

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION, IDENTITY, AND CIVIL WAR

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- Difficult to determine key factors contributing to civil wars.
- Ethnic fragmentation not related to civil wars (Fearon and Laitin, 2003)
- Polarization, though, appears to matter (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray, 2012)
- What about external interventions? (Civil wars as proxy wars during Cold war; more recently, DRC, Ukraine, Syria , Libya wars.)

- Motivation: polarization empirical result appears related to Cold War
- External intervention or identity (ethnic, religious, class) can each induce rebellion or civil war.
- External interventions exacerbate existing identity cleavages .
- Synergies between external intervention and identity.
- Model with rebellion and civil war as possible outcomes; distinction between War and Settlement.
- Examples/Possible case studies

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- Targeted expenditures on capital equipment, training, and organization (reduces marginal cost of other military expenditures)
- General subsidies to rebels conditional on rebellion
- Economic benefits to rebels, conditional on winning autonomy or independence (e.g., direct grants, investment, loan facilities, technical assistance, trade deals and preferential access to sponsor's markets)

Model in which rebels seek autonomy or secession

- Group A in government; B potential rebels.
- Material (total Y) and non-material payoffs
- Possible outcomes:
- Status quo (no rebellion) with payoffs:

$$U_a^q = \gamma Y$$

$$U_b^q = (1 - \gamma)Y - (1 - \alpha)\Delta$$

- Rebellion followed by Settlement
- Rebellion, followed by War and Win by the Rebels, leading to Autonomy or Secession
- Rebellion, followed by War and Win by the government.

Sequence of moves (in case of rebellion)

- 1 A and B choose simultaneously m_a and m_b military efforts.
- 2 A chooses whether to engage in War or Settlement. If they choose War, then War takes place with the probabilities of winning for the two sides: $p_a = \frac{m_a}{m_b + m_a}$, $p_b = 1 - p_a = \frac{m_b}{m_b + m_a}$
- 3 If A chooses Settlement, then they make an offer to B .
- 4 B either accepts or rejects the offer made by A . If they accept, the payoffs of A and B are in accordance with the offer. If they reject the offer, War takes place with the probabilities of winning described above.

Expected payoffs under War

- $U_a^W = p_a Y + (1 - p_a)0 - F - c_a m_a$
- $U_b^W = p_a(-(1 - \alpha)\Delta) + (1 - p_a)(Y + S_b^*) - F - c_b m_b$
- Arming under War:

$$m_a^W = \frac{c_b(Y + S_b^* + (1 - \alpha)\Delta)Y^2}{[c_b Y + c_a(Y + S_b^* + (1 - \alpha)\Delta)]^2}$$

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When War can occur

$$2F < \frac{c_a(Y + S_b^* + (1-\alpha)\Delta)}{c_b Y + c_a(Y + S_b^* + (1-\alpha)\Delta)} (S_b^* + (1-\alpha)\Delta)$$

Conditional on B choosing to rebel, War will occur only if the previous inequality were to hold. Then War is more likely,

- (i) the higher is the external subsidy S_b^* ;
- (ii) the higher is the distance Δ felt by group B ;
- (iii) the lower is the cost of War F ;
- (iv) the lower is group B 's marginal cost parameter c_b (and the more this parameter is lowered by subsidies from B^*);
- (v) the higher is the cost parameter c_a of A ;
- (vi) for $\alpha > 1/2$, the higher is the population of B (the lower is α);
- (vii) the higher is the polarization index $\alpha(1-\alpha)\Delta$.

Furthermore, whereas large enough S_b^* or Δ or a small enough F can induce War by themselves, none of the other factors can do so without complementing at least one of S_b^* , Δ or F .

Likelihood of Rebellion

Rebellion if $(1 - p_a^i)^2(Y + S_b^* + (1 - \alpha)\Delta) + M_b^* - (1 - \gamma)Y > F$
($i = w, s$)

A rebellion by B is more likely

- (i) the higher is the distance cost Δ ;
- (ii) the higher are the subsidies by B^* to B (S_b^* , M_b^* , and those that lower c_b);
- (iii) the lower is the share of A 's population $\alpha (> 1/2)$;
- (iv) the lower is the share of contested income $(1 - \gamma)$ received by B under the status quo;
- (v) the lower is the subsidy give by A^* to A to lower c_a ;
- (vi) the lower is the cost of War F ;
- (viii) the higher is the polarization measure $\alpha(1 - \alpha)\Delta$.

Evidence that perceived ethnic distance depends on the level of conflict

(Literature on Social Identity theory)

$\Delta = \Delta' + \delta(m_a + m_b)$ where $\Delta' > 0$ and $\delta \geq 0$

In equilibrium: $\Delta = \Delta' + \delta \frac{Y(Y+S_b^*+(1-\alpha)\Delta')}{c_b Y + c_a(Y+S_b^*+(1-\alpha)\Delta')}$

The endogenous distance cost whether there is War or Settlement under the threat of War is

- (i) increasing in the expected external subsidy S_b^* ;*
- (ii) decreasing in the marginal costs of military efforts c_a and c_b ;*
- (iii) increasing in the constant term of the distance cost Δ' and the sensitivity of the distance cost to military efforts (δ).*

It then follows that the same variables increase the chance of War and Rebellion.

Model Variations: Rebels seek government takeover; more groups

- Main difference from previous model: When A loses power, they incur cost of $\alpha\Delta$
- Same results for rebellion with Settlement
- Same results for rebellion with War, except for the effect of Δ
- More than two groups

Examples and possible case studies

- DRC (former Zaire)
- Syria
- Taiping Civil War
- American Revolution
- US Civil War
- Angola
- Fiji
- Former Soviet Union and Ukraine

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- \$5 bil. for "democratization" and "Yatch" (Victoria Nuland)
- Western Ukrainian identity as national identity

Concluding remarks

- External interventions critical in instigating rebellions and civil wars
- Interactions with group identification
- How external interventions exacerbate problems with identity
- Role of state capacity
- More on long-run evolution of identities in view of external interventions