We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their beliefs about the value of a good after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision-making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The results of our experiment are in line with the predictions of the overconfidence model and at odds with the others'.
Angrisani, Marco, Antonio Guarino, Philippe Jehiel, and Toru Kitagawa.
"Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment."
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness