# Asset Growth Anomaly of Corporate Bonds: A Decomposition Analysis

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Abstract

The asset growth anomaly – an inverse relationship between security performance and asset

growth rates – prevails not only in the equity market but also the corporate bond market. This

can be attributed to risk and return tradeoff that bonds of high asset growth firms are better

collateralized, driving lower default risk and expected return, or due to mispricing that investors

under-estimate default probabilities of high asset growth issuers leading to a poor realized perfor-

mance. We differentiate between these two possibilities by decomposing bond performance to yields

and yield changes. We find that the underperformance of high asset growth bond issuers is mainly

from the changes of bond yields. Among non-investment grade bonds where the anomaly effect is

most intensive, the difference in bond performance caused of yield spread changes between extreme

asset growth deciles is more than twice of the performance difference coming from yields spreads.

We also show that bond issuers' collateral growth contributes significantly to the changes in yield

spreads, and corroborating the mispricing interpretation, the collateral effect intensifies when bond

market sentiment is high.

**JEL Codes**: G11; G22

**Keywords:** Bond return; Mispricing; Asset growth; Bond collateral

## 1 Introduction

The effect of asset growth on security performance has been well studied. Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), Li and Zhang (2010), Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu (2013) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) demonstrate a negative association between firm asset growth rates and subsequent stock performance. More recently, Chordia, Goyal, Nozowa, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2017) and Choi and Kim (2018) show that asset growth rates inversely affect bond performance. However, the driving force for the inverse relationship is unclear. There are two competing views on the role of asset growth on security prices. Advocates of market efficiency view this inverse relationship reflective to the risk-return tradeoff: high asset growth firms are less risky and their cost of capital is lower, thus their expected return is lower (Hou et al., 2015). This is particularly true for bonds since high asset-growth firms have more collateral assets, resulting in a lower chance to default (Chen, 2001; Chordia et al., 2017; Fostele and Geanakoplo, 2014). On the other hand, the behavioral camp interprets the asset growth anomaly as evidence of mispricing. For example, Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) suggest that the inverse relationship between asset growth rates and stock performance in the subsequent period is largely due to investors over-extrapolation of firm asset growth rates – stock prices drop when asset growth rates are lower than expected in subsequent periods. Likewise, in the corporate bond market high asset growth rates lead investors to under-estimate default probabilities and this results in a poor bond performance when investors correct their expectations on firm default probabilities afterwards.

Examining the asset growth anomaly in the corporate bond market, our study aims to different from stock performance subject to both uncertainties from future cash flow and discount rates, the discount rate uncertainty is the main source of uncertainty for bond performance. Campello, Chen, and Zhang (2008) use corporate bond yields to estimate stock expected returns. Philippon (2009) suggests estimating firm value, as proxied by Tobin (1969)'s q, using bond market value since bond value is less affected by firm growth opportunities than equity value is. Bond performance can be decomposed into two elements i) a bond's yield to maturity and ii) a term associated with the change in the bond's yields from the current to next period. Yields reflect bond risk level thus we expect high asset-growth firms to have lower yields under the risk-return tradeoff explanation. Alternatively, a predictable pattern in yield changes is in line with the mispricing argument. As

a result, the simple bond performance decomposition offers a way to differentiate between two competing driving forces for the asset growth anomaly.

We first confirm the asset growth effect on bond performance. Using a sample of 4,448 bonds issued by 455 unique firms between 2002 and 2019, we find that bonds of issuers in the top decile group of asset growth rates underperform those of the bottom asset growth decile group by 297 basis points in equal-weighted portfolios in the subsequent year and the underperformance of the top decile is 216 basis points in value-weighted portfolios. This is consistent with Chordia, Goval, Nozowa, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2017) and Choi and Kim (2018) showing a significant underperformance of bonds issued by high asset growth firms. Further, we report that the underperformance of top asset growth decile concentrates in low-quality bonds including both low-investment grade bonds (rated between BBB- and BBB+) and non-investment grade bonds (below BBB-). Among non-investment grade bonds, the average underperformance of the top decile is 778 bps (641 bps) for the equal (value)-weighted portfolio. The underperformance of high asset growth bonds holds steadily for abnormal performance considering a comprehensive five-factor model, including the bond market return factor, the default premium factor, the term premium factor (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 1995), the liquidity factor (e.g., Lin, Wang, and Wu, 2011), and the momentum factor (e.g., Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel, 2013). Besides, we also find that, within top asset growth decile, the average asset growth rate of low-quality bond issuers is much higher than that of high-quality bond issuers. While this is aligned with the fact that some high growth firms are either too volatile or short of established record for good bond ratings, it contrasts the conventional view that low-quality firms typically are financially constrained thus less likely to experience fast growth.

We then look into the role of collateral growth in the negative association between asset growth and bond performance. Confirming the conventional wisdom that tangible fixed and current assets have greater collateral value than intangible assets, we find that bonds with high tangible asset growth are lower in their subsequent annual performance while we do not observe the same effect between intangible asset growth and bond performance. We further show that the impact of collateralized asset growth, proxied by the percentage change in corporate tangible assets, differs across rating groups – tangible asset growth negatively affects bond performance for non-investment

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>We obtain consistent results when extending the corporate bond sample back to 1994 using the Mergent NAIC transaction database.

grade bonds (below BBB-) and low investment-grade bonds (BBB- to BBB+), but not for high investment-grade bonds (A- to AAA). This, once again, can be justified by both rational expectation and mispricing interpretations. From the rational expectation perspective, since the default likelihood is greater among non-investment grade bonds, credit risk plays a larger role on pricing among non-investment grade bonds than it does for investment grade bonds (e.g., Huang and Huang, 2012), accommodating the stronger collateral growth effect among poorly rated bonds. Alternatively, firms issuing poorly rated bonds are a mix of companies with substantial growth opportunities but lack of good accounting numbers and firms with poor investment opportunities. Both types of firms may join the crowd of high asset growth bond issuers. As we document that among high asset growth firms, low quality bond issuers have much higher asset growth rates than high quality bond issuers, mispricing could arise when investors cannot distinguish issuer quality within the low-quality bond group (Greenwood and Hanson, 2013). When investors under-estimate high-growth firms' default probability, we expect to see a poor realized performance of corporate bonds issued by high asset growth firms in subsequent years.

In order to differentiate between the above two scenarios, we decompose bond performance to a yield component and a yield change component and examine how they are affected by collateral growth. We find that, consistent with the risk-reward interpretation, tangible asset growth and bond yield relative to treasury yield (i.e., yield spreads) evaluated in the same year with asset growth is inversely related. The result is also in line with the mispricing argument – there is a positive relation between the tangible asset growth and the following yield spreads changes. We include bond yield spreads in the regressions and find the effect of tangible asset growth remains. The result also holds after controlling for the new tangible asset growth in the subsequent year, showing that tangible asset growth has predictability power on subsequent yield changes. The evidence shows that high tangible asset growth leads to larger following yield spread changes, lowering bond performance. This is aligned with the overvaluation hypothesis.

Finally, we perform two sets of analyses to underscore the role of collateral growth on bond performance. First, we test the relative contributions of yield spreads and the changes in yield spreads and check the impact of collateral growth on individual components. We apply a four-way decomposition of individual bond annual returns including i) yield of a treasury bond with a matching maturity, ii) the change in yields of the matching treasury bond, iii) the yield spread

between the individual bond and matching treasury bond, and iv) the changes in yield spreads, and examining the explanatory power of each element on the subsequent bond performance. The first two elements capture the influence of the levels and changes in macro-economic conditions while the third and fourth components capture the levels and changes of credit risk for individual bonds. Second, the asset growth effect on bond return is mainly through the changes in yield spread channel rather than the level of yield spreads. We then look at how much of yield spread changes are attributed to corporate collateral growth. To do so, we split bonds into deciles based on the collateral growth (growth rate in firm tangible assets) in year t-1 and estimate the value-weighted average yield spread changes from July of year t to June of year t+1, and develop an arbitrage portfolio which has a long position in the top collateral growth group and has a short position in the bottom collateral growth group. As we expect mispricing to be stronger among poorly rated bonds, we anticipate the factor has a stronger influence on yield spread changes among poorly rated bonds. Consistent with this expectation, we find the explanatory power of collateral growth factor is higher among relatively poor-quality bonds –  $R^2$ s are 10% for low investment-grade bonds and 20% for non-investment grade bonds, as opposed to 3% for the high investment-grade bonds. Our finding supports the argument that asset growth effect on bond performance is attributed to yield spread changes through the collateral growth channel.

The second set to differentiate between mispricing and risk involves investor sentiments. If misreaction to corporate asset growth indeed causes biased estimations of corporate bond default probability and the subsequent recovery process, then the mispricing would be much stronger in high sentiment periods. This logic can be found in, for example, Baker and Wulgler (2002), Stambaugh et al. (2012) and Greenwood and Hanson (2015) for stock performance and in Greenwood and Hanson (2013) for bond performance and it is confirmed by our empirical finding. First, the treasury adjusted yield spreads for corporate bonds of high asset growth firms are lower in high-sentiment years than in low-sentiment years, inferring that high-growth firms receive a better valuation in high asset-growth periods. We also find that collateralized asset growth can largely subsume the effect of asset growth on bond performance. Second, and more relevant to the mispricing argument, there are greater subsequent-year increases in yield spreads for high asset growth firms in high sentiment years than during low sentiment years. That is, highly-priced high-asset growth bonds experience a greater price drop in the subsequent year. Once again, the role of asset growth

is subsumed by collateralized asset growth. Third, we find that there is a more pronounced inverse relation between collateral growth and subsequent bond performance exists in poor-quality bonds, including both non- and low-investment grade bonds. Our results support the over-extrapolative expectation argument (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008; Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, 1998), when sentiment is high, high collateral growth leads to greater current-year yield reduction which drives a greater reversal in subsequent bond yields.

Our study makes several important contributions to the literature. First, this study complements Greenwood and Hanson (2013) which concentrate on the time series dimension of corporate bond market mispricing from investors' extrapolation. We show that cross-sectionally yield spreads of individual bonds, a key component of bond performance considered to be not predictable under the rational expectation framework, covary with bond issuer collateral growth rates. We further show that such effect is particularly strong among non- and low-investment grade bonds where mispricing is more likely and find that the collateral growth effect intensifies in high bond market sentiment conditions. The additional cross sectional dimension allows us to take advantage of granular data on credit risk characteristics of individual bonds and bond issuers, such as bond yield spreads, rating and issuers' default probabilities, as well as firm attributes reflective of mispricing. In this sense, our paper joins the large recent literature on the effect of financial and product cycles on security performance, e.g., Greenwood and Shleifer (2014), Greenwood and Hanson (2015), Gennaioli, Ma, and Shleifer (2016).

Collateral is an important feature of corporate bonds. This study highlights an important feature of asset growth, unique to corporate bonds, that asset growth helps to improve bonds' collateral value. This recognition potentially helps two streams of empirical research. One stream of finance works attempt to understand both the level and changes of yield spreads but recognize a significant portion of the variations in both variables remain unexplained. Huang and Huang (2012), Longstaff et al. (2005), and Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001) suggest that there are undiscovered factors driving corporate spreads changes beyond conventional macroeconomic variables and firm-specific variables, such as credit-risk and liquidity. Another stream of literature is on the effect of collateral on firm value and asset price. Ai, Li, Li, and Schlag (2020) find the degree of asset collateralizability affects expected stock returns for financially constrained firms. Almeida and Campello (2007) reveal that collateral affects the sensitivity of investment on cash flow only in financially strained firms.

By connecting these two streams of research together, we suggest that investor information about collateralized assets is an important determinant of the level and changes of corporate bond yield spreads.

To our best knowledge, we are the first to apply the decomposition analysis to understand the influence of an economic force on bond pricing. Unlike stock performance simultaneously affected by uncertainties in future cash flow and discount rates, bond price uncertainties solely come from the discount rate channel. Under this premise, we decompose bond performance into yields and changes in bond yields. This approach allows us to separate unexpected bond performance driven by bond yield changes and expected bond performance determined by bond yields, which can be used in future works regarding bond performance.

The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple framework to decompose bond performance, followed by our empirical predictions, Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.

# 2 Bond Performance Decomposition and Testable Implications

## 2.1 Decomposing Bond Performance

Bond yields are inversely related to bond prices making yields a critical determinant of bond performance. If This idea is deeply embedded in extant empirical bond pricing models (e.g., Fama and French, 1989, 1993; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 1995). On the other hand, irrespective of causes of changes, either driven by new information or unknown forces driving bond yields, the changes in bond prices correspond to yield changes, which naturally affects bond performance. Following this idea, the one-year ahead bond performance can be decomposed into a yield component and a second component related to bond yield changes. We show that this relations not only holds for zero-coupon bonds (Campbell, Campbell), but also coupon-paying bonds.

For a bond having a zero accrual interest, its performance is specified below:<sup>2</sup>

$$R_{t+1} = \frac{C + P_{t+1} - P_t}{P_t} \tag{1}$$

where  $P_t$  and  $P_{t+1}$  are prices of the bond at time t and t+1 and can be expressed as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>We consider the case of having accrued interests in the Appendix.

$$P_{t+1} = \sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C}{(1+y_{t+1})^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_{t+1})^{n-1}}$$

$$P_t = \sum_{\tau=1}^{n} \frac{C}{(1+y_t)^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_t)^n}$$

Expressing the yield of the bond in the beginning of year t + 1:

$$y_{t+1} = y_t + \Delta y_{t+1} \tag{2}$$

and applying the first-order Taylor expansion on  $P_{t+1}$ , we have:

$$P_{t+1} = P(y_{t+1}) = P(y_t) + P'(y_t) \Delta y_{t+1}$$

$$= \sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C}{(1+y_t)^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_t)^{n-1}} - \left[\sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C\tau}{(1+y_t)^{\tau+1}} + \frac{M(n-1)}{(1+y_t)^n}\right] \Delta y_{t+1}$$
(3)

Inserting Eq. (3) in Eq. (1), as detailed in Appendix A1, we have the following expression for bond performance in the subsequent period:<sup>3</sup>

$$R_{t+1} = y_t - \frac{D_{t+1}^{y_t}}{1 + c_{t+1}^{y_t}} \Delta y_{t+1} \tag{4}$$

where  $D_{t+1}^{y_t}$  is the duration at t+1 when the yield stays constant at  $y_t$ ;  $c_{t+1}^{y_t}$  is the bond's current yield at t+1 given its yield to maturity at t.<sup>4</sup> Denoting  $\eta_t = \frac{D_{t+1}^{y_t}}{1+c_{t+1}^{y_t}}$ , we have

$$R_{t+1} = y_t - \eta_t \Delta y_{t+1} \tag{5}$$

Now we introduce expectation on individual bond i performance in t + 1, considering that Eq. (5) holds for any individual bonds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Here we consider the bond issuer make single coupon payment over the performance evaluation horizon. A practice concern is that most corporate bonds make coupon payments semiannually, thus two coupon payments would be made over the evaluation period. We discuss this case in Appendix A and offer the condition for the decomposition to hold.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>When a bond's price is close to its par value, its current yield approximates the yield to maturity. Then  $\frac{D_{t+1}^{y_t}}{1+c_{t+1}^{y_t}}$  approximates the bond's modified duration.

$$E_t(R_{i,t+1}) = y_{i,t} - \eta_{i,t} E_t(\Delta y_{i,t+1})$$
(6)

Performance and yields of corporate bonds are driven by firm specific and macroeconomic fundamental information (see, e.g., Fama and French, 1989; Huang and Huang, 2012). We accordingly separate  $y_{i,t}$  into bond i's maturity matching benchmark yield,  $b_{i,t}$ , and the spread between the yield of bond i and the benchmark yield,  $s_{i,t}$  ( $=y_{i,t}-b_{i,t}$ ). This gives us

$$E_t(R_{i,t+1}) = b_{i,t} + s_{i,t} - \eta_{i,t} E_t(\Delta b_{i,t+1}) - \eta_{i,t} E_t(\Delta s_{i,t+1})$$
(7)

where  $\Delta s_{i,t+1}$  is determined by individual firm's credit risk and  $\Delta b_{i,t+1}$  is affected by macroeconomic factors.

In the next subsection, we show that different expectations of  $E(\Delta y_{i,t+1})$  lead to alternative testable predictions given that  $E_t(\Delta b_{i,t+1})$  reflects the change in macroeconomic fundamentals, unlikely to be influenced by the changes in credit risk of individual bonds.

## 2.2 Testable Implications

First, we consider the case that  $E_t(\Delta s_{i,t+1}) = 0$  and  $E_t(\Delta b_{i,t+1}) = 0$ , thus that  $E_t(R_{i,t+1}) = s_{i,t} + b_{i,t}$ . Following previous studies, e.g., Berger and Udell (1990); Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006); Brumm, Grill, Kubler, and Schmedders (2015) that collateral is an important factor driving debt pricing, we consider x reflecting collateralized asset growth as a key determinant of  $s_{i,t}$  and express the expected performance of an individual bond as below:

$$E_t(R_{i,t+1}) = s_{i,t}(x) + b_{i,t}$$
(8)

It states that the yield of a bond is an unbiased estimator of its expected performance. This idea is illustrated in Figure 1 which considers two companies that one, denoted as h, has a high asset-growth rate and the other, denoted as l, has a low asset-growth rate. If the yield spreads of both groups are unbiased estimators of their spreads in the next period (yield changes are expected to be zero for both groups), we have  $s_{h,t} = E_t(s_{h,t+1}^e)$  and  $s_{l,t} = E_t(s_{l,t+1}^e)$ , where the superscript e is used to represent the case of rational reasoning.

