Supplemental Appendix to "Disemployment Effects of Unemployment Insurance: A Meta-Analysis"

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Contents

A Data **1**

A.1 Calculation of the Elasticity 1

A.2 Classification of "Macro Treatment" Policy Reforms 2

A.3 Classification of Journals 4

A.4 Levels of Aggregation 5

A.5 Ad Hoc Inclusions and Exclusions 6

B Supplemental Figures **7**

Figure B-1: Quasi-Experimental Share of Studies by Publication Year 7

Figure B-2: t-statistic bunching by UI policy margin 8

Figure B-3: Elasticity and Baseline Replacement Rates 9

Figure B-4: Optimal replacement rates for UI benefits: Andrews and Kasy (2019) Correction 10

Figure B-5: Micro and Macro Unemployment Duration Elasticities 11

C Supplemental Tables **12**

Table C-1: Distribution of Research Design by Policy Margin Among Included Studies . . 12

Table C-2: Distribution of Countries Among Included Studies 13

Table C-3: Study Characteristics for Predicting the Elasticity 14

D Studies Included in Meta-Analysis **18**

Table D-1: Included Studies: Disemployment Elasticities with Respect to Potential Benefit Duration 18

Table D-2: Included Studies: Disemployment Elasticities with Respect to Replacement Rate 23

A Data

A.1 Calculation of the Elasticity

The elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to UI benefits ($\frac{\text{d(unemployment duration)}}{\text{d(UI benefits)}} \times \frac{\text{UI benefits}}{\text{unemployment duration}}$) is our effect size of interest. We distinguish between two UI benefit margins: potential benefit duration (PBD) and replacement rate (RR). The potential benefit duration is the maximum number of benefit weeks a claimant can receive, and the replacement rate is the fraction of prior weekly earnings a claimant receives as benefits. We distinguish between two measures of unemployment duration: weeks without any employment (total nonemployment) and weeks claiming UI benefits (covered unemployment).

For a given UI benefit margin and unemployment duration definition, there are four different decision points:

1. Whether the authors simulate the elasticity
2. Whether the outcome and regressor are in levels vs. logarithms
3. Whether the outcome is unemployment duration or hazard rate
4. Whether the regressor is continuous benefit generosity or discrete policy eligibility

First, if the authors simulate the elasticity, then we directly use the simulated elasticity. If they do not, then we follow subsequent steps to extract the elasticity from a regression.

Second, whether the outcome and regressor are in levels vs. logarithms determines whether we scale the UI benefit coefficient. If both the outcome and regressor are in logs, then we do not scale the coefficient. If the outcome is in logs but the regressor is in levels, then we scale the coefficient by avg. UI benefit in control group. If the outcome is in levels but the regressor is in logs, then we scale the coefficient by $\frac{1}{\text{avg. unemployment duration in control group}}$. If both the outcome and regressor are in levels, then we scale the coefficient by $\frac{\text{avg. UI benefit in control group}}{\text{avg. unemployment duration in control group}}$.

Third, if the outcome is a hazard rate, then we need to translate the hazard rate elasticity to an unemployment duration elasticity. In the special case of a constant hazard rate, the duration elasticity is the additive inverse of the hazard elasticity. Accordingly, we calculate the duration elasticity assuming a constant hazard rate.

Fourth, if the regressor is a discrete policy change and the outcome is a hazard rate, then we take final two steps. We divide by the benefit change to express the elasticity in terms of benefit generosity units. Additionally, we exponentiate the expression and subtract 1 to avoid the logarithm approximation of a discrete change in the regressor.

We require that the paper includes sufficient information to calculate the elasticity's standard error. There are two cases when the authors directly provide this standard error: (1) when the simulated elasticity is bootstrapped and (2) when both the outcome and regressor are in logs. For the other cases when we need to transform a reported coefficient, we apply the same scaling to the reported coefficient's standard errors. In other words, we preserve the t-statistic.

