Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment Effects with Imperfect Instruments

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- Instrumental Variable (IV)
 - A popular solution to deal with endogeneity in social sciences

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- Instrumental Variable (IV)
 - A popular solution to deal with endogeneity in social sciences
- Key assumptions for the IV approach
 - Relevance: Correlation between the endogenous explanatory variable (EEV) and the IV
 - Exogeneity: No direct correlation between the potential outcome variable and the IV

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- Parametric Example: $Y = D\theta + U$
 - Relevance: $Cov(D, Z) \neq 0$;
 - Exogeneity: Cov(Z, U) = 0 for an instrument Z.

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 - Relevance: Correlation between the endogenous explanatory variable (EEV) and the IV
 - Exogeneity: No direct correlation between the potential outcome variable and the IV
- Parametric Example: $Y = D\theta + U$
 - Relevance: $Cov(D, Z) \neq 0$;
 - Exogeneity: Cov(Z, U) = 0 for an instrument Z.
- Exogeneity could be difficult to justify.

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Key Contributions

A nonparametric extension of Nevo and Rosen (2012)

Ø Building bridges between SDC and the literature

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Key Contributions

A nonparametric extension of Nevo and Rosen (2012) SDC: Same direction of correlation

- $Cov(D, U)Cov(Z, U) \ge 0$
- LEI: Less endogenous instrument
 - $|Corr(Z, U)| \leq |Corr(D, U)|$
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Key Contributions

A nonparametric extension of Nevo and Rosen (2012)

- SDC: Same direction of correlation
 - $Cov(D, U)Cov(Z, U) \ge 0$
- LEI: Less endogenous instrument
 - $|Corr(Z, U)| \leq |Corr(D, U)|$

Ø Building bridges between SDC and the literature

- MTS-MIV: Monotone treatment selection and monotone IV (Manski and Pepper, 2000, 2009)
- Comonotone IV: Comonotonicity between D and Z

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Potential Outcome Model (POM)

$$Y = \sum_{d=1}^{T} Y_d \mathbb{1} \{ D = d \}$$

$$\tag{1}$$

- Y: an outcome variable taking values in $\mathcal{Y} \subset \mathbb{R}$
- D: a discrete endogenous treatment variable taking values in $\mathcal{D} = \{1, 2, \dots, T\}$
- Y_d: a potential outcome that would have been observed if the treatment D had externally been set to d
- Z: an imperfect IV (IIV) in the sense that it may be correlated with the potential outcome Y_d with $Z \in \mathcal{Z} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^+$
 - Leading example: Parental education (Kédagni and Mourifié, 2020; Mourifié et al., 2020)

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Potential Outcome Model (POM)

$$Y = \sum_{d=1}^{T} Y_d \mathbb{1} \{ D = d \}$$

• The objects of interest:

- Potential outcome means $heta_d \equiv \mathbb{E}[Y_d] < \infty$
- Average treatment effects:
 - $ATE(d,d') \equiv heta_d heta_{d'}$, for $d,d' \in \mathcal{D}$
 - ATE(d, d') may vary across (d, d')
- Average treatment effect on the treated:
 - $ATT(d, d') \equiv \mathbb{E}[Y_d Y_{d'}|D = d]$
- Average treatment effect on the untreated:
 - $ATU(d, d') \equiv \mathbb{E}[Y_d Y_{d'}|D = d']$

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Assumption 1 (Bounded Support (BoS))

$$Supp(Y_d | D \neq d) = Supp(Y_d | D = d) = \left[\underline{y}_d, \overline{y}_d\right]$$

- The support of the counterfactual outcome is the same as that of the factual
- It is standard and similar to the usual bounded outcome assumption considered in Manski (1990, 1994)
- It does not require the support of the potential outcome Y_d to be uniform across all treatment levels d

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Assumption 2 (Same direction of correlation (SDC))

 $Cov(Y_d, D) Cov(Y_d, Z) \geq 0$

- It is equivalent to Assumption 3 in Nevo and Rosen (2012)
- The correlation between the imperfect instrument Z and the potential outcome Y_d has weakly the same sign as the correlation between the endogenous treatment D and the potential outcome
- If either the treatment *D* or the instrument *Z* is exogenous, then SDC holds
- If D = Z, then SDC trivially holds

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Bridges to SDC

- SDC is a weaker version of the concepts of MTS-MIV (Manski and Pepper, 2000, 2009)
 - MTS: Monotone treatment selection $(\mathbb{E}[Y_d|D = \ell] \text{ is monotone in } \ell)$
 - MIV: Monotone IV ($\mathbb{E}[Y_d|Z=z]$ is monotone in z)
- SDC is weaker than a comonotonicity between Z and D (CoMIV)
- MTS-MIV and CoMIV are two different sufficient conditions for SDC, but neither implies the other