Next, we consider the alternative case of a non-zero  $E_t(\Delta s_{i,t+1})$  whereas  $s_{i,t}$  is no longer an unbiased estimator of the bond yield in the next period. This is also illustrated in Figure 1. If investors over-extrapolate firm asset growth, then we expect yield spread in the following period  $(s_{h,t+1})$  tend to be higher than that of the current period  $(s_{h,t})$  for high growth firms. In Figure 1,  $E_t s_{h,t+1}^m$  represents the expected yield spread of the high asset growth issuer at t+1 when the bond price is mispriced. Superscript m indicates the case of mispricing. The opposite expectation holds for low asset growth firms when their credit risk is overestimated at time t, resulting in lower yield spread in the future. In other words, bond performance contains bond yield and the component reflecting yield changes. For a high asset growth firm, when  $(\Delta s_{i,t+1}) > 0$ , the realized yield spread,  $s_{i,t}$  underestimates the true yield spread and, as a result, it overestimates the bond's expected performance. Under the asset growth anomaly, the credit risk of the high asset growth firm is under-estimated due to an overextrapolation of corporate asset growth, driving a rise of yield spreads in the subsequent period. For the same consideration, the credit risk of low asset growth firms (i.e., the reduction in collateralized assets) is over-estimated, which leads to a drop of yield spreads in the next year.

Inserting Eq. (7) to Eq. (8), we have

$$E_t(R_{i,t+1}) = s_{i,t}(x) - \eta_{i,t} E_t \Delta s_{i,t+1}(x) + b_{i,t} - \eta_{i,t} E_t \Delta b_{i,t+1}$$
(9)

In Eq. (8), we consider x, collateralized asset growth in our setting, to affect yield spreads (s) and yield spread changes ( $\Delta s$ ) and it does not affect treasury yields (b) and treasury yield changes ( $\Delta b$ ) because treasury yields and their changes are driven by macroeconomic variables (Campbell and Shiller, Campbell and Shiller; Diebold and Li, 2006). If x is fully captured by bond yield spreads, We expect to see x explains bond performance through yield spreads and x is uncorrelated with yield spread changes. Alternatively, when investors misprice bond yields, we expect x to explains bond performance through both yield spreads and yield spread changes.

Regarding the mispricing interpretation, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) show that investors may make biased assessments of default probabilities. Specifically, they find that the deterioration of the credit quality after the issuance year is quite common. This results in a yield change effect that investors realize the overvaluation of collateral value of high asset growth firms, which leads to

a positive yield revision. As a result, the subsequent the price goes down and yield spread becomes larger. Similarly, low asset growth firms are more likely to be subject to underestimated collateral value. A correction of the underestimation afterward pushes up the bond price and lowers the bond yield spread, a positive yield revision. Cooper et al. (2008) also find investors tend to extrapolate high growth rates. This gives rise to our first empirical prediction which states that both the risk explanation and mispricing argument equally hold for the bond market asset growth anomaly.

Prediction 1 An increase in collateralized assets coming from asset growth lowers bond performance. This may be attributed either to risk reduction driven by greater collateral value of high asset growth firms or to a greater overvaluation of such firms. Holding bond risk constant, a positive relation between bond yield spread changes and issuers' collateral growth supports the mispricing interpretation.

We further consider the role of bond quality in the performance effect of collateral growth. It is likely that the marginal collateral effect is stronger for low-rated bonds since their issuers have higher default risk, higher probability of adverse selection and larger degree of information asymmetry than high-rated issuers. This is documented in the literature. For example, Almeida and Campello (2007) and Livdan et al. (2009) find the heterogeneity of collateral effect across firms. Given financial constraints to poorly-rated firms, creditworthiness disproportionately affects the financing costs they face. To the extent that debt is the main source for asset growth, the collateral effect may then be particularly beneficial to poorly-rated firms. Thus the financial quality of issuers is an important determinant of the strength of the collateral effect. Accordingly, the marginal value of the collateral is larger in low-rated firms than in high-rated firms.

Moreover, low-rated bonds is more sensitive to default risk than high-rated bonds. Huang and Huang (2012) show credit risk accounts for a much larger fraction of yield spreads for junk bonds than investment grade bonds. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) document a much larger percentage of default-risk components of yield spread for low-rated bonds than high-rated bonds. We therefore expect the collateral growth effect to be stronger for low-rated bonds than high-rated bonds. This leads to the second empirical prediction.

**Prediction 2** The risk mitigation effect and the mispricing of collateral value for high asset growth firms is more profound in low-rated bonds than in high-rated bonds. The mispricing interpretation

holds if the correlation between bond yield spread changes and issuers' collateral growth is greater for low-quality bonds.

As collateral value impacts the risk of default and the promised payments in the event of default, the valuation of collateral growth potentially affects the yield spread and the subsequent yield spread change, two components of bond return. It is critical to examine how much variation of  $r_{i,t+1}$  comes from the variations of  $s_{i,t}$  and  $\Delta s_{i,t+1}$ . In addition, the magnitude of explanatory power of  $\Delta s_{i,t+1}$  is a reflection of the magnitude of mispricing on collateral value for asset growth. On the other hand, there is little consensus on the determinants of yield spread changes. The traditional structure model values bond with contingent-claims analysis. Credit spread changes are determined by changes in these state variables related to future cash flows discounted at the risk-free rate. However, Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001) suggest these conventional factors only explain a small fraction of the variation in yield spread change.

Here we propose that collateral growth from high asset growth lowers default risk leads to lower bond yields in the current year and greater yield increase in the subsequent year. While respectively bond yields and yield changes correspond to a default risk reduction and mispricing of such influence, the relative magnitude of collateral growth explained yields and yield spread changes on bond performance helps us to identify the relative importance of two forces. This gives rise to our third prediction.

**Prediction 3** Asset growth effect on bond performance is mainly from yield spread changes through the collateral asset growth channel.

## 3 Data

#### 3.1 Corporate Bond Sample and Main Variables

Our main sample includes US corporate bonds the enhanced version of Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database. The database starts in July 1, 2002, so is the starting time of our main sample (used to generate empirical findings). The sample period ends at the end of 2019. Besides, to address the concern that the sample horizon is not be sufficiently long, we supplement the TRACE data with Mergent NAIC transaction database which covers transactions

of insurance companies and starts in 1994. The results based on the extended sample are reported in the Internet Appendix.

TRACE provides information on secondary market transactions, including transaction prices, volumes, trade direction and the exact data and time of the trade. We account for reporting errors using the data cleaning procedures commonly used for the TRACE transaction data (see, Dick-Nielsen, 2009 and Dick-Nielsen, 2014).<sup>5</sup> Following Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009), we estimate daily bond price by weighting each trade by its trading volume. This approach puts more weight on the institutional trades that incur lower transaction cost and more accurately reflect the underlying price of the bond. The month-end transaction is the last available daily price from the last five trading days of the month.<sup>6</sup> We then calculate monthly corporate bond return at time t as

$$R_{i,t} = \frac{P_{i,t} + AI_{i,t} + C_{i,t}}{P_{i,t-1} + AI_{i,t-1}} - 1 \tag{10}$$

where  $P_{i,t}$  is the month-end transaction price,  $AI_{i,t}$  is accrued interest, and  $C_{i,t}$  is the coupon payment, if any, of bond i in month t. We then convert bond returns from monthly to annual frequency. Annual bond return is estimated from July of year t to June of year t+1. We also denote  $r_{i,t} = R_{i,t} - r_{f,t}$ , where  $r_{f,t}$  is the risk-free rate proxied by the one-month Treasury bill rate.

We obtain bond characteristics from the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). This database contains a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, such as issue amount, maturity, provisions, coupon and credit ratings on all U.S. corporate bonds maturing in 1990 or later. We merge our transaction data with bond characteristics and exclude bonds with missing coupon, interest payment frequency, or bonds with variable coupon rates. Following Bai et al. (2019), we remove bonds that are not listed or traded in the US public market, which include bonds issued through private placement, bonds issued under the 144A rule, bonds that do not trade in US dollars, and bond issuers not in the jurisdiction of the United States. We also exclude bonds with maturity of less than one year, preferred shares, non-U.S. dollar denominated bonds, and bonds that are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>These include (i) same-day trade corrections and cancellations; (ii) trade reversals which refer to corrections and cancellations conducted not on the trading day but thereafter; (iii) agency and interdealer transactions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Using the last transaction within the last five trading days of the month instead of that on the last day helps increase the number of non-missing monthly observations. If there are no trades in the last five trading days, the month-end price is missing for that month.

mortgage backed, asset backed, convertible and exchangeable as well as secured bonds.<sup>7</sup> Finally, we mainly use the Standard & Poor's (S&P) rating from the FISD, but, if it is not available, we use the Moody's or Fitch rating when possible and drop bonds whose ratings we cannot identify. We convert ratings into a numeric scale from 1 to 22: AAA=22, AA+ = 21, AA=20, ..., C=2, D=1. Ratings 13 through 22 (BBB- through AAA) are investment grade and ratings below 13 are non-investment grade.

We combine our bond data with the CRSP database to get information on firm equity prices and returns, then merge it with COMPUSTAT to get non-financial issuer accounting information<sup>8</sup>. To mitigate the backfilling biases, a firm must be listed on the Compustat for 2 years before it is included in the data set (e.g., Fama and French, 1993). A main variable of interest is the annual asset growth rate (AG). Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), the annual asset growth rate (AG) observed at the end of June of year t is calculated as the percentage change in total assets (denoted as A, Compustat data item 6) from the end of fiscal year t-2 to the end of fiscal year t-1, where fiscal year t is defined as the fiscal year ending in calendar year t.

$$AG_t = \frac{A_{t-1} - A_{t-2}}{A_{t-2}} \tag{11}$$

To compute asset growth rate, we require a firm has no zero or negative total assets in both fiscal years t-2 and t-1. We further winsorize asset growth rate at the top and bottom 1% in each year to control for the influence of outliers.

We define tangible asset growth (TG) in a similar way as AG, where, following Almeida and Campello (2007), we define tangible assets (TAN) as below:

$$TAN = Cash + 0.715 * Receivable + 0.547 * Inventory + 0.535 * Net Fixed Asset$$
 (12)

In Eq. (12), Cash is Compustat data item 1; Receivable is Compustat data item 2; Inventory is Compustat data item 3; and Net Fixed Asset is Compustat item 8.

Another important component of AG is IG, intangible asset growth, which is measured in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Secured bonds represent a small portion of the corporate bond, about 3%. We exclude them because the focus of this study is on the collateral effect due to corporate asset growth, not the specific collateral pledged on an individual bond.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Consistent with Cooper et al. (2008), we keep non-financial firms and exclude firms with four-digit SIC codes between 6000 and 6999.

same way as AG and TG, where when estimating intangible assets, we exclude goodwill (Compustat data item 204) from reported intangible assets (Compustat data item 33).

Our final sample includes 4,448 bonds issued by 455 unique firms, for a total of 22,784 bond-year observations from July 2002 to June 2020. On average, there are approximately 1,213 bonds per year over the whole sample.

## 3.2 Summary Statistics

Table 1 reports the summary statistics of key variables, including both bond and issuer characteristics. To be noticed that, firm specific variables are estimated at bond issuer level, while bond characteristics variables are estimated at bond issue level. The variables' descriptions are provided in Appendix B.

We first report bond characteristics at the individual bond level, including annual bond excess return (return), yield, rating, duration, coupon, issue size (par), put and call feature. Annual bond excess return has a mean of 4.5% and standard deviation of 9.12%, ranging from -5.45% in the 5th percentile to 17.7% in the 95th percentile. The average bond yield is 4.1% with a standard deviation of 2.73%. The sample contains bonds with a median rating of 16 (i.e., A-). Note that, our sample only includes bonds issued by publicly listed firms, resulting in a higher average rating and lower yield than that of the overall Trace sample. An average corporate bond has Maculay duration of 6.64 years, annual coupon rate of 5.04%, issue size of \$618.8 million and Amihud illiquidity measure of 0.27% per million dollars. 76% of bonds are callable while only 1% of bonds have put options.

The key firm-level variables are the asset growth (AG) rate and tangible asset growth (TG). The mean (median) asset growth is 6.86% (3.72%) with a standard deviation of 23.25%. The average asset growth rate is smaller than that reported in Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) because in our sample we consider firms with public debt issues. There is no surprise that firms with corporate bond issues tend to have a larger size and relatively smaller growth rates than average listed firms. The mean (median) tangible asset growth is 2.70% (1.88%) with a standard deviation of 10.92%. Intangible asset growth (IG) has an average growth rate of 2.25% with a standard deviation of 11.02%.

The other firm characteristics include total assets (Size, in billion dollars), leverage (LEV) and OIA. These variables are covered in previous studies, e.g., Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001), Campbell

and Taksler (2003), and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007). The average (median) of total assets is \$28.36 (10.66) billion. The standard deviation of leverage is 0.19 while the average is 0.28. OIA measured as operating income over total assets has an average of 0.14, ranging from 0.05 to 0.28 from 5 to 95 percentiles. Moreover, the reported means of these measures are higher than their medians, suggesting that large firms are more levered and also more profitable.

Next, we look at bond issuer and issue characteristics across asset growth decile portfolios in Table 2. At the end of June of each year from 2002 to 2019, bonds are allocated into deciles based on the issuer's annual asset growth rate, and portfolios are formed from July of year t to June of year t+1, where t is the portfolio formation year. The decile 10 (D10) bonds are issued by the highest asset growth firms while decile 1 (D1) has the lowest asset growth firms. The portfolios are equal-weighted. Table 2 reports averages of the various bond issues and issuer characteristics of 10 portfolios prior to the portfolio formation date.

The average asset growth (AG) of the lowest growth firms is -14.53%. The highest asset growth portfolio has an average growth rate of 43.98%. The difference is 58.51%, significant at the one percent level. High (low) growth firms tend to be firms that have also experienced high (low) tangible asset growth (TG) over the same period. The highest growth portfolio grows with 14.18% tangible assets, while the tangible assets of the lowest growth decile drops by 6.7%. The difference in tangible asset growth is 20.89%, significant at 1% level. We also report the growth of intangible assets. The average for the top decile group is 17.82% and the difference between the top and bottom decile is 20.5%. Note the sum of tangible and intangible assets is 32% for the top decile firms, less than 43.98% for the total asset growth rate. This is mainly due to the weights placed on current asset items and net fixed assets when estimating AG. Decile 10 has a leverage increase of 0.057 during the asset growth year while the leverage of decile 1 decreases by 0.007. The spread of leverage change ( $\Delta LEV$ ) is 0.064.

In the last three columns, we look at the distributions of bonds in the three rating groups: i) high investment (HI) grades with a rating of A- and above, ii) low investment (LI) grades with a rating between BBB- and BBB+, and iii) non-investment (JK) grades whose ratings are below BBB-. In the bottom decile (D1), these three types of bonds respectively account for 28%, 41% and 31% while in the top decile (D10), these three types of bonds account for 49%, 42% and 8%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>We follow the convention to set a 6-month gap between the calendar date of the fiscal year end and the beginning of stock return evaluation date.

More junk bonds are in the lowest asset growth decile groups than in the highest asset growth decile groups. It shows that issuer credit quality is higher in high asset growth groups. It also shall be noted that the fractions of high investment grade bonds (junk bonds) do not monotonically increase (decrease) in issuer asset growth, suggesting that credit quality is not sole determinant of issuer asset growth.

# 4 Empirical Results

## 4.1 Asset Growth and Corporate Bond Returns

### 4.1.1 Portfolio Analysis

At the end of June of each year from 2002 to 2019, bonds are allocated into deciles based on the issuer's annual asset growth rate of year t-1, and portfolios are formed from July of year t to June of year t+1. Decile 10, abbreviated as D10, constitute of the highest asset growth firms while decile 1, abbreviated as D1, has the lowest asset growth firms. We estimate equal-weighted (EW) average bond performance as well value-weighted (VW) average bond performance and report them in Table 3. As asset growth predictability is a cross sectional phenomenon, we estimate the averages of individual decicle portfolios in a cross sectional manner – individual bond performance is averaged across bonds in each year first and then these averages are average over time. We apply the Newey-West (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimator with a lag of order one to estimate the time-series t-statistics.

Panel A shows the results of equal-weighted portfolios. In the full sample, the lowest asset growth decile (D1) earns average EW annual portfolio returns of 6.98% and the highest asset growth decile (D10) earns average annual returns of 4.01%, an annual spread of -2.97% with a t-statistic of -9.09. This result is consistent with Choi and Kim (2018), who find that the average high (D10) minus low (D1) returns are monthly 0.3% for EW portfolios. We further test whether the significant return difference holds across various rating groups. The full sample is classified into three rating groups: high investment grade bonds (A- to AAA), low investment grade bonds (BBB-to BBB+) and non-investment grade bonds (BB+ or lower). Portfolios sorted by rating groups exhibit results similar to those in the full sample. We show that moving from the lowest asset

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>We follow the literature, e.g., (Fama and French, 1993) to set a 6-month gap between the calendar date of the fiscal year end and the beginning of stock return evaluation date.

growth decile to the highest asset growth decile, high growth portfolios earn lower bond returns than low growth portfolios in all subsamples. In the high investment grade bond subsample, the annual bond return is 4.01% in decile 1 and 3.57% in decile 10. The t-statistic of difference is marginally significant at 10% level.

In contrast, in the low-investment grade bonds and junk bonds, the return differences between D10 and D1 become much more statistically significant and have a larger economic magnitude. Reported in the column for low-investment grade bonds (LI), the average EW bond excess return difference between D10 and D1 is -1.27% with a t-statistic of 2.72. Strikingly, in the non-investment grade bond subsample, the annual bond return is 5.11% in decile 10 and 12.88% in decile 1, with a difference of -7.78% (t-stat = -4.80). The results show that the negative relation between asset growth and bond return is much stronger in non-investment bonds than in investment bonds, supporting the second prediction that the asset growth effect is stronger for low-quality bonds than high-quality bonds.

We also look at bond performance across AG decile portfolios in year t+2. Unlike the finding for bond performance of year t+1, there is no clear pattern across different AG deciles, and the bond performance difference between D10 and D1 bonds is no longer statistically significant for the full sample, low-investment grade and non-investment grade subsamples. To conserve space, we report the empirical finding in the Table A2 of Internet Appendix.

Subsequently, in Panel A we report average annual bond excess returns of value-weighted asset growth decile portfolios. We find consistent findings as shown for EW portfolios. In the full sample, the return spread between decile 10 and decile 1 is -2.16%, significant at 1% level. Though the spread is insignificant for high investment grade bonds, the return spreads between decile 10 and decile 1 are -1.63% and -6.41% with t-statistics of -2.65 and -4.08 for low-investment and non-investment grade bonds, respectively. Overall, we find a negative relation between firms asset growth and future corporate bond returns. In addition, the negative relation holds much stronger for low-investment and non-investment grade bonds than high-investment grade bonds.

