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ABSTRACT

We study climate and macroprudential policies in an economy with financial frictions. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring both a pollution market failure and a market failure in the financial sector, we explore transition risk – whether ambitious climate policy can lead to macroeconomic instability. It can, but the risk can be alleviated through macroprudential policies – taxes or subsidies on banks’ assets. Then, we explore efficient climate and macroprudential policy in the long run and over business cycles. The presence of financial frictions affects the steady-state value and dynamic properties of the efficient carbon tax. Macroprudential policy alone, without a carbon tax, is not very effective at addressing the pollution externality.

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1 Introduction

Achieving the Paris Agreement’s goal to maintain global temperature increases within 2°C above pre-industrial levels will likely demand ambitious and quick climate policy action, rather than the gradual “ramp-up” approach to policy favored by some integrated assessment models like DICE. Such an ambitious and sudden policy may create macroeconomic risks given the financial sector’s investment in fossil fuel reserves and polluting industries. A non-trivial fraction of financial intermediaries’ asset portfolios is currently represented by carbon-intensive assets at a high risk of becoming “stranded,” i.e. losing most of their economic value. This risk is what Mark Carney’s influential speech at Lloyd’s (Carney 2015) identified as “transition risk,” stemming from unanticipated ambitious climate action.¹ Could a climate policy large and sudden enough to near the 2°C goal cause a recession because of the financial sector’s exposure to risky assets? And if so, could some other policy mitigate this risk?

Beyond its impact on the transition risk, the financial sector can have important implications for the efficient design of climate policy in the long run and over business cycles. The Great Recession has illustrated that financial and credit market frictions play a crucial role in driving business cycles and has emphasized the need for macroprudential regulation to manage financial stability risk (Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010, Bernanke 2019). Both the Great Recession and the COVID recession have demonstrated that carbon pollution levels are sensitive to economic activity. Given market failures associated with both greenhouse gas pollution and financial frictions, and given banks’ exposure to carbon-intensive assets, understanding the interactions between climate policy and macroprudential policy is important for the efficient design of such policies.

The purpose of this paper is to study how the presence of financial market frictions affects the efficient design of climate policy and the possibility of transition risk. We answer the following two questions: (i) Could a sudden and ambitious climate policy shock create transition risk, and

¹See also ESRB (2016), Bank of England (2018), and Banque de France (2019).

can macroprudential policy alleviate this risk? (ii) How do financial frictions affect the efficient design of climate policy and macroprudential financial policy in the long run and over business cycles? We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with “brown” (polluting) and “green” (non-polluting) production sectors and two sources of inefficiencies: a pollution externality and financial frictions in a banking sector. We allow for two types of policies: a carbon tax to target the climate externality, and macroprudential policies in the form of a tax or a subsidy on banks’ assets to target financial frictions.

At the core of our model are banks that raise deposits from households and make loans to non-financial firms in green and brown sectors. The firms in turn rely on bank credit to finance capital purchases. Financial frictions between banks and depositors constrain the amount of investment in the economy by banking sector equity (or net worth). When banks are in financial stress (i.e., when their net worth is low), real economic activity falls. This is a newly-identified channel through which climate policy can impact the economy.

We calibrate the model to U.S. data and run two sets of simulations. First, we consider the response of the economy to an exogenous abrupt introduction of ambitious climate policy, and we study how this response can be mitigated using macroprudential policies. These simulations address the threat of transition risk induced by climate policy. Second, we solve for the efficient policy responses (the Ramsey problem) both in the long run (the steady state) and in response to business cycles generated by exogenous productivity shocks (as in the real business cycle literature). These simulations address how the pollution externality and the financial frictions interact in the design of efficient policies. We consider both the first-best case, where both a carbon tax and macroprudential policies are available, and second-best cases where some policies are constrained. To assess the role of financial stability risk, we compare economies both with and without financial frictions.

Our first set of simulations shows that transition risk is possible – ambitious climate action can trigger instability in the banking sector – and that macroprudential policy can alleviate

this risk. Without financial frictions, an unanticipated introduction of a permanent carbon tax triggers a transition away from brown production and towards green production. With financial frictions, the same carbon tax can lead to a contraction in both the green and brown sectors – a recession. Due to financial instability in the banking sector, climate policy has a negative spillover effect on the green sector. The carbon tax lowers the market value of carbon-intensive assets (asset stranding). Because of their exposure to these assets, banks experience equity losses and are forced to cut lending to both brown and green producers.

The extent of transition risk depends on banks’ exposure to carbon-intensive assets at the time of climate action. Therefore, we consider macroprudential policy tools that shift banks’ portfolio composition away from brown assets to mitigate the transition risk. Financial regulators, acting within their financial stability mandates, can reduce banks’ exposure to climate-sensitive industries and mitigate the risk of a disorderly transition to a low carbon economy. That is, central banks and financial regulators can limit transition risk now to prevent the need to delay, on financial stability grounds, ambitious climate policy, when the opportunity for more stringent policy would present itself. We stress that the results of these simulations are not intended to show that “ambitious climate policy will cause a recession,” but rather that prudent financial regulation can be enacted to ensure that ambitious climate policy does not cause a recession. The argument that the threat of macroeconomic instability should prevent climate policy from being enacted thus ignores the ability of macroprudential policy to eliminate that threat.