We note two useful methodological practices not fully adopted in our sample. First, among papers whose main specification is a hazard model, only one-fifth simulate the model-implied duration elasticity. Approximating a duration elasticity using the hazard model coefficient requires assuming a constant hazard rate. However, this does not appear to hold in the data; there is strong evidence of duration dependence among papers that graphically report hazard rates by unemployment duration. Specifically, the typical range in weekly hazard rates (nine percentage points) is slightly larger than the average weekly hazard rate (7%); nearly every paper finds that it falls with unemployment duration. Second, the ratio of behavioral costs to mechanical costs is a sufficient statistic for the efficiency cost of UI benefit expansions. It facilitates comparisons with other tax and transfer policies because it is the fiscal externality term in the Marginal Value of Public Funds formula (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020). Accordingly, we recommend authors directly compute and report the UI reform's behavioral costs, mechanical costs, and the ratio of behavioral costs to mechanical costs (Lee et al., 2021).

A.2 Classification of "Macro Treatment" Policy Reforms

We classify 5 studies as having variation in benefits at the market level.

1. **Lalive et al. (2015)**

   (a) Identifying variation: Regional variation in benefits

   (b) Policy margin: PBD

   (c) Description: The study's captures the macro effect, as its primary purpose is to identify market-level externalities of extended benefits. It uses observational variation that

approximates the "double randomization" experimental ideal: some regions (Austrian states) are treated with benefit expansions, but not all workers are treated (only over 50 years old). The pure control group comprises similar workers in untreated regions. The study explores the identifying assumption that these labor markets are largely disconnected from treated labor markets.

2. **Topel (1983)**

   (a) Identifying variation: Regional variation in benefits

   (b) Policy margin: RR

   (c) Description: This study captures the macro effect because it compares claimants in regions (US states) with high replacement rates to claimants in states with low replacement rates. Specifically, the study constructs a simulated replacement rate using claimant-level characteristics and region-level UI laws. It estimates a regression controlling for claimant-level characteristics. The study explains that the "main source of identification in estimating the impact of UI is between-state variation in the qualifying provisions of UI laws."

3. **Card and Levine (2000)**

   (a) Identifying variation: Time variation in benefits

   (b) Policy margin: PBD

   (c) Description: This study captures the macro effect because it compares UI claimants in different claim filing cohorts in New Jersey, where the entire claim filing cohort has different potential benefit durations due to a policy change. The treatment group has a PBD of 39 weeks and comprises claimants scheduled to exhaust their benefits between July and November 1996, while the control group has a PBD of 26 weeks and comprises claimants scheduled to exhaust benefits between July and November of 1995 or 1997.

4. **van Ours and Vodopivec (2006)**

   (a) Identifying variation: Time variation in benefits

   (b) Policy margin: PBD

(c) Description: This study captures the macro effect because it compares UI claimants in different claim filing cohorts in Slovenia, where the entire claim filing cohort has different potential benefit durations due to a policy change. The law passed in October 1998 and reduced PBD for all workers with at least 1.5 years of experience: from 6 to 3 months for 1.5-5 years of experience, from 9 to 6 months for 5-10 years of experience, from 12 to 6 months for 10-15 years of experience, and from 18-9 months for 15-20 years of experience. The sample comprises workers who became unemployed under the prior regime between August 1997 and July 1998 and workers who became unemployed under the subsequent regime between January 1999 and December 1999.

5. **Arranz et al. (2008)**

(a) Identifying variation: Time variation in benefits

(b) Policy margin: PBD

(c) Description: This study captures the macro effect because it compares UI claimants in different claim filing cohorts in Spain, where the entire claim filing cohort has a different PBD due to a policy change. The law passed in April 1992 and reduced PBD for most workers: "Before the reform workers making contributions for 6-12 months were eligible for 3 months; a contribution of 13-18 months entailed 6 months, and so on to a maximum of 24 months for those who contributed to Social Security for more than 48 months (Table 1). In contrast, after the amendments, workers who made contributions for 12-17 months are eligible for 4 months; a contribution of 18-23 months entails 6 months, and so on to a maximum of 24 months for those contributing to Social Security for 72 months or longer." The treatment group comprises workers who became unemployed under the prior regime in 1991, while the control groups comprises workers who became unemployed under the subsequent regime in 1993.

