

A Positive Effect of Political Dynasties: the case of France's 1940 enabling act

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Introduction - Dynastic persistence

Dynasties persist even in democracies

[Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys and Smith, 2017, Fiva and Smith, 2018]



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- Dynastic politicians underperform
 - Lower efforts in politics [Rossi, 2017]
 - Lower education [Geys, 2017]
 - Lower performance [Braganca et al., 2015]

But are they beyond redemption?

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Introduction - Political dynasties during autocratic reversals

Dynastic politicians might protect the regime they originate from:

- Protection of the electoral and economic advantages [Dal Bó et al., 2009, Geys and Smith, 2017, Folke et al., 2017, Fiva and Smith, 2018]
- Cultural transmission [Bisin and Verdier, 2001] and democratic networks [Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2009]

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Introduction - Why focus on democratic dynasties?

Democratic dynasties - A political dynasty whose founder:

- supported democratic reforms under autocracy,
- or belonged to a party supporting democracy as political system

As a result:

- Vested interests?
- Stronger transmission of cultural values [Piketty, 1995]
- Dynasties as a norms-enforcing device [Jennings et al., 2009, Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2009]

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Introduction - Enabling Act in 1940 France

- **1940 Enabling Act - A shock revealing preferences:**
 - 18 days after the 1940 armistice
 - Lack of synchronisation [Ermakoff, 2008]
 - De facto no party leadership [Wieviorka, 2001]
- **Observability:**
 - One case of autocratic reversal voted by a democratic Parliament.
 - Data on the vote - *Journal officiel de la République Française*
 - Biographical data - *Dictionnaire des députés et sénateurs français*
- **Turning point in French history**
End of the longest french democratic regime / Collaboration with Nazi Germany
- **Lack of evidence on the individual determinants of the vote**
[Wieviorka, 2001, Ermakoff, 2008]

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1940 - France autocratic reversal

« The French Assembly grants full powers to the Government of the Republic under the authority of Marshall Pétain to promulgate a new Constitution for the French State by passing one or several Acts. This Constitution will rest upon the values of Labor, Family and Fatherland. »

Loi du 10 Juillet 1940

- Clear objective of the bill: “institutional alignment with authoritarian regimes” [Odin, 1946]
- Long-term consequences were expected (see newspapers - July 1940)
- Only 80 MPs opposed the reform (12%)

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Dynasties during the IIIrd Republic

- Long lived Third Republic (70 years in 1940)
- 15% of representatives
- Up to 70 cumulated years of national mandate in a family
- Diverse in terms of length, composition and political orientation



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Voted No
Son of a Republican



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Data - General

- **Biographical data on each representative (847) in 1940.**
- Journal officiel de la République Française
 - Individual characteristics: being a Free mason, jewishness
 - Roll-Call data on previous delegations of power

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Data

- **Main variable of interest: Democratic Dynasty**
- **By using biographies:**
 - Almost exhaustive list of dynastic politicians (\neq Geys and Smith 2017, Fiva and Smith 2018; using surname similarity)
 - Possibility to distinguish dynasties along biographical elements (here dynasty founder political affiliation)

127 dynastic politicians (15%) among them 71 belonged to a democratic dynasty (8%)

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Method

Logit estimations:

$$Prob(Vote_i = No) = f(\alpha + \beta_1 DemocraticDynasty_i + \Gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i)$$

- $DemocraticDynasty_i$
- X_i : Control variables (Chamber, Political orientation, Religion, Free-mason, Age, Occupation, veterans, in an occupied territory, departement means)
- ε_i : Error term

Endogeneity:

- Limited concern regarding reverse causality
- Adding numerous control variables to check for omitted variable bias
- Selection into the vote (sequential logit)
- Non-linearity and “selection into treatment”(Propensity score matching)

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
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First hints



Baseline results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	No1940	No1940	No1940	No1940
Dynastic politicians	0.301 (0.995)		0.995*** (2.616)	
Democratic dynastic politicians		0.728** (2.072)		1.079*** (2.632)
Non-democratic dynastic politicians		-0.414 (-0.770)		0.808 (1.234)
Constant	-2.050*** (-15.42)	-2.050*** (-15.42)	-6.121*** (-5.491)	-6.084*** (-5.454)
Marginal effect Dyn	0.03		0.08***	
Marginal effect DemDyn		0.08**		0.09***
Marginal effect NoDemDyn		-0.04		0.068
Baseline Controls			Yes	Yes
Observations	669	669	669	669

Robust z-statistics in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- Democratic dynastic politicians have a 7.6 to 9.0 percentage points higher probability of opposing the 1940 enabling Act.
- Non-democratic dynastic politicians not different from non-dynastic politicians

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Robustness checks

- **Robust to using alternative estimation methods**
 - Propensity score matching (Selection into treatment)
 - Sequential logit (Selection in the vote)
 - Ordered logit or multinomial logit (Abstention as a level of opposition)
 - Different clustering methods

Transmission channels?

- **Likely not vested interests**
 - Control for political mandates, decorations, time holding a Cabinet position, # interventions in the Parliament, #applause in the Parliament, #boos in the Parliament.

= Results in line with Baseline results
- **Likely not preferences for checks and balances**
 - The democratic dynasty dummy does not correlate with opposition during previous delegations of power
 - Results in line with baseline results when controlling for opposition in previous delegations of power

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A tentative explanation - Local environment

Local environment as a norms-enforcing device (Within-dynasties estimates)

Sample	(1) No1940 Dem Dyn	(2) No1940 Dem Dyn	(3) No1940 Dem Dyn	(4) No1940 Dem Dyn	(5) No1940 All Dyn	(6) No1940 All Dyn	(7) No1940 All Dyn	(8) No1940 All Dyn
Nb Interventions in Chamber	-19.34*** (-3.292)				-8.636 (-1.405)			
Special role in Assembly		-6.670*** (-3.099)				0.238 (0.220)		
Year as a conseil. gen.			0.147** (2.438)				0.0249 (0.837)	
SyndicalismDyn				6.036*** (3.136)				1.279 (1.047)
Constant	-47.29*** (-2.911)	-47.55*** (-3.984)	-26.96*** (-3.738)	-27.83*** (-2.764)	-10.75* (-1.695)	-7.709* (-1.838)	-7.472* (-1.870)	-8.216* (-1.869)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	57	57	57	57	108	108	108	108

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Additional result:

Democratic dynasties with syndicalism = +15% opposition
 Democratic dynasties without syndicalism = +7.5% opposition

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- **To our knowledge, this is the first paper:**
 - Showing a “positive” effect of political dynasties. They stabilize the political regime they originate from.
 - Showing an heterogeneous effect of political dynasties - “Democratic dynasties” vs other-types of dynasties
- The negative consequences of dynasties have to be weighed against their stabilizing properties.
- Pro-democracy environments monitor politicians and encourage democratic consolidation.
- “Democratic dynasties” might be a dimension of democratic capital [Persson and Tabellini, 2009].

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