It is worth comparing our way of modelling macroprudential policies – taxes or subsidies on banks’ assets – to Basel-type capital requirements, which are a more common approach to financial regulation in advanced economies. Broadly, capital requirements impose limits on banks’ leverage ratios.² In our model, the financial friction itself imposes an endogenous leverage

²Basel accords – developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – represent an international regulatory framework that requires banks to hold a certain amount of equity capital in proportion to their risk-weighted assets. While capital requirements are common, many countries also use a tax on banks’ balance sheets as a macroprudential policy tool. See Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven (2017) for a survey.

constraint on banks. Given this constraint, the taxes and subsidies on banks' assets that we model incorporate, in a tractable way, climate-related factors in macroprudential regulation. For example, a tax on brown assets encourages banks to shift their portfolios away from carbon-intensive sectors. This tax policy closely mimics a capital requirement policy that introduces positive risk-weights on banks' brown assets (e.g., a "brown-penalizing" factor) within the Basel framework, which would also discourage banks from lending to carbon-intensive firms.³

In our second set of simulations, we solve for the efficient carbon tax and macroprudential policy, both in the long run (the steady state) and over business cycles driven by productivity shocks. The steady-state results demonstrate the importance of the interaction of the two market failures. Without financial frictions, the carbon tax brings about the first best by reducing emissions. With financial frictions, and when the only available policy instrument is the carbon tax, the second-best carbon tax is lower than its first-best level. This is because the inefficiency from financial frictions works in the opposite direction as the climate externality – the financial frictions lead to underproduction, and the pollution externality leads to overproduction. When the only available policy instrument is a uniform macroprudential policy – a tax or subsidy on banks' assets that is the same for brown and green assets – then output is higher than in the unregulated equilibrium, but pollution is also higher. The regulator uses macroprudential policy to primarily tackle financial frictions and pays very little attention (in a quantitative sense) to fixing the climate externality. Using macroprudential policy alone as a substitute for climate policy is not very efficient. This is even true when the regulator can use a differentiated macroprudential policy – a tax or subsidy on banks' assets that can be different for brown and green assets. Under the second-best differentiated macroprudential policy, pollution is not much lower than it is under the second-best uniform macroprudential policy. When both a carbon tax

³The current version of the Basel accords (Basel III) does not assign risk weights to assets based on climate-related risks. But, central banks are starting to consider implicit taxes on banks depending on the carbon intensity of their assets. See Campiglio et al. (2018), Krogstrup and Oman (2019), and van der Ploeg (2020) for surveys of a broader set of policy tools, including climate stress-tests and risk disclosure, and "brown-penalizing" and "green-supporting" factors, whose main goal is to encourage banks to decarbonize their balance sheets. The taxes or subsidies on banks' assets that we model can also mimic such tools, which shift banks' portfolios away from brown assets.

and macroprudential policy are available, then the first-best outcome can be achieved. Hence, the implementation of macroprudential policy is not only useful in dealing with transition risk, but also later on, to complement climate policy with the goal of leading to an efficient level of economic activity and emissions.

The business cycle results also demonstrate the importance of accounting for both market failures. In response to a negative total factor productivity shock, when financial frictions are present, the efficient carbon tax falls by more than when those frictions are absent. As a result, emissions are less procyclical when financial frictions are present. When macroprudential policies are available, emissions are more procyclical than when the carbon tax is the only available instrument. In the absence of a carbon tax, macroprudential policies (both uniform and differentiated) yield more procyclical emissions than the first best.

Overall, our paper contributes to several strands of literature. We contribute to a growing theoretical literature on climate policy and stranded assets. Van der Ploeg and Rezai (2020) and Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte (2020) show that unanticipated changes in climate policy may result in the stranding of carbon-intensive capital.⁴ We also contribute to an emerging literature analyzing the role of central banks and macroprudential authorities in tackling climate change, including Campiglio (2016) and Böser and Senni (2020). Further, our paper is related to an established literature in macroeconomics allowing for financial frictions, building on the seminal work by Bernanke and Gertler (1986) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). This literature, which largely emerged in response to the Great Recession, identifies credit market frictions and disruptions in the banking sector as an important source of macroeconomic fluctuations (Meh and Moran 2010, Jermann and Quadrini 2012, Christiano and Ikeda 2013, Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014, Iacoviello 2015).⁵ Finally, we contribute to the literature that studies

⁴See also reviews by Monasterolo (2020) and Semienuk et al. (2020). There is also growing empirical literature studying climate policy and stranded assets, such as Ramelli et al. (2018), Carattini and Sen (2019), Barnett (2020), Sen and von Schickfus (2020). Van der Ploeg (2020) provides a review of the inability of financial markets to fully price climate risks.

⁵See Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and Sannikov (2013) for an extensive survey of the literature on macroeconomic models with financial frictions.

macroprudential regulation of the financial sector (e.g., Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto 2012, Angeloni and Faia 2013, Collard et al. 2017, De Paoli and Paustian 2017, Jeanne and Korinek 2020). Our way of modelling macroprudential policy instruments as taxes and subsidies on banks’ assets is most similar to that of Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012) and De Paoli and Paustian (2017).

Methodologically, our paper combines two strands of the DSGE literature. The first adds an environmental component to a DSGE model (which has been called an E-DSGE model) to study climate and other environmental policies under business cycles, including Fischer and Springborn (2011), Heutel (2012), and Dissou and Karnizova (2016).⁶ Second, our paper relates to the literature addressing the role of financial frictions in driving macroeconomic dynamics, using a banking sector DSGE model from Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). Our model combines a standard DSGE real business cycle model with an environmental component (as in the E-DSGE literature) and with banking financial frictions (as in Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010 and Gertler and Karadi 2011).

A concurrent working paper by Diluio et al. (2020) also combines an E-DSGE model with a banking sector and financial frictions based on Gertler and Karadi (2011) to address a related set of research questions. As we do, they study transition risk stemming from climate policy, but unlike our paper, they do not study first-best or second-best efficient policy design via the Ramsey optimization problem. In addition, our results on transition risk differ substantially from theirs. Diluio et al. (2020) conclude that “even for very ambitious climate targets, transition risks are limited for a credible, exponentially growing carbon price.” However, what concerns central banks and policymakers is mostly an unanticipated, sudden carbon policy shock (“too late, too sudden”), potentially leading to a “hard landing,” where a large portion of the economy, not only the fossil fuel sector, is exposed to transition risk (Battiston et al. 2017). Hence our focus on abrupt transitions and both brown and green sectors.

⁶See Fischer and Heutel (2013) for an early survey of this literature. Golosov et al. (2014) also develop a DSGE model with an environmental externality but do not study business cycles. Gallic and Vermandel (2020) develop a DSGE model of climate and weather shocks, but without pollution or pollution policy.

Several other E-DSGE papers also consider macroeconomic policies and the interaction between macroeconomic and environmental policies. Annicchiarico and Di Dio (2015, 2017) and Economides and Xepapadeas (2018) add a new-Keynesian specification of price rigidities to an E-DSGE model to study monetary policy. Chan (2020) compares fiscal and monetary policies to climate policies. As mentioned earlier, like our paper, Diluiso et al. (2020) also combine an E-DSGE model with financial frictions and macroprudential policy, as do Benmir and Roman (2020) and Ferrari and Landi (2020).

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 describes the calibration. Sections 4 and 5 present our simulation results. In Section 4, we assess the transition risk of climate-policy-induced recession by presenting the response to an unanticipated exogenous emissions tax, both with and without financial frictions, and with and without macroprudential policies. Section 5 considers efficient policy design by presenting results from the Ramsey problems, both first-best and second-best, in both the deterministic steady state and in response to exogenous productivity shocks. Section 6 concludes.

2 Model

We consider a closed economy consisting of households, a government, and four types of firms – financial intermediaries (banks), capital producers, and non-financial final-goods-producing “green” and “brown” firms. The economy features two sources of inefficiency. The first is a standard environmental externality: brown firms do not internalize how their individual production decisions affect the pollution stock and thus aggregate output. The second source of inefficiency comes from financial market frictions: the moral hazard problem between banks and depositors constrains the amount of credit in the economy by banks’ net worth. Since bankers cannot issue new equity when constrained, credit is undersupplied, and shocks to the economy are inefficiently amplified through the standard financial accelerator mechanism. To address these inefficiencies, we model two types of policies: climate policy, in the form of a

carbon tax, and macroprudential policies, in the form of taxes or subsidies on banks' assets.

2.1 Households

We follow Gertler and Karadi (2011) in formulating the household sector. There is a continuum of identical households of measure unity. Each household has a continuum of a unit measure of family members. A fraction $(1 - \iota)$ of members are workers, and a fraction ι are bankers. Workers supply labor hours to non-financial firms in brown and green production sectors and return wage income to the household. Each banker manages a financial intermediary (a bank) and transfers dividends to the household. There is perfect consumption insurance within the household. The household consumes and saves. Households cannot save by directly lending to productive firms. Rather, they can only save through depositing funds in banks.

A representative household chooses consumption C_t , savings in the form of bank deposits D_t , and sector-specific labor hours, L_t^b and L_t^g , to maximize

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{1}{1-\eta} \left(C_t - \varpi \frac{[(L_t^b)^{1+\rho_L} + (L_t^g)^{1+\rho_L}]^{\frac{1+\xi}{1+\rho_L}}}{1+\xi} \right)^{1-\eta} \right\}, \quad (1)$$

subject to the budget constraint,

$$C_t + D_t = w_t^b L_t^b + w_t^g L_t^g + R_{t-1} D_{t-1} + \Xi_t + \Pi_t + T_t, \quad (2)$$

where w_t^b and w_t^g are wage rates in brown and green sectors, R_{t-1} is a non-contingent interest rate on bank deposits, Ξ_t are net dividends from banks, Π_t denotes profits from the ownership of non-financial firms, and T_t is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The parameter $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the household's subjective discount factor, $\varpi > 0$ is a labor disutility parameter, and $\eta > 0$ controls the curvature of the utility function.

The specification of labor hours in the utility function follows Horvath (2000) and allows for imperfect labor substitutability between the sectors. In every period the representative household is endowed with one unit of time. Denote by $L_t \equiv \left[(L_t^b)^{1+\rho_L} + (L_t^g)^{1+\rho_L} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\rho_L}}$ total (composite) hours worked in period t . When $\rho_L = 0$, labor hours in brown and green sectors are perfect substitutes. When $\rho_L > 0$, labor hours are imperfect substitutes across the sectors. The parameter ξ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the labor hours aggregator.

Let $M_{t,t+1} \equiv \beta \frac{U_{c,t+1}}{U_{c,t}}$ be the household's stochastic discount factor, where $U_{c,t} = \left(C_t - \varpi \frac{L_t^{1+\xi}}{1+\xi} \right)^{-\eta}$ is the marginal utility of consumption in period t . Then households' optimal consumption and sector-specific labor supply decisions are characterized by standard first order conditions:

$$\mathbb{E}_t (M_{t,t+1} R_t) = 1, \quad (3)$$

$$\varpi L_t^{\xi-\rho_L} (L_t^i)^{\rho_L} = w_t^i, \quad \text{for } i = \{g, b\}. \quad (4)$$

2.2 Bankers

Each banker manages a financial intermediary (a bank). The banker offers loans to non-financial firms by combining her own net worth with external funds raised from households in the form of deposits. In particular, at time t , an individual banker j purchases securities $S_{j,t}^i$, at unit price Q_t^i , issued by final good producing firms in sector $i = \{g, b\}$.⁷ We assume that the government can levy macroprudential taxes (or subsidies if negative) τ_t^i , $i = \{g, b\}$, on banks' assets. We allow these taxes to potentially differ across brown and green assets, which would capture the scenario in which a supervisory authority takes into account environmental aspects in bank capital regulation.⁸ In addition, banks are subject to small asset management costs,

⁷These securities are claims on the gross rate of return on sector-specific capital.

⁸As mentioned earlier, these taxes or subsidies capture some of the proposed policies in bank regulatory frameworks, e.g., brown penalizing and green supporting factors. Taxes on banks' assets require information about firms' emissions, unlike carbon taxes, which can be implemented upstream. But we consider this a feasible policy. For instance, in the United Kingdom all large firms must disclose carbon emissions under the Streamlined Energy and Carbon Reporting scheme, while in the United States large polluters must report carbon emissions

described below in detail. The banker finances the expenditure side of her balance sheet with net worth $N_{j,t}$ and newly issued deposits $D_{j,t}$.