Show in Panel A, for EW portfolios, the spreads of asset growth rates between D10 and D1 are 38.07% for high investment grade bonds and 86.76% for non-investment grade bonds, suggesting that low quality bond issuers have a higher variation in terms of firm asset growth. Specifically, the top decile portfolio has much higher average asset growth rates for low- and non-investment

grade bonds (60.67% and 59.33%, respectively) than for high-investment grade bonds (29.44%). The similar pattern is shown for VW portfolios in Panel B. To be noticed that, firms with non-investment grade rating can also have rapid growth. For example, growth firms, in their early stage, tend to have high asset growth rate, but are rated as non-investment grade because of the lack of profitability and long operating history.

In summary, our findings of portfolio analysis are supportive to the presence of asset growth effects – bonds of higher asset growth firms are lower in performance and such effect is stronger for bonds of low-quality firms than high-quality firms.

#### 4.1.2 Cross Sectional Regressions of Bond Returns

The result reported in the last subsection shows that bonds with higher asset growth have lower subsequent returns. To test if the asset-growth effect on bond performance is merely a manifestation of other important determinants of the cross-section of bond returns beyond asset growth rates, we perform Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions prescribed below:

$$R_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 A G_{i,t} + \beta_2 Y S_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(13)

The dependent variable,  $R_{i,t+1}$ , is the annual bond return in excess of the one-month T-bill rate, estimated from July of year t to June of year t + 1. In the above regression, the key variable of interest is bond issuers' asset growth (AG). Measured in June of year t, yield spread (YS) is an additional explanatory variable included to examine whether performance is driven by an individual bond's risk level. Following the return decomposition discussed in Section 2.1, YS is considered as an unbiased estimator of bond expected return. Under the efficient market hypothesis, we expect that the coefficient on YS is positive, and second, the AG effect shall be subsumed by YS. Alternatively, under the mispricing interpretation, YS is merely an element of a bond's expected performance; the AG effect is expected to hold after the YS inclusion.

The included control variables, c, are firm characteristics including market leverage (LEV), leverage change ( $\Delta LEV$ ) and natural logarithm of total assets (Firm Size), reported in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 (Fama and French, 1993), corresponding to year t used in Eq. (13), as well as bond level variables including bond credit ratings, illiquidity (LIQ), duration, convexity (Convex), coupon rate, bond issue size (Par), and dummies for puttable and callable bonds (put

and call), which are evaluated in June of year t. The t-statistics are estimated in the same way as the sorted portfolio analysis using Newey-West adjustment with an order of one.

The first three columns of Table 4 report results of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression tests of Eq. (13). All reported coefficients are time-series averages of coefficients estimated from cross sectional regressions. Column (1) shows asset growth effect on future bond returns with firm and bond level control variables. The coefficient on AG is -0.017 which is statistically significant at 5 percent level (with a t-statistic of -2.63), confirming the negative and significant relation between asset growth and bond returns from the portfolio analysis. As reported in Table 2, the AG spread between the top and bottom asset growth firms is 58.5%; multiplying the AG spread by -0.017, the coefficient on AG, yields an annual performance difference of -99.45 basis points across the top and bottom deciles. Though the magnitude is smaller than that reported in Table 3, AG generates about 1% annual return that cannot be explained by bond and firm level variables.

In Column (2), we report the result when YS is additionally included in the regression. The coefficient on YS is 1.196 with a t-statistic of 3.75. It is close to 1, which is in line with Eq. (9) in the model section. This suggests that bond return is positively related to the level of yield spreads, i.e. the riskiness of a bond. In addition, we continue to find a negative coefficient on AG (coefficient = -0.007 with a t-statistic of -2.11). The coefficient on AG changes from -0.017 to -0.007, suggesting that AG effect is partially attributed to the risk level of a bond. As yield spread is a proxy for bond risk level, we interpret this result as an additional piece of supporting evidence to the mispricing argument.

Out of control variables, the coefficient on duration is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Longer duration bonds are exposed to greater interest rate risk thus they have a greater expected returns. Up to this point, our finding is in line with both the efficient market hypothesis and the mispricing argument.

Next, we separate total asset growth into tangible asset growth (TG) and intangible asset growth (IG) to understand the specific type of asset growth having an effect on bond performance. As defined in Section 3.1, TG and IG account for roughly 70% of total asset growth. The remained changes in asset growth are attributed to changes in cash, account accruals and other assets. Firms with higher tangible asset growth have more pledgeable assets. We therefore expect tangible asset growth to have a direct favorable influence on reducing corporate credit risk. In a related study,

Vig (2013) shows that the securitization reform to strengthen creditor rights in India results in an increase in asset growth which concentrates in tangible asset growth and a reduction in corporate debt. On the other hand, intangible asset growth is deemed to have an impact on corporate future growth opportunities while it plays a limited role on firm collaterized assets and debt value. In line with this view, Eisfeldt, Kim, and Popanikolaou (2021); Gulen, Li, Peters, and Zekhnini (2021) show that intangible investments favorably affect equity pricing.

The regression takes the following form with the same set of control variables for Eq. (13).

$$R_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T G_{i,t} + \beta_2 I G_{i,t} + \beta_3 Y S_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(14)

The test results are reported in columns 3 - 6 of Table Table 4. Shown in Column (3), consistent with our expectation, we find the coefficient on TG is -0.050 with a t-statistic of -3.03 while the coefficient on IG is not statistically significant, suggesting that tangible asset growth is a significant determinant of bond performance while intangible asset growth is not. Considering the spread in average TG between deciles 10 and 1 (20.89%), the slope of 0.050 yields an estimated annual risk premium of 104.5 bps. In Table A1, we further decompose total asset growth into 6 component: cash and short term investment growth (CG); noncash current asset growth (NCG); property, plant and equipment growth (PPENTG); intangible asset growth; investments growth (IVSTG) and other asset growth (AOG). Then we examine the effect of each component on future bond returns. We find growth of current assets and PPENT has a negative effect on returns. The result shows that tangible assets growth, where tangible asset is a main component of collateral value, subsumes the explanatory power of asset growth on returns, suggesting the collateral channel is critical for the impact of asset growth on bond return. Also, the result shows that the asset growth effect is unlikely to be driven by intangible asset change.

Next, we look at the asset growth effects across bonds of different credit rating. It follows the instinct that as tangible assets reduce credit risk, bonds with lower ratings have higher credit risk and thus are more sensitive to tangible asset growth than bonds with higher ratings. Bonds are grouped by rating into three portfolios: high investment (A- to AAA), low investment (BBB-to BBB+) and non-investment (BB+ or below). We follow the regressions specification (13) and perform cross-sectional regressions for three rating groups from Column (4) to (6). Similar to the

previous finding, we find the coefficients on TG are significant while the coefficients on IG are insignificant.

In Column (4) and (5), the coefficients on TG are -0.032 and -0.037, with t-statistics of -2.98 and -3.32. The results show the explanatory power of collateral channel on asset growth effect on bond return in high and low investment-grade bonds. In Column (6), we focus on non-investment grade bonds, in which we expect the strongest tangible asset growth effect. The coefficient on TG is -0.155 and significant at 1% level. The results show the most profound tangible asset growth effect on bond returns is for non-investment grade bonds, which could be completely explained by the largest collateral channel effect in this group.

Overall, the results indicate that asset growth is priced in the corporate bond market. The asset growth effect is mainly from the collateral value growth, driven by tangible asset growth. The tangible asset growth effect is much stronger for non-investment grade than high and low investment grade bonds.

## 4.2 Asset Growth Rates and Default Probability

A factor directly influencing bond yield and expected performance is issuers' default probabilities. Firm's asset growth may have mixed effects on the default risk. On the one hand, firms that have high asset growth should be less risky because of more collateralized assets (Almeida and Campello, 2007; Chen, 2001; Chordia et al., 2017; Fostele and Geanakoplo, 2014). On the other hand, if asset growth is largely financed with debt rather than retained earnings, financial leverage increases default risk (Altman, 1968; Traczynski, 2017). To explore the role of asset growth on default risk, we perform the following cross-sectional regression of asset growth on changes in a firm's expected default probability at the firm level.

$$\Delta EDF_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AG_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{15}$$

Both EDF and AG are measured in year t. The regression dependent variable is change of expected default frequency  $(\Delta EDF)$ , estimated following Bharath and Shumway (2008), with details provided in Appendix B. We report the results in Table 5. In Column (1) to (4), we look at the effect of asset growth on changes in expected default frequency  $(\Delta EDF_t)$  from year t-1 to t. The key independent variable in the regression is asset growth.  $c_{i,t}$  includes yield spread (YS), market leverage (LEV), leverage change ( $\Delta LEV$ ) and the natural log of total assets (Size).

In Column (1), the coefficient on AG is -0.047, significant at 1% level, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase of asset growth is associated with a 1.1% decrease in expected default frequency. Consistent with our conjecture, high asset growth leads to a lower firm's default risk. It is also worth noting that the coefficient on changes in leverage ( $\Delta LEV$ ) is 0.612 with a t-statistic of 6.07, suggesting firms with higher change in financial leverage are more risky. Next, we examine the asset growth effect on firm's default risk across various rating categories from Column (2) to (4). The asset growth effect on EDF is relatively weaker for high investment grade bonds with the coefficient on EDF significant at 10% level and strongest for non-investment grade bonds with 1% significant.

To further explore the potential channel of asset growth effect on firm's default risk, we include tangible asset growth (TG) and intangible asset growth (IG) in the following regression.

$$\Delta EDF_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TG_{i,t} + \beta_2 IG_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(16)

As reported in Column (5), the coefficient on tangible asset growth in the full sample is -0.111, with a t-statistic of -5.79, while the coefficient on intangible asset growth is insignificant. This is consistent with our hypothesis that asset growth lowers default risk because of the growth of tangible assets. Almeida and Campello (2007) estimate liquidation value using a firm's tangible assets. Instead, intangible asset growth that is not traditionally considered as eligible collateral have trivial impact on default risk. Similar as previous findings, changes in leverage are associated with a higher changes in EDF, suggesting that a higher financial leverage results in a higher default risk. In addition, in Column (4), (5) and (6) for the regressions in high, low and non-investment grade bonds groups respectively, the coefficients on TG are negative and significant across all three rating categories while IG is only significant for non-investment grade bonds. Thus far, we have documented a direct link between asset growth and default risk.

#### 4.3 A Decomposition Analysis of Corporate Bond Returns

In the last subsection, we show both asset growth and tangible asset growth significantly lower firm default probabilities, which potentially drive a negative link between bond yield spreads and asset growth as well collateral asset growth. In this section, we perform a decomposition analysis and look at the collateral value effect on two bond return components as shown in Eq. (7): the yield spread component and bond performance attributed spread changes.

#### 4.3.1 Sorted Portfolios

We first perform decomposition analysis using sorted portfolios. Panel A of Table 6 shows the results for equal-weighted (EW) portfolios: Columns (1) to (4) report yield spreads of respective issuer asset growth deciles for all bonds and bonds in three rating groups; Columns (5) to (8) report yield spreads changes across asset growth deciles for all and subsample bonds; Columns (9) to (12) report bond performance based on the corresponding yield spreads changes. Yield spreads are evaluated in the month of June in year t and reflect information of firm asset growth rates in year t-1. Yield spread changes are estimated from July of year t to June of year t+1. Moreover, yield spread change based performance is estimated as  $-\eta_{i,t}\Delta s_{i,t+1}$ , where as shown in Section 2.1,  $\eta_{i,t} = \frac{D_{t+1}^{y_t}}{1+c_{t+1}^{y_t}}$ , could be approximated as a bond's modified durations estimated based in year t + 1 assuming bond yield spread stays the same as the level in year t.

We first discuss the result of yield spreads reported in the first four columns. Column (1) reports the average yield spreads of individual decile portfolios based on the full sample. The lowest asset growth decile (D1) has an equal-weighted average yield spread of 2.56% while the highest asset growth decile (D10) has an equal-weighted average yield spread of 1.41%. The EW yield spread difference between D10 and D1 is -1.15% and significant at the 1 percent level. Consistent with existing works, firms that have high asset growth are less risky and, thus, have lower yield spreads. Column (2) reports the average yield spreads of high investment (HI) grade bonds, the average yield spread in D1 is 0.01% lower than that in D10 though the difference is statistically insignificant. In the low investment grade bond group (LI), the average yield spread of D10 is 0.55% lower than that in D1 and the difference is highly significant at 1% level. Further, in the non-investment grade bond group (JK), the spreads between D10 and D1 are -2.80% with a t-statistic of -5.38. The result shows that the yield spread differences become much larger and more significant when we move from high quality bonds to low quality bonds. Our findings provide direct evidence of Prediction 2 that the collateral value effect is more profound in low-rated bonds than high-rated bonds.

Next, we look at yield spread changes of equal-weighted portfolios reported in Column (5) to (8). We find that the average yield spread changes are -0.09 for D1 and 0.10 for D10 in the full

sample. The spread between the D10 and D1 is 0.19% with a t-statistic of 3.22. As suggested in Figure 1, firms with high (low) asset growth tend to have a high (low) yield spread changes in the subsequent period. Our findings are in line with the hypothetical figure. Specifically, the average yield spread changes of D10 is 0.05% higher than that of D1 for high investment grade bonds. Moreover, the differences of average spread changes between top and bottom deciles are 0.15% and 0.83% for low investment grade bonds and non-investment grade bonds, respectively. Similar to previous findings, the differences of yield spread changes between the D10 and D1 become much larger and more statistically significant for low quality bonds than high quality bonds.

The last block of the panel shows the bond performance based on the yield spread change. A unit change in bond yield spreads leads to a change in bond return of  $-\eta_{i,t}$  units. For the full sample analysis reported in Column (9), the average bond performance attributed to yield spread change in the bottom decile (D1) is 0.82% and the corresponding performance of the top decile (D10) is -0.95%. The spread between D10 and D1 is about -1.77%. Given the sample of average modified duration of 6.6 years, the -1.77% difference in bond return between these two extreme deciles can reconcile the difference of yield spread changes between the deciles reported in Column (5). In Addition, the differences of yield spread changes between D10 and D1 leads to a difference of -0.46% (t=-3.10) and -0.91% (t=-3.49) in bond returns between D10 and D1 for high investment and low investment grade bonds, respectively. It is worth noting that for non-investment grade bonds, the bond performance attributed to yield spread change in the top decile D10 underperforms the bottom decile D1 by 4.66%, the largest difference among three rating groups.

Panel B of Table 6 presents the decomposition results of value weighted portfolios. They are consistent with the Panel A. As reported in Column (1), the spread of average yield spread between D10 and D1 is -0.68% for the full sample, with a relatively small magnitude compared to equal-weighted portfolio. Column (5) reports the difference of yield spread changes between D10 and D1 is 0.16 with a t-statistic of 2.44. In Column (9), yield spread changes based return of D10 is 1.52% lower than D1 with a t-statistic of 3.68. The magnitude is roughly the same as that reported in Panel A.

The revealed pattern is consistent with Figure 1 of the model section. For example, in year t (corresponding to the year when asset growth is measured), in the full sample, the bonds in the D10 group have a lower average yield spread (1.41%) than D1 group (2.56%) while the consequent

yield spread changes of 0.14 for D10 bonds are higher than -0.13 for D1 bonds, both contributing to worse performance of bonds in D10 than D1. In other words, there is a strong reversal in bond yield spread. This reversal is stronger for low-quality bonds and among junk bond sample. While it is quite premature to argue a mispricing interpretation of the asset growth anomaly, results from the sorted portfolio analysis are consistent with this interpretation.

#### 4.3.2 Regression Analysis

First, we examine the effect of collateral value on yield spreads. High asset growth comes with high tangible asset growth and corresponding high collateral value growth, which lowers credit risk and cost of capital. Accordingly, we expect a negative relation between tangible asset growth and yield spreads. We perform the following regressions to examine the effect of collateral growth on bond yield spreads:

$$YS_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TG_{i,t} + \beta_2 TG_{i,t} * Low_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\tag{17}$$

where  $Low_{i,t}$  is an indicator for bonds with a below an A- rating and  $c_{i,t}$  is the same set of control variables used in the previous tables.

The regressions results are presented in Table 7. In Column 1, we examine the tangible asset growth effect on bond yield spreads with control variables. The coefficient on TG is -0.012 with a t-statistic of -2.50, suggesting that tangible asset growth is negatively related to yield spreads. This is consistent with our conjecture that asset growth increases the tangible asset and collateral value, lowering yield spread.

If the impact of tangible asset on bond pricing is through the collateral channel, we expect tangible asset plays a more important role among low-rated bonds where the default risk is larger than that for high-rated bonds. To test this hypothesis, we include the interaction term between TG and a dummy variable for low investment grade bonds Low. We classify all bonds in our sample into two groups: high-rated bonds (rated A- or higher) and low-rated bonds (BBB+ or lower). Low is 1 for low-rated bonds and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.020 with a t-statistic of -3.47, almost 70% higher than the coefficient on TG for all the bonds in Column 1. This suggests that the tangible asset effect is largely driven by low-investment grade bonds, supporting the collateral channel story.

Next, we subsequently perform the regression to examine the effect of collateral growth on changes in yield spreads:

$$\Delta Y S_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T G_{i,t} + \beta_2 T G_{i,t+1} + \beta_3 \Delta L e v_{i,t+1} + \beta_4 Y S_{i,t} + \beta_5 T G_{i,t} * Low_{i,t}$$

$$+ \beta_6 T G_{i,t+1} * Low_{i,t} + \beta_7 \Delta L e v_{i,t+1} * Low_{i,t} + \beta_8 Y S_{i,t} * Low_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$
(18)

Regression results are reported in column (3) to (9) of Table 7. In Column (3), we include TG and same set of control variables as in Column 1. The coefficient on TG is 0.011 with a t-statistic of 2.96, confirming a positive relationship between tangible asset growth and changes in yield spread. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in tangible asset growth is associated with a 12 bps increase of yield spread change.