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Binarized MTS-MIV

 In order to establish a connection between MTS-MIV and SDC, we introduce an intermediate concept

Definition 1 (Binarized MTS-MIV)

The variable Z is a binarized MTS-MIV for D if for each $d \in D$,

$$\left(g_d^+(j)-g_d^-(j)
ight)\left(h_d^+(z)-h_d^-(z)
ight)\geq 0 \ \ \mbox{for all } j, \ z.$$

where $g_d^+(j) = \mathbb{E}[Y_d | D \ge j]$, $g_d^-(j) = \mathbb{E}[Y_d | D < j]$, $h_d^+(z) = \mathbb{E}[Y_d | Z \ge z]$, and $h_d^-(z) = \mathbb{E}[Y_d | Z < z]$.

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Binarized MTS-MIV

Lemma 1

MTS-MIV in the same direction for D and Z implies that Z is a binarized MTS-MIV for D.

Lemma 2

If Z is a binarized MTS-MIV for D, then Assumption SDC holds.

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Binarized MTS-MIV



Figure: Illustration of Lemmas 1 and 2

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Definition 2 (Comonotonicity)

Let (Ω, \mathcal{F}) be a measurable space. Two random variables X_1 and X_2 defined on Ω are said to be comonotonic if

$$ig(X_1(\omega)-X_1(\omega')ig)ig(X_2(\omega)-X_2(\omega')ig)\geq 0 \ \ \mbox{for all} \ \ \omega,\omega'\in\Omega.$$

Definition 3 (Comonotone instrumental variable (CoMIV))

The variable Z is said to be a comonotone instrumental variable (CoMIV) for the treatment D if Z and D are comonotonic.

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CoMIV

Lemma 3

The following results hold.

- If D is a deterministic increasing function of Z (or vice versa), then Z is a CoMIV for D.
- Suppose D = h(Z, V), where h is increasing in both of its arguments, and V represents unobserved heterogeneity. If Z and V are comonotonic, then Z is a CoMIV for D.
 - For example, when D = 2Z + V and $Z = e^{V}$, Z is a CoMIV for D

Lemma 4

If Z is a CoMIV for D, then Assumption SDC holds.

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CoMIV



Figure: Illustration of Lemma 4

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Example 1

Consider the following data generating process (DGP)

$$\begin{cases} Y = 2D + U \\ D = 0 \cdot \mathbb{1} \{ V \in [0,1] \} + 1 \cdot \mathbb{1} \{ V \in (1,\frac{3}{2}] \} + 2 \cdot \mathbb{1} \{ V \in (\frac{3}{2},5] \} \\ Z = 2D \\ U = 4V \mathbb{1} \{ V \in [1,2] \} + V \mathbb{1} \{ V \notin [1,2] \} \end{cases}$$

where $V \sim \mathcal{U}_{[0,5]}$.

- The DGP does not satisfy MTS-MIV
- The DGP satisfies binarized MTS-MIV
 - Thus, the DGP satisfies SDC by Lemma 1
- The DGP also satisfies CoMIV
 - Thus, the DGP satisfies SDC by Lemma 4

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Figure: Numerical illustration of a violation of MTS and MIV

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 $g_d^+(j)$ and $g_d^-(j)$, d=0

 $h_d^+(k)$ and $h_d^-(k)$, d=0



Figure: Numerical illustration of binarized MTS-MIV 1

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 $g_d^+(j)$ and $g_d^-(j)$, d=1

 $h_d^+(k)$ and $h_d^-(k)$, d=1



Figure: Numerical illustration of binarized MTS-MIV 2

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 $g_d^+(j)$ and $g_d^-(j)$, d=2

 $h_d^+(k)$ and $h_d^-(k)$, d=2



Figure: Numerical illustration of binarized MTS-MIV 3

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Relationship between the Assumptions



Figure: Illustration of Example 1 and Assumptions

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Relationship between the Assumptions



Figure: Illustration of Supplementary Examples

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Assumption 3 (Less endogenous instrument (LEI))

 $\mid \rho_{Y_dD} \mid \geq \mid \rho_{Y_dZ} \mid$

where ρ_{UV} denotes the coefficient of correlation between two random variables U and V.