The individual bank's balance sheet or flow-of-funds constraint is

$$(1 + \tau_t^b)Q_t^b S_{j,t}^b + (1 + \tau_t^g)Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g + \Psi(Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g, \mathcal{W}_{j,t}) = D_{j,t} + N_{j,t}, \quad (5)$$

where Ψ is a quadratic cost function, $\Psi(Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g, \mathcal{W}_{j,t}) = \frac{\psi}{2} \left(\frac{Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g}{\mathcal{W}_{j,t}} - \bar{s}^g \right)^2 \mathcal{W}_{j,t}$. Here $\mathcal{W}_{j,t} \equiv Q_t^b S_{j,t}^b + Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g$ is the total value of assets held by banker j at time t . The parameter \bar{s}^g is a measure of banks' long-run (steady-state) green-to-total assets ratio, and $\psi > 0$ is the adjustment cost parameter. In our calibration, these costs are very small, and their sole purpose is to make banks' steady-state portfolio choice determinate.⁹

Denote by $R_{k,t}^b$ and $R_{k,t}^g$ the time t realized gross rates of return on banks' brown and green assets, respectively. The individual bank's net worth evolves according to

$$N_{j,t+1} = R_{k,t+1}^b Q_t^b S_{j,t}^b + R_{k,t+1}^g Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g - R_t D_{j,t}. \quad (6)$$

As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011), we introduce the following moral hazard problem to limit banks' ability to obtain external funds: After raising deposits and purchasing assets at time t , a banker managing the bank can choose to divert an exogenous fraction κ of total assets for personal use (i.e., transfer the funds to his/her own household).¹⁰ The cost to the banker from diverting the funds is that the depositors can shut down the bank after recovering the remaining $(1 - \kappa)$ fraction of assets. Recognizing the possibility of bankers "running away," depositors will thus lend to banker j only if she has incentives to operate honestly.

to the Environmental Protection Agency under the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program.

⁹This is a common technical tool to make portfolio choice determinate in models solved around a deterministic steady state (Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto 2012, Aoki, Benigno and Kiyotaki 2018).

¹⁰Households deposit funds in banks other than the ones they own.

Let $V_{j,t}$ denote the franchise (or continuation) value of the bank at the end of period t . Then for the depositors (households) to be willing to deposit money with banker j , the following incentive constraint must be satisfied,

$$V_{j,t} \geq \kappa \underbrace{(Q_t^b S_{j,t}^b + Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g)}_{\mathcal{W}_{j,t}}. \quad (7)$$

Households are willing to lend to a bank as long as the bank's franchise value $V_{j,t}$, which measures the present discounted value of future profits from operating honestly, is larger than the gains from diverting funds. This inequality always holds, so in equilibrium, bankers never actually "run away" or divert funds.

At the end of each period, a banker exits the business with exogenous probability $1 - \gamma$.¹¹ Upon exit, a banker transfers her retained earnings to her family in the form of dividends and becomes a worker.¹² Surviving bankers reinvest all their net worth. Since bankers are members of households, they maximize the expected present value of their terminal wealth (or future dividend payouts to households). A banker chooses asset holdings in green and brown production sectors $S_{j,t}^i$, $i = \{g, b\}$, and deposits $D_{j,t}$ to maximize

$$V_{j,t} = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \sum_{\tilde{\tau}=t+1}^{\infty} (1 - \gamma) \gamma^{\tilde{\tau}-t-1} M_{t,\tilde{\tau}} N_{j,\tilde{\tau}} \right\}, \quad (8)$$

subject to (5), (6) and (7), where $M_{t,\tilde{\tau}}$ is the households' stochastic discount factor $M_{t,\tilde{\tau}} \equiv \beta^{\tilde{\tau}-t} \frac{U'_{c,\tilde{\tau}}}{U'_{c,t}}$.

Denote by $s_t^g = \frac{Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g}{\mathcal{W}_{j,t}}$ the portfolio share of green assets.¹³ It is convenient to reformulate

¹¹This assumption is common in the financial frictions literature (Gertler and Kiyotaki 2010, Gertler and Karadi 2011) and guarantees that banks never accumulate enough internal funds to avoid the need for external finance.

¹²The number of bankers that become workers in every period is thus $(1 - \gamma) \iota$. To keep the relative proportion of each group fixed over time, we assume that the same number of workers randomly become bankers in every period.

¹³We dropped the bank-specific index j from s_t^g , because as we show later the portfolio shares are the same across banks.

the banker's problem in which the banker decides on holdings of total assets ($\mathcal{W}_{j,t}$) and the portfolio share of green assets (s_t^g). Appendix A contains a detailed characterization of the bank's problem and associated optimality conditions. Here we discuss key equations.

In the Appendix, we show that the bank's value function is linear in individual net worth,

$$V_{j,t} = \varphi_t N_{j,t}, \quad (9)$$

where $\varphi_t \geq 1$ is the time-varying shadow value of a bank's net worth, common across banks. Combining (9) with (7), we can express the incentive constraint as

$$Q_{j,t}^b S_{j,t}^b + Q_{j,t}^g S_{j,t}^g \leq \frac{\varphi_t}{\kappa} N_{j,t}. \quad (10)$$

Bank's assets cannot exceed a fraction $\frac{\varphi_t}{\kappa}$ of its equity capital. In our calibrated model, this constraint will always bind in the proximity of the steady state. Aggregating (10) at equality over the entire banking sector yields

$$Q_t^b S_t^b + Q_t^g S_t^g = \frac{\varphi_t}{\kappa} N_t. \quad (11)$$

This is the key equation capturing the negative financial accelerator and the inefficiency arising from the financial sector. When banks are financially constrained, the demand for capital in the economy ($Q_t^b S_t^b + Q_t^g S_t^g$) is restricted by the amount of financial intermediaries' net worth (N_t). Shocks to the economy get amplified through fluctuations in the banking sector's equity capital. Bankers do not internalize this effect that their net worth has on the economy – this is analogous to a second externality – and thus the equilibrium is inefficient.

Equation (11) determines the total amount of brown and green capital intermediated by banks. The demand for sector-specific assets is then pinned down by the optimal portfolio share

of green assets,

$$s_t^g = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \Omega_{t+1} \left[(R_{k,t+1}^g - R_{k,t+1}^b) - (\tau_t^g - \tau_t^b) R_t \right] \right\}}{\psi \mathbb{E}_t [\Omega_{t+1} R_t]} + \bar{s}^g, \quad (12)$$

where $\Omega_{t+1} \equiv M_{t,t+1} (1 - \gamma + \gamma \varphi_{t+1})$ is the banker's effective stochastic discount factor. The numerator on the right-hand-side of equation (12) is the expected discounted excess return on green assets over brown assets, taking into account the tax advantage or disadvantage of each type of asset. For example, all else equal, a higher τ_t^b or lower τ_t^g increases the optimal share of green assets in the bank's portfolio. Therefore, through macroprudential taxes a regulator can affect the relative attractiveness of brown versus green assets in banks' portfolios.