In Figure 2, we look at how asset growth (Panel A) and tangible asset growth (panel B) evolve over time. The figures respectively plot the difference of AG and TG between the top and the bottom asset growth decile in portfolio formation year t and portfolio evaluation year t+1 for high, low and non-investment grade bonds. Both AG and TG growth rates are apparently not persistent over time – the average differences of AG and TG growth rate between top and bottom deciles is large in year t but fairly close to 0 in year t+1 – the same pattern holds for high, low and non-investment grade bonds. The decline of asset growth rates from t to t+1 is much higher for low and non-investment grade bonds than high investment grade bonds. This pattern results in two implications. First, if the over-extrapolation bias truly exists, the non-persistent asset growth will cause mispricing. Second, bond yields of high asset growth firms in the subsequent year might change after incorporating the new tangible asset growth information.

The second consideration above motivates us to include the tangible asset growth in year t+1. In other words, we examine the overvaluation effect by including the realized tangible asset growth rate in the year of t+1 to control for the impact of tangible asset growth persistence on yield spread changes. The result is shown in Column 4. Consistent with our expectation, we have the coefficient on  $TG_{t+1}$  to be -0.003, and significant at 5% level. The negative sign shows that a high tangible asset growth from year t to t+1 is negatively associated with changes in yield spreads. Nevertheless, the coefficient on  $TG_t$  is 0.007 (t-stat = 2.24), which confirms that tangible asset growth has a positive relation with the following yield change and the relation is not assumed by

the impact from the realized tangible asset growth from t to t+1.

Subsequently in Column (5), we further add the realized change in leverage in year t+1. The coefficient on  $TG_t$  remains significant (0.006 with a t-statistic of 2.21). In Column (6), (7), (8) and (9), we additionally interact  $TG_t$ ,  $TG_{t+1}$ ,  $\Delta LEV_{t+1}$  and YS with Low respectively. In Column (9) with all the interaction terms, the coefficient on  $TG_t$  is 0.002 and significant at 10% level. Interesting, for low-rated bond, the coefficient on  $TG_t * Low$  is 0.012 and both significant at 5%. Putting together, the total effect of TG on change in yield spreads for low-rated bonds is 0.014, much higher than 0.002 in high-rated bonds, showing a stronger positive relationship between tangible asset growth and following changes in yield spread for low-rated bonds than for high-rated bonds.

In Column 9, the coefficient on  $TG_{t+1}$  is -0.007 and significant at 5% level and the coefficient on  $TG_{t+1} * Low$  is non-significant. The coefficient on  $\Delta LEV_{t+1}$  is 0.021 and the interaction term  $\Delta LEV_{t+1} * Low$  is 0.010 and both significant at 5%. The coefficient on YS is -0.556 and the interaction term YS \* Low is 0.326 and both significant at 1%. The results show the explanatory power of tangible asset growth on change in yield spreads is not assumed by yield spreads, the new information of tangible asset growth or change in leverage.

## 4.4 Bond Performance Decomposition: Time Series Analysis

We have shown a negative relation between tangible asset growth and future corporate bond returns. Particularly, tangible asset growth affects bond returns through two channels: yield spreads and changes in yield spreads. But which one is the primary driver of the negative asset growth effect on bond return? To answer this question, we first examine the explanatory power of yield spreads and yield spreads change on bond returns. Then we construct and apply tangible asset growth factors to explain the explanatory power of tangible asset growth on yield spreads and yield spreads change.

Following the bond return decomposition in eq. (9), we perform the following regressions:

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 b_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 \Delta b_{i,t+1} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha_3 + \beta_3 s_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha_4 + \beta_4 \Delta s_{i,t+1} + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$
(19)

The dependent variable,  $R_{i,t+1}$ , is excess return on bond i in month t.  $b_{i,t}$  is the bond i's maturity-matching treasury bond yield in month t;  $\Delta b_{i,t+1}$  is the changes in treasury bond yield from month t to t+1;  $s_{i,t}$  is the yield spread of bond i in month t and  $\Delta s_{i,t+1}$  is the changes in yield spreads from month t to t+1. For each month, we form bivariate portfolios by independently sorting bonds into five quintiles based on their asset growth rate and three rating groups based on their bond ratings (high investment grade, low investment grade and non-investment grade). Then we run time-series regression of bond return in each of the fifteen groups.

Panel A of Table 8 shows univariate time-series regression results of bond excess returns on bonds' matching treasury bond yields. The coefficients on treasury bond yields  $(b_{i,t})$  are insignificant for investment-grade bonds (HI and LI), with an average  $R^2$  of 0.01% for HI and 0.01% for LI. For non-investment grade bonds, only asset growth group 3, 4 and 5 have negative and significant coefficients on  $b_{i,t}$ , but the average  $R^2$  in five groups is only 1.4%. The results suggest that treasury bond yields have a low explanatory power on bond returns.

Panel B reports regression results of bond returns on changes in treasury bond yields. The coefficients on changes in treasury bond yield ( $\Delta b_{i,t+1}$ ) are negative and significant at 1% level for investment-grade bonds. The average  $R^2s$  are 41.3% and 15.3% for high- and low-rated investment grade bonds, suggesting that a large part of the variation of investment-grade bond returns can be explained by changes in treasury bond yield which captures changes in macroeconomic conditions. In contrast, for non-investment bonds,  $b_{i,t+1}$  is not significant in all AG groups and the variation of the changes in treasury bond yields can explain less than 1% variation of bond returns, a trivial impact of changes in treasury bond yields on non-investment bond return.

The regression results of bond returns on yield spreads  $(s_{i,t})$  are reported in Panel C. The average  $R^2s$  are 5.1%, 7.1% and 10.4% for the high-investment grade group (HI), the low-investment grade

group (LI) and the non-investment group (JK). The range of  $R^2s$  are [2.7%, 7.3%] in HI, [4.4%, 9.1%] in LI and [5.5%, 17.8%] in LI. The average  $R^2$  of yield spreads is higher than that of treasury bond yields in Panel A, indicating that yield spreads have a stronger explanatory power on bond returns than treasury bond yields.

Panel D shows regression results of bond returns on changes in yield spreads. The coefficients of change in yield spreads ( $\Delta s_{i,t+1}$ ) in all groups are negative and statistically significant. In addition, the range of  $R^2s$  are [10.2%, 22%] in high-investment grade groups, [35.1%, 57.1%] in low-investment grade groups and [62.6%, 85.1%] in non-investment groups. The results reveal that the changes in yield spreads on bond returns can explain a much larger part of the variation of bond returns than that by treasury bond yields, changes in treasury bond yields or yield spreads. Moreover, we find that changes in yield spreads has a stronger explanatory power on non-investment grade bonds with an average  $R^2$  of 83.5% than high investment-grade bonds with an average  $R^2$  of 18%, suggesting that changes of idiosyncratic risk of individual bond matter more for bonds with lower ratings.

Concerning that the sample period from 2002 to 2018 could be too short for a time-series analysis, we augment the sample by including the period from 1994 to 2001 using the Mergent NAIC corporate bond returns of insurance companies. The results are reported in Appendix C. The patterns in terms of the explanatory powers of the four elements resemble what we have reported in Table 8.

Taken together, these results show that changes in yield spreads and changes in treasury yield spreads capture most return variation in corporate bonds. Specifically, changes in yield spreads have the strongest explanatory power for non-investment grade bonds while changes in treasury yield spreads have played a more important role on bonds with higher ratings.

## 4.5 Explanatory Power of Collateral Growth on Yield Spread Changes

So far, we demonstrate that, cross-sectionally, collateral growth is a significant determinant of both bond yield spreads and yield spread changes (see sections 8 and 4.6) and that both treasury yield changes and yield spread changes are the primary drivers of bond performance (as noted in section 4.3.2). Both treasury yields and treasury yield changes are primarily influenced by macro economic factors and thus they are unlikely affected by collateral growth of individuals firms. As

a result, we focus on the question how much yield spread changes can be explained by a firm's collateral growth. To address this question, following prior studies such as Fama and French (1993) and (Bai et al., 2019) that develop factor portfolios capturing the covariance between security performance and underlying economic factors, we extract factors potentially driving bond yield spread changes. Within each rating group, we breakdown bonds into ten equal-numbered groups based on collateralized asset growth in year t-1. We calculate the value-weighted average monthly yield spreads changes of each portfolio July of year t to June of year t+1, denoted as  $\Delta$  YS<sub>jt</sub>, where j = 1 to 10. Then we estimate collateral growth factors using the average yield spread changes ( $\Pi$ ) of the top (j=10) and bottom (j=1) deciles:

$$\Pi_t = \Delta Y S_{10,t} - \Delta Y S_{1,t} \tag{20}$$

Under the hypothesis that mispricing drives bond yields, we expect individual bonds' yield spread changes to comove with the spread of the arbitrage portfolio. Moreover, mispricing is expected to be stronger among poorly rated bonds. For this reason, we anticipate the factor has a stronger influence on yield spread changes among poorly rated bonds.

In order to test these expectations, within each bond rating category, high-investment grade, low-investment grade, and junk bonds, we sort insurers into quintiles based on bond issuers' asset growth rates, then test how the above two factors determine yield spreads and changes in yield spreads using the following regressions:

$$\Delta Y S_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_i \Pi_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{21}$$

Note that the dependent variables are yield spreads (YS) of individual bond portfolio i in month t and changes in yield spreads  $(\Delta YS)$  of bond portfolio i from month t to month t+1.

Table 9 reports the result when regressing yield spread changes onto the tangible-asset-growth-based yield spreads change factor  $(F^{\Delta YS})$ . The coefficients of the yield spread factor are not significant in HI and HI bonds groups except one group. In contrast, the coefficients are significant in JK bond groups. The average  $R^2s$  for HI and LI are 3.3% and 10.5% while 20.6% for

JK. This means, for non-investment grade bonds, tangible asset growth can explain about one fifth of variations of yield spreads change component of bond returns, corroborating the strongest mispricing effect collateral growth in explaining non-investment grade bond returns.

Note that, in order to address the concern that the sample period from 2002 to 2019 could be too short for a time-series analysis, we augment the sample by including the period from 1994 to 2001 using the Mergent NAIC corporate bond returns of insurance companies. The results are reported in the internet Appendix A2. The patterns in terms of the explanatory power of collateral growth on yield spread changes is consistent with that in Table 9.

Altogether, we find collateral growth is the main driver of bonds returns through the change in yield spreads channels for poorly rated corporate bonds, rendering supports to the mispricing explanation of the asset growth anomaly.

#### 4.6 Role of Investor Sentiment

#### 4.7 Sentiment Effect on Bond Performance

A large literature shows investor sentiment plays an active role in driving security prices. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2006) shows when sentiment is high, some securities whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage, such as small stocks, young stocks, high volatility and unprofitable stocks, earn relatively low subsequent returns. Consistently, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) point out that in the high sentiment periods featured by heightened investor risk appetites, poor quality firms are more likely to issue corporate bonds which experience low returns when the firms' credit quality becomes worse later.

We specifically apply issuer quality (IQ) used in Greenwood and Hanson (2013) to proxy for market sentiment. IQ evaluates the equal-weighted average expected default frequency (EDF) of firms with high amount of debt issues relative to the equal-weighted average EDF of firms with low amount of debt issues. Investor sentiment is considered to high when high debt issuers have a low issuer quality, i.e., a high expected default frequency.

$$IQ_{t} = \frac{\sum_{i \in High \, d_{it}} \text{EDF Score}_{it}}{N_{t}^{High \, d_{it}}} - \frac{\sum_{i \in Low \, d_{it}} \text{EDF Score}_{it}}{N_{t}^{Low \, d_{it}}}$$
(22)

where EDF Score is the decile rank (from 1 to 10) of a bond issuer's EDF;  $d_{it} = \Delta D_{it}/A_{it}$ 

denotes debt issuance;  $N^{High \, d_{it}}$  and  $N^{Low \, d_{it}}$  respectively denote the numbers of high and low debt issuance firms (top and bottom quintiles based on d using NYSE cutoffs). Construction details of the measure can be found in Appendix B.<sup>11</sup> Precisely, a high score of IQ in a particular year corresponds to the average issuer quality in that year is low. A great issuance of low-quality bonds corresponds to booming periods in the corporate bond market.

The construction of IQ solely involves the Compustat data, to compare our IQ measure with the original measure reported in Greenwood and Hanson (2013), in Figure 3, we plot IQ, the red dash line, back to 1990. Based on the figure, the bond market sentiment is high in 1995 - 98 and 2004 - 07 (right before the dot com bubble burst and the financial crisis), and 2013-14 (short-term bond market booming attributable to U.S. economic stimulus policies). The pattern is consistent with the finding documented in Greenwood and Hanson (2013) showing the bond market sentiment from 1962 to 2008.

Depicted as the blue solid line, Figure 3 simultaneously plots a second issuer quality, CGQ by comparing average EDF scores of high and low collateral growth bond issuers:

$$CGQ_{t} = \frac{\sum_{i \in High \, TG_{it}} \text{EDF Score}_{it}}{N_{t}^{High \, TG_{it}}} - \frac{\sum_{i \in Low \, TG_{it}} \text{EDF Score}_{it}}{N_{t}^{Low \, TG_{it}}}$$
(23)

CGQ is constructed in the same way as IQ except that we use collateral growth, proxied by tangible asset growth rates, to split bond issuers. When the mispricing argument holds, high collateral growth issuers on average have lower issuer quality in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment period. We thus expect CGQ to be highly correlated with IQ under the mispricing argument. This prediction is confirmed by Figure 3, where we find the two data series move closely with each other. The correlation between CGQ and IQ is 0.73. The strong association between bond issuers' asset growth quality and bond market sentiments is parallel to empirical finding reported in Section 4.5 showing a high explanatory power of the collateral growth factor on bond yield spreads. Next, we examine whether the anomaly effect intensifies in high sentiment periods. We perform the following regression:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Greenwood and Hanson (2013) also introduce a second sentiment measure â the high-yield share quantified as the proportion of high yield bonds among all bond issuance. We obtain consistent results when applying the alternative sentiment measure.

 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$ Greenwood and Hanson (2013) note that the measure "tends to be low in recessions and high in expansions. However, this relation is not exact, and the lead-lag relationship between the business cycle" and it varies over time. For instance, IQ falls during many recessions but rises during the 1982 recession as the 1980s high-yield boom was getting underway.

$$Ret_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TG_{i,t} + \beta_2 TG_{i,t} * Sent_{i,t} + \beta_3 YS_{i,t} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

$$\tag{24}$$

where Sent is an indicator representing a high sentiment years equal to 1 when IQ is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. The interaction between TG and HS is to capture the influence of high sentiment on the effect of collateral growth.<sup>13</sup> The main explanatory variable is the interaction term between TG and dummy variable for high sentiment period (HS). The control variables include TG, HS, yield spreads (YS), firm size, leverage (LEV), change in leverage  $(\Delta LEV)$ , rating, duration, coupon, par, put and call.

The result of the analysis on sentiment effect on bond annual performance is reported in Table 10. Column (1) shows the result for the full sample. The coefficient on TG \* HS is -0.023 with a t-statistic of -2.63. We find the inverse relation between the tangible asset growth and bond return is more pronounced in the high sentiment period than in the low sentiment period. Specially, a one standard deviation increase in tangible asset growth reduces bond return by 17 bps more in high sentiment period than in low sentiment period.

Next, we estimate Eq. 24 with each of three rating subgroups: i) high investment-grade bonds (A- and above), ii) low investment-grade bonds (BBB- to BBB+) and iii) non-investment-grade bonds (below BBB-). As reported, the coefficient on TG\*HS is 0.01 (t-stat = 0.65), -0.011 (t-stat = -1.92) and -0.025 (t-stat = -2.19) in the high, low and non-investment grade group respectively. (YS) is only significant for low- and non-investment grade bonds. The results show the impact of tangible asset on lowering bond return is magnified most for the non-investment grade bonds in the high sentiment period among all bonds.

#### 4.8 Sentiment Effect on Yield Spreads and Yield Spread Changes

Now we work on the sentiment effect on yield spreads and change of yield spreads. We perform the exactly same regression as Table 10 while replacing the dependent variable to

is reported in Table 11. Columns (1) to (4) are the result of the analysis on the yield spreads. The dependant variable is bond return. The main explanatory variable is the interaction term between TG and dummy variable for high-sentiment period (HS). The control variables include

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$ We obtain consistent results under two variations. First, we use IQ itself instead of the sentiment dummy. Second, we alternatively use CGQ as a sentiment measure.

TG, the size, leverage, ratings, duration, coupon, par, put and call. In the full sample, the coefficient on TG\*HS is -0.002 with a t-statistic of 1.88. Then we run the regression in the three rating subgroups respectively. The coefficient on TG\*HS is -0.000 (t-stat = -0.66), -0.001 (t-stat = -2.03) and -0.002 (t-stat = -2.65) in the high, low and non-investment grade group respectively. The result shows the inverse relationship between tangible asset growth and yield spreads is most pronounced for non-investment grade bonds in the high sentiment period than in the low sentiment period among all bonds. Further, Columns (5) - (8) are the result of the analysis on the change of yield spreads. Besides the same set of control variables in the regression of yield spreads, we add yield spreads variable. In the full sample, the coefficient on TG\*HS is 0.005 with a t-statistic of 3.07. Then we run the regression in the three rating subgroups respectively. The coefficient on TG\*HS is 0.002 (t-stat = 1.36), 0.008 (t-stat = 1.85) and 0.010 (t-stat = 2.45) in the high, low and non-investment grade group respectively. The result shows the inverse relationship between tangible asset growth and change of yield spreads is most pronounced for non-investment grade bonds in the high sentiment period than in the low sentiment period among all bonds.

In summary, on the one hand, a higher collateral value results in lower yield spread at time t in the high sentiment period than in the low sentiment period. On the other hand, a higher collateral value results in lower yield spread at time t in the high sentiment period than in the low sentiment period, a contribution to the more pronounced inverse relation between the asset growth and bond return in the high sentiment period. This pattern is strongest for the non-investment grade bonds among all bonds. This evidence supports the notion that the pricing on collateral value for low-rated bonds at time t is overvalued, with the price reversal magnitude subject to the sentiment level.

