
Incarceration of African American Men and the Impacts on Women and Children

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ASSA

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Mass Incarceration



Research Questions

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 - Women's marriage and labor market outcomes;
 - Children's family structure, long-run educational outcome, and income.

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 - Women's marriage and labor market outcomes;
 - Children's family structure, long-run educational outcome, and income.
- Different effects of black men who serve relatively short and long terms of imprisonment.

Why important?

- Evaluation of sentencing policies.
- Understanding of inequality and racial gap.

- Impacts of Incarceration
 - Former prisoners: E.g., Levitt (1996), Kling (2006), Hjalmarsson (2009), Green and Winik (2010), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013), Aizer and Doyle (2015), Mueller-Smith (2015), Bhuller et al. (2018).
 - Marriage market: Charles and Luoh (2010), Mechoulan (2011), O'keefe (2018).

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Sex Ratios and Marriage Markets

- Exogenous variation: Becker (1973, 1974), Angrist (2002), Chiappori et al. (2002), Abramitzky et al. (2008), .
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- Race-specific sex ratios.
- Sentencing Policies and Prison Population
 - Panel regressions
 - Simulation models: Blumstein and Beck (1999), Pfaff (2011), Raphael and Stoll (2013), Neal and Rick (2016).

Data and Measurement

- National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP)
 - Individual-level records of all prisoners: Admissions and releases (1983-2009); stocks in custody (2004-2009).
 - Demographic and sentence information (e.g., offense, sentence, county of sentence).
 - Incarceration rate by gender, race, year, and MSA where sentence was imposed.

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Household data: 5% Census, ACS, CPS.

Women's and children's outcomes.

Impact of black male incarceration on women and children:

$$y_{imt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 incar_{mt} + X_{imt}\pi + \theta_t + \mu_m + \epsilon_{imt}.$$

- ▶ *i*: individual; *m*: MSA; t: year.
- *y*: women's or children's outcome.
- ▶ *incar*: the incarceration rate of black men.

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- Construction: sufficient statistics of sentencing outcomes.
 - Probability of prison admission conditional on arrest;
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 - Leave out the own MSA: local crimes and judges.
- Identifying assumption: Changes in sentencing policies are exogenous.
 - Confounding variables (e.g., crime rate, racial composition).

- A_{mt}^c : number of admissions for crime c, MSA m, and year t.
- C_{mt}^c : population of criminals prevalence of crime.
- α_{mt}^c : Pr(arrest | engagement in crime *c*) police effectiveness.
- γ^c_{mt}: Pr(prison admission | arrest for crime c) punitiveness of sentencing policies.

$$A_{mt}^c = C_{mt}^c \alpha_{mt}^c \gamma_{mt}^c$$

Assume that the prison population starts with zero at t = 0.


The prison population of year-end 1 sentenced from MSA m (I_{m1}) is:

$$I_{m1} = \sum_{c=1}^{N} I_{m1}^{c} = \sum_{c=1}^{N} A_{m1}^{c} = \sum_{\substack{c=1\\ \text{prisoners admitted in year 1}}}^{N} C_{m1}^{c} \alpha_{m1}^{c} \gamma_{m1}^{c}$$

The prison population of year-end 2 sentenced from MSA m (I_{m2}) is:


where \bar{S}_{mt}^c is average time served.

The prison population of year-end t sentenced from MSA m (I_{mt}) is:




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


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To construct simulated IV, hold behavior constant!

Let $C_{mt}^c \alpha_{mt}^c$ be constant: $C \alpha$ – normalization

$$I_{mt}|_{\text{arrest}} = \sum_{c=1}^{N} C \alpha \gamma_{mt}^{c} + \sum_{c=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} C \alpha \gamma_{mj}^{c} \mathbbm{1}\{\bar{S}_{mj}^{c} > t-j\}$$

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Let $C_{mt}^{c}\alpha_{mt}^{c}$ be constant: $C\alpha$ – normalization

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Simulated IV

Simulated instrument for the incarceration rate:


$$IV_{mt} = \frac{\sum_{c=1}^{N} C \alpha \gamma_{s(m)t}^{c} + \sum_{c=1}^{N} \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} C \alpha \gamma_{s(m)j}^{c} \mathbb{1}\{\bar{S}_{-mj}^{c} > t-j\}}{P_{mt}}$$

where

• $\gamma_{s(m)t}^c$: Pr(admission to prison | arrest).

- \bar{S}_{-mt}^c : Average length of sentence served.
- \triangleright $C\alpha$: Average number of arrests.
- \blacktriangleright P_{mt} : Resident population.

Behavior-constant Prison Population Arkansas



Note: Voluntary sentencing guideline and determinate sentencing in 1994, and three-strikes law in 1995.

Threats to Identification

- 1. Sentencing outcomes may be driven by severity of crimes.
- 2. Large MSAs may dominate a state's policy-making.
- 3. Harsher sentencing policies may be initiated by confounding factors.
- 4. Sentencing policies may affect women directly or through female incarceration. Detail
- 5. Prison overcrowding may affect sentencing outcomes. Detail

Incarceration rate of black men

- Black women:
 - ▶ \downarrow married or marrying up
 - ↑ employed
- Black children:
 - † born out of wedlock
 - † living in a mother-only family
 - $\blacktriangleright \downarrow$ obtaining some college education

Incarceration rate of black men († 1 pp):

- Black women:
 - \downarrow married (3 pp) or marrying up (2 pp);
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- Black children:
 - † born out of wedlock (4.3 pp);
 - † living in a mother-only family (3.5 pp);
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Black men at different margins of incarceration:

- Extensive-margin incarceration: more-educated women;
- ▶ Intensive-margin incarceration: less-educated women, children.

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Findings

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
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Harsher sentencing policies:


↑ black-white intergenerational income gap for men.

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
Incarceration Growth



Arrest Rates (Black Adults)



Crime Rates (Black Adults)



Source: FBI's Uniform Crime Reports, 1970-2013.

Perpetual Inventory Method

- I^{rs}_{mt}: the number of prisoners in custody of race r and sex s, sentenced from MSA m at yearend t.
- A_{mt}^{rs} : the number of persons admitted to prison.
- R_{mt}^{rs} : the number of persons released from prison.
- Change of prison population between yearend t 1 and t:

$$\Delta I_{mt}^{rs} = A_{mt}^{rs} - R_{mt}^{rs}.$$

Back out the number of prisoners in custody before 2009:


$$I_{m,2008}^{rs} = I_{m,2009}^{rs} - \Delta I_{m,2009}^{rs}$$

$$I_{m,2007}^{rs} = I_{m,2008}^{rs} - \Delta I_{m,2008}^{rs}$$


$$\dots$$

$$I_{m,1983}^{rs} = I_{m,1984}^{rs} - \Delta I_{m,1984}^{rs}$$

Estimated & Reported Prison Population: MSA Level



Estimated & Reported Prison Population: State Level



Back correlation = 0.935

- 1. Sentencing outcomes may be driven by severity of crimes.
 - Leave-one-out means.
 - Sentencing outcomes have been more punitive towards almost all types of offenses. Admission/1000 Arrests
 - Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Drug Possession
- 2. Large MSAs may dominate a state's policy-making.
- 3. Harsher sentencing policies may be initiated by confounding factors.
- 4. Sentencing policies may affect women directly or through female incarceration.
- 5. Prison overcrowding may affect sentencing outcomes.

- 1. Sentencing outcomes can be driven by criminal behaviors.
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HHI: relative black population of MSAs within states.

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
Back

- 1. Sentencing outcomes can be driven by criminal behaviors.
- 2. Large MSAs may dominate a state's policy-making.
- 3. Harsher sentencing policies may be initiated by confounding factors.
 - Control for lags and leads of the IV.
 - Correlation between the IV and potential confounding factors (e.g., crime rates and proportion of the black population).
 - Control for state-specific time trends.
- 4. Sentencing policies may affect women directly or through female incarceration.
- 5. Prison overcrowding can affect sentencing outcomes.


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- 3. Harsher sentencing policies may be initiated by confounding factors.
- 4. Sentencing policies may affect women directly or through female incarceration.
 - Policies may not be salient to the general population.
 - Female incarceration rate is very low.
 - Other channels, other than black male incarceration, that would induce lower marriage, more out-of-wedlock children, and higher female employment at the same time?
- 5. Prison overcrowding can affect sentencing outcomes.


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- 5. Prison overcrowding can affect sentencing outcomes.
 - Control for lags and leads of the IV.
 - Judges' discretion to impose alternatives to incarceration \$\propto due to guidelines (Conaboy, 1997).
 - Prison overcrowding should not affect sentencing outcomes of a state's prisoners sent to federal prisons.


Pr(Prison Admission | Arrest) Black Offenders, Drug Possession



Note: Anti-Drug Abuse Act effective on Oct 27, 1986. Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act effective on Nov 18, 1988.







Graphs by Category of Offenses

