Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 15,
no. 3, August 2023
(pp. 256-85)
Abstract
Many countries use CCTs targeted to parents to promote schooling. Attendance conditions may work through two channels: incentivization and information. If children have private information, (i) providing attendance information to parents may increase attendance inexpensively relative to CCTs and (ii) it may be more effective to incentivize children, who have full information, than parents. Tackling both questions in a unified experimental setting, we find that information alone improves parental monitoring and has a large effect relative to our CCT. Incentivizing children is at least as effective as incentivizing parents—importantly, not because parents were able to appropriate transfers to children.Citation
de Walque, Damien, and Christine Valente. 2023. "Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 15 (3): 256-85. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20210202Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I22 Educational Finance; Financial Aid
- I28 Education: Government Policy
- L31 Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
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