- It is the same assumption as Assumption 4 in Nevo and Rosen (2012)
- The imperfect instrument Z is less correlated with the potential outcome than is the endogenous treatment D
- In the context of our empirical example, it reasonable to assume that parental education is less correlated with the individual's potential wage than is the individual's own education

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Assumption 4 (Monotone treatment response (MTR))

 $Y_d \ge Y_{d'}$ for all d > d'.

- The potential outcome weakly increases with the level of the treatment (Manski, 1997)
- In the returns to schooling example, it implies that the wage that a worker earns weakly increases as a function of the worker's years of schooling.

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Assumption 5 (Roy Selection (RS))

$$\{D = d\} \iff \{Y_d > Y_{d'} \quad \text{for all} \quad d' \neq d\}$$

- Agents choose the level of treatment that maximizes their potential outcome (Roy, 1951)
 - This version implicitly assumes that agents have perfect foresight
- Note that Assumption RS is not compatible with the MTS and MTR assumptions, while Assumption SDC is

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Nevo and Rosen (2012)'s Approach

• Consider the simple linear model:

$$Y = \theta D + U$$

• From the model, we have

$$\theta^{OLS} = \frac{Cov(Y, D)}{Var(D)} = \theta + \frac{Cov(D, U)}{Var(D)}$$
$$\theta^{IV} = \frac{Cov(Y, Z)}{Cov(D, Z)} = \theta + \frac{Cov(Z, U)}{Cov(D, Z)}$$

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$$\theta^{IV} = \frac{Cov(Y, Z)}{Cov(D, Z)} = \theta + \frac{Cov(Z, U)}{Cov(D, Z)}$$

• Under SDC,

 $\mathit{Cov}(D,U) \geq 0$, $\mathit{Cov}(Z,U) \geq 0$ or $\mathit{Cov}(D,U) \leq 0$, $\mathit{Cov}(Z,U) \leq 0$

$$\implies \qquad \theta^{IV} \le \theta \le \theta^{OLS} \text{ or } \theta^{OLS} \le \theta \le \theta^{IV} \qquad (\text{if } \rho_{DZ} < 0)$$

$$\theta \le \min\{\theta^{OLS}, \theta^{IV}\} \text{ or } \max\{\theta^{OLS}, \theta^{IV}\} \le \theta \quad (\text{if } \rho_{DZ} > 0)$$

• Assumption SDC is equivalent to

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\tilde{D}\right]\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\tilde{Z}\right] \geq 0$$
 where $\tilde{D} \equiv D - \mathbb{E}[D]$ and $\tilde{Z} \equiv Z - \mathbb{E}[Z]$

• That is equivalent to: either

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\tilde{D}\right] \geq 0, \tag{2}$$
$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\tilde{Z}\right] \geq 0, \tag{3}$$

or

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\tilde{D}\right] \leq 0, \tag{4}$$
$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\tilde{Z}\right] \leq 0. \tag{5}$$

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• Inequality (2) implies that, for any $\alpha \in [0,1)$, we have the following inequalities

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_{d}\alpha\tilde{D}\right]\geq0 \text{ and } \mathbb{E}\left[-Y_{d}\alpha\tilde{D}\right]\leq0,$$

• They are equivalent to

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\left(1+\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\right] \geq \mathbb{E}[Y_d] \equiv \theta_d \text{ and } \mathbb{E}\left[Y_d\left(1-\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\right] \leq \mathbb{E}[Y_d] \equiv \theta_d,$$

which we rewrite using the identity $\mathbbm{1}\left\{D=d\right\}+\mathbbm{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\}=1$ as

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y\left(1+\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\mathbb{1}\left\{D=d\right\}+Y_d\left(1+\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\mathbb{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\}\right] \geq \theta_d, \quad (6)$$

$$\mathbb{E}\left[Y\left(1-\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\mathbb{1}\left\{D=d\right\}+Y_d\left(1-\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\mathbb{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\}\right] \leq \theta_d, \quad (7)$$

respectively, given that $Y = Y_d$ when D = d.

