Preferences for Government Concessions Amid Protests and Repression: Experimental Evidence from Hong Kong's Anti-ELAB Movement and National Security Law

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January 7, 2022 ASSA 2022

Outline

- 1. Theories
- 2. Experiment Design
- Results Main NSL Causal Heterogeneities
- 4. Conclusions

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- Additional Causal Heterogeneities: Protest Expectations and Repression Perceptions.

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- We are interested in the marginal effect of an attribute on support for the concession. (i.e, Average Marginal Component Effect, AMCE (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014))

$$\psi_A(a_\ell, a_0) \equiv \mathbb{E}\left[\int \{Y_i(a_\ell, B_i) - Y_i(a_0, B_i)\} dF(B_i)\right]$$
(1)

where $a_{\ell}, a_0 \in A$ and B_i is another factor whose distribution function is $F(B_i)$.

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2. Average Component Interactive Effect (ACIE)

$$\varphi_{A}(a_{\ell}, a_{0}) \equiv \mathbb{E}\left[\int \{Y_{i}(a_{\ell}, b_{m}, C_{i}) - Y_{i}(a_{0}, b_{m}, C_{i})\}dF(C_{i})\right]$$
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• A way to avoid the social desirability bias (self-censorship). (Caruso et al., 2009; Horiuchi et al., 2020)

Subject Recruitment

- Rakuten Insight's Online Panel
- Quota Sampling: Gender, Education, and Age.
- Sample Sizes: 1400 for both before (May, 2020) and after (June, 2020) the NSL

A Conjoint Experiment

Five Attributes

- 1. Political Reforms
- 2. Economic Reforms
- 3. Social Assimilation
- 4. Reforms in Law Enforcement
- 5. Government Restructuring
- Each Attributes has 4-8 levels: This makes our experiment a $8 \times 6 \times 4 \times 5 \times 5$ factorial design.
- We also included various questions such as subjects' socio-economic background, political attitudes towards democracy and redistribution, and their political stances

Political Reforms

- 1. Popular votes for the Chief Executive and LegCo by all adults above 18 years old
- 2. Popular votes for the Chief Executive by all adults above 18 years old
- 3. Popular votes for the LegCo by all adults above 18 years old
- 4. Expansion of the Election Committee for the Chief Executive
- 5. Seat Increase for LegCo's geographical constituencies
- 6. Cancellation of the functional constituency
- 7. Extension for the One-Country-Two-System beyond 2047
- 8. Status Quo

Government Personnel

- 1. Resignation of the Chief Executive
- 2. Resignation of the Police Chief
- 3. Resignation of the Chief Secretary for Administration
- 4. Resignation of the Attorney-General
- 5. Status Quo

Law Enforcement

- 1. Independent Investigations (including foreign experts) into police brutality
- 2. Amnesty for arrested protesters
- 3. Drop the riot characterization of protests
- 4. Disband the Police Force
- 5. Status Quo

Social Assimilation

- 1. Suspend the Patriotic Education
- 2. Reduce the Immigration from the Mainland
- 3. Reduce the Ratio of Mandarin Classes to Cantonese ones
- 4. Status Quo

Economic Reforms

- 1. Suspend the Greater Bay Area Project
- 2. Housing market and Land Reform
- 3. More financial assistance to start-ups
- 4. More social services (medical, educational, etc...)
- 5. Status Quo

An Example

Please carefully review the options detailed below, and then answer the following question. Which one of the two proposals do you prefer?

	Proposal A	Proposal B
Economic Reforms	Status Quo	Increase Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (cash handout, Caring and Sharing Scheme, etc.)
Political Reforms	Extend the One- Country-Two-Systems Policy beyond 2047	Status Quo
Social Assimilation	Suspend the National Education Curricula	Suspend the National Education Curricula
Law Enforcement Reforms	Retract the Characterization of Protests as Riots	Status Quo
Government Restructuring	The Resignation of the Secretary for Justice	The Resignation of the Secretary for Justice



O Proposal B

Main


Outline

3. Results Main NSL Causal Heterogeneities

Results


Main

AMCEs before the NSL



Feature - PolR - EconR - SocA - GovR - LawE

Acemoglu-Robinson Thesis: ACEs Before the NSL (EconR X PolR) $% \left({{\rm NSL}_{\rm{ACE}}} \right)$




Feature - EconR_PolR

Main

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


Feature - EconR_SocA

Results

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
Causal Interactions: ACIEs Before the NSL



Feature - PolR - SocA

Main

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


Feature - EconR

Results

Main

Causal Interactions: ACIEs Before the NSL



Feature - EconR

NSL


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Main **NSL** Causal Heterogeneities Results

NSL

AMCEs after the NSL




Feature - PolR - EconR - SocA - GovR - LawE

Results I


NSL

Differences in AMCEs before and after the NSL




Feature - PolR - EconR - SocA - GovR - LawE

Acemoglu-Robinson Thesis: ACEs After the NSL (EconR X PolR)



Feature - EconR_PolR

Acemoglu-Robinson Thesis: ACEs After the NSL (EconR X SocA)




Feature - EconR_SocA

Results N

NSL

Causal Interactions: ACIEs After the NSL




Feature - PolR - SocA

Results

NSL

Causal Interactions: ACIEs After the NSL




Feature - EconR

Results

NSL

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
Feature - EconR

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
Main NSL Causal Heterogeneities

Exit Options and Post-NSL Preferences




Feature - PolR - EconR - SocA - GovR - LawE

Internet Censorship and Post-NSL Preferences




Feature - POLR - ECONR - SOCA - GOVR - LAWE

News Media Censorship and Post-NSL Preferences



Feature - POLR - ECONR - SOCA - GOVR - LAWE

Protest Expectations and Post-NSL Preferences



Feature - POLR - GOVR - LAWE - SOCA - ECONR

Concluding Remarks

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- The politics of concession amid protests under dictatorships: Fear Tactics and Space for Political Compromises
- Crafting a dictatorship: The effects of the NSL: Opening more space for concessions (and the erosion of HK's British legacies)