FDICIA after Five Years
- (pp. 139-158)
AbstractAt year-end 1991, Congress enacted fundamental deposit insurance reform for banks and thrifts--the FDIC Improvement Act. This reform followed the failure of more than 2,000 depository institutions in the 1980s. Many failed because the incentive incompatibility of the structure of federal government-provided deposit insurance encouraged moral hazard behavior by banks and poor agent behavior by regulators. Insurance was put on a more incentive compatible basis, providing for a graduated series of sanctions mimicking market discipline that first may and then must be applied by the regulators on floundering banks. This article reviews these changes and evaluates early results.
CitationBenston, George J., and George G. Kaufman. 1997. "FDICIA after Five Years." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (3): 139-158. DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.3.139
- G28 Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages