

# Trade Credit and Markups

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## Overview

Document with U.S. Compustat and Chilean micro data that:

- Trade credit use increases in markups
- Markup effect stronger when borrowing costs higher

Rationalize findings in model with

- Positive markups
  - Costly financial intermediation (borrowing rate exceeds deposits rate)
- ⇒ Financing cost advantage of trade credit.

## Introduction

Trade credit is the most important form of short-term finance for firms. In 2019, U.S. non-financial firms had \$4.5 trillion in trade credit outstanding, equaling 21 percent of U.S. GDP.

## Intuition for main mechanism

**Trade Credit:** Seller borrows production cost  $C$ :

$$FC^{TC} = r_b \frac{C}{\text{Production Cost}} \quad (1)$$

**Cash in Advance:** Buyer borrows revenue  $R = \mu C$ ; seller deposits surplus liquidity  $R - C = (\mu - 1)C$ :

$$FC^{CIA} = r_b \frac{\mu C}{\text{Revenues}} - r_d \frac{(\mu - 1)C}{\text{Bank Deposit}} \quad (2)$$

**Difference in financing costs:**

$$\Delta FC = FC^{CIA} - FC^{TC} = (\mu - 1)(r_b - r_d)C \quad (3)$$

⇒ If there is a positive markup and the borrowing rate is above the deposit rate, cash in advance has higher financing costs than trade credit.

## Proposition 1: Payment Choice: Domestic Case

Suppose the borrowing rate is above the deposit rate,  $r_b > r_d$ , and firms charge a positive markup over effective costs ( $\mu > 1 + r_b$ ). Then, firms should always use trade credit.

## Proposition 3: Trade Credit and Markups

Suppose  $(1 + r_b^*) \tilde{\lambda}^* > (1 + r_d) \tilde{\lambda}$ , where  $(\tilde{\lambda}, \tilde{\lambda}^*)$  are functions of domestic and foreign contract enforcement. Then:


- The use of trade credit increases with the markup  $\mu$ .
- This effect increases with  $r_b^*$  and  $\lambda^*$  and decreases with  $r_d$  and  $\lambda$ .

## Data

- **United States:** Compustat, 1965-2016.
- **Chile:** (i) Customs-level data, containing payment mode information; (ii) Production-level data at the firm-product level from ENIA, 2003-2007.
- **Chilean data key for identification:** It allows instrumenting markups with physical productivity (TFPQ), and controlling for exhaustive set of fixed effects, including firm-year fixed effects.
- **Markups estimation:** Follow production-based approach by De Loecker et al (2016), and De Loecker, Eeckout and Unger (2020).

## Graphical Evidence

Figure 1: Trade Credit Share Increases with Markups: U.S. Evidence



## Empirical Specification

**First Stage**

$$\ln(\mu_{ipt}) = \gamma_1 \ln(TFPQ_{ipt}) + \gamma_2 \ln(L_{it}) + \alpha_i + \alpha_p + \alpha_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ipt} \quad (4)$$

**Second Stage**

$$\rho_{ijpt} = \beta_1 \widehat{\ln \mu_{ipt}} + \beta_2 \ln(L_{it}) + \delta_i + \delta_p + \delta_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijpt}, \quad (5)$$

## Results

Table 1: Baseline Results

Specification:	OLS (1)	Reduced Form (2)	First Stage (3)	Second Stage (4)
Dependent Variable:	TC Share	TC Share	ln(markup)	TC Share
ln(Markup)	.0204*** (.0047)	—	—	.1050*** (.0291)
ln(TFPQ)	—	.0054*** (.0015)	.0519*** (.0038)	—
First Stage F-Statistic	—	—	232.2	—
Firm FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
HSS FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	93,556	90,727	90,727	90,727
R <sup>2</sup>	.368	.371	.692	.368

Table 2: Interaction Terms

Specification	OLS (1)	OLS (2)	OLS (3)	OLS (4)	2SLS (5)	2SLS (6)	2SLS (7)	2SLS (8)
ln(markup)	-.0215 (.0311)	-.0298 (.0318)	—	—	.539** (.222)	.459** (.226)	—	—
ln(markup) × $r_d$	-.533 (2.510)	-.485 (2.512)	—	—	-2.130 (17.34)	-1.551 (17.64)	—	—
ln(markup) × $r_b^*$	.293** (.121)	.328*** (.126)	.308** (.135)	.315* (.141)	.953* (.545)	1.232** (.562)	1.136** (.569)	1.363** (.587)
ln(markup) × Rule of Law	—	.0212 (.0151)	—	.0212 (.0164)	—	.239* (.137)	—	.209 (.147)
First Stage F-Statistic	—	—	—	—	21.1	16.5	51.7	26.9
Firm-Year FE	✓	✓	—	—	✓	✓	—	—
HSS FE	✓	✓	—	—	✓	✓	—	—
Country-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Firm-HSS-Year FE	—	—	✓	✓	—	—	✓	✓
Observations	93,556	93,556	93,556	93,556	90,727	90,727	90,727	90,727
R <sup>2</sup>	.420	.420	.437	.437	.409	.402	.435	.430

## Conclusions

- Strong link between trade credit provision and markups
- Trade credit allows firms to save on financial intermediation
- International trade data useful to shed light on trade credit trade-offs (because enforcement is harder across borders)

## Contact Information

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