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Political Selection and Intra-Party Conflicts in China

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 4, 2019 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Hyatt Regency Atlanta, Hanover D & E
Hosted By: Association for Comparative Economic Studies
  • Chair: Yang Yao, Peking University

Early-Mover Advantage in Political Careers: A Sponsored-Mobility View of Chinese City-Level Officials

Lixing Li
,
Peking University
Feng Wan
,
Peking University
Yang Yao
,
Peking University

Abstract

Tournament competition is widely recognized as a basic mechanism of personnel control in organizations. However, tournament fails as an effective incentive scheme when the playing field is not level. In this paper, we argue that the playing field needs not be level because the principals do not want selection to be in that way. Instead, early-movers are chosen among same-level agents and enter a career track that affords more rotations and a higher rate of promotion. Using lifetime career path data of all city leaders in China between 1994 and 2016, we demonstrate an “early-selection-and-cultivation” pattern of their political careers, and argues for a “sponsored mobility” (Turner, 1960) interpretation of the political tournament in China.
Specifically, after controlling for economic performance, the career ceiling of city leaders depends on the diversity of their working experience, both across provinces and trans-departmental. The more frequent they are rotated across provinces and departments, the higher position they will reach in their later career. Thus, political rotation serves as a way of on-the-job-training that improves politicians’ human capital and social capital, and makes them more competent in moving up the political hierarchy. Further examination shows that younger officials are more likely to get rotation opportunities even if they did not appear to generate higher economic growth. These evidence suggest that an early-mover advantage may be important for thinking about the incentive of bureaucrats.

Informal Elite Competition and Power-Sharing under Authoritarianism

Ji Yeon Hong
,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Leo Yang
,
University of California-San Diego

Abstract

While a growing literature argues that power-sharing institutions play a critical role in maintaining authoritarian regime stability, scholars also find that political struggles among non-institutionalized, informal factions shape authoritarian politics. This paper examines whether competition among factions can induce stable power-sharing outcomes as power-sharing institutions are intended to do. By analyzing the behaviors of Chinese bureaucrats directly connected to top national leaders, we show that powerful factions pursue power dominance, rather than sharing power among existing ruling groups. Using news reports in Chinese local newspapers on corruption investigations from 2000 to 2014, we find that political elites connected to powerful patrons are more likely to promote negative news about the members of weaker factions. These negative reports indeed harm the promotion prospects of reported-on province leaders, weakening the already weak factions. Our findings thus suggest that informal competition does not substitute for institutional power-sharing mechanisms.

Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China's Anti-Corruption Campaign

Xi Lu
,
National University of Singapore
Peter Lorentzen
,
University of San Francisco

Abstract

We examine the targeting and motivations of the first phase of China's anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping (2012-2015). Combining data on officials' personal networks revealed during the campaign with biographical and economic data, we find evidence that the campaign indeed targeted corruption. In addition, individuals, networks, and geographic regions that departed sharply from meritocratic governance practices appear to have been a primary target, with higher rates of indictment. This is consistent with the party's own claim that the crackdown was designed to reduce corruption and strengthen party-led meritocracy. However, individuals with personal ties to Xi Jinping appear to be exempt from investigation while, individuals with ties to the other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee had no special protection. Taken together, these findings indicate that the crackdown served both its stated goal of strengthening the party and the unstated goal of consolidating Xi's power.

Dilemmas of Autocratic Governance: Theory and Evidence from the Anti-Corruption Campaign in China

Tianyang Xi
,
Peking University
Yang Yao
,
Peking University
Qian Zhang
,
Peking University

Abstract

Autocracy faces strategic dilemmas over how to grapple with different models gathering popular consent and maintaining stability of the ruling coalition in the same time. Rent sharing promotes economic performance and secures the ruling coalition. However, popular consent also depends on people’s perception about a clean government. China’s recent anti-corruption campaign offers a case to study those dilemmas. The campaign indicates a move from a model emphasizing performance and rent sharing to another model emphasizing a clean government and loyalty. We use data collected on provincial and municipal officials to empirically test several hypotheses coming out of our theoretical model. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the paper finds that (1) officials with better economic performance were more likely to be investigated; (2) officials with stronger connections to the incumbent political superiors were less likely to be investigated; and (3) connections to the incumbent superiors granted protection for high-performers, and connections to the previous superiors made high-performers more vulnerable.
Discussant(s)
Chen Cheng
,
Johns Hopkins University
Jennifer Gandhi
,
Emory University
Yongjing Zhang
,
University of Ottawa
JEL Classifications
  • P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies
  • H1 - Structure and Scope of Government