.018	-0.035	0.000
	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	-0.004	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.005	0.021	-0.044	-0.001
	(0.023)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.177	0.183	0.154	0.727	0.406	0.030	0.948	0.824	0.422
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.069**	-0.001	-0.003	0.001	-0.003**	-0.055***	0.086*	0.020	-0.001
	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.045)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.060*	0.003**	0.002	0.006	0.000	0.002	0.044	-0.004	0.002
	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.006	0.065	0.313	0.436	0.099	0.047	0.551	0.699	0.105
Observations	1656	1656	1656	1656	1656	1656	812	812	1656
B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.046*	0.001	0.005*	0.008**	0.003***	0.048***	0.009	-0.018	-0.001
	(0.025)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.075**	0.001	0.009***	0.005	0.001	0.041**	-0.018	0.085**	-0.000
	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.453	0.661	0.288	0.635	0.436	0.768	0.634	0.038	0.882
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.076**	-0.003**	-0.008**	-0.008	-0.003**	-0.039	0.048	0.014	-0.000
	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.004	0.000	-0.012***	-0.003	-0.001	-0.005	0.046	0.115**	0.000
	(0.039)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.025)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.141	0.096	0.513	0.527	0.251	0.327	0.977	0.115	0.802
Observations	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	1242	812	812	1242

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent's self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.S.. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from "Very liberal (1)" to "Very conservative (5)." Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has "Moderate" views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in Appendix OA.2. "p-value diff" is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country, and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.1$,** $p < 0.05$,*** $p < 0.01$

TABLE OA18: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: UK

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
A. Unconditional Beliefs									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.041*	0.003***	0.006***	0.011***	0.003***	-0.021	0.078**	-0.032**	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.038)	(0.015)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.020	-0.001	-0.005*	-0.007*	-0.000	0.003	0.017	-0.026	-0.003***
	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.022)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.573	0.010	0.002	0.000	0.026	0.397	0.309	0.818	0.005
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.059	-0.002	-0.009**	-0.009*	-0.003*	0.067**	-0.009	0.053**	-0.002
	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.024)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.043	0.000	0.004	0.007	0.003	-0.019	-0.040	0.007	0.004*
	(0.049)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.038)	(0.079)	(0.031)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.099	0.425	0.029	0.064	0.036	0.070	0.759	0.231	0.020
Observations	729	728	729	729	729	729	728	728	729
B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.035	0.004*	0.004	0.009*	0.005***	0.022	-0.027	0.006	0.002
	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.061)	(0.024)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	-0.020	0.003	-0.003	-0.001	-0.000	0.065	0.072	0.002	-0.006**
	(0.061)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.103)	(0.040)	(0.003)
p-value diff.	0.830	0.940	0.256	0.309	0.091	0.476	0.406	0.940	0.011
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	0.015	-0.004	-0.015***	-0.015*	-0.003	0.052	0.011	0.049	-0.004*
	(0.057)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.048)	(0.098)	(0.038)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	0.093	0.002	0.003	-0.000	0.002	-0.080	-0.084	0.065	0.005
	(0.070)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.059)	(0.120)	(0.046)	(0.003)
p-value diff.	0.384	0.146	0.045	0.227	0.198	0.080	0.535	0.794	0.019
Observations	352	351	352	352	352	352	352	352	352

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent's self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.K.. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from "Very liberal (1)" to "Very conservative (5)." Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has "Moderate" views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in Appendix OA.2. "p-value diff" is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.1, ^{**}p < 0.05, ^{***}p < 0.01$

TABLE OA19: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: FRANCE

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
A. Unconditional Beliefs									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.009	-0.001	0.006**	0.001	0.001	0.015	0.097*	-0.043**	-0.001
	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.050)	(0.021)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	-0.008	0.000	0.007***	0.007**	0.002*	0.020	0.049	-0.023	0.000
	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.046)	(0.019)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.973	0.575	0.630	0.243	0.388	0.827	0.477	0.497	0.576
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.053	-0.005**	-0.003	-0.007	0.001	-0.038	-0.127	0.112***	0.005*
	(0.048)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.092)	(0.038)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.082*	-0.000	-0.007	0.004	0.001	-0.041	-0.001	0.039	-0.001
	(0.042)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.081)	(0.034)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.644	0.099	0.510	0.199	0.849	0.934	0.302	0.152	0.076
Observations	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739	739
B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.057	-0.001	0.002	-0.010**	0.002	0.012	0.175**	-0.009	-0.003
	(0.036)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.029)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.022	0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.026	0.111	-0.009	-0.001
	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.025)	(0.073)	(0.031)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.130	0.490	0.657	0.074	0.930	0.699	0.529	0.992	0.704
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.139*	0.001	-0.004	-0.010	-0.001	0.016	-0.349**	0.098	-0.001
	(0.082)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.056)	(0.162)	(0.066)	(0.004)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.023	0.001	-0.009	0.004	-0.000	-0.059	-0.142	0.047	-0.001
	(0.066)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.045)	(0.130)	(0.053)	(0.003)
p-value diff.	0.268	0.902	0.651	0.346	0.812	0.290	0.319	0.545	0.987
Observations	366	366	366	366	366	366	366	366	366

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent's self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from France. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from "Very liberal (1)" to "Very conservative (5)." Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has "Moderate" views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in Appendix OA.2. "p-value diff" is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.1, ^{**} p < 0.05, ^{***} p < 0.01$

TABLE OA20: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: ITALY

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
A. Unconditional Beliefs									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.027	0.002**	0.006***	0.004	0.003**	0.016	0.095**	-0.049**	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.021)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.050*	0.001	0.007***	0.013***	0.001	-0.038	0.102*	-0.048	0.000
	(0.029)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.025)	(0.053)	(0.030)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.533	0.350	0.646	0.042	0.364	0.096	0.926	0.975	0.662
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.113***	-0.001	-0.010***	-0.006	-0.004**	-0.004	-0.172**	0.101**	-0.003
	(0.040)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.073)	(0.040)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.045	0.001	-0.008**	-0.007	0.002	0.040	-0.027	0.072	-0.001
	(0.045)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.039)	(0.083)	(0.046)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.261	0.376	0.752	0.840	0.054	0.392	0.191	0.639	0.398
Observations	721	721	721	721	721	721	718	718	721
B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.012	0.001	0.003	0.005	0.002	0.024	0.128*	-0.028	-0.000
	(0.038)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.065)	(0.035)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.008	0.000	0.007	0.010	0.003	0.022	0.123	-0.044	0.001
	(0.047)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.040)	(0.082)	(0.044)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.937	0.587	0.581	0.602	0.727	0.961	0.969	0.777	0.717
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.117	0.000	-0.018**	-0.016	-0.005	-0.005	-0.426***	0.268***	-0.003
	(0.075)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.063)	(0.130)	(0.069)	(0.003)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.181**	-0.001	-0.010	-0.002	0.005	-0.112*	-0.166	0.055	0.001
	(0.072)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.061)	(0.125)	(0.066)	(0.003)
p-value diff.	0.541	0.740	0.419	0.305	0.039	0.223	0.151	0.026	0.446
Observations	358	358	358	358	358	358	357	357	358

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent's self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from Italy. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from "Very liberal (1)" to "Very conservative (5)." Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has "Moderate" views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in Appendix OA.2. "p-value diff" is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

TABLE OA21: REGRESSING POLICY PREFERENCES ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: SWEDEN

	Budget Opp. (1)	Support Estate Tax (2)	Support Equality Opp. Policies (3)	Government Interv. (4)	Unequal Opp. Very Serious Problem (5)	Budget Safety Net (6)	Tax Rate Top 1 (7)	Tax Rate Bottom 50 (8)	Govt. Tools (9)
A. Unconditional Beliefs									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	0.022	0.001	0.005	0.000	0.003**	0.003	-0.002	-0.047	0.000
	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.042)	(0.001)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.048	-0.001	0.003	-0.001	0.001	0.008	-0.029	-0.004	0.000
	(0.030)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.053)	(0.034)	(0.001)
p-value diff.	0.591	0.394	0.615	0.810	0.180	0.882	0.747	0.430	0.834
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.131**	0.005**	-0.005	-0.001	-0.004*	-0.001	-0.023	-0.024	-0.003
	(0.056)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.037)	(0.100)	(0.064)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.085*	0.000	-0.003	0.004	-0.001	0.000	0.024	0.067	-0.002
	(0.051)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.033)	(0.091)	(0.059)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.548	0.118	0.719	0.651	0.241	0.972	0.730	0.294	0.571
Observations	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
B. Beliefs Conditional On Effort									
Q1 to Q1 × Left-Wing	-0.044	0.002	0.001	-0.013*	-0.000	0.044	-0.119	0.128**	-0.002
	(0.057)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.034)	(0.103)	(0.059)	(0.002)
Q1 to Q1 × Right-Wing	0.041	-0.001	0.001	0.003	-0.000	-0.048	-0.094	-0.057	-0.004**
	(0.054)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.097)	(0.056)	(0.002)
p-value diff.	0.287	0.275	0.988	0.086	0.968	0.052	0.859	0.026	0.549
Q1 to Q5 × Left-Wing	-0.029	-0.007	-0.015	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.136	-0.003	0.004
	(0.141)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.084)	(0.254)	(0.147)	(0.005)
Q1 to Q5 × Right-Wing	-0.134	-0.002	0.007	0.012	0.001	0.029	0.196	0.002	0.008**
	(0.087)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.157)	(0.091)	(0.003)
p-value diff.	0.525	0.413	0.079	0.497	0.688	0.786	0.263	0.976	0.589
Observations	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225	225

Notes: The table reports estimates of regressions of the variable in the column on mobility perception interacted with dummies for the respondent's self-reported political affiliation. The sample is composed of respondents from Sweden. Political views are assessed on a five point scale, ranging from "Very liberal (1)" to "Very conservative (5)." Left-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Right-Wing respondents have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." The coefficient on the interaction between the mobility perception and a dummy equal to one if the respondent has "Moderate" views on economic issue is not reported in the table. Outcome variables are defined in Appendix OA.2. "p-value diff" is the p-value of a test of equality of the effects on left- and right-wing respondents. Panel A studies the effect of unconditional probabilities, while panel B studies perceptions when respondents are asked to think conditional on individual hard work. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having a job with a status higher than father, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1,^{**}p < 0.05,^{***}p < 0.01$

	First Survey All Respondents (1)	First Survey Who Took Follow Up (2)	Follow up Respondents (3)
Q1 to Q1			
Treated	8.532***	9.544**	7.841**
	(1.806)	(3.691)	(3.625)
Q1 to Q2			
Treated	-1.386	-0.264	-1.340
	(0.854)	(1.883)	(2.014)
Q1 to Q3			
Treated	-4.404***	-5.666***	-6.252***
	(0.863)	(1.946)	(2.015)
Q1 to Q4			
Treated	-2.348***	-2.679**	-1.790
	(0.635)	(1.214)	(1.331)
Q1 to Q5			
Treated	-0.394	-0.936	1.541
	(1.058)	(2.506)	(1.951)
Q1 to Q4 (Qual.)			
Treated	-0.197***	-0.210*	-0.315**
	(0.058)	(0.125)	(0.131)
Q1 to Q5 (Qual.)			
Treated	-0.169**	-0.217	-0.233*
	(0.066)	(0.136)	(0.135)
Obs.	916	214	214

Notes: The coefficients and standard error in row j refer to a regression of the variable listed in row j on a dummy for being in the treatment group. Column 1 shows the first round effects on the full sample of respondents in the first round, while column 2 limits the sample to respondents who also took the follow up survey. Column 3 shows the second round effects. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3 of the paper. All dependent variables are defined as in Table 4 of the paper. The samples in all columns include only respondents who have views on economic issues that are "Liberal" or "Very liberal." Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1,^{**} p < 0.05,^{***} p < 0.01$