Banks that exit the business are replaced by an equal number of new banks, with each of them receiving a small initial start-up transfer $\frac{\zeta}{1-\gamma} \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} Q_t^i S_t^i$ from the households. Thus, the aggregate banking sector's net worth evolves according to

$$N_{t+1} = \gamma \left[\sum_{i=\{g,b\}} R_{k,t+1}^i Q_t^i S_t^i - R_t D_t \right] + \zeta \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} Q_t^i S_t^i, \quad (13)$$

and the net dividend payouts to households are

$$\Xi_{t+1} = (1 - \gamma) \left[\sum_{i=\{g,b\}} R_{k,t+1}^i Q_t^i S_t^i - R_t D_t \right] - \zeta \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} Q_t^i S_t^i. \quad (14)$$

As is common in the financial frictions literature, we define the aggregate banking sector leverage ratio as the value of banks' total assets over net worth, $\text{lev}_t \equiv \frac{Q_t^b S_t^b + Q_t^g S_t^g}{N_t}$. Similarly, credit spread is a difference between the expected rate of return on a given type of asset and the risk-free rate, $\text{spread}_t^i \equiv \mathbb{E}_t (R_{k,t+1}^i - R_t)$, $i \in \{b, g\}$.

2.3 Final Goods Firms

Two types of representative firms produce final goods: green and brown. Brown production entails emissions as a byproduct, while green production does not. Both production sectors rely on the banking sector to obtain funds to purchase capital.

2.3.1 Production Technology

Pollution negatively affects productivity in both green and brown sectors. Both types of firms operate a Cobb-Douglas production technology with capital (K_{t-1}^i) and labor (L_t^i) inputs,

$$Y_t^i = [1 - d(X_t)] A_t (K_{t-1}^i)^{\alpha^i} (L_t^i)^{1-\alpha^i}, \quad 0 < \alpha^i < 1,$$

where X_t is the pollution stock in the economy, $d(\cdot) \in (0, 1)$ is an increasing damage function; A_t is the aggregate economy-wide total factor productivity (TFP) shock

$$\log A_t = \rho_A \log A_{t-1} + \sigma_A \varepsilon_{A,t}, \quad \varepsilon_{A,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1). \quad (15)$$

Green and brown goods are imperfect substitutes for each other. The aggregate final consumption good Y_t is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of sectoral outputs,

$$Y_t = \left[(\pi^b)^{\frac{1}{\rho_Y}} (Y_t^b)^{\frac{\rho_Y-1}{\rho_Y}} + (1 - \pi^b)^{\frac{1}{\rho_Y}} (Y_t^g)^{\frac{\rho_Y-1}{\rho_Y}} \right]^{\frac{\rho_Y}{\rho_Y-1}}, \quad (16)$$

where $\rho_Y > 0$ is the elasticity of substitution parameter, and π^b is the weight on brown input in the final good production. The demand functions for the two types of output are

$$Y_t^b = \pi^b \frac{Y_t}{(p_t^b)^{\rho_Y}}, \quad Y_t^g = (1 - \pi^b) \frac{Y_t}{(p_t^g)^{\rho_Y}}, \quad (17)$$

where p_t^b and p_t^g denote relative prices of brown and green goods. The final consumption good is numeraire, and its price is normalized to 1.

2.3.2 Brown Sector

Production in the brown sector entails emissions as a byproduct. The pollution stock X_t evolves according to

$$X_t = \delta_X X_{t-1} + e_t + e_t^{\text{row}}, \quad (18)$$

where e_t denotes current-period domestic emissions and e_t^{row} is emissions imposed from the rest of the world. Domestic emissions depend on production in the brown sector (Y_t^b) and the fraction of emissions abated μ_t ,

$$e_t = (1 - \mu_t) h(Y_t^b). \quad (19)$$

Abatement costs Z_t units of the final good,

$$Z_t = f(\mu_t) Y_t^b. \quad (20)$$

We follow Nordhaus (2008) and Heutel (2012) in specifying the functional forms for emissions elasticity with respect to output, $h(Y_t^b) = (Y_t^b)^\epsilon$, and the abatement cost function, $f(\mu_t) = \theta_1 \mu_t^{\theta_2}$. An environmental externality arises because the representative brown firm does not internalize how its production affects both green and brown output through the pollution stock X_t and associated damages $d(X_t)$.

At the end of period t final goods firms in the brown sector purchase capital K_t^b from capital producers at market price Q_t^b . Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), the firms finance their capital purchases by issuing financial claims S_t^b to banks. Each claim is priced at the same price (Q_t^b) as capital so that $Q_t^b K_t^b = Q_t^b S_t^b$. After production takes place in time $t + 1$, the firm can sell the undepreciated capital $(1 - \delta^b) K_t^b$ on the market at price Q_{t+1}^b . There are no financing frictions between firms and banks, and the firms offer a state-contingent payoff $R_{k,t+1}^b$

on securities owned by the financial intermediaries.

Brown firms are subject to an emissions tax τ_t^e imposed by the government. Their time t realized profits are

$$\Pi_t^b = p_t^b Y_t^b - \tau_t^e e_t - Z_t - w_t^b L_t^b - R_{k,t}^b Q_{t-1}^b K_{t-1}^b + (1 - \delta^b) Q_t^b K_{t-1}^b, \quad (21)$$

The optimality conditions with respect to labor (L_t^b) and abatement (μ_t) are:

$$w_t^b = (1 - \alpha^b) \frac{Y_t^b}{L_t^b} [p_t^b - f(\mu_t) - \tau_t^e (1 - \mu_t) h'(Y_t^b)], \quad (22)$$

$$\tau_t^e h(Y_t^b) = Y_t^b f'(\mu_t). \quad (23)$$

A state-contingent return on brown assets, satisfying the first order optimality condition, is given by

$$R_{k,t}^b = \frac{\alpha^b \frac{Y_t^b}{K_{t-1}^b} [p_t^b - f(\mu_t) - \tau_t^e (1 - \mu_t) h'(Y_t^b)] + (1 - \delta^b) Q_t^b}{Q_{t-1}^b}. \quad (24)$$

