# Do Offshore Activities Teleport Information? Evidence from Foreign Analysts' Coverage of U.S. Firms

#### MOTIVATION

- A growing number of U.S. multinational corporations engage in offshore activities due to globalization.
- Investors struggle to understand multinational firms' foreign operations due to geographic and linguistic distance, differences in accounting standards, and increased business com (Huang, 2015; Finke and Weigert, 2017).

#### **RESEARCH QUESTION**

Whether and how the geographic distribution of U. shore business activities affects information endowr foreign financial analysts?


#### CONTRIBUTIONS

- Geography of information -- even non-local analysts information advantage due to offshore activities.
- Impact of U.S. offshore activities;
- Provide evidence of alternative information sources analysts.

# Data and Sample Construction

- (1) Offshore activities: Hoberg and Moon, 2017 (2) A Location: Nelson's Directory
- We have two testing samples. (1) Coverage decision test

1,095,520 firm-country-year Obs 49 countries; 6,903 unique U.S. firms Coverage rate = 0.32%



2) Forecast Accuracy Test: 17,418 Forecasts

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# **EMPIRICAL MODEL**

<ul> <li>Forecast accuracy test</li> </ul>	
$Forecast\_Error_{a,i,j,t} = \alpha + \gamma +$	$\beta * Ou \\ * X_{i,t} +$
BASELIN	
Panel A: – Coverage Decision Test (Logistic Reg	gression)
Dependent Variable Co	ver_Dumr
	(1)
Output_Dummy	$0.146^{***}$
Output_Fraction	(2.627)
Controls Country Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects Observations	Yes Yes Yes 844,464
Panel B: Earnings Forecast Accuracy Test (OLS	Regressio
Dependent Variable	AFE/
	(1)
Output_Dummy	-0.199 (-2.86
Output_Fraction	·
Controls Analyst Fixed Effects Year Fixed Effects Observations	Yes Yes Yes 17,33
	Forecast_Error_ $a,i,j,t$ = $\alpha + f + \gamma + \gamma$

Coverage decision test

*Output\_Dummy*: A binary variable that equals one if there is at least one "output" related keyword mentioned for firm *i* in country *j* in year *t* and, zero otherwise. Output\_Fraction: Calculated as the number of mentions of "output" related keywords of firm i in country *j* in year *t*, divided by total number of "output" related keywords mentions across all

countries in year t.

adj. R-sq

$$Cover\_Dummy_{i,j,t+1} = f(\alpha + \beta * Output\_Var_{i,j,t} * \gamma \\ * X_{i,j,t} + \lambda * Z_{i,j,t} + \epsilon_{i,j,t+1})$$
(1)

$$tput\_Var_{i,j,t} + \lambda * W_{a,t} \quad (2)$$
  
$$\eta * Z_{j,t} + \epsilon_{a,i,j,t}$$

#### **JLTS**

·	
_Dummy	Cover_Dummy
(1)	(2)
46***	
.627)	
	0.580***
	(4.392)
Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes
4,464	844,464
gression)	
AFE/P	AFE/P
(1)	(2)
0.199**	*
(-2.861)	
	-0.297***
	(-8.543)
Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes
17,338	17,338
0.321	0.321

# **CROSS SECTIONAL - Country institutional infrastructure**

#### Panel A: Foreign Analysts' Coverage Decision

Dependent Variable	Cover_Dummy			
Weak Institutions	Anti-Director-Rights	Anti-Self-Dealing	Lower Legal System	Lower Disclosure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Output_Dummy*Weak Institutions	1.112**	1.075***	1.139**	0.975**
	(1.971)	(2.610)	(2.259)	(2.220)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	844,464	844,464	736,597	736,597

#### Panel B: Foreign Analysts' Forecast Errors

Dependent Variable		AF	E/P	
Weak Institutions	Anti-Director-Rights	Anti-Self-Dealing	Lower Legal System	Lower Disclosure
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Output_Dummy*Weak Institution	-0.658*	-1.117***	-4.524***	-1.132***
	(-1.844)	(-3.357)	(-3.695)	(-3.144)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Analyst Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17,338	17,338	16,811	16,811
adj. R-sq	0.241	0.241	0.243	0.243

# **CHANNEL -- Investor Demand**

Dependent Variable	Ln(1+Tota	al # of EDGAR Searches)	Foreign Ir	nst Holdings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Output_Dummy	0.960** (2.642)		0.446** (2.801)	
Output_Fraction		2.642*** (6.213)		1.085*** (4.918)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,446	3,446	2,620	2,620
adj. R-sq	0.298	0.279	0.374	0.379

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- analysts coverage decisions and forecast accuracy.
- country.
- Channels of effect -- investor demand.

#### CONCLUSIONS

• We study the impact of U.S. firms' offshore activities on non-U.S.

 Foreign analysts' coverage and forecast accuracy improves as U.S. firms sell more goods and products in the analysts' domiciled