#### 4.9 Collateral Growth Effect after Bond Risk Correction

In this section, we examine whether the asset growth effect on corporate bond returns can be explained by systematic variation or traditional risk premiums in the corporate bond market. We investigate this issues using bond-level cross-sectional regressions. Specifically, for each bond and each month in our sample, we estimate the factor loadings from the 36-month fixed window rolling regressions of excess bond returns on the five-factor mode (Fama and French, 1993; Elton et al., 1995; Bessembinder et al., 2009; Jostova et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2011) with the bond market factor

(MKT), the default factors (DEF), the term factor (TERM), the bond momentum factor (MOM), and the bond liquidity factor (LIQ).

$$R_{i,t+1} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 T G_{i,t} + \theta' \beta_{it} + \gamma' c_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{25}$$

where  $Factor_t$  is one of the four value-weighted bond market factors, DEF, TERM, MOM and LIQ, and  $\beta_{i,t}^{Factor}$  is one of the four factor betas:  $\beta_{i,t}^{DEF}$ ,  $\beta_{i,t}^{TERM}$ ,  $\beta_{i,t}^{MOM}$ , and  $\beta_{i,t}^{LIQ}$  of bond i in month t.

We examine the asset growth effect on expected returns controlling bond risk factors at the bond level using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. The results are reported in Table 12. Regression (1) and (2) are for the full sample. Regression (1) presents negative and statistically significant relations between tangible asset growth and the cross-sectional future bond return controlling for five bond factor betas. Regression (2) adds the other bond characteristics (rating, illiquidity, duration and size) as the controlling variables. In regression (1), the coefficient on TG is -0.0039 (t-statistic =-1.84), suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in TG leads to 0.39% decrease in monthly bond return (i.e. 4.68% annual bond return). In regression (2), the coefficient on TG is -0.0025 (t-statistic =-1.83). The results indicate that the collateral growth effect cannot be captured by common bond risk factors. Another notable point is that common risk factors have strong explain power on future bond returns as the adj.  $R^2$  equals 22% in regression (1). However, their predictability of future returns become much weaker in our sample, which only consider bonds issued by listed firms.

Regressions (3)-(5) repeat the regression (2) in three subrating groups. The cross-sectional relation between TG and future bond returns are negative and significant for the low and non-investment grade bonds while insignificant for high investment grade bonds. Specifically, the coefficient on tangible asset growth is -0.0034 and significant at 10% level for low investment grade bonds and -0.0059 and significant at 10% level for non-investment grade bonds. A one-standard deviation increase of TG is associated with a 6.4% decrease of monthly bond returns.

The results show that the effect of tangible asset growth on future bond return can not be subsumed by five common bond factors and other bond characteristics.

### 5 Conclusions

High asset growth rates lead to a rise in firm collateralized assets which lower default risk and lead to a lower expected performance for bonds issued by such firms. On the other hand, if the anticipated collateralized asset growth rates may be overestimated, especially for low-quality issuers, then bonds issued by high asset-growth firms may experience a lower realized performance. In this study, we separate these two explanations by decomposing bond performance into yield spread and yield spreads change components as well as the level and changes in treasure bond yields. It follows the idea that when bond yields are an unbiased estimator of bond expected performance, then on average yield spread changes are expected to be zero.

We find that over 80 percent of bond performance variations of non-investment grade performance come from yield spread changes while bond yield spreads can explain roughly 10 percent of performance variations. We also find that collateral growth play a significant role in both elements. Further along, we report that collateral growth is significant determinant of yield spread changes and the effect intensifies in years of high bond market sentiment. More interestingly, our empirical finding shows that, over time, bond issuers' credit quality is highly negatively correlated with bond market sentiment. We conclude that our findings reinforce the overreaction explanation where investors over-extrapolate corporate growth in collateralized assets when firm assets grow rapidly.

# Appendix A: Bond Return Decomposition

Performance of a coupon bond is expressed as  $R_{t+1} = \frac{C + P_{t+1} - P_t}{P_t}$ , where

$$P_{t+1} = \sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C}{(1+y_{t+1})^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_{t+1})^{n-1}}$$

$$P_t = \sum_{\tau=1}^{n} \frac{C}{(1+y_t)^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_t)^n}$$

Bond yield in the beginning of year t+1 can be expressed as follows:

$$y_{t+1} = y_t + \Delta y_{t+1} \tag{A1}$$

Applying the first-order Taylor Expansion on  $P_{t+1}$ , we have:

$$P_{t+1} = P(y_{t+1}) = P(y_t) + P'(y_t) \Delta y_{t+1}$$

$$= \sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C}{(1+y_t)^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_t)^{n-1}} - \left[\sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C\tau}{(1+y_t)^{\tau+1}} + \frac{M(n-1)}{(1+y_t)^n}\right] \Delta y_{t+1}$$

$$= \sum_{\tau=2}^{n} \frac{C}{(1+y_t)^{\tau-1}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_t)^{n-1}} - \left[\sum_{\tau=2}^{n} \frac{C\tau}{(1+y_t)^{\tau}} + \frac{M(n-1)}{(1+y_t)^n}\right] \Delta y_{t+1}$$
(A2)

It can be shown,

$$C + P_{t+1} = (1+y_t)P_t - \left[\sum_{\tau=2}^n \frac{C(\tau-1)}{(1+y_t)^{\tau-1}} + \frac{M(n-1)}{(1+y_t)^{n-1}}\right] \Delta y_{t+1}/(1+y_t)$$
(A3)

$$R_{t+1} = \frac{C + P_{t+1} - P_t}{P_t}$$

$$= \frac{(1+y_t)P_t - \left[\sum_{\tau=2}^n \frac{C(\tau-1)}{(1+y_t)^{\tau-1}} + \frac{M(n-1)}{(1+y_t)^{n-1}}\right] \Delta y_{t+1}/(1+y_t) - P_t}{P_t}$$

$$= y_t - \frac{\sum_{\tau=1}^{n-1} \frac{C\tau}{(1+y_t)^{\tau}} + \frac{M(n-1)}{(1+y_t)^{n-1}}}{P_t} \frac{\Delta y_{t+1}}{1+y_t}$$
(A4)

We can express bond price at t as below:

$$P_{t} = \sum_{\tau=1}^{n} \frac{C}{(1+y_{t})^{\tau}} + \frac{M}{(1+y_{t})^{n}}$$

$$= \frac{C+P_{t+1}^{y_{t}}}{1+y_{t}}$$
(A5)

where  $P_{t+1,t}$  is the forward price of the bond – bond price at t+1 given  $y_t$ .

Inserting  $P_t$  into  $R_{t+1}$ , we have:

$$R_{t+1} = y_t - \frac{P_{t+1}^{y_t}}{C + P_{t+1}^{y_t}} D_{t+1}^{y_t} \Delta y_{t+1}$$
(A6)

where  $P_{t+1}^{y_t}$  is the bond's forward price – the price in the subsequent period given the bond's yield stays constant as  $y_t$ ;  $D_{t+1}^{y_t}$  is the duration at t+1 when the yield stays constant at  $y_t$ .

Using  $c_{t+1}^{y_t}$ , the bond's current yield at t+1 given its yield to maturity at t, we express bond performance  $R_{t+1}$  as

$$R_{t+1} = y_t - \frac{D_{t+1}^{y_t}}{1 + c_{t+1}^{y_t}} \Delta y_{t+1}$$
(A7)

There are two practical issues to be addressed. First, U.S. corporate bonds typically make semiannual coupon payments. Given that asset growth rates are measured annually, two coupon payments are involved to calculate annual bond performance. It can be easily shown that under the assumption that coupon payments are reinvested at the current yield to maturity,  $y_t$ , Eq. (A7) still holds. Second, when a bond is transacted between two coupon payments, we evaluate bond performance using dirty prices, see Eq. (10). The return decomposition also holds.

# Appendix B: Key Variables

The variables used in the paper are listed below (with Compustat data items in parentheses).

- Bond Excess Return is defined as the monthly return of an individual bond in excess of the one-month T-bill rate.
- Yield is an individual bond's annual yield to maturity.
- Yield Spread is measured as the difference between a bond's annual yield to maturity and the corresponding annual yield to maturity of the treasury bond with the same maturity.
- Rating is the bond's numerical credit rating based on the following letter rating conversion scheme: AAA=22, AA+=21, ..., C=2 and D=1.
- Duration is an individual bond's Macaulay duration in years.
- Coupon is the bond's annual interest rate in percentages.
- Par is the principal amount outstanding of a given bond in million dollars.
- ILLIQ is the Amihud illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002). The monthly Amihud measure for any bond i in month j is:

$$Amihud_{i,j} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=1}^{N} \frac{R_t}{Q_t}$$
 (B1)

where N is the number of positive-volume trading days in a given month.  $R_t$  and  $Q_t$  are the return and dollar trading volume, per million dollars when there is at least a trade in day t.

- Asset Growth (AG) is the 1-year percentage change in total firm assets from Cooper et al. (2008), where assets are Compustat data item 6.
- Tangible Asset Growth (TG) is the year-over-year percentage change in tangible assets scaled by total assets (Almeida and Campello, 2007), where tangible assets = Cash (data1) + 0.715 \* Receivables (data2) + 0.547 \* Inventory (data3) + 0.535 Net \* Fixed Assets (data8).
- Intangible Asset Growth (IG) the year-over-year percentage change in intangible assets (data33) other than goodwill (data204) scaled by total assets (Barth and Kasznik, 1999).

- Size is the firm's total (book value of) assets in billion dollars, Compustat data item 6.
- Leverage (LEV) is the sum of long-term debt (data9) and short-term debt (data34) over the sum of total debt and the fiscal-year end share price times the number of shares outstanding (data199\*data25).
- OIA is the operating income before depreciation (data13) scaled by total assets (data6).
- EDF is the expected default frequency developed by Moody's Analytics estimating Merton (1974)'s default probability. Its estimation involves two steps. In the first step, we estimate the distance to default (DD) measure for each individual bond issuer:

$$DD = \frac{\ln(V/D) + (\mu - 0.5\sigma_v^2)T}{\sigma_v \sqrt{T}}$$
(B2)

where V is the firm's market value; D is the sum of a firm's current assets (Compustat data item 34) and half of long-term liabilities (Compustat data item 9) (Bharath and Shumway, 2008); T is the forecasting horizon of 1 year. Besides,  $\mu$  (the firm's asset return) and  $\sigma_v$  (the firm's asset volatility) are estimated following Bharath and Shumway (2008). Then in the second step, we estimate the default probability as (1 - Norm(DD)) where Norm represents a normal cumulative density function.

• *IQ*, issuer quality, is measured as the default risk of high-debt issuers with that of low-debt issuers, following Greenwood and Hanson (2013). We compare the credit quality of firms that issue large amounts of debt to that of firms that issue little debt or that are retiring debt.

$$IQ_t = \frac{\sum_{i \in High \, d_{it}} \text{EDF Score}_{it}}{N_t^{High \, d_{it}}} - \frac{\sum_{i \in Low \, d_{it}} \text{EDF Score}_{it}}{N_t^{Low \, d_{it}}}$$
(B3)

where EDF Score is the decile rank score of a bond issuer's expected default frequency;  $d_{it} = \Delta D_{it}/A_{it}$  denotes debt issuance;  $N^{High}d_{it}$  and  $N^{Low}d_{it}$  respectively denote the numbers of high and low debt issuance firms. Debt issuance is calculated as the change in assets minus the change in book equity from Compustat, scaled by lagged assets. A bond issuer's expected default frequency is the Merton (1974) expected default frequency, computed following Bharath and Shumway (2008). IQ compares the average EDF Score of high net debt issuers (net debt issuance in the top sample quintile) with that of low net debt issuers (net debt issuance in the bottom sample quintile). IQ reflects a broader measure of investors'

sentiment in both loan and bond markets and is a barometer of credit market overheating, taking higher values when there are more debt issuers with poor credit quality (Greenwood and Hanson, 2013).

# Appendix C: Bond Risk Factors

We largely follow Bai et al. (2019) to include a set of common systematic risk factors including common five factors, including the bond market return factor, the default premium factor, the term premium factor, the liquidity factor, and the momentum factor.

- Bond market return factor, MKT is the monthly return of an individual bond in excess of the one-month T-bill rate (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 1995).
- Default factor, DEF is the difference between the monthly returns of long-term investment-grade corporate bonds and long-term government bonds. The long-term investment-grade bond returns are based on a value-weighted market portfolio that includes all investment-grade bonds (Aaa to Baa3) in the sample with at least ten years to maturity. The weight is determined by the market value of a bond, which equals the number of units outstanding multiplied by the market price of the bond (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 1995).
- Term factor, TERM is defined as the difference between the monthly returns of long-term government bond and the one-month Treasury bill. We proxy the term factor using the difference between 10-year treasury bond yield and the one-month Treasury bill (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 1995).
- Bond momentum factor, MOM is constructed from decile portfolios of bond momentum defined as the cumulative returns over months from t-6 to t-1 (formation period) (e.g., Jostova, Nikolova, Philipov, and Stahel, 2013).
- Liquidity risk factor, LIQ is the average return difference between the high liquidity beta portfolio and the low liquidity beta portfolio. Specifically, we follow Lin, Wang and Wu (2011) and estimate the liquidity beta over a five-year rolling window for each individual bond. We then sort individual bonds into ten decile portfolios each month by the preranking liquidity betas.

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#### Table 1: Summary Statistics

The table reports summary statistics of bond issue and issuer characteristics from July 2002 to June 2020. Bond characteristics variables include return (the monthly return of an individual bond in excess of the one-month T-bill rate), yield (the annual yield to maturity), rating (the bond's numerical credit rating based on the following letter rating conversion scheme: AAA=22, AA+=21, ..., C=2 and D=1), duration (Macaulay duration in years), coupon (the bond's annual interest rate in %), par (the face value of bond's issue size in millions of \$), Amihud (the Amihud illiquidity measure in % per million dollars), and dummy variables for the puttable and callable bonds. Firm characteristics variables include asset growth (AG, the year-over-year percentage change in total assets from Cooper et al. (2008)), tangible asset growth (TG, the year-over-year percentage change in tangible assets scaled by total assets from Almeida and Campello (2007)), intangible asset growth (TG, the year-over-year percentage change in intangible assets), size (the firm's total assets in billions of \$), market leverage LEV (the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt over the sum of total debt and the fiscal-year end share price times the number of shares outstanding), changes in market leverage ( $\Delta LEV$ ) and OIA (the operating income over total assets). Details on the construction of these variables are provided in the Appendix B. The distributional statistics include the 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles, as well as the mean, median and standard deviation (STD) of each variable. The time-series averages of the cross-sectional statistics are reported.

Variables	N	P5	P25	Mean	Median	P75	P95	STD
Bond Charac	cteristics							
Return	22,784	-0.0545	0.0006	0.0450	0.0308	0.0794	0.1770	0.0912
Yield	22,784	0.0124	0.0259	0.0410	0.0382	0.0515	0.0761	0.0273
Rating	22,784	11	14	15.69	16	17	21	3.01
Duration	22,784	1.39	3.08	6.64	5.46	9.02	15.75	4.48
Coupon (%)	22,784	1.95	3.60	5.04	5.13	6.50	8	1.89
Par	22,784	149.39	298.14	618.80	495.69	748.10	1602.81	564.59
Amihud (%)	22,784	0.01	0.06	0.27	0.14	0.32	0.95	0.44
Put	22,784	0	0	0.01	0	0	0	0.09
Call	22,784	0	1	0.76	1	1	1	0.43
Firms Chara	cteristics							
$\overline{AG}$	3,938	-0.1327	-0.0190	0.0686	0.0372	0.1000	0.3328	0.2325
TG	3,938	-0.0815	-0.0113	0.0270	0.0188	0.0538	0.1597	0.1092
IG	3,938	-0.0404	-0.0043	0.0225	0.0000	0.0129	0.1487	0.1102
Size	3,938	1.91	4.90	28.36	10.66	25.59	98.60	66.96
LEV	3,932	0.0499	0.1349	0.2778	0.2279	0.3949	0.6494	0.1876
$\Delta LEV$	3,925	-0.1095	-0.0340	0.0044	-0.0018	0.0359	0.1451	0.0808
OIA	3,930	0.0553	0.0942	0.1427	0.1339	0.1789	0.2775	0.0910

Table 2: Bond Issuer and Issue Attributes across Asset Growth Deciles

At the end of June of each year from 2002 to 2019, the bonds are allocated into deciles based on their issuers' annual asset growth rates. D1 (D10) represents the issuers' decile with the lowest (highest) asset growth rate. The table reports bond issue and issuer characteristics prior to the portfolio formation date. AG is the annual asset growth rate, defined as the year-over-year percentage change in total assets from Cooper et al. (2008). TG is the annual growth rate of tangible assets from Almeida and Campello (2007). IG is the annual growth rate of intangible assets. Size is the total assets in billions of \$ at the fiscal year end in calendar year t-1.  $\Delta LEV$  is the changes in leverage. The fraction of high investment bonds (HI) containing the bonds with ratings of A- or higher, the fraction of low investment grade bonds (LI) receiving ratings from BBB- to BBB+, and the fraction of junk bonds (JK) rated below BBB- are reported. Details on the construction of these variables are provided in the Appendix B. All numbers, except for t-statistics, are expressed in percentage. The time-series averages of the statistics are reported. The t-statistics are obtained using the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent covariance estimator with a lag of order one. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denotes the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

Decile	AG	TG	IG	$\Delta LEV$	%HI	%LI	%JK
1	-14.53	-6.70	-2.68	-0.69	28.15	41.06	30.78
2	-4.51	-2.06	-0.85	-0.50	45.02	35.45	19.53
3	-1.42	-0.30	-0.43	-0.22	44.56	43.29	12.14
4	0.92	0.88	-0.11	-0.05	50.15	42.42	7.43
5	2.95	1.68	0.23	0.11	59.08	33.74	7.18
6	4.77	2.81	0.54	-0.06	61.76	33.97	4.26
7	6.82	3.37	0.92	0.03	63.54	29.61	6.85
8	9.47	4.45	1.65	0.86	69.17	27.59	3.24
9	13.82	7.37	2.63	2.05	64.69	32.47	2.85
10	43.98	14.18	17.82	5.70	49.49	42.07	8.44
Spread (10-1)	58.51***	20.89***	20.50***	6.40***	21.34***	1.01	-22.34***
t-stat (spread)	(63.27)	(59.75)	(-37.09)	(23.42)	(14.33)	(0.65)	(-18.66)