A.3 Classification of Journals

- *Field journals*: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, ILR Review, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Public Economics, LABOUR, Labour Economics, National Tax Journal, The Review of Economics and Statistics.

- *"Top-5" journals:* American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies.
- *Econometric methods journals*: Journal of Applied Econometrics, Journal of Econometrics.
- *Other general interest journals*: American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings, Bulletin of Economic Research, Economics Letters, European Economic Review, Journal of The European Economic Association, Moneda Y Credito, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Oxford Economic Papers, Portuguese Economic Journal, Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, and The Economic Journal.

A.4 Levels of Aggregation

We use two different levels of aggregation of estimates at different places in the study.

1. *One Estimate Per Policy Margin-Outcome-Group-Paper* Through most of the analysis, we define the unit of observation as one estimate for each policy margin (RR versus PBD), one estimate for each outcome (unemployment vs nonemployment), and one estimate for each group when the paper does not indicate a preferred estimate (e.g. men and women are separate groups in Bennmarker et al. (2007), Schmieder et al. (2012) studies different age groups, and Røed et al. (2008) has different elasticity estimates for Norway and Sweden). This allows for authors exclusively reporting group-level estimates because of publication bias. However, multiple papers study the same benefit variation in the same region. We refer to these as "contexts", and allow for serial correlation between estimates within the same context. This analysis has 91 observations.

2. *One Estimate Per Policy Margin-Outcome-Paper* For the Bayesian model averaging in Table 3, we aggregate estimates across groups such that there is one estimate for each policy margin and outcome. We average, weighting each group by the inverse variance of the group. One paper does not report sample sizes for older vs younger workers (Lalive et al., 2015). For this group, we weight the two groups equally to aggregate. We do this to avoid putting excess emphasis on author reporting decisions. Because BMA itself relies on computing averages across studies, averaging from the group level to the study level has little impact on the results. This analysis has 72 observations.

A.5 Ad Hoc Inclusions and Exclusions

Inclusions There are two papers (Card et al., 2015; Kolsrud et al., 2018) we knew estimated the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to benefit generosity that did not appear in our Publish and Perish search. Because of our goal is to survey the entire literature, we decided to include these studies in producing our estimates.

There are three papers published by the time of our search (Britto, 2022; Kyyrä and Pesola, 2020; Farber and Valletta, 2015) that Publish or Perish captured only in their working paper form. We included them after being notified of their exclusion in an initial draft of our meta-analysis. We thank Geoffrey Schnorr for identifying their exclusion.

Exclusions We identified six studies which meet our meta-analysis study inclusion criteria but are excluded from some or all of our analysis.

1. We exclude Hunt (1995) (elasticity of -3.32 and standard error of 2.25) from the BMA analysis shown in Table 2, but include Hunt (1995) in the Andrews-Kasy estimates of Table 1. We made this choice because Hunt (1995) had an outsized effect on the BMA model, which is sensitive to outliers, but had negligible effect on the parametric Andrews-Kasy model (can compare Table 2 rows 1 and 4).

2. Additionally, for visual clarity, in Figure 1, Hunt (1995), three estimates from Bennmarker et al. (2007) (elasticities are -1.95, 2.01, and 2.32; standard errors are 1.12, 0.68, and 0.60), Carling et al. (2001) (elasticity of 1.97 and standard error of 0.97), Kolsrud et al. (2018) (elasticity of 1.53 and standard error of 0.13), and Røed and Westlie (2012) (elasticity of 1.71 and standard error of 0.06) are excluded. All of these estimates except Hunt (1995) are included in BMA.

3. We exclude throughout Sahin and Kizilirmak (2007). This study reports an elasticity of 10 with a t-statistic of 200. Obviously, if we had included this estimate it would have swamped all the other results because of the large elasticity and large t-statistic.

