Are Women Really Better Borrowers in Microfinance?

Evidence from Matrilineal and Patrilineal Societies in India

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Why Microfinance?

- Nover 2.5 billion people more than $\frac{1}{3}$ rd of world's population live on less than \$2 per day and remain unbanked (Karlan and Appel 2011)
- Under this background microfinance has emerged as an alternative way to rethink banking for the poor
 - Number of microfinance clients had increased from 7.6 million in 1997 to 137.5 million in 2010 (Banerjee et al. 2015)
- Two popular lending innovations in microfinance: group liability and gender targeting

Why Women?

- ➤ More than 80% of all microfinance clients worldwide are women (D'Espallier et al. 2011).
- > Double dividend of gender targeting of women in microfinance
- 1. Social dividend: women empowerment, investment in child schooling and healthcare
- 2. Economic dividend: higher repayment rates for the lenders
- Conventional wisdom in microfinance (World Bank Report, 2008): Women are better credit risks than men.


Research Questions

- > Are women really better borrowers in microfinance?
 - Does gender targeting generate higher repayment rates for the Microfinance Institutions (MFIs)?

- > What drives gender differences in repayment among borrowers?
 - Do social context and norms lead to gender differences in behavior among microfinance borrowers?

The Answer Lies Here





http://www.mdoner.gov.in/zoomimzgemap/imagemap.php?map=States Maps/Assam

The Two Societies- Karbi and Khasi

- The Khasis and the Karbis share a genetic background and appear to be close kin based on genetic analysis of six polymorphic loci (Roychoudhury 1992)
- They are neighboring societies in the north-eastern region of India
- ➤ Both are either Christians or follow their indigenous religion (nature worship)
- Both are indigenous agricultural societies
- > But the two societies are very different in terms of gender relations
 - Karbis are a patrilineal society while the Khasis are a matrilineal society

Patrilineal Karbi

Matrilineal Khasi

- Men inherit and control property
 - Eldest son gets family property
- Wife moves to husband's house
 - But do not own property

- Men do not inherit property, women do
 - Youngest daughter gets family property
- Husband moves to wife's house
 - But do not own property

- Women have very little bargaining and decision-making power
- Women have a lot of bargaining and decision-making power



Project Choice

> Subjects receive a loan and decides independently to invest between the following *projects*:

Project	Success		Failure
	Prob	Return	Return
X	5/6	60	0
Y	1/2	160	0

Repayment Choice

- > If project fails then individual subjects cannot repay loan
 - Involuntary or non-strategic default

- If project is successful, individual subjects decide independently between the following:
 - Repay loan
 - Default strategically

Microfinance Games

- > 368 subjects in total (184 male, 184 female) participated in the experiment
- > Each subject is randomly assigned to one of the 2 microfinance games:
 - Individual game and Group liability game
- For group liability loans, two subjects of the same gender and society are randomly matched and make the same decisions in the experiment
- Group debt is split equally among the two randomly matched group members
 - If one group member defaults, the other must repay the entire group loan to continue receiving loans in future rounds in the experiment

What Else can Matter?

Individual Characteristics


- ✓ Age
- ✓ Religion
- ✓ Household members
- ✓ Whether head of household
- ✓ Type of dwelling
- ✓ Whether holds a bank account

Risk Attitudes


- Implemented incentivized
 Investment Risk Task
- Subjects choose how much of a fixed endowment to invest in a risky lottery that yields a return of 3 times the amount invested with 50% chance and zero otherwise
- The lower the amount invested, the more risk averse subjects are




Reversal of Gender Effect in Loan Default




Risky Project Choice: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi



Strategic Default: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi



Risk Attitude: Matrilineal Khasi vs. Patrilineal Karbi



Outcome Variables	(1) Risky Project Choice+	(2) Strategic Default+
Famala	-0.23***	-0.10**
Female	(0.07)	(0.04)
Matuilia a al 171a a ai	-0.01	-0.05
Matrilineal Khasi	(0.07)	(0.03)
F1-*N/1	0.15*	0.16***
Female*Matrilineal	(0.09)	(0.05)
C I 1 111	0.22***	0.10**
Group Liability	(0.05)	(0.04)
T 4 4 D' 1	0.32***	0.003
Investment Risk	(0.06)	(0.03)
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes
Round Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	743	592
Pseudo R-Squared	0.13	0.20

Robust standard errors, clustered at group level, in parentheses.

^{***} p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Key Findings

- > Reversal of gender effect across societies
 - In patrilineal society women are better credit risks (conventional wisdom)
 - But the pattern reverses in matrilineal society (new insight)
- Matrilineal women are more likely to invest in risky projects and default strategically more than patrilineal women

➤ Patrilineal women are significantly more risk-averse than patrilineal men, but this gender gap disappears in the matrilineal society

Policy Implications

- Microfinance Policy
 - Although women have lower default on average, a universal gender targeting policy might be suboptimal in presence of heterogeneity across societies

- > Development Policies in general importance of social context
 - One should be careful about generalizing a policy simply because it has worked in a particular context
 - Policymakers should take into consideration the heterogeneity and the social context to design better targeted policies