2.3.3 Green Sector

Similar to brown firms, green firms rely on bank credit to purchase sector-specific capital K_t^g at price Q_t^g . They also hire labor L_t^g from households at wage rate w_t^g . The green firms' optimality conditions imply

$$w_t^g = (1 - \alpha^g) \frac{p_t^g Y_t^g}{L_t^g}, \quad (25)$$

and

$$R_{k,t}^g = \frac{\alpha^g \frac{p_t^g Y_t^g}{K_{t-1}^g} + (1 - \delta^g) Q_t^g}{Q_{t-1}^g}. \quad (26)$$

2.4 Capital Firms

Capital is sector-specific and immobile across sectors. Competitive capital-producing firms build green and brown capital goods subject to convex capital adjustment costs. Producing I_t^i , $i = \{g, b\}$, units of sector-specific new capital goods requires $\left(1 + \frac{\phi^i}{2} \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1\right)^2\right) I_t^i$ units of the final good, where the parameter $\phi^i \geq 0$ controls the size of the adjustment cost (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2005).¹⁴

Denote by Q_t^i the price of new sector-specific capital goods. The capital producers solve

$$\max_{\{I_t^i\}_{i=\{g,b\}}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} M_{0,t} \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} \left[Q_t^i I_t^i - \left(1 + \frac{\phi^i}{2} \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1\right)^2\right) I_t^i \right]. \quad (27)$$

The first order optimality condition associated with this problem is

$$Q_t^i = 1 + \frac{\phi^i}{2} \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1\right)^2 + \phi^i \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1\right) \frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ M_{t,t+1} \phi^i \left(\frac{I_{t+1}^i}{I_t^i} - 1\right) \left(\frac{I_{t+1}^i}{I_t^i}\right)^2 \right\}, \quad i = \{g, b\}. \quad (28)$$

Sector-specific capital stock evolves according to

$$K_t^i = (1 - \delta^i) K_{t-1}^i + I_t^i, \quad \text{for } i = \{g, b\}, \quad (29)$$

where δ^i is the depreciation rate of capital.

¹⁴We include these investment adjustment costs to allow for endogenous movements in the price of capital that contribute to fluctuations in banks' net worth. This is a standard way of making asset prices volatile, which in turn makes financial frictions quantitatively more relevant (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997).

2.5 Government

The government simply transfers net revenues from the carbon tax and the macroprudential policies to households in a lump-sum manner,

$$T_t = \tau_t^e e_t + \tau_t^b Q_t^b S_t^b + \tau_t^g Q_t^g S_t^g. \quad (30)$$

3 Calibration

In this section, we describe the calibration of the model. A period in the model corresponds to one quarter. The model parameters can be divided into three categories: standard real business cycle (RBC) parameters, parameters related to financial frictions, and parameters related to climate externalities. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated values. The calibration is based on the baseline scenario when all policy instruments are zero ($\tau_t^e = \tau_t^b = \tau_t^g = 0$).

We choose standard values for the subjective discount factor $\beta = 0.995$ (which implies an annualized risk-free rate of 2% in the steady state), the risk aversion parameter, $\eta = 2$, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, $\frac{1}{\xi} = 1$, and the capital depreciation rate, $\delta^b = \delta^g = 0.025$. We set the capital share in green production α^g to 0.33. We allow the brown sector to be slightly more capital intensive, $\alpha^g = 0.35$.¹⁵ Both of these values are commonly used in the RBC literature. The parameter controlling for inter-sectoral elasticity of substitution between labor hours (ρ_L) is set to 1. This is the estimate found by Horvath (2000) using sectoral labor hours data from the U.S. As is common in the RBC literature, we set the labor disutility parameter ϖ so that the fraction of time spent working in the steady state is $\frac{1}{3}$.

For the elasticity of substitution between green and brown output, we rely on empirical estimates in Papageorgiou, Saam and Schulte (2013) and set $\rho_Y = 2$. We choose the share of

¹⁵For instance, Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) and Fullerton and Heutel (2007) find that the dirty sector is slightly more capital intensive than the clean sector.

brown output in the production of final consumption good (π^b) to target the steady-state ratio of green-to-total capital stock of 0.60.¹⁶ The implied value, $\pi^b = 0.3326$, is also consistent with the fact that income share of green sector to total output is about 70%.

The persistence and standard deviation of the aggregate TFP shock are set at the standard RBC values, $\rho_A = 0.95$, $\sigma_A = 0.007$. The investment adjustment cost parameter for both sectors (ϕ^i) is 10. These values are in line with the parameter values also used in the environmental DSGE literature (e.g., Heutel 2012, Annicchiarico and Di Dio 2015).

We calibrate the environmental part of the model based on the most recent version of the DICE model (Nordhaus 2018). While DICE models damage as a function of temperature, where temperature is affected by the carbon stock through a dynamic climate model, here we simplify and model damages directly as a function of carbon $d(X_t)$. The climate damage function takes a quadratic form $d(X_t) = d_0 + d_1X_t + d_2X_t^2$. We use the parameter estimates $d_0 = -0.0076$, $d_1 = 8.10e - 6$, and $d_2 = 1.05e - 8$ from Gibson and Heutel (2020). In the parameterized damage function, pollution stock (X_t) is measured in gigatons, while in our model, the units are abstract. To map the empirical estimates into the model, we set the steady-state pollution level to 2030 GtC, which is the mean value of the carbon stock over the first 250 years of the simulation in the DICE business-as-usual scenario.¹⁷ This implies that at the steady state, damages are of 5.2% of output (i.e., $d(X_{ss,model}) = 0.052$). It also implies (as we will show in the results) that the steady-state level of the efficient carbon tax is about \$30 per ton of carbon dioxide, which is approximately equal to the social cost of carbon found by studies relying on DICE (Nordhaus 2017). Since other studies using other integrated assessment models (IAMs) or other methodologies argue for higher social costs of carbon (e.g., Ricke et al. 2018, Pindyck 2019), our model can be understood as a conservative approach based on DICE. If anything,

¹⁶This yields a slightly lower ratio of green-to-total capital stock than in some other studies, e.g. Fried, Novan and Peterman (2020) calibrate a ratio of about 0.80. Since nearly all production uses at least some polluting inputs, it is inevitably somewhat arbitrary to impose a strict cutoff between a green and brown sector.