TABLE OA23: PERSISTENCE OF TREATMENT EFFECTS ON MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS –
RIGHT-WING RESPONDENTS

	First Survey All Respondents (1)	First Survey Who Took Follow Up (2)	Follow up Respondents (3)
Q1 to Q1			
Treated	9.763***	7.650**	5.015*
	(1.555)	(2.990)	(2.838)
Q1 to Q2			
Treated	-1.544**	-2.705*	-0.291
	(0.765)	(1.474)	(1.658)
Q1 to Q3			
Treated	-6.581***	-6.901***	-3.038*
	(0.932)	(1.884)	(1.769)
Q1 to Q4			
Treated	-1.932***	0.179	-1.851
	(0.597)	(1.170)	(1.188)
Q1 to Q5			
Treated	0.294	1.778	0.165
	(1.016)	(1.847)	(1.699)
Q1 to Q4 (Qual.)			
Treated	-0.309***	-0.149	-0.029
	(0.056)	(0.107)	(0.110)
Q1 to Q5 (Qual.)			
Treated	-0.313***	-0.060	0.042
	(0.062)	(0.128)	(0.126)
Obs.	1033	264	264

Notes: The coefficients and standard error in row j refer to a regression of the variable listed in row j on a dummy for being in the treatment group. Column 1 shows the first round effects on the full sample of respondents in the first round, while column 2 limits the sample to respondents who also took the follow up survey. Column 3 shows the second round effects. All regressions include the same controls as Table 3 of the paper. All dependent variables are defined as in Table 4 of the paper. The samples in all columns include only respondents who have views on economic issues that are "Conservative" or "Very conservative." Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.1,$ $^{**}p < 0.05,$ $^{***}p < 0.01$

FIGURE OA6: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS CONDITIONAL ON EFFORT

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability *conditional on effort* of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See Appendix OA.2 for a definition of the groups.

## FIGURE OA7: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: U.S.

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile   **Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile**

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.S.. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See Appendix OA.2 for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA8: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: U.K.

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile **Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile**

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from the U.K.. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See Appendix OA.2 for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA9: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: FRANCE

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile

Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from France. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See Appendix OA.2 for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA10: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: ITALY

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile   **Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile**

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from Italy. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See Appendix OA.2 for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA11: HETEROGENEITY IN MOBILITY PERCEPTIONS: SWEDEN

Panel A: Probability of remaining in the bottom quintile   **Panel B: Probability of reaching the top quintile**

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability of a child from the bottom quintile remaining in the bottom quintile (Panel A) or moving to the top quintile (Panel B) for different groups of respondents. The sample is composed of respondents from Sweden. The shaded areas are 90% confidence intervals around the average response. See Appendix OA.2 for a definition of the groups.

FIGURE OA12: ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED TRANSITION PROBABILITIES ACROSS U.S. STATES

Perceived and actual Q1 to Q5: All states (Left panel) and Omitting South-Eastern States (Right Panel)


Perceived and actual Q1 to Q1 (Left panel) and Q1 to Q4 (Right panel)


Notes: The figure shows the average perceived probability in each state (y axis) against the actual probability in the state (x axis), together with the best-fit line and the coefficient and standard error of the slope. The dotted line is the 45 degree line. See the notes to Figure 6.

41

Panel A:

Panel B:

Notes: The figures shows the treatment effects for left-wing and right-wing respondents from Panel A of Table 6, together with 90% confidence intervals. See the notes to Table 6.

OA.6 (Mis)perceptions of inequality

We conducted an additional, small survey in the U.S. (484 respondents) to elicit respondents' perceptions of inequality. The survey had no treatment component, and asked the same questions on perceptions of mobility as our main surveys.

We asked questions about inequality in i) income, ii) capital income more specifically, and iii) wealth. For each of these three variables, we asked respondents about their perceived shares of the top 1%, the top 10%, and the bottom 50%. We also asked respondents about their perceived income tax rates for different groups of taxpayers. The additional questions are reported below.