B Supplemental Figures

Figure B-1: Quasi-Experimental Share of Studies by Publication Year



Notes: The figure is a binned scatterplot of the conditional mean by ventiles of year. Quasi-experimental studies are defined as those that identify the elasticity using a difference-in-differences design, regression discontinuity design, or regression kink design. The only other type of study in the sample is cross-sectional variation that uses a selection on observables assumption for identification.

Figure B-2: t-statistic bunching by UI policy margin



Notes: This plot shows the density of t-statistics, which are the ratios of the elasticity to its standard error. They include all main estimates. For visual clarity, they exclude t-statistics above 10 from Gerard and Gonzaga (2021); Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020); Schmieder and von Wachter (2016); Schmieder et al. (2012); Røed and Westlie (2012); Lalive (2007); Moffitt (1985).

Figure B-3: Elasticity and Baseline Replacement Rates



Notes: This figure compares the duration elasticity with respect to replacement rates to the baseline replacement rate in the control group in each study.

Figure B-4: Optimal replacement rates for UI benefits: Andrews and Kasy (2019) Correction



Notes: This figure shows the optimal replacement rates implied by the Baily-Chetty formula. Consumption-smoothing estimates assume constant relative risk aversion with parameter $\gamma = 2$ and a consumption drop during unemployment $\frac{\Delta c(r)}{c}$ from Gruber (1997), while elasticity estimates $\epsilon_{1-e,r}(r)$ come from the Andrews and Kasy (2019) procedure from Section 3. The downward-sloping black line shows the Gruber (1997) welfare gains from consumption-smoothing. The other two lines show elasticity estimates. Our preferred estimate is the horizontal purple line, which is the mean of the latent replacement rate elasticity distribution absent any publication bias. Its intersection with the black line is the optimal replacement rate given by Equation 4. The horizontal dashed blue line is the mean of the observed replacement rate elasticities in our sample from Table 1. It differs from the comparable horizontal dash blue line in Figure 2 due to different sample compositions. The Andrews and Kasy (2019) correction sample allows for multiple estimates per study by policy margin combination because it can correct for clustering, while the Bayesian model averaging sample uses only a single estimate per study by policy margin combination.

Figure B-5: Micro and Macro Unemployment Duration Elasticities



Notes: This figure compares several prior papers' estimates of the micro and macro elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to unemployment benefit generosity to our estimate. Studies are ordered by the difference between their macro and micro elasticities. The horizontal lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the *difference* between the micro and macro elasticities. Such standard errors are only available for Fredriksson and Söderström (2020), Jessen et al. (2023), Lalive et al. (2015), and our paper. We use suffixes "a" and "b" to denote what Landais et al. (2018) calls their "lower bound" and "upper bound" estimates.

C Supplemental Tables

Table C-1: Distribution of Research Design by Policy Margin Among Included Studies

	DID	RDD	RKD	Other	Total
PBD	14 (45%)	14 (45%)	1 (3%)	2 (6%)	31 (100%)
RR	9 (29%)	0 (0%)	6 (19%)	16 (52%)	31 (100%)
Total	23 (37%)	14 (23%)	7 (11%)	18 (29%)	62 (100%)

Notes: The table includes 62 total observations from the 57 included papers because 5 papers estimate both an elasticity with respect to potential benefit duration and an elasticity with respect to replacement rate. This table aggregates to one paper per study-margin (see Appendix A). The rows split policy parameters by whether the elasticity is with respect to potential benefit duration or replacement rate. The columns correspond to mutually exclusive research designs. The first three columns are quasi-experimental designs: DID is difference-in-differences, RDD is regression discontinuity design, and RKD is regression kink design. Other refers to papers using only cross-sectional variation, which implicitly relies on a selection on observables assumption for identification. The numbers correspond to the total number of estimates in that cell, and the percentages in parentheses refer to the fraction of the row's observations in that cell. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

