

# 1.What do we study and why?

• Spending time together with a partner is a major source of gain from marriage (lots of empirical evidence across disciplines about this).

 But most models of household time use abstract from togetherness (exceptions are Fong & Zhang 2001; and Browning et al. 2021).

- As a result, we know very little about:
  - 1. how households value togetherness,
  - 2. what benefits and costs togetherness accrues,
  - 3. how togetherness interacts with other time uses.

• Our paper addresses precisely these points; our aim is to:

- 1. study how couples with children allocate time across work, leisure, and childcare,
- 2. characterize the costs & benefits of togetherness,
- 3. estimate the value of togetherness in the data.

• Distinctive features of our paper:


- we divide the time each spouse spends on leisure and childcare to: • private: time spent alone,
- joint: time spent together with the partner.
- Togetherness naturally requires spouses to synchronize their schedules to be physically together at the same time:
- we give the decision-making spouses a choice over their hours of work and over the timing of such work.

# **2.**Togetherness

• Our data and sample: Dutch data in 2009-12 (the LISS panel), couples with children up to 12 years old.


### JOINT LEISURE

• First aspect of togetherness, leisure time spent together with the partner.



# **2.Togetherness** (cont.)

# JOINT CHILDCARE




• We only observe each parent's overall childcare (private+joint): • only 2% of fathers do *not* do any childcare at all, mothers' and fathers' hours positively correlated, • parents spend equal times on several childcare activities (see paper).

### **BENEFIT OF JOINT CHILDCARE** Child cognitive & noncognitive development and parental well-being • e.g. Cano et al 2019; Flood et al 2020; Le Forner 2021.

COST OF JOINT LEISURE & JOINT CHILDCARE: forgone flexibility at work Togetherness requires both spouses to be together at the same time, to synchronize their schedules and be away from work at same time.

 But the spouses may differ in the timing of their market work – many work irregular and unpredictable hours limiting togetherness in the family.



 If irregular work pays a premium and workers do not control its precise timing, synchronization in the household may be impossible without: restricting the labor market flexibility of one spouse, forgoing the premium associated with irregular hours.

ADDITIONAL COST OF JOINT CHILDCARE: forgone specialization at home • Young children require attention and care for given # hours. A child time budget takes childcare by parents and external carers as inputs. • The parents must forgo 2 units of private childcare (1 by mother, 1 by father) to provide 1 unit of joint childcare by both. • They need extra childcare, perhaps from the costly market, to fill the 1-unit gap in the child time budget caused by the provision of joint childcare.

## conditionally accepted at AEJ-Microeconomics

### • Second aspect of togetherness, childcare done together by both parents.

# **3.**Model and results

• A household consists of two spouses,  $m = \{1, 2\}$ , and young children. All time use variables below are choice variables.

• Each spouse has  $\mathcal{T}_m$  units of time after sleep and personal care, allocated to leisure  $L_m$ , childcare  $T_m$ , and market work  $H_m$  $L_m + T_m + H_m = T_m$ 

 Leisure and childcare have private and joint components, such that  $l_m + l_l = L_m$  $t_m + t_l = T_m$ 

 We divide market work into two types: regular R and irregular I, such that  $h_m^R + h_m^I = H_m$ 

• Irregular work is asynchronous between spouses (by assumption).

Collective household problem (Chiappori 1988, 1992): choose private and joint time use, consumption, and market childcare to max  $\mu_1 U_1(l_1, l_1, C_P) + \mu_2 U_2(l_2, l_1, C_P) + \mu_K U_K(t_1, t_2, t_1, C_K)$ where  $U_m$  is parental utility,  $U_K$  is child utilities, and the  $\mu$ 's are utility weights.

• The problem is subject to two togetherness constraints reflecting 1. Forgone flexibility at work: the more a spouse works in the market, the less togetherness the couple can enjoy  $l_I + t_I \leq T_m - (\max\{h_1^R, h_2^R\} + h_1^I + h_2^I)$ 

2. Forgone specialization at home: child time budget reflecting trade-off between private and joint childcare.  $t_1 + t_2 + t_1 + external childcare = #hours child needs care$ 

**REVEALED PREFERENCE CHARACTERIZATION & RESULTS** We obtain necessary and sufficient nonparametric conditions that the data must satisfy if behaviour is rational and consistent with our model.

Pass rates: results suggest that togetherness is prevalent in the data pass rates: comparison of different collective models with time use

model

(1) private times only (2) private & joint time (3) private & joint time

 Value of togetherness: benefits and costs must be equal at equilibrium. The togetherness constraints monetize the costs at (1) value of forgone earnings and (2) value of external childcare, respectively.

Value of togetherness - how much a household is willing to pay for 1 hour of joint time over price of 1 hour of private time by each spouse: • 1.22 euro per hour -10% of wage- to convert private leisure to joint • 2.08 euro per hour -17% of wage- to convert private childcare to joint

• Togetherness and the gender wage gap:

But togetherness mitigates intra-household inequality: spousal resource shares less unequal between spouses vs. setting without togetherness.

	pass rate (max. 1.0)	number of observations (max. 398)
	0.06	19
es, no togetherness constraints	0.25	87
es, full togetherness	0.67	250

 model and results suggest women likelier to forgo better paid irregular work to align their schedules with their husbands' and enjoy togetherness, women thus forgo earnings for the sake of togetherness, which tends to reinforce the wage gap between women & men,

• the model thus links the timing of female work with the gender wage gap, a point made by Claudia Goldin (2014) and other scholars.