



# Figure 1. Country correlations between cyclical components of real government spending and real GDP, 1980-2020



Notes: Black (dark) bars denote advanced economies (AE). Red (light) bars denotes emerging markets and developing economies (EMDE). Each bar represents the correlation between the Hodrick-Prescott cyclical components of real GDP and real government spending. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.




# Figure 3. Commodity exporters versus non-commodity exporters, 1980-2006



Note: Identical plot as in Figure 2, but for the period 1980-2006.  
Sources: Authors' calculations based on WEO (IMF) data.




Figure 5. High versus low capital account restrictions, 1980-2020



Notes: Same as Figure 2 but countries are now divided into high and low capital account restrictions. Based on the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness (where a higher number represents more financial openness), a country is classified as having high (low) capital account restrictions if its Chinn-Ito index is below (above) the median. The difference between the two averages is significant at the 5 percent level.

Sources: Authors' calculations based on Chinn-Ito index and WEO (IMF) data.


# Figure 6. Exchange rate regime



CE with fixed ER regimes = 0.46\*\*\*  
 CE with floating ER regimes = 0.36\*\*\*

Notes: Same as in Figure 2, but countries are now divided between those operating under fixed exchange rates or floating exchange rate regimes during the sample period, according to the classification in Ilzetzki *et al.* (2021). The difference between the two averages is not significant (p-value is 0.17).  
 Sources: Authors' calculations based on Ilzetzki *et al.* (2021) and WEO (IMF) data.


# Figure 7. High and low external debt



Notes: Same as in Figure 1, but countries are now divided between having high and low external debt, defined as external debt, as percentage of GNI, above (below) the sample median. The difference between the two averages is not significant.


Sources: Authors' calculations based on International Debt Statistics (World Bank) and WEO (IMF) data.

# Figure 8. Good versus bad times




Notes: Same as in Figure 2, but countries are now divided between good or bad times. Good (bad) times are defined as a positive (negative) Hodrick-Prescott cycle. The difference between the two averages is not significant.  
 Sources: Authors' calculations based on WEO (IMF) data.

# Figure 9. Political risk




Notes: Same as Figure 2, but countries are now divided according to political risk. High (low) political risk is defined as political risk above (below) the sample median. The difference between the two averages is significant at the ten percent level.  
 Sources: Authors' calculations based on International Country Risk Guide and WEO (IMF) data.

# Figure 10. Level of bureaucracy quality



Notes: Same as in Figure 2, but countries are now divided according to level of bureaucracy quality, defined as bureaucracy quality above (below) the sample median. The difference between the two averages is not significant at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.16).  
 Sources: Authors' calculations based on International Country Risk Guide and WEO (IMF) data.


# Figure 11. Control of corruption



Notes: Same as Figure 2, but countries are now divided between having high (low) control of corruption, defined as control of corruption above (below) the sample median. The difference between the two averages is significant at the 10 percent level.

Sources: Authors' calculations based on International Country Risk Guide and WEO (IMF) data.


# Figure 12. Government stability



Notes: Same as Figure 2, but countries are now divided between having high (low) government stability, defined as government stability above (below) the sample median. The difference between the two averages is not significant.

Sources: Authors' calculations based on International Country Risk Guide and WEO (IMF) data.


# Figure 13. Law and order




Notes: Same as in Figure 2, but countries are now divided according to law and order, defined as law and order above (below) the sample median. The difference between the two averages is significant at the 5 percent level.

Sources: Authors' calculations based on International Country Risk Guide and WEO (IMF) data.

# Figure 14. Fall in commodity prices









# Figure 15. Fiscal multiplier



Source: Computed by the authors from quarterly data for commodity exporters using a panel SVAR with the Blanchard-Perotti identification.