Table C-2: Distribution of Countries Among Included Studies

Country	**Number of Studies**	**Share**
USA	20	32%
Austria	10	16%
Germany	8	13%
Sweden	4	6%
Finland	3	5%
Norway	3	5%
Brazil	2	3%
France	2	3%
Portugal	2	3%
Spain	2	3%
Canada	1	2%
Netherlands	1	2%
Norway and Sweden	1	2%
Slovenia	1	2%
Switzerland	1	2%
Turkey	1	2%
Total	62	100%

Notes: The table includes 62 total observations from the 57 included papers because 5 papers estimate both an elasticity with respect to potential benefit duration and an elasticity with respect to replacement rate. This table aggregates to one paper per study-margin (see Appendix A).

Table C-3: Study Characteristics for Predicting the Elasticity

Category	Variables
Economic characteristics	
Policy	Potential benefit duration (vs. replacement rate), All affected by variation (vs. targeted variation)
Environment	Baseline potential benefit duration, Baseline replacement rate, Sample year, Relative unemployment rate, United States, Labor tax wedge
Methodological characteristics	
Data	Administrative data (vs. survey), total nonemployment (vs. covered unemployment) as the outcome
Estimation technique	RDD, DID/RKD, hazard model
Publication	Journal impact factor (z-score)

Notes: Dummy variables are defined taking the value 0 with the category in parentheses.
Economic characteristics definitions: The baseline potential benefit duration is defined as the amount for the control group in quasi-experimental designs or the average sample amount in cross-sectional designs. The sample year is the year of the initial policy reform or the average sample year; it is defined relative to the present-day (2023) such that all values are positive. The relative unemployment rate measures the time-specific macroeconomic environment. It comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators database that is available since 1991. The difference comes from subtracting the average across all available years from the value in the sample year. The labor tax wedge summarizes the country's tax code. It is defined as the ratio between the amount of taxes paid by an average single worker without children and the corresponding total labor cost for the employer. It is the latest available value from the OECD: 2019 for Brazil and 2021 for all other countries. The estimation technique variables are all dummy variables. Difference-in-differences (DID) and regression kink designs (RKD) are pooled together, regression discontinuity designs (RDD) is its own category, and the omitted category is selection on observables designs relying on cross-sectional variation. The journal impact factor is the IDEAS/RePEc Simple Impact Factor as of April 10, 2023.

Appendix A-C References

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D Studies Included in Meta-Analysis

Table D-1: Included Studies: Disemployment Elasticities with Respect to Potential Benefit Duration

Paper	**Policy**	**Design**	**UE measure**	**Elasticity**	**SE**	**Source**
Addison and Portugal (2008) EL	PBD	DID	Non-emp	1.08	0.47	Table 2
Britto (2022) RESTAT	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.19	0.03	Table 6 Panel B Column 4 Row 1, text (477)
Caliendo et al. (2013) JAE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.85	0.58	Text for elasticity (pg 624) and Table V for SEs
Caliendo et al. (2013) JAE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.60	0.26	Text for elasticity (pg 624) and Table V for SEs
Card and Levine (2000) JPubEc	PBD	DID	Claimed	0.31	0.05	Table 6 Column 2 Row 2
Card et al. (2007) QJE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.18	0.03	Table II Column 3 Row 2
Centeno and Novo (2009) PEJ	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.44	0.06	Figure 1, Table 2 Column 2
Centeno and Novo (2009) PEJ	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.40	0.09	Figure 1, Table 2 Column 4