New Questionnaire Questions:

1. What percent of total national income in the United States do you think goes to the top 1% richest households? (Please enter a number between 0 and 100 to indicate the percent (%)).

2. What percent of total national income do you think goes to the top 10% richest households?

3. Finally, what percent of total national income do you think goes to the bottom 50% (poorest) households?

4. Now think about total income coming from capital in the United States. This is income that comes for instance from interest on savings in your bank account or mutual fund, in the form of capital gains or dividends from holding stock in companies, or from investing in a business. Take the top 1% richest households by capital income (the 1% of households with the most capital income). What percent of total capital income in the United States do you think goes to these households? (Please enter a number between 0 and 100 to indicate the percent (%)).

5. What percent of total capital income do you think goes to the top 10% richest households?

6. Finally, what percent of total capital income do you think goes to the bottom 50% (poorest) households?

7. Now think about the total wealth in the United States.
   Take the top 1% wealthiest households (the 1% of households with the most wealth). What percent of total wealth in the United States do you think goes to these households? (Please enter a number between 0 and 100 to indicate the percent (%)).

8. What percent of total wealth do you think goes to the top 10% wealthiest households?

9. Finally, what percent of total wealth do you think goes to the bottom 50% (least wealthy) households?

10. Please use the sliders below to tell us how much you think each of the following groups currently pays in income tax as a percentage of their total income.

    - The top 1% (Richest)
    - The next 9% (Only 1% of households earn more, 90% earn less)
    - The next 40% (Only 10% earn more, 50% earn less)
    - The bottom 50% (Poorest)

TABLE OA24: CORRELATION BETWEEN PERCEPTIONS OF MOBILITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF INEQUALITY AND TAXES

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:	Perceived Share Income Top 1	Perceived Share Income Top 10	Perceived Share Capital Top 1	Perceived Share Capital Top 10	Perceived Share Wealth Top 1	Perceived Share Wealth Top 10	Perceived Average Tax Rate Top 1
Q1 to Q1	0.115 (0.054)	0.189 (0.054)	0.146 (0.056)	0.179 (0.056)	0.179 (0.055)	0.192 (0.056)	-0.103 (0.042)
Panel B:	Overestimate Share Income Top 1	Overestimate Share Income Top 10	Overestimate Share Capital Top 1	Overestimate Share Capital Top 10	Overestimate Share Wealth Top 1	Overestimate Share Wealth Top 10	Overestimate Average Tax Rate Top 1
Overestimate Q1 to Q1	0.062 (0.044)	0.160 (0.046)	0.173 (0.047)	0.157 (0.041)	0.139 (0.045)	0.051 (0.023)	-0.078 (0.047)
Panel C:	Overestimate Share Income Top 1	Overestimate Share Income Top 10	Overestimate Share Capital Top 1	Overestimate Share Capital Top 10	Overestimate Share Wealth Top 1	Overestimate Share Wealth Top 10	Overestimate Average Tax Rate Top 1
Overestimate Q1 to Q5	0.024 (0.043)	-0.127 (0.045)	-0.109 (0.046)	-0.157 (0.040)	-0.122 (0.044)	-0.037 (0.023)	0.093 (0.045)
Observations	484	484	484	484	484	484	484

Notes: Regression results from the variables in the columns on the variables in the rows. The dependent variables are: columns 1 and 2: the perceived share of national income of the top 1% and top 10%. Columns 3 and 4: the perceived share of capital income of the top 1% and top 10%. Columns 5 and 6: the perceived share of wealth of the top 1% and top 10%. Column 7: perceived average income tax rate for the top 1%. In Panel A the dependent variables are the perceived shares of income/capital/wealth going to the group or the perceived average tax rate. In Panel B and C the dependent variables are dummies equal to one if the perceived share (or perceived tax rate) is higher than reality. *Q1 to Q1* is the perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintile 1 when adult. *Overestimate Q1 to Q1* (respectively, *Overestimate Q1 to Q5*) is a dummy equal to one if the perceived probability that a child born to parents in the bottom quintile of the income distribution will be in quintile 1 (respectively, 5) when adult is higher than reality. Controls included in all regressions are: indicator variables for gender, age less than 45, having children, being in the top quartile of the income distribution, having a college degree, political affiliation, having at least one of the parents not born in the country. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$,$^{**}p < 0.05$,$^{***}p < 0.01$