# Table 1. Testing theories of fiscal procyclicality

	Dependent variable: CORR(g, y)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<b>Financial openness</b>	<b>-0.25 **</b> (-0.11)				<b>-0.19</b> (0.13) 
<b>Corruption Control</b>		<b>-0.12 ***</b> (-0.04) 			<b>-0.07</b> (0.05) 
<b>Political Constraint Index</b>			<b>-0.470 **</b> (0.23) 		<b>-0.08</b> 0.3
<b>GDP Volatility</b>				<b>1.58 **</b> (0.63) 	<b>1.26</b> (0.81) 
<b>F-test</b>					<b>**</b>
<b>R-squared</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.06</b>	<b>0.18</b>
<b>Observations</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>72</b>

Notes: Cross-section OLS for commodity exporters. Standard deviations in parentheses. For regression (5), the F-test evaluates the joint significance of financial openness, corruption control, and GDP volatility. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.

# Table 2. Panel fixed-effects regression of output growth on commodity prices

**Table 2. GDP regressions (fixed effects)**

Dependent variable: GDP						
Explanatory variables	(1) EMDE	(2) EMDE	(3) EMDE	(4) Full	(5) Full	(6) Full
Commodity Export Price Index (EPI)	0.085 *** (0.014)	0.063 *** (0.017)	0.080 *** (0.013)	0.024 (0.021)	0.018 (0.03)	0.026 (0.026)
Terms of Trade		0.029 (0.022)			0.026 (0.02)	
GDP (-1)			0.367 *** (0.045)			0.366 *** (0.038)
Commodity Export Price Index x EMDE				0.062 ** (0.024)	0.046 * (0.026)	0.054 ** (0.02)
Observations	381	364	370	533	436	518
Countries	11	11	11	15	15	15
R2	0.068	0.09	0.26	0.065	0.08	0.26
F-Test joint Commodity EPI and EMDE interaction				***	***	***

Notes: Panel least squares with country fixed effects. Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables are in log-differences. Full refers to the sample with AE and EMDE. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.

# Table 3. Panel fixed-effects regression of government spending on commodity prices

**Table 3. Fiscal regressions (fixed effects)**

Dependent variable: Real Government Spending						
Explanatory variables	(1) EMDE	(2) EMDE	(3) EMDE	(4) Full	(5) Full	(6) Full
Commodity Export Price Index (EPI)	0.061 * (0.034)	0.080 * (0.044)	0.061 * (0.033)	-0.123 *** (0.0423)	-0.072 (0.056)	-0.121 *** (0.04)
Terms of Trade		-0.060 (-0.066)			-0.072 (0.058)	
GDP (-1)			0.688 *** (0.134)			0.625 *** (0.107)
Commodity Export Price Index x EMDE				0.184 *** (0.051)	0.158 *** (0.058)	0.183 *** (0.049)
Observations	276	269	276	415	341	413
Countries	11	11	11	15	15	15
R2	0.01	0.0115	0.11	0.03	0.03	0.123
<b>F-Test joint Commodity EPI and EMDE interaction</b>				***	**	***

Notes: Panel least squares with country fixed effects. Standard deviations in parentheses. All variables are in log-differences. Full refers to the sample with AE and EMDE. \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate statistical significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 percent, respectively.

# Table 4. Pours as a fraction of rain in CE

<b>Emerging Markets</b>	<b>Pours/rain</b>	<b>Advanced Economies</b>	<b>Pours/rain</b>
Argentina	23.4%	Australia	-61.9%
Brazil	31.2%	Canada	-66.6%
Chile	16.3%	New Zealand	-65.3%
Colombia	18.3%	Norway	-67.8%
Costa Rica	12.1%	Average	-65.4%
Ecuador	22.8%		
Honduras	17.8%		
Indonesia	11.6%		
Russian Federation	26.6%		
South Africa	20.5%		
Ukraine	35.0%		
Average	21.4%		

Note: Authors' calculations (see text for details).

## Table 5. EMDE: Pours as a fraction of change in GDP

<b>Emerging Markets</b>	<b>Pours</b>	<b>Rains</b>
Argentina	19.0%	81.0%
Brazil	23.8%	76.2%
Chile	14.0%	86.0%
Colombia	15.5%	84.5%
Costa Rica	10.8%	89.2%
Ecuador	18.6%	81.4%
Honduras	15.1%	84.9%
Indonesia	10.4%	89.6%
Russian Federation	21.0%	79.0%
South Africa	17.0%	83.0%
Ukraine	26.0%	74.0%
Average	17.4%	82.6%

Note: Columns add up to 100.

Source: Authors' calculations (see text for details).

# Table 6. Application to commodity boom episode

2003-2008 Cycle	
Increase in commodity export prices EMDE	76.3%
Increase in commodity export prices AE	65.7%
Government reaction EMDE	4.6%
Government reaction AE	-8.1%
GDP reaction EMDE	6.5%
GDP reaction AE	1.6%
Pours EMDE (GDP pp)	1.1%
Pours AE (GDP pp)	-3.0%
Rain EMDE (GDP pp)	5.4%
Rain AE (GDP pp)	4.6%

Source: Authors' calculations (see text for details).

## Table 7. Welfare costs

$\sigma$	EM: Pours/GDP	A: Pours/GDP
0.5	2.62%	-5.30%
0.75	2.62%	-5.30%
1	2.63%	-5.30%

Source: Authors' calculations (see text for details).

# Table A1. Sample of countries

Table A1. Sample of countries

Commodity exporters		Non-commodity exporters	
Algeria	Liberia	Afghanistan	Malaysia
Angola	Libya	Albania	Maldives
Argentina	Madagascar	Antigua and Barbuda	Malta
Armenia	Malawi	Austria	Marshall Islands
Australia	Mali	Bangladesh	Mauritius
Azerbaijan	Mauritania	Barbados	Mexico
Bahrain	Mongolia	Belarus	Micronesia
Belize	Mozambique	Belgium	Moldova
Benin	Myanmar	Bhutan	Montenegro
Bolivia	Namibia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Morocco
Botswana	New Zealand	Bulgaria	Nauru
Brazil	Nicaragua	Cambodia	Nepal
Brunei Darussalam	Niger	China	Netherlands
Burkina Faso	Nigeria	Croatia	North Macedonia
Burundi	Norway	Cyprus	Pakistan
Cabo Verde	Oman	Czech Republic	Palau
Cameroon	Papua New Guinea	Denmark	Panama
Canada	Paraguay	Djibouti	Philippines
Central African Republic	Peru	Dominica	Poland
Chad	Qatar	Dominican Republic	Portugal
Chile	Russian Federation	Egypt	Romania
Colombia	Rwanda	El Salvador	Samoa
Comoros	São Tomé and Príncipe	Eritrea	San Marino
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Saudi Arabia	Estonia	Serbia
Congo, Rep.	Senegal	Eswatini	Singapore
Costa Rica	Seychelles	Finland	Slovak Republic
Côte d'Ivoire	Sierra Leone	France	Slovenia
Ecuador	Solomon Islands	Georgia	Somalia
Equatorial Guinea	South Africa	Germany	Spain
Ethiopia	South Sudan	Greece	Sri Lanka
Fiji	Sudan	Grenada	St. Kitts and Nevis
Gabon	Suriname	Haiti	St. Lucia
Ghana	Tajikistan	Hong Kong SAR, China	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Guatemala	Tanzania	Hungary	Sweden
Guinea	The Gambia	India	Switzerland
Guinea-Bissau	Timor-Leste	Ireland	Syria
Guyana	Togo	Israel	Taiwan, China
Honduras	Trinidad and Tobago	Italy	Thailand
Iceland	Turkmenistan	Jamaica	The Bahamas
Indonesia	Uganda	Japan	Tonga
Iran, Islamic Rep.	Ukraine	Jordan	Tunisia
Iraq	United Arab Emirates	Kiribati	Turkey
Kazakhstan	Uruguay	Korea	Tuvalu
Kenya	Uzbekistan	Latvia	United Kingdom
Kuwait	Yemen	Lebanon	United States
Kyrgyz Republic	Zambia	Lesotho	Vanuatu
Lao PDR	Zimbabwe	Lithuania	Vietnam
		Luxembourg	

Notes: This list comprises 189 countries, divided into 152 EMDE and 37 AE, and 94 commodity exporters and 95 non-commodity exporters.

## Table O2: Baxter-King filter

	Figure 1	Figure 2	Figure 4	Figure 5
AE	-0.19***			
EMDE	0.26***			
CE		0.27***	0.28***	0.20***
Non-CE		0.07	0.04	-0.14**