de Groot and van der Klaauw (2019) LE	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.41	0.08	Text (pg 207) and Table 2
Fackler et al. (2019) LE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	-0.03	0.22	Table 1 Column 1
Fackler et al. (2019) LE	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.48	0.17	Table 1 Column 2
Farber and Valletta (2015) JHR	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.02	0.02	Table 4 Column 3 Row 2, Table 6 Panel B Column 2 Rows 2 and 4
Farber and Valletta (2015) JHR	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.06	0.03	Table 4 Column 1 Row 2, Table 6 Panel A Column 2 Rows 2 and 4
Filiz (2017) LABOUR	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.08	0.01	Table 3 Column 1
Gerard and Gonzaga (2021) AER	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.09	0.04	Figure 5 Panel D
Gerard and Gonzaga (2021) AER	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.89	0.01	Figure 5 Panel A
Hunt (1995) JOLE	PBD	DID	Non-emp	1.10	0.54	Table 7 Column 2, Table 2, Table 5 Columns 3 and 5, Text (pg 91-92)
Johnston and Mas (2018) JPE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.42	0.06	Footnote 15
Johnston and Mas (2018) JPE	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.89	0.10	Table 3 Column 1
Katz and Meyer (1990a) JPubEc	PBD	Cross-sect.	Claimed	0.53	0.33	Table 3 Columns 2, Rows 1 and 5

Kyyrä and Pesola (2020b) LE	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.55	0.07	Table 2 Column 4 and text (footnote 12)
Lalive and Zweimüller (2004) JPubEc	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.09	0.04	Table 4 bottom row and Table 3
Lalive (2007) AEAPP	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.26	0.03	Table 1 Column 1 Row 1, Figure 1
Lalive (2007) AEAPP	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	1.57	0.09	Table 1 Column 2 Row 1 (170-week extension for women), Figure 2
Lalive (2008) JOE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.35	0.08	Table 2 Column 2 Panel B and Figure 3
Lalive (2008) JOE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.64	0.08	Table 2 Column 2 Panel B and Figure 8
Lalive et al. (2006) RESTUD	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.17	0.03	Table 5 Row 3 for elasticity from simulation, Table 4 Row 1 for SE
Lalive et al. (2006) RESTUD	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.09	0.01	Table 5 Row 2 for elasticity from simulation, Table 4 Row 1 for SE
Lalive et al. (2015) AER	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.58	0.07	Table 2 Column 3, Table 1 Panel B Column 2
Lalive et al. (2015) AER	PBD	DID	Claimed	1.40	0.26	Table 2 Column 4, Table 1 Panel B Column 2

Landais (2015) AEJ:EP	PBD	RKD	Non-emp	0.33	0.43	Table 4 Column 2 Row 2
Landais (2015) AEJ:EP	PBD	RKD	Claimed	1.35	0.69	Table 4 Column 2 Row 1
Le Barbanchon (2016) LE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.12	0.04	Table 7 Column 2 Row 5
Le Barbanchon et al. (2019) JPubEc	PBD	DID	Claimed	0.31	0.03	Table 4 Column 4 Row 2, Table A1
Lichter and Schiprowski (2021) JPubEc	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.18	0.05	Table 2 Column 6
Lichter and Schiprowski (2021) JPubEc	PBD	DID	Claimed	0.53	0.06	Table 2 Column 4
Moffitt (1985) JOE	PBD	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.16	0.02	Table 4 for elasticity and Table 3 Column 4 for SE
Nekoei and Weber (2017) AER	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.06	0.02	Table 2 Column 1 Row 1
Petrunyk and Pfeifer (2023) BER	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.09	0.02	Table 3 Column 4 bottom panel and Table 1 Column 2
Røed and Westlie (2012) JEEA	PBD	DID	Non-emp	1.71	0.06	Table 4 Column 2
Schmieder et al. (2012) QJE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.10	0.01	Table 2 Column 1 Panel B, Figure 1, Table W-1 Row 2 Column 1
Schmieder et al. (2012) QJE	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.53	0.01	Table 2 Column 1 Panel B, Figure 1, Table W-1 Row 2 Column 1

Schmieder et al. (2012) QJE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.11	0.02	Table 2 Column 1 Panel B, Figure 1, Table W-1 Row 2 Column 2
Schmieder et al. (2012) QJE	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.53	0.02	Table 2 Column 1 Panel B, Figure 1, Table W-1 Row 2 Column 2
Schmieder et al. (2012) QJE	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.13	0.03	Table 2 Column 1 Panel B, Figure 1, Table W-1 Row 2 Column 4
Schmieder et al. (2012) QJE	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.68	0.04	Table 2 Column 1 Panel B, Figure 1, Table W-1 Row 2 Column 4
Schmieder et al. (2016) AER	PBD	RDD	Non-emp	0.13	0.03	Table 1 Column 2 Panel B
Schmieder et al. (2016) AER	PBD	RDD	Claimed	0.52	0.01	Table 1 Column 1 Panel B
van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) JOLE	PBD	DID	Non-emp	0.42	0.12	Table 5 Row 1

