American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
(pp. 179–94)
Abstract
A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous outside information is the agent's only source of information, and examine the welfare implications of our analysis.Citation
Bizzotto, Jacopo, Jesper Rüdiger, and Adrien Vigier. 2021. "Dynamic Persuasion with Outside Information." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13 (1): 179–94. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180141Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness