Information Illusion:

Different Amounts of Information and Stock Price Estimates

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Motivation and research questions

- Information for individual financial decision making has been in the focus of research with regard to both relevance and appropriate amount of information.
- Ambiguous findings regarding the relevance of idiosyncratic and further ulletsystematic factors than the market factor.
- Appropriate amount of information considers recipients' limited cognitive ulletcapacity for information perception and processing, i.e. avoids information overload.

Data and methodology

- Questionnaire-based stock forecast price competition among 196 undergraduate students in business administration.
- Questionnaire consists of two parts:
 - 1. Items on participant characteristics: gender, knowledge, financial self-assessed knowledge statistics, attitude, risk in cognitive reflection, overconfidence, Big Five
- We analyze how investors perceive different amounts of information in ulletthe context of stock price estimates. Three main research questions:
 - 1. How well do participants feel informed when receiving different amounts of information?
 - 2. What impact do different amounts of information have on investors' expectation of stock return and risk and – ex post – the accuracy of their estimate?
 - 3. What impact do different amounts of information have on investors' expectations regarding the accuracy of their own stock price estimates compared to the accuracy of the estimates of other investors, i.e. in a stock price forecast competition?

personality factors, locus of control, affect.

2. Stock price forecast competition with three different stocks. Participants state expected stock return and risk. The first stock is presented with low amount of information and is the same in all questionnaires. The other two stocks are with medium (additional systematic) and high (additional systematic and idiosyncratic) amount of information. Second and third stock are presented in

Key Findings

- With more systematic and idiosyncratic information, participants state to have significantly more relevant information.
- But the amount of information has

Added information acts as placebic information and

| varying order among participants. | | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| How well do participants feel informed? | Perceived amount or relevant information | | | | | |
| Stock with amount of information | | | | | | |

| • But the amount of information has no significant influence on participants' stock price estimates. | leads to an information illusion. | Low Medium High | 4. 5. 5 | 04 19 71 | |
|---|--|------------------------------------|---|------------------|--|
| For stocks with medium and high amount of expect a significantly lower payoff from the because they on average expect a higher pro- | stocks with medium and high amount of information, participants ect a significantly lower payoff from the forecast competition, | | TIGN ****Differences between all three settings are statistically significant at one per mill level**** | | |
| all than for the stock with low amount of inform | ation. | | | | |
| Participants' expectations of payoffs from the c | competition still exceed the | Impact of information on | Expected | Expected | |
| payoffs that they could expect in a fair game. | | expected stock return | return (in | risk (in | |
| Participants' overconfidence plays a key role: | | and risk | percent) | percent) | |
| Participants with <u>higher levels of overcor</u> higher net payoffs from the forecast compet | nfidence generally expect ition and hardly lower their | Stock with amount of information | | | |
| expectations to win a prize when information | n IS added. | Low | 22 | 7.3 | |
| Participants with <u>lower levels of overconfide</u> net payoffs and also significantly lower th | ence state lower expected | Medium | 66 | 7.1 | |
| prize when information is added. | ion oppositions to will a | High | 39 | 7.5 | |
| Higher amounts of information reduce | ce less overconfident | Differences between any two settin | igs are not statistic | ally significant | |

Implications

Regulators and policy makers should consider that placebic information can significantly impact investors' perception; regulation on information that is provided to retail investors should focus on relevant and avoid irrelevant information.

participants' level of perceived expertise.

- Researchers should be aware that in experiments irrelevant information asymmetrically influences expectations of participants with different levels of overconfidence and their perception of how well they are informed.
- Research should analyze the impact of irrelevant information on financial \bullet decision making and interdependencies with individual characteristics in other methodological setups and for further groups of decision makers.

| ٦ | | Impact of information on | | Probability | | |
|--------|---|----------------------------------|------------|--------------|--|--|
| | | expected performance | Expected | no prize in | | |
| | | in the forecast | net payoff | competition | | |
| | | competition | (in Euro) | (in percent) | | |
|) F | | Stock with amount of information | | | | |
| ļ | | Low | 2.76 | 73.41 | | |
| | | Medium | 2.23 | 75,23 | | |
| I | | High | 2.21 | 76.32 | | |
| Ì | ***Differences between setting with low amount of information and other settings are statistically significant at least at the five per mill level*** | | | | | |