#### Table 3: Asset Growth Decile Portfolios: Annual Bond Performance

This table reports the annual bond performance and asset growth rates across decile groups sorted by issuers' annual asset growth rates, AG. Bond annual performance is the cumulative buy-and-hold bond monthly returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. Asset growth rates are estimated as the percentage changes of individual firms' total assets from year t-2 to year t-1. "1" and "10" represent the lowest and the highest decile ranks of issuers based on their asset growth rates. Panel A reports the results of equal-weighted portfolios. Panel B reports the results of value-weighted portfolios. All the reported numbers are averaged across bonds of a decile first and then are averaged over time. The difference in annual bond returns between D10 and D1, estimated as the time series average of the averaged differences in extreme deciles, are presented at the second row from the bottom in each panel. The Newey-West t-statistics with a lag of order one for the D10 minus D1 bond performance difference are reported in the last row of each panel. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denotes the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: Equal Weighted Portfolio

	F	Bond Perfe	ormance (%	(o)		Asset Gr	rowth (%)	
Decile	All	HI	LI	JK	All	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	6.98	4.01	6.11	12.88	-14.53	-8.63	-15.96	-27.43
2	5.41	4.00	4.84	8.66	-4.51	-2.28	-4.54	-13.01
3	5.08	3.72	4.43	9.67	-1.42	0.41	-1.67	-9.44
4	3.67	3.64	4.17	6.59	0.92	2.60	0.49	-5.42
5	4.14	3.60	4.58	7.62	2.95	4.22	2.47	-4.25
6	4.17	3.26	5.08	4.37	4.77	5.95	4.20	-0.94
7	4.04	3.64	4.24	6.59	6.82	7.72	5.90	0.56
8	3.86	3.46	4.05	5.80	9.47	10.02	8.81	4.34
9	3.63	3.73	3.49	6.69	13.82	13.30	16.7	12.01
10 (High)	4.01	3.57	4.84	5.11	43.98	29.44	60.67	59.33
Diff (D10-D1)	-2.97***	-0.44*	-1.27***	-7.78***	58.51***	38.07***	76.63***	86.76***
t-stat	(-9.09)	(-1.66)	(-2.72)	(-4.80)	(63.27)	(57.64)	(40.07)	(18.08)

Panel B: Value Weighted Portfolio

	В	ond Perfe	ormance (%	%)		Asset Gr	owth (%)	
Decile	All	HI	LI	JK	All	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	6.07	4.45	5.50	11.95	-13.92	-9.57	-16.4	-25.62
2	4.88	4.35	4.57	8.84	-4.31	-2.58	-4.27	-13.11
3	5.39	5.18	5.08	9.03	-1.32	-0.17	-1.44	-11.14
4	4.21	4.08	4.74	7.43	0.67	2.13	0.38	-5.80
5	4.27	3.57	4.14	8.56	2.77	3.70	2.45	-4.42
6	4.43	4.00	5.35	4.18	4.55	5.51	4.34	0.12
7	4.34	3.88	4.57	6.31	6.76	7.20	6.10	0.46
8	4.05	3.69	3.95	5.36	9.52	10.34	8.88	5.30
9	3.35	3.91	3.10	5.15	13.68	13.15	18.62	14.00
10 (High)	43.98	29.44	3.87	59.33	44.17	28.15	67.47	64.15
Diff (D10-D1)	-2.16***	-0.34	-1.63***	-6.41***	58.09***	37.71***	83.86***	89.76***
(t-stat)	(-6.24)	(-1.27)	(-2.65)	(-4.08)	(66.21)	(64.29)	(44.15)	(18.39)

Table 4: Cross-sectional Regressions of Annual Bond Returns on Asset Growth

In this table, the annual bond excess returns are regressed on the issuers' asset growth rates and other variables. The dependent variable is the annual excess bond return calculated as the difference between a bond's annual return and the annual 1-month treasury bill rate from July of year t to June of year t+1. Asset growth (AG) is the annual percentage change in total assets from Cooper et al. (2008). Tangible asset growth (TG) is the annual percentage change in tangible assets. Issuers' accounting variables include leverage (LEV), changes in leverage  $(\Delta LEV)$  and natural logarithm of total assets (Size). Bond characteristics variables include credit ratings (Rating), illiquidity (ILQ), duration (in years), convexity, coupon rate (%), issue size (Par) and dummy variables for puttable and callable bonds. Rating groups are defined by sorting bonds into one of three rating group. High investment bonds (HI) contain bonds with ratings of A- or higher. Low investment grade bonds (LI) receive ratings from BBB- to BBB+. Junk bonds (JK) are rated below BBB-. Beta estimates are time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression betas obtained from the annual cross-sectional regressions. The Newey-West t-statistics with a lag of order one are reported in parentheses to denote the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

		Full Sample	;	HI	LI	JK
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\overline{AG}$	-0.017** (-2.63)	-0.007** (-2.11)				
TG	,	,	-0.047***	-0.032***	-0.037**	-0.155***
IG			(-3.03) -0.004	(-2.98) -0.016	(-3.32) -0.032	(-3.16) -0.057
YS		1.196***	(-0.27) 1.220***	(-1.14) 1.368***	(-1.23) 1.340***	(-0.64) 1.036***
Size	0.003	(3.75) 0.003*	(3.94) 0.004**	(6.92) $0.002$	(3.99) 0.002**	(3.03) $0.011$
LEV	(1.54) -0.003	(2.05) -0.021***	(2.24) -0.021***	(1.57) -0.017**	(2.32) -0.029***	(1.70) -0.031
$\Delta LEV$	(-0.32) $0.029$	(-3.96) 0.003	(-4.35) $0.003$	(-2.20) -0.010	(-8.65) $0.017$	(-0.99) -0.047**
Ratings	(1.20) -0.004** (-2.28)	(0.19) -0.000 (-0.23)	(0.19) -0.000 (-0.08)	(-0.73) $0.001$ $(1.59)$	(0.85) $0.001$ $(0.47)$	(-2.69) -0.001 (-0.32)
LIQ	0.403 $(0.68)$	-0.174 (-0.41)	-0.190 (-0.44)	-0.152 (-0.71)	0.342 $(1.54)$	-0.725 (-1.06)
Duration	0.006*** $(4.22)$	0.007*** $(3.74)$	0.007*** $(3.74)$	0.006*** $(3.45)$	0.006*** $(3.05)$	0.019** $(2.74)$
Convex	-0.001*** (-3.76)	-0.001*** (-3.23)	-0.001*** (-3.22)	-0.001*** (-3.19)	-0.001** (-2.24)	-0.001* (-2.00)
Coupon	0.210**	-0.037 (-0.57)	-0.039	-0.035	-0.081 (-0.87)	-0.246 (-1.04)
Par	(2.53) $0.007***$	0.007***	(-0.61) 0.007***	(-0.66) 0.007***	0.008***	0.002 $(0.62)$
Put	(4.66) -0.017***	(5.20) -0.017***	(5.10) -0.018***	(4.81) -0.013***	(3.83) -0.013**	-0.035*
Call	(-5.17) -0.003*	(-5.48) -0.001	(-5.58) -0.001	(-4.51) -0.002	(-2.44) $0.006$	(-1.99) $0.010$
Constant	(-2.03) -0.057** (-2.18)	(-1.02) -0.130*** (-4.61)	(-1.00) -0.129*** (-4.50)	(-1.22) -0.132*** (-7.05)	(1.09) -0.144** (-2.47)	(1.00) -0.155* (-1.93)
Observations $Adj.R^2$	20,703 0.388	20,703 0.468	20,703 0.471	11,405 0.466	7,281 0.433	2,017 0.442

#### Table 5: Asset Growth and Changes of Bond Issuer Expected Default Probability

This table reports the effect of annual asset growth, tangible asset growth and intangible asset growth on the changes in the expected default frequency. The dependent variable is the change in expected default frequency in from t-1 to year t . EDF is the expected default frequency estimated based on Bharath and Shumway (2008). Asset growth (AG) is the year-over-year percentage change in total assets from Cooper et al. (2008). Tangible asset growth (TG) is the annual percentage change in tangible assets from Almeida and Campello (2007). Intangible asset growth (IG) is the annual percentage change in intangible assets. Control variables include yield spread (YS), leverage (LEV), changes in leverage  $(\Delta LEV)$  and natural logarithm of total assets (Size). We conduct the cross-sectional regression at the firm level. AG, TG, IG and  $\Delta LEV$  are estimated at the end of year t. YS, LEV and Size are estimated at the end of year t-1. The Newey-West t-statistics with a lag of order one are reported in parentheses to denote the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

	All (1)	HI (2)	LI (3)	JK (4)	All (5)	HI (6)	LI (7)	JK (8)
$\overline{AG}$	-0.047***	-0.017*	-0.014**	-0.068***				
	(-6.00)	(-1.96)	(-2.53)	(-3.15)				
TG	, ,	, ,	, ,		-0.111***	-0.020**	-0.056**	-0.153***
					(-5.79)	(-2.50)	(-2.63)	(-3.13)
IG					-0.066	0.003	-0.014	-0.155**
					(-1.10)	(0.83)	(-0.37)	(-2.22)
YS	-0.003	-0.001	-0.009	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.010	-0.004
	(-1.54)	(-0.83)	(-1.54)	(-1.01)	(-1.67)	(-0.90)	(-1.62)	(-1.34)
LEV	-0.015	-0.015	-0.020*	-0.014	-0.017	-0.014	-0.022*	-0.017
	(-0.70)	(-1.06)	(-1.79)	(-0.23)	(-0.78)	(-1.06)	(-1.92)	(-0.29)
$\Delta LEV$	0.612***	0.075**	0.276**	1.024***	0.620***	0.059	0.275**	1.040***
	(6.07)	(2.43)	(2.54)	(9.11)	(6.36)	(1.72)	(2.61)	(8.84)
Size	-0.004	-0.002	-0.000	-0.007	-0.004	-0.002	-0.000	-0.008
	(-1.41)	(-0.73)	(-0.08)	(-0.92)	(-1.47)	(-0.75)	(-0.08)	(-1.00)
Constant	0.035	0.021	0.010	0.061	0.037	0.021	0.013	0.076
	(1.25)	(0.79)	(0.42)	(0.97)	(1.37)	(0.80)	(0.52)	(1.08)
Observations	3,891	$1,\!451$	1,737	703	3,891	1,451	1,737	703
$Adj.R^2$	0.304	0.193	0.314	0.487	0.314	0.194	0.319	0.509

#### Table 6: Asset Growth Decile Portfolios: Yield Spreads and Changes in Yield Spreads

At the end of June of each year from 2002 to 2019, the bonds are allocated into deciles based on their issuers' annual asset growth rates. D1(D10) represents the issuers' decile with the lowest(highest) asset growth rate. The portfolios are formed based on the asset growth deciles in June (year t). The table reports the average yield spreads (year t), the subsequent changes in yield spreads (year t+1) and annual bond performance attributed to yield spread changes for equal-weighted portfolio in Panel A and value-weighted portfolio in Panel B. The yield spreads,  $s_t$ , are estimated prior to the formation of asset growth portfolios, i.e. June of year t. Annual bond performance attributed to yield spread changes, -MD\* $\Delta s_{t+1}$ , is estimated from July of year t to June of year t+1. MD is the modified duration estimated based in year t + 1 when bond yield spread stays the same as the level in year t. The Newey-West t-statistics with a lag of order one for the differences between top and bottom decile portfolios are reported in the parentheses. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: Equal-Weighted Portfolios

		Yield	Spreads		Yi	ield Spre	ad Chang	ges	-M	D*Yield S <sub>l</sub>	oread Chan	ges
Decile	All (1)	HI (2)	LI (3)	JK (4)	All (5)	HI (6)	LI (7)	JK (8)	All (9)	HI (10)	LI (11)	JK (12)
1 (Low)	2.56	0.90	2.18	6.56	-0.09	-0.03	-0.07	-0.37	0.82	0.17	0.40	2.08
2	2.02	0.82	1.84	4.79	-0.05	-0.01	-0.06	-0.33	0.35	0.10	0.41	1.85
3	1.63	0.87	1.83	5.43	-0.04	-0.02	-0.03	-0.19	0.28	0.12	0.23	1.04
4	1.38	0.82	1.77	4.53	0.05	0.02	-0.03	0.15	-0.37	-0.15	0.23	-0.84
5	1.33	0.76	1.53	5.01	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.10	-0.51	-0.14	-0.52	-0.61
6	1.29	0.83	1.46	4.35	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.31	-0.41	-0.24	-0.27	-1.83
7	1.20	0.77	1.64	4.52	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.21	-0.28	-0.26	-0.20	-1.16
8	1.12	0.84	1.49	4.08	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.28	-0.35	-0.30	-0.21	-1.57
9	1.14	0.78	1.54	4.50	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.37	-0.67	-0.27	-0.42	-2.07
10 (High)	1.41	0.89	1.63	3.76	0.10	0.02	0.08	0.46	-0.95	-0.29	-0.51	-2.58
Spread (10-1) t-stat (spread)	-1.15*** (-13.55)	-0.01 (-1.15)	-0.55*** (-6.06)	-2.80*** (-5.38)	0.19*** (3.32)	0.05 (1.33)	0.15** (2.53)	0.83*** (4.12)	-1.77*** (-5.63)	-0.46*** (-3.10)	-0.91*** (-3.49)	-4.66*** (-3.89)

Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios

		Yield S	Spreads		Y	ield Spre	ad Chang	ges	-M	D*Yield S	pread Chai	nges
Decile	All (1)	HI (2)	LI (3)	JK (4)	All (5)	HI (6)	LI (7)	JK (8)	All (9)	HI (10)	LI (11)	JK (12)
1 (Low)	1.88	0.94	1.91	5.92	-0.08	-0.02	-0.09	-0.37	0.77	0.15	0.75	2.09
2	1.69	0.79	1.67	3.95	-0.07	-0.01	-0.11	-0.36	0.42	0.10	0.88	2.03
3	1.37	0.97	1.64	5.86	-0.04	-0.01	-0.07	-0.35	0.31	0.07	0.44	1.91
4	1.27	0.79	1.79	4.31	-0.06	-0.02	-0.05	-0.39	0.40	0.12	0.34	2.26
5	1.14	0.78	1.40	4.93	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.12	-0.29	-0.19	-0.27	-0.70
6	1.15	0.78	1.37	3.66	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.15	-0.28	-0.26	-0.26	-0.88
7	1.03	0.73	1.63	3.78	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.16	-0.10	-0.07	-0.09	-0.89
8	1.04	0.85	1.41	3.38	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.25	-0.67	-0.73	-0.56	-1.38
9	0.99	0.76	1.40	3.33	0.10	0.03	0.09	0.28	-0.72	-0.19	-0.63	-1.57
10 (High)	1.20	0.84	1.47	3.67	0.09	0.02	0.07	0.35	-0.75	-0.21	-0.52	-1.94
Spread (10-1)	-0.68***	-0.10***	-0.44***	-2.25***	0.17***	0.04	0.16**	0.72***	-1.52***	-0.36**	-1.27***	-4.03***
t-stat (spread)	(-4.49)	(-4.73)	(-5.40)	(-3.58)	(3.11)	(1.23)	(2.44)	(3.29)	(-3.68)	(-2.17)	(3.67)	(-2.99)

# Table 7: Cross-sectional Regressions of Yield Spreads and Change in Yield Spread on Asset Growth

This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of bond yields and changes in bond yields. In the first two columns, the dependent variables are individual bonds' yield spreads at June of year t where yield spreads are evaluated as the difference between yields of individual bonds and yields of treasury bonds with closest maturities. In the subsequent three columns, the dependent variables are changes in yield spreads ( $\Delta$  Yield Spread) from July of year t to June of year t+1. All independent variables are estimated prior to the formation of asset growth portfolios. TG stands for changes in tangible assets scaled by total assets (t-1) from Almeida and Campello (2007).  $TG_{t+1}$  are measured at the end of year t+1. Low is the dummy variable for bonds rated BBB+ or lower. Accounting variables include market leverage (LEV),  $\Delta LEV$  and firm size (Size) (logarithm of total assets). Bond characteristics variables include credit ratings (Rating), illiquidity (ILQ), duration, convexity, coupon rate, par (logarithm of issue size) and dummy variables for puttable and callable bonds. The Newey-West t-statistics with a lag of order one are reported in parentheses to denote the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