¹⁷That is, we compute $d_{scale} = \frac{X_{ss,model}}{2030 \text{ GtC}}$ and rescale the empirical estimates accordingly: $\hat{d}_1 = \frac{d_1}{d_{scale}}$ and $\hat{d}_2 = \frac{d_2}{d_{scale}^2}$.

higher social costs of carbon would lead to stronger shocks to the economy if ambitious climate policy is abruptly implemented. The same applies to carbon tax rates obtained following a cost-effectiveness approach, as in Stiglitz et al. (2017) and IMF (2019).

The abatement cost function is also parameterized following Nordhaus (2018). We set the exponent θ_2 to 2.6 – the same value as in Nordhaus (2018). To calibrate the coefficient θ_1 , we take into account two considerations: First, the abatement cost coefficient is a decreasing function of time in DICE, representing growth in abatement technology, though it is constant in our model. Second, in our model, the abatement cost applies only to the brown sector, while in DICE, it is calibrated as a share of total GDP. As in our strategy for the steady-state pollution stock calibration, we take the mean value of the abatement coefficient from DICE over the first 250 years of the simulation, and then we rescale it to account for the fact that it applies just to the brown sector.¹⁸ The resulting value of θ_1 is 0.0335.

Since in our model emissions depend on brown production, we assume the unit elasticity of emissions with respect to brown output, $\epsilon = 1$. This value is consistent with the estimates in the existing one-sector environmental RBC literature.¹⁹ The pollution decay parameter δ_X is 0.9965. Emissions from the rest of the world are assumed to be constant over time $e_t^{\text{row}} = e^{\text{row}}$. Consistent with the fact that the U.S. emits about one-sixth of global carbon dioxide, we set e^{row} to equal five times the steady-state value of domestic emissions.

We set the bank survival rate γ to 0.972 as in Gertler and Karadi (2011), implying that, on average, bankers survive for about 9 years. We choose the values for the fraction of funds that can be diverted (κ) and transfer parameter (ζ) to match the steady-state leverage ratio of the banking sector of 4.5 and annualized credit spreads (both on brown and green assets) of 90 basis points. This implies the parameter values $\kappa = 0.3409$, $\zeta = 0.003$, which are in

¹⁸The mean value of the abatement cost coefficient for the first 250 years of DICE simulation is 0.015. We multiply this value by the ratio $\frac{Y_{ss}}{Y_{ss}^b}$ to obtain the adjusted θ_1 .

¹⁹Heutel (2012) estimates the elasticity of CO₂ emissions with respect to GDP using monthly data from the U.S. and finds this elasticity to be within the range of 0.55 – 0.88. Doda (2014) finds this elasticity to be 1.01 using annual data.

line with the ones used in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). We set the banks' portfolio adjustment cost parameter to a very small number, $\psi = 10^{-4}$, as its sole purpose is to make banks' steady-state portfolio determinate. The parameter \bar{s}^g is set at 0.60 to be consistent with the share of green capital of 60%.

4 Climate action and transition risk

In this section, we study transition dynamics to a low-carbon economy, and we assess the risk of policy-induced recession and the potential for macroprudential policy to address it.²⁰ We consider a surprise introduction of a permanent emissions tax of 30.5 dollars per ton of CO₂, which is the efficient steady-state carbon price in our model. We can think of this scenario as one in which, after decades of delayed and insufficient action, there is a sudden shift in the global political environment resulting in the implementation of ambitious climate policy.

The carbon tax that we consider is the same order of magnitude as those recommended by Stiglitz and Stern (2017) and the IMF (2019), which argue that a global carbon tax within the \$40-\$80 range by 2020 would be necessary to achieve the temperature trajectory consistent with the Paris Agreement. If anything, a higher carbon tax would lead to a larger shock to the economy when ambitious climate policy is abruptly implemented, making our approach conservative or accommodating expectations of a positive carbon tax rate among agents. That is, our experiment can also be seen as a carbon tax shock of 30.5 dollars per ton of CO₂ above expectations, i.e., a surprise increase of 30.5 dollars in the carbon tax rate that agents had priced in.

The economy starts in the baseline deterministic steady state (with no policies of either type, climate or macroprudential). In time period (quarter) 5, the economy is surprised by the introduction of a permanent emissions tax.²¹ We focus on the transition dynamics in which the

²⁰We solve the model numerically using the Dynare package developed by Adjemian et al. (2011).

²¹The \$30.5 per ton of CO₂ tax corresponds to an increase in τ_t^e from 0 to 0.017. To obtain dollar amounts

economy has perfect foresight about its future path after the tax has been introduced. In this section we ignore productivity shocks. We compare results from our baseline model (described above) to a model that does not have a financial sector and thus does not have financial frictions.²² This allows us to gauge the importance of financial frictions in the macroeconomic effects of a carbon price shock.

Figure 1 plots the transition dynamics in response to the exogenous carbon tax. Solid lines show the dynamics of our baseline model with financial frictions presented in Section 2. Dashed lines show the dynamics of the model without financial frictions. In response to the carbon tax, emissions fall by about 36% (Panel (a)), with or without financial frictions. The next two panels show that the economy with financial frictions experiences a deeper recession: investment and output fall by more than they do in the economy without financial frictions. In the long run, once this carbon tax is implemented, output, investment, and efficiency will all increase because of the tax internalizing the climate externality. However, the focus of the simulations in this section is on the transition, so we present relatively short to medium term economic dynamics (i.e., the first 20 periods after the carbon tax has been put in place).²³

The remaining panels of Figure 1 illustrate the mechanisms behind the climate-policy-induced financial crisis. Panel (d) shows that the banking sector’s net worth quickly falls by about 10% before rebounding. These equity losses in the banking sector occur because of falling asset prices (particularly on brown assets) from the emissions tax. With financial frictions, undercapitalized banks are forced to cut lending to both brown and green sectors, so both brown and green capital fall (Panels (e) and (f)). Without financial frictions, the economy

we perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation in which we set the steady state level of aggregate output in the baseline model to be equal to the U.S. GDP (\$20 trillion) and the steady state emissions to total U.S. emissions (5 billion CO₂ tons.)