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• Using Assumption BoS, we can bound the counterfactuals (second terms of (6) and (7)) as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} Y_{d}\left(1+\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\mathbbm{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\} &\leq \\ &\max\left\{\underline{y}_{d}\left(1+\alpha\tilde{D}\right),\overline{y}_{d}\left(1+\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\right\}\mathbbm{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\} \\ Y_{d}\left(1-\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\mathbbm{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\} &\geq \\ &\min\left\{\underline{y}_{d}\left(1-\alpha\tilde{D}\right),\overline{y}_{d}\left(1-\alpha\tilde{D}\right)\right\}\mathbbm{1}\left\{D\neq d\right\} \end{array}$$

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• Therefore, the inequalities (6) and (7) imply that

$$\mathbb{E}\Big[\overline{f}_d\left(Y, D, 1 + \alpha \tilde{D}\right)\Big] \geq \theta_d \text{ and } \mathbb{E}\Big[\underline{f}_d\left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha \tilde{D}\right)\Big] \leq \theta_d$$

for any $\alpha \in [0,1)$, where we define the function \underline{f}_d and \overline{f}_d as

$$\underline{f}_{d}(Y, D, \delta) \equiv \mathbb{1} \{ D = d \} \, \delta Y + \mathbb{1} \{ D \neq d \} \min \left\{ \delta \underline{y}_{d}, \delta \overline{y}_{d} \right\}$$

$$\overline{f}_{d}(Y, D, \delta) \equiv \mathbb{1} \{ D = d \} \, \delta Y + \mathbb{1} \{ D \neq d \} \max \left\{ \delta \underline{y}_{d}, \delta \overline{y}_{d} \right\}.$$

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• Finally, we can then take the supremum and the infimum of the lower and upper bounds over α , respectively, to obtain the following bounds for θ_d :

$$I_{SDC1}^{d} \equiv \left[\sup_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E}\left[\underline{f}_{-d}\left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha \tilde{D}\right)\right], \inf_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E}\left[\overline{f}_{-d}\left(Y, D, 1 + \alpha \tilde{D}\right)\right]\right]$$

which is implied by the inequality (2)

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• In the same manner, from (3), (4), and (5), we have

$$\begin{split} I_{SDC2}^{d} &\equiv \left[\sup_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\underline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha \tilde{Z} \right) \Big], \inf_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\overline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 + \alpha \tilde{Z} \right) \Big] \Big], \\ I_{SDC3}^{d} &\equiv \left[\sup_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\underline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 + \alpha \tilde{D} \right) \Big], \inf_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\overline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha \tilde{D} \right) \Big] \Big], \\ I_{SDC4}^{d} &\equiv \left[\sup_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\underline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 + \alpha \tilde{Z} \right) \Big], \inf_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\overline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha \tilde{Z} \right) \Big] \Big], \end{split}$$

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Proposition 1

Under Assumptions BoS and SDC, the identification region for the parameter θ_d is:

$$I_{SDC}^{d} \equiv \left(I_{SDC1}^{d} \cap I_{SDC2}^{d}\right) \cup \left(I_{SDC3}^{d} \cap I_{SDC4}^{d}\right).$$

- We relax the parametric linear assumption at the expense of the bounded support assumption
- The bounds derived in Proposition 1 may not be sharp

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Identification under SDC and LEI

Proposition 2

Under Assumptions BoS, SDC and LEI, the identification region for θ_d is:

$$I_{LEI}^{d} \equiv \left(I_{LEI1}^{d} \cap I_{SDC2}^{d}\right) \cup \left(I_{LEI2}^{d} \cap I_{SDC4}^{d}\right).$$

where $I_{LEI1}^{d} \equiv \left[\sup_{\alpha \in I0} \mathbb{E}\left[\underline{f}_{d}\left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha\left(\tilde{D}\sigma_{Z} - \tilde{Z}\sigma_{D}\right)\right)\right],\right]$ $\inf_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \mathbb{E} \Big[\overline{f}_d \left(Y, D, 1 + \alpha \left(\widetilde{D} \sigma_Z - \widetilde{Z} \sigma_D \right) \right) \Big] \Big|$ $I_{LEI2}^{d} \equiv \bigg| \sup_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\underline{f}_{-d} \left(\mathbf{Y}, D, 1 + \alpha \left(\tilde{D} \sigma_{Z} - \tilde{Z} \sigma_{D} \right) \right) \Big],$ $\inf_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \left[\overline{f}_d \left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha \left(\widetilde{D} \sigma_Z - \widetilde{Z} \sigma_D \right) \right) \right] \right|$

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Inference of the set I_{SDC}^d

$$I_{SDC}^{d} = \left(I_{SDC1}^{d} \cap I_{SDC2}^{d}\right) \cup \left(I_{SDC3}^{d} \cap I_{SDC4}^{d}\right)$$

- This is an intersection-union test as described in Berger (1982)
- Construct confidence regions for the sets I^d_{SDC1} ∩ I^d_{SDC2} and I^d_{SDC3} ∩ I^d_{SDC4} using the intersection bounds framework of Chernozhukov et al. (2013) or Andrews and Shi (2013)
- Take the union of the two confidence regions, which has at least the same coverage rate as each confidence region (Berger and Hsu, 1996)