FIGURE OA14: ACTUAL AND PERCEIVED INEQUALITY

A: Shares to the top 1%

B: Shares to the top 10%

C: Shares to the bottom 50%

Notes: The figure shows the average perceived share (y axis) of total income, capital income, and wealth going to the top 1% of households (Panel A), to the top 10% of households (Panel B) and to the bottom 50% of households (Panel C) against the actual shares (x axis). The dotted line is the 45 degree line. Data on actual shares of capital income is from Saez and Zucman (2015). Data on actual shares of national income and wealth is from the World Wealth and Income Database.

OA.7 Data Sources for Population Statistics

- U.S.: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey. Income brackets (annual gross household income) are: less than $20,000; $20,000-$40,000; $40,000-$70,000; more than $70,000.

- U.K.: data on gender, age, and income is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from the Office of National Statistics. Income brackets (monthly net household income) are: less than £1,500; £1,500-£2,500; £2,500-£3,000; more than £3,000.

- France: data on gender, age, and income is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from INSEE. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-2,500; 2,500-2,000; more than 3,000.

- Italy: data on gender and age is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on income is from the Bank of Italy. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from ISTAT. Income brackets (monthly net household income, in Euros) are: less than 1,500; 1,500-,2450; 2,450-3,350; more than 3,350.

- Sweden: data on gender, age, and income is from Eurostat Census Data. Data on share of married, native, employed, unemployed, and college educated individuals is from Statistics Sweden. Income brackets (monthly gross household income, in SEK) are: less than 33,000; 33,000-42,000; 42,000-58,000; more than 58,000.

OA.8 Information on construction of the French transition matrix

Our methodology is inspired by Piraino (2007). We perform a two-stage regression based on two samples: a sample of sons who reported their fathers' socioeconomic characteristics and a sample of adult men ("pseudo fathers") whose age was consistent with that of the actual fathers. Once the samples are selected, the steps required for this empirical strategy are:

1. estimate an income equation from the older sample;

2. use the estimated coefficients to predict fathers' incomes on the basis of sons' reports;

3. construct a transition matrix based on these results.

Sample selection:

- Sample of fathers: from the 1985 wave of the "Formation et Qualification professionnelle, INSEE" survey. They are men born between 1927 and 1947, who have at least one child and who have less than four older sister and brothers. We restrict the sample to individuals with positive income that are above half of the annual minimum wage and discard self-employed individuals because we do not have information on income from self-employment. The final sample has about 4500 fathers.

- Sample of sons: from the 2003 wave of the "Formation et Qualification professionnelle, INSEE survey. They are born between 1963 and 1973, with fathers born between 1927 and 1947. We therefore measure income of the pseudo fathers when sons are 12-22. We further restrict the

sample to those individuals who report a basic set of their father's demographic characteristics, have less than four older siblings, and, similarly to the fathers' sample, have positive income, are above half of the annual minimum wage and are not self-employed. The final sample has 1279 sons.

Variables to construct income of pseudo fathers: educational level, occupation category, year of birth, indicator for whether father lived in Paris.

References

Chetty, R., N. Hendren, P. Kline, and E. Saez (2014). Where is the land of opportunity? the geography of intergenerational mobility in the united states. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129*(4), 1553–1623.

Piraino, P. (2007). Comparable estimates of intergenerational income mobility in italy. *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7*(2).

Reardon, S. F. (2011). Measures of income segregation. Technical report, CEPA Working Papers. Stanford, CA: Stanford Center for Education Policy Analysis.

Rupasingha, A. and S. J. Goetz (2008). Us county-level social capital data, 1990-2005. Technical report, The Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development, Penn State University, University Park, PA, 2008.