	Yield S	$\operatorname{Spread}_t$			ΔΥ	ield Sprea	$\mathbf{d}_{t+1}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
$\overline{TG}$	-0.012**	-0.000	0.011***	0.007**	0.006**	0.003**	0.003**	0.002*	0.002*
$TG_{t+1}$	(-2.50)	(-0.20)	(2.96)	(2.24) -0.002**	(2.21) -0.005**	(2.46)	(2.32) -0.003**	(1.87) -0.004**	(1.94) -0.007**
$I \cup t+1$				(-2.31)	(-2.51)		(-2.36)	(-2.59)	(-2.42)
$\Delta LEV_{t+1}$					0.020***			0.010**	0.021***
YS					(3.41)			(2.45)	(3.83) -0.556***
TO I		0.000***				0.01.4**	0.016**	0.010**	(-4.41)
TG*Low		-0.020*** (-3.47)				0.014** $(2.47)$	0.016** $(2.27)$	0.013** $(2.31)$	0.012** $(2.58)$
$TG_{t+1} * Low$		( 3.27)				(=)	0.002	-0.002	-0.008
$\Delta LEV_{t+1} * Low$							(0.27)	(-0.29) 0.017***	(-1.70) 0.010**
$\Delta LE V_{t+1} * Low$								(2.93)	(2.73)
YS*Low									0.326***
Low		-0.003**				0.001*	0.001*	0.001	(9.51) -0.003***
		(-2.33)				(1.77)	(1.92)	(0.87)	(-3.02)
Size	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001**
	(-0.74)	(-1.06)	(-1.74)	(-1.66)	(-1.74)	(-1.71)	(-1.62)	(-1.63)	(-2.39)
LEV	0.014*** $(4.47)$	0.014*** $(4.91)$	0.003 $(1.33)$	0.003 $(1.30)$	0.003 $(1.42)$	0.003 $(1.27)$	0.002 $(1.17)$	0.002 $(1.25)$	0.007*** $(3.26)$
$\Delta LEV$	0.016**	0.017**	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.009***
<b>_</b>	(2.70)	(2.87)	(0.70)	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.79)	(0.75)	(0.96)	(3.36)
Rating	-0.002***	-0.003***	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001***
, and the second	(-6.52)	(-5.75)	(0.78)	(0.87)	(0.94)	(0.89)	(1.01)	(1.05)	(-3.14)
ILQ	0.454***	0.451***	0.005	0.002	-0.014	0.005	0.003	-0.014	0.091
	(4.52)	(4.61)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(-0.18)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(-0.17)	(1.53)
Duration	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
<i>C</i>	(-0.28)	(-0.20)	(1.09)	(1.11)	(1.18)	(1.05)	(1.07)	(1.14)	(0.19)
Convex	0.000 $(0.39)$	0.000 $(0.28)$	-0.000 (-0.69)	-0.000 (-0.67)	-0.000 (-0.65)	-0.000 (-0.61)	-0.000 (-0.58)	-0.000 (-0.59)	0.000 $(0.29)$
Coupon	0.172***	0.176***	-0.019	-0.020	-0.024	-0.022	-0.022	-0.027	0.29)
Coupon	(11.71)	(11.05)	(-1.21)	(-1.20)	(-1.47)	(-1.26)	(-1.20)	(-1.48)	(2.55)
Par	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***
1 007	(-0.10)	(0.14)	(-0.81)	(-0.82)	(-1.41)	(-0.97)	(-1.06)	(-1.49)	(-3.11)
Put	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.35)	(0.65)	(1.13)	(1.04)	(0.64)	(0.93)	(1.22)	(0.98)	(0.60)
Call	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001**
	(-1.48)	(-1.60)	(-1.48)	(-1.41)	(-1.33)	(-1.55)	(-1.50)	(-1.42)	(-2.21)
Constant	0.045***	0.050***	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.024**
	(3.70)	(3.75)	(0.64)	(0.58)	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(2.63)
Observations	20,703	20,703	20,703	20,600	20,600	20,703	20,600	20,600	20,600
Adj. $R^2$	0.688	0.694	0.301	0.306	0.334	0.308	0.316	0.350	0.495

#### Table 8: A Decomposition of Bond Performance

This table reports the results of the decomposition of bond returns to four components including i) treasury yield, ii) the change in treasury yields, iii) yield spread between an individual bond and a treasury bond with nearest maturity, and iv) the change in yield spreads. The dependent variable is monthly bond excess return, evaluated as the difference between the monthly return of an individual bond and monthly yield of the 1-month Treasury bill. Bonds are sorted into i) high investment bonds (HI) containing bonds with ratings of A- or higher, ii) low investment grade bonds (LI) with ratings from BBB- to BBB+, and iii) non-investment grade bonds (JK) which are rated below BBB-. With each rating category, bonds are sorted into quintile groups based on the issuers' asset growth rates evaluated in year t-1. Yield spreads is obtained from the month t-1 and change in yield spreads is the following yield spread change from year t-1 to t. We perform time-series regression and regress bond excess returns on lagged yield spreads and changes in yield spreads. The intercepts  $(\alpha)$ , the coefficient on one of four bond performance determinants  $(\beta)$  and associated t-statistics as well as regression  $R^2$  are reported.

Panel A. Treasury Yield

		$\alpha$			$\beta$			$R^2$	
AG	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	0.005**	0.009***	0.016**	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.010	0.003
	(2.03)	(2.87)	(2.39)	(-0.60)	(-1.52)	(-1.11)			
2	0.005*	0.008*	0.022**	-0.000	-0.001	-0.004	0.000	0.006	0.013
	(1.86)	(1.81)	(2.32)	(-0.23)	(-1.04)	(-1.47)			
3	0.004*	0.008**	0.018***	-0.000	-0.001	-0.004**	0.001	0.005	0.032
	(1.94)	(2.05)	(3.18)	(-0.37)	(-0.95)	(-2.45)			
4	0.005*	0.006**	0.018***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.005**	0.001	0.002	0.019
	(1.74)	(2.15)	(3.12)	(-0.58)	(-0.73)	(-2.27)			
5 (High)	0.005*	0.007**	0.013*	-0.000	-0.001	-0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.008
	(1.68)	(2.05)	(1.91)	(-0.38)	(-0.48)	(-1.80)			
All	0.005*	0.008**	0.015*	-0.000	-0.001	-0.003**	0.001	0.001	0.014
	(1.92)	(2.26)	(1.91)	(-0.72)	(-0.53)	(-2.16)			

Panel B.  $\Delta$  Treasury Yield

		$\alpha$			β			$\mathbb{R}^2$	
$\overline{AG}$	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	0.003***	0.004***	0.011***	-0.040***	-0.023***	0.013	0.423	0.104	0.004
	(4.41)	(3.73)	(3.96)	(-10.31)	(-3.85)	(0.54)			
2	0.003***	0.003***	0.011***	-0.050***	-0.024***	0.017	0.544	0.085	0.010
	(4.05)	(2.86)	(3.78)	(-9.96)	(-3.37)	(1.05)			
3	0.002***	0.004***	0.005***	-0.042***	-0.030***	0.012	0.448	0.148	0.011
	(3.60)	(3.57)	(2.63)	(-9.43)	(-4.34)	(1.19)			
4	0.002***	0.003***	0.004	-0.048***	-0.033***	-0.002	0.467	0.164	0.000
	(2.97)	(2.92)	(1.50)	(-11.16)	(-4.47)	(-0.10)			
5 (High)	0.002***	0.004***	0.006**	-0.048***	-0.036***	0.011	0.390	0.243	0.006
	(2.81)	(4.09)	(2.39)	(-7.95)	(-6.48)	(0.80)			
All	0.002***	0.004***	0.006**	-0.045***	-0.030***	0.012	0.413	0.153	0.004
	(3.45)	(3.47)	(3.13)	(-8.72)	(-4.77)	(1.04)			

Panel C. Yield Spread

		$\alpha$			$\beta$			$\mathbb{R}^2$	
AG	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	-0.000	-0.003	-0.011	0.006	0.004**	0.005*	0.073	0.069	0.169
	(-0.13)	(-0.79)	(-1.08)	(1.51)	(2.29)	(1.84)			
2	-0.004	-0.003	-0.013*	0.011	0.004**	0.005***	0.073	0.051	0.178
	(-0.73)	(-0.76)	(-1.73)	(1.47)	(1.98)	(2.69)			
3	-0.002	-0.004	0.001	0.009*	0.006**	0.001	0.065	0.070	0.078
	(-0.69)	(-0.88)	(0.27)	(1.86)	(2.06)	(1.32)			
4	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.027	0.044	0.066
	(0.32)	(-0.01)	(0.05)	(1.02)	(1.28)	(0.48)			
5 (High)	-0.004	-0.006	-0.003	0.010	0.007***	0.002	0.063	0.091	0.055
, - ,	(-0.69)	(-1.45)	(-0.50)	(1.42)	(2.76)	(1.30)			
All	-0.003	-0.004	-0.008	0.007	0.005*	0.003	0.051	0.071	0.104
	(-0.69)	(-1.45)	(-0.50)	(1.42)	(1.89)	(1.52)			

Panel D.  $\Delta \mathrm{Yield}$  Spread

		$\alpha$			β			$R^2$	
AG	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	0.005*** (5.94)	0.006*** (6.82)	0.010*** (8.33)	-0.025*** (-3.92)	-0.035*** (-9.23)	-0.025*** (-9.07)	0.196	0.445	0.851
2	0.005*** (4.99)	0.005*** (6.36)	0.010*** (7.19)	-0.026* (-1.71)	-0.037*** (-12.57)	-0.030*** (-7.62)	0.102	0.571	0.735
3	0.005*** (5.00)	0.006*** (6.60)	0.007*** (6.07)	-0.027*** (-3.43)	-0.037*** (-9.63)	-0.022*** (-10.68)	0.116	0.470	0.626
4	0.005*** (4.91)	0.006*** (6.34)	0.007*** (6.12)	-0.036*** (-5.42)	-0.035*** (-6.70)	-0.028*** (-10.91)	0.207	0.514	0.854
5 (High)	0.005*** $(4.55)$	0.006*** (6.26)	0.007*** (6.78)	-0.044*** (-3.77)	-0.039*** (-7.89)	-0.029*** (-15.69)	0.220	0.351	0.811
All	0.005*** (5.04)	0.006*** (6.19)	0.008*** (7.24)	-0.037*** (-3.77)	-0.038*** (-7.89)	-0.024*** (-15.69)	0.180	0.519	0.835

#### Table 9: Explanatory Powers of Tangible-Asset-Growth Associated Factors on Yield Spread Changes

This table reports the results of time series regressions of bond portfolio yield spread changes. All sample bonds are independently sorted into three bond rating groups (HI, LI, and JK) and 5 quintiles based on issuers' asset growth rates. High investment bonds (HI) contain bonds with ratings of A- or higher. Low investment grade bonds (LI) receive ratings from BBB- to BBB+. Non-investment grade bonds (JK) are rated below BBB-. Change of yield spreads are evaluated as the value-weighted change of yield spreads of the bonds in a given subgroup. To estimate the yield spreads factor and the yield spreads change factor, sample bonds are sorted into deciles based on tangible asset growth in year t-1. The yield spread change factor is the difference of the average value-weighted yield spread changes between D10 (highest) and D1 (lowest) tangible asset growth portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1. The table reports the alpha, loading and  $R^2$ .

	$\alpha$				$\mathrm{t}(lpha)$			β			$\mathrm{t}(eta)$			$R^2$		
	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	
1 (Low)	-0.034	-0.018	-0.029	-1.67	-0.90	-0.24	0.054	0.093	0.716	0.88	3.63	3.29	0.036	0.113	0.195	
2	-0.033	-0.015	-0.032	-1.12	-0.63	-0.48	0.072	0.109	1.086	1.23	1.81	3.17	0.041	0.104	0.205	
3	-0.033	-0.024	0.057	-1.40	-1.02	1.06	0.084	0.102	1.246	0.66	0.99	4.65	0.033	0.096	0.215	
4	-0.032	-0.019	0.049	1.54	-0.65	0.58	0.095	0.267	1.380	1.58	0.70	3.13	0.037	0.093	0.191	
5 (High)	-0.028	-0.036*	-0.002	-1.61	-1.78	-0.03	0.135	0.318	2.008	0.88	1.03	3.65	0.026	0.109	0.199	
All	-0.032	-0.028*	0.002	-1.05	-1.16	0.33	0.086	0.178	1.287	1.09	1.24	3.28	0.033	0.105	0.206	

Table 10: Cross-Sectional Regressions: Sentiment Analysis

This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of annual bond performance. The dependent variable is annual bond return evaluated from July of year t to June of year t+1. The full sample is split into high-sentiment and low-sentiment categories based on the issuer quality measure from Greenwood and Hanson (2013). The high-sentiment dummy variable (Sent) is one in which the value of the issuer quality in the quarter before the formation of portfolios is below the median value for the sample period, zero otherwise. AG stands for changes in total assets scaled by total assets (t-1) from Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008). TG stands for changes in tangible assets scaled by total assets (t-1) from Almeida and Campello (2007). Other independent variables are lagged variable, which are estimated prior to the formation of asset growth portfolios. Accounting variables include book leverage (LEV) and logarithm of total assets (Size). Bond characteristics variables include credit ratings (Rating), illiquidity (ILQ), duration, convexity, coupon rate, issue size (Par) and dummy variables for puttable and callable bonds. High investment bonds (HI) contain bonds with ratings of A- or higher. Low investment grade bonds (LI) receive ratings from BBB- to BBB+. Non-investment grade bonds (JK) are rated below BBB-. The Newey-West t-statistics with the order of one are reported in parentheses to determine the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients.

	Full	HI	LI	JK
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
TG*Sent	-0.023**	-0.000	-0.011*	-0.025**
	(-2.63)	(-0.42)	(-1.94)	(-2.14)
TG	-0.032***	-0.014	-0.014*	-0.109**
	(-3.77)	(-1.07)	(-2.03)	(-2.24)
Sent	-0.005	-0.006	0.004	0.018
	(-0.85)	(-0.88)	(0.65)	(1.25)
YS	1.265***	1.372***	1.175***	1.091***
	(4.07)	(6.83)	(4.40)	(2.92)
Size	0.003**	0.002	0.003***	0.007
	(2.47)	(1.58)	(4.84)	(1.41)
LEV	-0.024***	-0.017*	-0.027***	-0.042
	(-4.15)	(-1.90)	(-5.36)	(-1.66)
$\Delta LEV$	0.002	-0.011	0.001	-0.007
	(0.16)	(-0.72)	(0.10)	(-0.33)
Rating	0.001**	0.001	0.002	0.003
	(2.70)	(1.59)	(0.60)	(1.19)
ILQ	0.072	-0.151	0.329	-0.343
	(0.25)	(-0.67)	(1.56)	(-1.17)
Duration	0.007***	0.006***	0.006***	0.018**
	(3.58)	(3.40)	(2.92)	(2.73)
Convex	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000*	-0.000*
	(-3.10)	(-3.15)	(-2.10)	(-1.83)
Coupon	-0.138	-0.049	-0.174**	-0.225
	(-1.37)	(-0.91)	(-2.20)	(-0.76)
Par	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.004
	(5.36)	(4.70)	(4.30)	(1.18)
Put	-0.018***	-0.013***	-0.014*	-0.044**
	(-4.82)	(-4.74)	(-1.96)	(-2.46)
Call	-0.002	-0.001	0.004	0.008
	(-1.42)	(-0.98)	(0.75)	(1.09)
Constant	-0.129***	-0.109***	-0.149**	-0.218**
	(-4.67)	(-5.46)	(-2.45)	(-2.27)
Observations	20,703	11,405	7,281	2,017
$Adj.R^2$	0.466	0.461	0.431	0.450

#### Table 11: Sentiment Effect on Yield Spreads and Changes in Yield Spreads

This table reports the results of Fama-MacBeth regressions of yield spreads and yield spread changes. The dependent variable of the first four columns is the bond yield spread in June of year t, evaluated as the the difference between yields of individual bonds and the yield of treasury bonds with the nearest maturities. The dependent variables of the next four columns are the yield spread changes from year t to t+1. The full sample is split into high-sentiment and low-sentiment categories based on the issuer quality from Greenwood and Hanson (2013). The high-sentiment dummy variable (Sent) is one in which the value of the issuer quality in the quarter before the formation of portfolios is below the median value for the sample period, zero otherwise. TG stands for changes in tangible assets scaled by total assets (t-1) from Almeida and Campello (2007). Other independent variables are lagged variable, which are estimated prior to the formation of asset growth portfolios at year t. Accounting variables include market leverage (LEV) and logarithm of total assets (Size). Bond characteristics variables include credit ratings (Rating), illiquidity (ILQ), duration, convexity, coupon rate, issue size (Par) and dummy variables for puttable and callable bonds. The Newey-West t-statistics with the order of one are reported in parentheses to determine the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients.


		Yield S	$Spread_t$		$\Delta$ Yield Spread <sub>t+1</sub>					
	Full	HI	LI	JK	Full	HI	LI	JK		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
$\overline{TG*Sent}$	-0.006**	-0.000	-0.005**	-0.012**	0.005***	0.002	0.008*	0.010**		
	(-2.28)	(-0.66)	(-2.33)	(-2.65)	(3.07)	(1.36)	(1.85)	(2.45)		
TG	-0.006**	-0.002	-0.006**	-0.026***	0.006**	0.001	0.007	0.013**		
	(-2.51)	(-1.22)	(-2.48)	(-3.45)	(2.79)	(0.13)	(0.86)	(2.62)		
Sent	0.006	0.002	0.009	0.006	-0.008	-0.003	0.024**	0.030**		
	(1.33)	(1.24)	(1.32)	(1.20)	(-1.30)	(-0.45)	(2.57)	(2.29)		
YS					-0.279**	-0.541***	-0.318**	-0.191**		
					(-2.57)	(-6.27)	(-2.74)	(-2.31)		
Size	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.001**	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.001		
	(-1.06)	(-3.33)	(-2.72)	(-1.46)	(-1.49)	(-1.50)	(-2.33)	(-0.86)		
LEV	0.013***	0.006***	0.009***	0.019***	0.006**	0.003	0.006**	0.006		
	(4.87)	(3.65)	(6.09)	(4.26)	(2.47)	(1.61)	(2.83)	(1.68)		
$\Delta LEV$	0.016**	0.004**	0.015***	0.021***	0.009*	0.005***	0.010	0.013***		
	(2.89)	(2.83)	(3.62)	(3.08)	(2.07)	(3.14)	(1.44)	(4.29)		
Rating	-0.002***	-0.000***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.001**	-0.000***	-0.001*	-0.001*		
	(-7.21)	(-3.26)	(-9.71)	(-4.91)	(-2.38)	(-4.13)	(-2.07)	(-1.76)		
ILQ	0.423***	0.101***	0.276***	0.654***	0.086*	0.033*	0.012	0.225**		
	(3.87)	(4.51)	(4.54)	(4.16)	(1.75)	(1.85)	(0.52)	(2.56)		
Duration	0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.000*	0.001**	-0.001		
	(0.07)	(1.06)	(0.91)	(-0.31)	(0.78)	(2.09)	(2.16)	(-0.58)		
Convex	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*	0.000		
	(0.03)	(-0.27)	(-1.05)	(-0.21)	(-0.85)	(-0.93)	(-2.01)	(0.05)		
Coupon	0.165***	0.091***	0.165***	0.234***	0.034**	0.025***	0.044***	0.068		
	(13.12)	(8.25)	(8.24)	(8.79)	(2.25)	(5.31)	(3.22)	(0.96)		
Par	0.000	0.000	-0.001*	-0.002*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001*	0.000		
	(0.34)	(0.61)	(-1.86)	(-1.77)	(-1.23)	(-1.64)	(-1.88)	(0.34)		
Put	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000	0.005		
	(0.23)	(-0.79)	(0.07)	(0.20)	(1.04)	(0.89)	(-0.39)	(1.50)		
Call	-0.001*	0.000	-0.001***	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.001**	-0.003**		
	(-2.10)	(0.49)	(-3.26)	(-0.82)	(-2.28)	(-1.53)	(-2.14)	(-2.48)		
Constant	0.035***	0.011***	0.058***	0.068**	0.017*	0.014*	0.032	0.029		
	(3.09)	(3.53)	(4.89)	(2.63)	(1.87)	(1.99)	(1.68)	(0.97)		
Observations	20,701	11,403	7,281	2,017	20,701	11,403	7,281	2,017		
$Adj.R^2$	0.632	0.506	0.500	0.691	0.350	0.353	0.399	0.458		

#### Table 12: Asset Growth and Monthly Bond Return: Controlling Bond Risk Factors

This table reports the average intercept and slope coefficients from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of one-month-ahead corporate bond monthly excess returns on the bond market betas, with and without control variables. The bond market betas ( $\beta^{Bond}$ ,  $\beta^{DEF}$ ,  $\beta^{TERM}$ ,  $\beta^{MOM}$ , and  $\beta^{LIQ}$ ) are estimated for each bond from the time-series regressions of bond excess returns on the excess bond market return and the associated bond factors (DEF, TERM, MOM, LIQ) using a 36-month rolling window estimation. The high-sentiment dummy variable (HS) is one in which the value of the issuer quality in the quarter before the formation of portfolios is below the median value for the sample period, zero otherwise. TG stands for changes in tangible assets scaled by total assets (t-1) from Almeida and Campello (2007). Bond characteristics include credit rating (Rating), illiquidity (ILQ), duration, convexity and the natural logarithm of bond amount outstanding (Par). The Newey-West t-statistics with the order of one are reported in parentheses to determine the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients.