Inference of the set I_{SDC}^d

• If we draw U from the uniform distribution over [0, 1), independently of the data (Y, D, Z), then we have

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\underline{f}_{d}\left(Y, D, 1 - U\tilde{D}\right) \middle| U = \alpha\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\underline{f}_{d}\left(Y, D, 1 - \alpha\tilde{D}\right)\right]$$

• Then, for instance, we have

$$\begin{split} I^{d}_{SDC1} &= \left[\sup_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\underline{f}_{d} \Big(Y, D, 1 - U \tilde{D} \Big) \Big| U = \alpha \Big], \\ &\inf_{\alpha \in [0,1)} \mathbb{E} \Big[\overline{f}_{d} \left(Y, D, 1 + U \tilde{D} \right) \Big| U = \alpha \Big] \right] \end{split}$$

which takes the from of conditional moment inequalities

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Data

- A data set drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSYM)
 - This data includes 3,010 young men who were ages 24-34 in 1976
- The outcome variable (Y) is log hourly wage in cents (*lwage*)
- The treatment variable (D) is education (*educ*) grouped in 4 categories:
 - Iess than high school (educ < 12 years)</p>
 - 2 high school ($12 \leq educ < 16$)
 - 3 college degree $(16 \le educ < 18)$
 - graduate ($educ \ge 18$)
- Imperfect IV (Z) is parental education
 - An individual's ability can be dependent on her parents' ability, which is correlated with parental education

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Estimation

- For practical reasons, we follow Ginther (2000) to trim the log wage
 - In theory, the outcome variable *lwage* is unbounded
 - $Y = \tau$ -quantile of *lwage* if *lwage* is less than or equal to its τ -quantile
 - $Y = (1 \tau)$ -quantile of *lwage* if *lwage* is greater than or equal to its (1τ) -quantile
 - Y = lwage otherwise
 - We set $\tau = 0.05$
- Two-sided confidence bounds on the potential average log wages using the *clr2bound* command of Chernozhukov et al. (2015) in the Stata software
- The results with mother's education as an IIV are presented

Estimated Confidence Intervals

Parameters	95% conf. LB	95% conf. UB
$\theta_0 \ (< high)$	5.53	6.86
θ_1 (high)	5.89	6.66
θ_2 (college)	5.65	6.88
θ_3 (graduate)	5.55	6.94
$\theta_0 - \theta_1$	-1.13	0.97
$ heta_2 - heta_1$	-1.01	0.98
$\theta_3 - \theta_1$	-1.11	1.05

Table: Confidence sets for parameters under SDC

* conf. LB: confidence lower bound; conf. UB: confidence upper bound.

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Estimated Confidence Intervals

Table: Confidence sets for parameters under SDC and LEI

Parameters	95% conf. LB	95% conf. UB
$\theta_0 \ (< high)$	5.53	6.86
θ_1 (high)	5.89	6.66
θ_2 (college)	5.65	6.86
θ_3 (graduate)	5.55	6.94
$\theta_0 - \theta_1$	-1.13	0.97
$\theta_2 - \theta_1$	-1.01	0.97
$\theta_3 - \theta_1$	-1.11	1.05

* conf. LB: confidence lower bound; conf. UB: confidence upper bound.

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Estimated Confidence Intervals

Table: Confidence sets for parameters under SDC, LEI, and MTR

Parameters	95% conf. LB	95% conf. UB
$\theta_0 \ (< high)$	5.53	6.30
θ_1 (high)	6.30	6.46
θ_2 (college)	6.46	6.82
θ_3 (graduate)	6.82	6.94
$ heta_0 - heta_1$	-0.93	0.00
$ heta_2 - heta_1$	0.00	0.52
$\theta_3 - \theta_1$	0.36	0.64

* conf. LB: confidence lower bound; conf. UB: confidence upper bound.

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- Analytical Framework



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Conclusion

- Non-parametric bounds on the average treatment effect are derived when an imperfect instrument is available
 - Nevo and Rosen (2012)'s identification results are extended
- We show that the MTS-MIV restrictions introduced by Manski and Pepper (2000, 2009), jointly imply the SDC assumption
- We introduce the concept of comonotone IV, which also satisfies the SDC assumption
- The identified set takes the form of intersection bounds, which can be implemented using the Chernozhukov et al. (2013) inferential method
- We illustrate our methodology using the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men data to estimate returns to schooling

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