Notes: Each row is a separate main estimate. The first column is the authors, publication year, and journal abbreviation. The second column indicates that all of the estimates correspond to the elasticity with respect to potential benefit duration. The third column contains mutually exhaustive categories for regression discontinuity design (RDD), regression kink design (RKD), difference-in-differences (DID), and cross-sectional variation with controls (cross-sectional). The fourth column describes whether the unemployment outcome is total nonemployment or unemployment claim duration. The fifth column is the elasticity of the unemployment duration outcome with respect to the benefit generosity parameter and the sixth column is its standard error. The seventh describes the calculation sources from the published paper.

Table D-2: Included Studies: Disemployment Elasticities with Respect to Replacement Rate

Paper	**Policy**	**Design**	**UE measure**	**Elasticity**	**SE**	**Source**
Arranz et al. (2009) MyC	RR	Cross-sect.	Claimed	0.44	0.13	Table 7 Column 4
Belzil (2001) JAE	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.19	0.06	Text (pg 634) for elasticity and Table 2 Column 1 for SE
Bennmarker et al. (2007) LABOUR	RR	DID	Non-emp	2.01	0.68	Table 6 Row 1 Column 2, Table 3 Row 2 Columns 1 and 5, Table 7 Row 2 Column 4
Bennmarker et al. (2007) LABOUR	RR	DID	Non-emp	2.32	0.60	Table 6 Row 2 Column 2, Table 3 Row 3 Columns 1 and 5, Table 7 Row 3 Column 4
Bennmarker et al. (2007) LABOUR	RR	DID	Non-emp	1.33	0.43	Table 6 Row 2 Column 2, Table 3 Row 4 Columns 1 and 5, Table 7 Row 4 Column 4
Bennmarker et al. (2007) LABOUR	RR	DID	Non-emp	-1.95	1.12	Table 6 Row 1 Column 4, Table 3 Row 6 Columns 1 and 5, Table 7 Row 7 Column 4
Bennmarker et al. (2007) LABOUR	RR	DID	Non-emp	-1.28	0.73	Table 6 Row 2 Column 4, Table 3 Row 7 Columns 1 and 5, Table 7 Row 8 Column 4

Bennmarker et al. (2007) LABOUR	RR	DID	Non-emp	-1.30	0.57	Table 6 Row 3 Column 4, Table 3 Row 8 Columns 1 and 5, Table 7 Row 9 Column 4
Blau and Robins (1986) JPubEc	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.18	0.04	Table 4 Column 1 and text (pg 188)
Blau and Robins (1986) JPubEc	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.26	0.10	Table 4 Column 1 and text (pg 188)
Card et al. (2015a) AEAPP	RR	RKD	Claimed	0.21	0.07	Table 1 Column 1 Row 2 of NBER WP
Card et al. (2015b) ECMA	RR	RKD	Non-emp	1.40	0.20	Table 1 Panel E Column 1
Carling et al. (2001) EJ	RR	DID	Non-emp	1.97	0.97	Table 4 Column 4 Row DPOL and text (footnote 19)
Carling et al. (1996) JPubEc	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.06	0.02	Text (pg 327) for elasticity and Table 3 Column 1 Row UI for SE
Chetty (2008) JPE	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.53	0.27	Table 2 Column 1
Classen (1977) ILRR	RR	Cross-sect.	Claimed	0.45	0.08	Table 2 Column 1
Eugster (2015) SJES	RR	DID	Non-emp	0.39	0.19	Table 4 Column 1
Hunt (1995) JOLE	RR	DID	Non-emp	-3.32	2.25	Table 7 Column 2, Table 2, Table 5 Columns 3 and 5, Text (pg 91-92)