	A	.11	HI	LI	JK
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TG	-0.0039*	-0.0025*	-0.0004	-0.0034*	-0.0059*
	(-1.84)	(-1.83)	(-0.55)	(-1.92)	(-1.85)
$\beta^{MKT}$	0.1985**	0.1132*	0.0147	0.1354*	0.1109*
	(2.56)	(1.84)	(1.92)	(2.12)	(1.90)
$eta^{DEF}$	-0.0055	-0.0070	-0.0063	-0.0107	-0.0125*
	(-0.94)	(-1.26)	(-1.43)	(-1.63)	(-1.79)
$\beta^{TERM}$	0.0070	0.0071	0.0044	0.0054	0.0065
	(1.37)	(1.33)	(1.58)	(1.09)	(1.50)
$\beta^{MOM}$	-0.2372	-0.1892	-0.2231*	0.0892	0.1892*
	(-1.31)	(-1.50)	(-1.85)	(0.56)	(1.79)
$\beta^{LIQ}$	0.0583	0.0238	0.0436	0.0389	0.0377
	(0.75)	(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.55)	(0.77)
Rating		0.0002	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002
		(0.90)	(1.08)	(0.95)	(0.73)
ILQ		-0.0450	-0.0424	-0.0509	0.0276
		(-0.97)	(-1.22)	(-1.43)	(0.47)
Duration		0.0004*	0.0009**	0.0002*	0.0002
		(2.54)	(2.29)	(1.84)	(1.16)
Convex		-0.0000**	-0.0000	-0.0000***	-0.0000
		(-2.53)	(-0.44)	(-2.98)	(-0.44)
Par		0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	-0.0001
		(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.76)	(-1.13)
Constant	0.0020***	-0.0012	0.0024	-0.0024	0.0012
	(2.64)	(-0.54)	(0.78)	(-0.63)	(0.69)
Observations	$149,\!372$	139,027	64,723	$48,\!531$	25,773
$Adj.R^2$	0.216	0.298	0.352	0.257	0.254


Figure 1: Evolution of Bond Yield Spreads of High- and Low Asset Growth Firms




This graph depicts the evolution of hypothetical yield spreads of bonds issued by high asset-growth (h) and low asset growth firms (l) from year t-1 to t+1 under the efficient market hypothesis and the mispricing hypothesis.  $s_{l,t}^e$  and  $s_{h,t}^e$  are respective observed yield spreads of low and high asset growth firms at time t.  $s_{l,t+1}^e$ ,  $s_{h,t+1}^e$  are respective expected yield spreads of low and high asset growth firms under the efficient market hypothesis at time t+1.  $s_{l,t+1}^m$ , and  $s_{h,t+1}^m$  are respective expected yield spreads of low and high asset growth firms under the mispricing hypothesis at time t+1.

Figure 2: Differences of Asset Growth and Tangible Asset Growth between Top and Bottom Decile Groups

Panel A: Difference of Asset Growth between D10 and D1 Deciles



Panel B: Difference of Tangible Asset Growth between D10 and D1 Deciles



Panel A shows the differences between the top and bottom deciles sorted by the bond issuers' asset growth rates in i) the average asset growth rates in year t (portfolio formation year), ii) the average asset growth rates in year t+1, and iii) the average changes in asset growth rates from year t to year t+1. Panel B shows the differences between the top and bottom deciles sorted by the bond issuers' tangible asset growth rates in the same set of variables.




Figure 3: Issuer Quality versus Collateral Growth Quality

This graph plots the corporate bond issuer quality (IQ) and collateral growth quality (CGQ) from 1990 to 2019. Plotted as the red dash line, IQ is defined as the difference in the averages of individual issuers' EDF decile ranks between high and low debt issuers. Plotted as the blue solid line, CGQ is defined the difference in the averages of individual issuers' EDF decile ranks between high and low tangible asset growth issuers.

## Internet Appendix

#### Table A1: Asset Growth Decomposition and Bond Return: Cross-sectional Analysis

In this table, annual bond excess returns are regressed on variables obtained from a balance sheet decomposition of asset growth. The asset decomposition defines total assets as the sum of: (1) Cash and short-term investments (Compustat #1), (2) Noncash current assets (Compustat #4 - Compustat #1), (3) Property, plant and equipment (Compustat #8), (4) Intangible assets (Compustat #33), (5) Investments (Compustat #31 + Compustat #32) and (6) Other assets (Total assets minus the above components). Variables used in the cross-sectional regressions are changes in these variables from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2 to the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 scaled by total assets in the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2. We also control for issuer and bond lever characteristics. Issuers' accounting variables include leverage (LEV), changes in leverage ( $\Delta LEV$ ) and natural logarithm of total assets (Size). Bond characteristics variables include credit ratings (Rating), duration (in years), coupon rate (%), issue size (Par) and dummy variables for puttable and callable bonds. Newey and West (1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses to denote the statistical significance of the average intercept and slope coefficients. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denote the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
CG	-0.061* (-1.945)					
NCG	,	-0.037* (-1.999)				
PPENTG		,	-0.058*** (-4.440)			
IG			,	-0.000 (-0.058)		
IVSTG				,	0.018 $(1.009)$	
AOG					()	-0.020 (-1.594)
Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations R-squared	$21,591 \\ 0.357$	$21,591 \\ 0.359$	$21,591 \\ 0.360$	$21,591 \\ 0.358$	$21,591 \\ 0.358$	$21,591 \\ 0.361$

#### Table A2: Asset Growth Decile Portfolios: Annual Bond Performance in year t+2

This table reports the annual bond performance across decile groups sorted by issuers' annual asset growth rates, AG, measured at the end of June of each year from 2002 to 2019. D1 (D10) represents the issuers' decile with the lowest (highest) asset growth rate. Panel A reports equal-weighted average annual excess returns and Panel B reports value-weighted average annual excess returns. Bond excess return is calculated as the difference between a bond's monthly return and the T-bill rate from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. In both panels, we additionally sort bond issuers into deciles with the following bond rating groups: i) high investment bonds (HI) containing the bonds with ratings of A- or higher, ii) low investment grade bonds (LI) receiving ratings from BBB- to BBB+, and iii) junk bonds (JK) rated below BBB-. The return spreads between the highest growth (10) and the lowest growth (1) portfolios are presented at the bottom. t-stat (spread) shows the t-statistics for the high-low bond performance. \*, \*\* or \*\*\* denotes the significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.

Panel A: Equal-Weighted Portfolios

	F	ull	]	HI		LI	JK	
Decile	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	2,157	5.38	1,211	3.36	779	5.04	222	7.41
2	2,188	5.11	1,147	3.77	786	4.59	191	5.90
3	2,209	4.90	1,168	3.77	774	4.64	207	11.94
4	2,216	4.10	1,187	3.66	824	5.36	206	5.34
5	2,132	4.56	1,157	3.39	739	4.40	278	12.23
6	2,166	3.84	1,220	3.69	789	4.26	163	12.42
7	2,212	3.78	1,229	3.40	792	4.38	254	6.52
8	2,210	3.99	1,208	3.80	770	4.03	206	5.64
9	2,176	4.45	1,189	3.83	785	4.84	219	10.84
10	2,163	5.33	1,143	4.08	782	4.50	204	8.66
Diff (10-1)		-0.05		0.72**		-0.54		1.25
t-stat		(-0.17)		(2.16)		(-1.43)		(0.88)

Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios

	F	ull		HI		LI	JK	
Decile	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1	2,157	4.59	1,211	3.23	779	4.73	222	6.42
2	2,188	5.02	1,147	4.41	786	4.80	191	5.21
3	2,209	4.77	1,168	4.46	774	5.80	207	10.68
4	2,216	4.25	1,187	3.85	824	5.16	206	4.60
5	2,132	3.95	1,157	3.51	739	4.49	278	10.67
6	2,166	4.15	1,220	4.08	789	3.67	163	9.54
7	2,212	3.80	1,229	3.68	792	3.90	254	3.11
8	2,210	4.18	1,208	4.53	770	3.79	206	4.57
9	2,176	4.37	1,189	4.22	785	5.02	219	9.67
10	2,163	4.82	1,143	4.32	782	4.18	204	7.52
Diff (10-1)		0.23		1.09***		-0.55		1.11
t-stat		(1.30)		(2.49)		(-1.56)		(0.92)

#### Table A3: Bond Performance Decomposition with Extended Sample from 1994-2019

This table reports the results of the decomposition of bond returns to four components including i) treasury yield, ii) the change in treasury yields, iii) yield spread between an individual bond and a treasury bond with nearest maturity, and iv) the change in yield spreads. The dependent variable is monthly bond excess return, evaluated as the difference between the monthly return of an individual bond and monthly yield of the 1-month Treasury bill. Bonds are sorted into i) high investment bonds (HI) containing bonds with ratings of A- or higher, ii) low investment grade bonds (LI) with ratings from BBB- to BBB+, and iii) non-investment grade bonds (JK) which are rated below BBB-. With each rating category, bonds are sorted into quintile groups based on the issuers' asset growth rates evaluated in year t-1. Yield spreads is obtained from the month t-1 and change in yield spreads is the following yield spread change from year t-1 to t. We perform time-series regression and regress bond excess returns on lagged yield spreads and changes in yield spreads. The sample period is from 1994 to 2019. The intercepts  $(\alpha)$ , the coefficient on one of four bond performance determinants  $(\beta)$  and associated t-statistics as well as regression  $R^2$  are reported.

Panel A. Treasury Yield

		α			β		$R^2$			
AG	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	
1 (Low)	0.004**	0.007***	0.013**	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.005	0.002	
	(2.49)	(3.27)	(2.44)	(-0.46)	(-1.32)	(-0.82)				
2	0.004**	0.005*	0.013*	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.003	
	(2.17)	(2.16)	(1.68)	(-0.12)	(-0.65)	(-0.88)				
3	0.004*	0.006**	0.008*	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.001	0.002	
	(2.01)	(2.37)	(1.95)	(0.13)	(-0.69)	(-0.78)				
4	0.004*	0.004**	0.006*	0.000	-0.000	-0.001**	0.000	0.001	0.001	
	(1.76)	(2.15)	(1.65)	(0.03)	(-0.48)	(-0.79)				
5 (High)	0.004*	0.006***	0.008*	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	0.005	0.002	
	(1.87)	(2.93)	(1.68)	(-0.37)	(-1.36)	(-0.83)				
All	0.004***	0.006**	0.009***	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.001*	0.000	0.002	0.002	
	(4.58)	(5.70)	(4.05)	(-0.38)	(-1.99)	(-1.82)				

Panel B.  $\Delta$  Treasury Yield

		α			β		$R^2$			
$\overline{AG}$	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	
1 (Low)	0.003***	0.004***	0.010***	-0.032***	-0.021***	0.004	0.342	0.109	0.001	
	(5.50)	(5.15)	(5.13)	(-9.89)	(-4.72)	(0.28)				
2	0.003***	0.004***	0.008***	-0.042***	-0.020***	0.011	0.468	0.085	0.004	
	(5.12)	(4.19)	(3.63)	(-10.84)	(-4.44)	(0.81)				
3	0.003***	0.004***	0.005***	-0.034***	-0.024***	0.008	0.391	0.125	0.007	
	(5.48)	(4.50)	(3.80)	(-10.06)	(-5.21)	(1.15)				
4	0.003***	0.003***	0.004*	-0.037***	-0.026***	-0.002	0.373	0.157	0.000	
	(4.53)	(3.80)	(1.93)	(-10.45)	(-5.80)	(-0.13)				
5 (High)	0.003***	0.003***	0.05**	-0.037***	-0.028***	0.000	0.323	0.173	0.000	
	(4.06)	(4.23)	(2.69)	(-8.42)	(-5.94)	(0.80)				
All	0.003***	0.004***	0.006**	-0.036***	-0.024***	0.004	0.375	0.128	0.001	
	(10.90)	(9.78)	(7.56)	(-21.75)	(-11.68)	(0.75)				

Panel C. Yield Spread

		$\alpha$			eta			$R^2$	
AG	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK
1 (Low)	0.000	-0.003	-0.007	0.004	0.004***	0.003**	0.032	0.087	0.124
	(0.02)	(-1.42)	(-1.04)	(1.12)	(2.97)	(2.04)			
2	-0.000	-0.002	-0.015***	0.005	0.004**	0.005***	0.016	0.045	0.153
	(-0.06)	(-0.86)	(-2.79)	(0.81)	(2.03)	(3.70)			
3	0.000	-0.002	-0.000	0.004	0.004**	0.001**	0.022	0.048	0.028
	(0.00)	(-0.77)	(-0.18)	(122)	(2.10)	(2.22)			
4	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.002	0.002	-0.000	0.010	0.014	0.000
	(0.60)	(0.20)	(0.82)	(0.80)	(0.85)	(-0.08)			
5 (High)	-0.001	-0.002	-0.004	0.005	0.004**	0.002	0.025	0.036	0.041
	(-0.25)	(-0.79)	(-0.73)	(1.08)	(2.03)	(1.42)			
All	0.000	-0.002	-0.003	0.004**	0.004**	0.002***	0.019	0.043	0.045
	(0.22)	(-1.40)	(-1.09)	(2.19)	(4.20)	(2.89)			

Panel D.  $\Delta \mathrm{Yield}$  Spread

		$\alpha$			β				$R^2$	
$\overline{AG}$	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI		LI	JK
1 (Low)	0.004*** (5.86)	0.004*** (6.66)	0.009*** (7.04)	-0.021*** (-3.85)	-0.030*** (-8.10)	-0.017*** (-6.31)	0.15	6	0.366	0.610
2	0.004*** (4.86)	0.004*** (6.40)	0.008*** (5.26)	-0.019* (-1.95)	-0.032*** (-10.97)	-0.024*** (-5.23)	0.04	7	0.458	0.582
3	0.004*** (5.37)	0.005*** (6.03)	0.005**** $(4.69)$	-0.017*** (-2.78)	-0.011*** (-2.10)	-0.014*** (-3.18)	0.05	9	0.142	0.405
4	0.004*** (5.02)	0.004*** (5.94)	0.006*** (5.92)	-0.027*** (-4.24)	-0.029*** (-6.71)	-0.022*** (-7.31)	0.15	3	0.404	0.681
5 (High)	0.004*** $(4.52)$	0.005*** (6.21)	0.007*** (6.12)	-0.029*** (-3.33)	-0.031*** (-7.89)	-0.019*** (-5.07)	0.13	7	0.321	0.553
All	0.004*** $(11.33)$	0.004**** $(14.02)$	0.007*** (12.21)	-0.023*** (-7.14)	-0.022*** (-4.01)	-0.019*** (-10.73)	0.10	8	0.277	0.566

# Table A4: Explanatory Powers of Tangible-Asset-Growth Associated Factors on Yield Spread Change with Extended Sample Period from 1994-2019

This table reports the results of time series regressions of bond portfolio yield spread changes. All sample bonds are independently sorted into three bond rating groups (HI, LI, and JK) and 5 quintiles based on issuers' asset growth rates. High investment bonds (HI) contain bonds with ratings of A- or higher. Low investment grade bonds (LI) receive ratings from BBB- to BBB+. Non-investment grade bonds (JK) are rated below BBB-. Change of yield spreads are evaluated as the value-weighted change of yield spreads of the bonds in a given subgroup. To estimate the yield spreads factor and the yield spreads change factor, sample bonds are sorted into deciles based on tangible asset growth in year t-1. The yield spread change factor is the difference of the average value-weighted yield spread changes between D10 (highest) and D1 (lowest) tangible asset growth portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1. The table reports the alpha, loading and  $R^2$ .

	$\alpha$				$\mathrm{t}(lpha)$			β			$\mathrm{t}(eta)$			$R^2$		
	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	HI	LI	JK	
1 (Low)	-0.031	-0.015	-0.024	-1.61	-0.75	-0.13	0.047	0.087	0.695	0.72	3.32	3.04	0.0327	0.105	0.172	
2	-0.031	-0.012	-0.025	-1.01	-0.52	-0.32	0.063	0.099	1.032	1.14	1.88	3.21	0.034	0.089	0.195	
3	-0.026	-0.021	0.046	-1.34	-1.34	1.56	0.076	0.087	1.205	0.54	0.76	4.12	0.025	0.076	0.201	
4	-0.026	-0.014	0.043	1.51	-0.65	0.51	0.087	0.243	1.337	1.45	0.56	2.98	0.026	0.087	0.185	
5 (High)	-0.022	-0.031*	-0.001	-1.56	-1.65	-0.01	0.126	0.301	1.984	0.81	1.01	3.33	0.021	0.101	0.178	
All	-0.029	-0.021*	0.001	-1.01	-1.03	0.28	0.075	0.171	1.243	1.01	1.15	3.03	0.025	0.089	0.199	