Katz and Meyer (1990a) JPubEc	RR	Cross-sect.	Claimed	0.66	0.17	Table 3 Column 2 Row 2
Katz and Meyer (1990b) QJE	RR	Cross-sect.	Claimed	0.41	0.35	Table 6 Column 1 Row 3 scaled by MO WBA in Table 1
Kolsrud et al. (2018) AER	RR	RKD	Claimed	1.53	0.13	Table 2 Panel 1 Column 1
Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016) RESTUD	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.63	0.33	Table 2 Column 1 Row 1
Kyyrä and Pesola (2020a) OBES	RR	RKD	Non-emp	0.08	0.24	Table 3 Panel B Row 5 Column 2
Kyyrä and Pesola (2020a) OBES	RR	RKD	Claimed	0.90	0.79	Table 3 Panel B Row 5 Column 1
Lalive et al. (2006) RESTUD	RR	DID	Non-emp	0.17	0.04	Table 5 Row 4 for elasticity from simulation, Table 4 Row 2 for SE
Landais (2015) AEJ:EP	RR	RKD	Non-emp	0.32	0.08	Column 2 in Tables 2, B2, B3, B4, B5 for elasticity, Table 4 Column 1 Row 2 for SE
Landais (2015) AEJ:EP	RR	RKD	Claimed	0.73	0.11	Table 4 Column 1 Row 1
Lee et al. (2021) JOLE	RR	RKD	Claimed	1.06	0.41	Table 4 Column 5
Meyer and Mok (2014) NTJ	RR	DID	Non-emp	0.19	0.03	Table 2 Column 1 for elasticity, Table 3 Column 1 for SE
Moffitt (1985) JOE	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.36	0.01	Table 4 for elasticity, Table 3 Column 4 for SE
Portugal and Addison (1990) ILRR	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.60	0.31	Table 3 Column 3 and Table 1

Poterba and Summers (1995) RESTAT	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.36	0.15	Table 4 for elasticity, Table 3 Column 2 Row 4 for SE
Rebollo-Sanz and Rodríguez-Planas (2020) JHR	RR	DID	Non-emp	0.76	0.02	Correct author error in simulation from text (pg 149) for elasticity and Table 3 Column 5 for SE
Røed and Zhang (2003) EJ	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.95	0.17	Table 4 Column 1 Row 1 first panel
Røed and Zhang (2003) EJ	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.34	0.19	Table 4 Column 1 Row 1 second panel
Røed and Zhang (2005) EER	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.65	0.08	Table 3 Column 1 and Text (pg 1823)
Røed et al. (2008) OEP	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	1.07	0.15	Table 2 Column 1 Row 1
Røed et al. (2008) OEP	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.47	0.09	Table 2 Column 2 Row 1
Topel (1984) JOLE	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.64	0.30	Table 3 Column 3 Row 6 and Table 2
Topel (1984) JOLE	RR	Cross-sect.	Non-emp	0.51	0.16	Table 3 Column 3 Row 6 and Table 2
Uusitalo and Verho (2010) LE	RR	DID	Non-emp	0.79	0.25	Text (pg 650) for elasticity and Table 3 Column 1 Row 1 for SE
Winter-Ebmer (1998) OBES	RR	DID	Non-emp	0.07	0.02	Table 1

Notes: Each row is a separate main estimate. The first column is the authors, publication year, and journal abbreviation. The second column indicates that all of the main estimates correspond to the elasticity with respect to replacement rate. The third column contains mutually exhaustive categories for regression discontinuity design (RDD), regression kink design (RKD), difference-in-differences (DID), and cross-sectional variation with controls (cross-sectional). The fourth column describes whether the unemployment outcome is total nonemployment or unemployment claim duration. The fifth column is the elasticity of the unemployment duration outcome with respect to the benefit generosity parameter and the sixth column is its standard error. The seventh describes the calculation sources from the published paper.

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