²²The model without financial frictions is a two-sector environmental DSGE model in which households directly lend capital to non-financial firms with no agency problem between households and firms.

²³Early in the transition, output falls even in the economy without financial frictions because the carbon tax lowers equilibrium labor hours, and even though damages also fall, the former effect dominates. Once the new post-tax steady state is reached, aggregate output is about 1 to 1.5% higher than the initial steady state, and green production expands while brown production slightly contracts. Because of the very slow decay rate of the carbon pollution stock (a quarterly decay rate of less than one-half of one percent, calibrated based on a half-life of 50 years), it takes several hundred periods for the economy to reach this new steady state.

moves away from brown and towards green investment, and green capital expands as a result. The green sector and the economy overall experiences a deeper and more prolonged recession in the economy with financial frictions, since the frictions slow the transition from brown to green production.

We next ask whether macroprudential regulation can mitigate this transition risk by reducing banks' exposure to brown assets. Suppose that prior to the introduction of the emissions tax, the regulator enacts a tax-and-subsidy scheme on brown and green assets to shift banks' steady-state portfolio composition away from brown assets. We set $\tau^b = 0.006$ and $\tau^g = -0.00316$, which reduces the share of brown assets in banks' portfolios from 40% to 32% but leaves steady-state output unchanged.

Figure 2 shows the same transition dynamics as in Figure 1 for the economy with financial frictions but also includes the dynamics after the introduction of the macroprudential policies. These policies can mitigate the severity of the transition risk. Aggregate investment and output fall by less with the macroprudential policy than without it, while the reduction in emissions is the same. Since the banking sector is now less exposed to the brown sector, equity losses are milder and credit issued to the firms falls by less. With the macroprudential policy, green economic activity experiences a milder slowdown and faster recovery.²⁴

In Appendix D, we present simulations that consider other assumptions about the timing of policy introduction. We present one set of simulations where the exogenous carbon tax is pre-announced several periods in advance, rather than unanticipated. We also present simulations where the macroprudential policies are introduced at the same time as the carbon tax, rather than pre-existing before the carbon tax is implemented.

²⁴Figures A1 and A2 in the appendix present additional variables under the simulations presented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.

5 Efficient climate and macroprudential policies

In Section 4, we studied the financial sector’s role for transition risk induced by an abrupt implementation of climate policy, and the role of macroprudential policy to mitigate that risk. In those simulations, we focused on exogenous policies. This section explores the interactions between financial frictions and environmental externalities and their implications for efficient policies. When both a carbon tax τ_t^e and a uniform macroprudential tax $\tau_t^b = \tau_t^g$ (subsidy if negative) on banks’ assets are available, the policymaker can fully undo both types of distortions. We refer to this Ramsey-efficient policy mix and the associated allocations as the “first best.”²⁵ Using the first best as a benchmark, we also consider second-best policies, that is, when one of the instruments is absent from a policy toolbox. We also consider the case where the policymaker can use a differentiated macroprudential policy, setting separate taxes on different types of assets (green or brown) in banks’ portfolio ($\tau_t^b \neq \tau_t^g$).

5.1 Steady state

Table 2 reports the deterministic steady-state outcomes of key variables in the models with and without financial frictions across different policy scenarios. The first two columns report steady-state outcomes in the model without financial frictions, under the no-policy scenario and with the efficient emissions tax. Columns 3 and 4 consider similar policy scenarios in the model with financial frictions, and the remaining columns also consider macroprudential policies. The units of the emissions tax are in dollars per ton of CO₂, where we convert the arbitrary units of the DSGE model to these real-world units using the strategy described in the calibration section above. The macroprudential taxes are in percentages. The welfare losses are in terms of compensating variation in consumption that equates the steady-state welfare under a given

²⁵In the social planner’s problem, there are no asset management costs, which in our baseline decentralized economy depend on prices. However, because these costs are very small in our calibration, numerical differences between our “first-best” and the planner’s efficient outcomes are negligible.

policy scenario to that of the first-best outcome.²⁶ The remaining variables in Table 2 are presented in arbitrary model units.

In the absence of an emissions tax, firms do not internalize the negative climate externality, pushing emissions up to inefficiently high levels in both economies, with and without financial frictions. In the model with financial frictions, this effect is counteracted by the inefficiently low production as bank lending to firms is constrained by the presence of financial frictions. The two sources of market failure work in opposite directions, so unregulated steady-state emissions are lower with financial frictions than without them.

Without financial frictions, the efficient steady-state emissions tax is 0.017 in abstract DSGE units, which corresponds to 30.5 dollars per ton of CO₂. With financial frictions, the second-best carbon tax (absent any macroprudential policies) is 24.2 dollars per ton of CO₂. Because the financial frictions work in the opposite direction of the climate externality, the presence of financial frictions implies that the carbon tax would be lower. Steady-state emissions are thus higher in the model with financial frictions, although this difference is small in magnitude (0.23%). The second column is a first-best outcome, since without financial frictions the only externality is pollution, and it is corrected through the Pigouvian tax. The fourth column is a second-best outcome; there are two sources of market inefficiencies (pollution externality and financial frictions) but only one instrument (the emissions tax) to address them.

The last three columns report deterministic steady-state outcomes in the baseline model (with both a pollution externality and financial frictions) when macroprudential policy instruments are available. The fifth column is the case where only a uniform macroprudential policy (i.e., $\tau_t^b = \tau_t^g$) is available, and the sixth column allows for differentiated macroprudential policies. The last column is the first-best scenario, with both types of instruments available.

When only a uniform macroprudential policy is available, since financial frictions limit the level of economic activity to inefficiently low levels, the policymaker subsidizes banks to increase

²⁶We also computed the unconditional mean of welfare based on the second-order approximation to a household's lifetime utility and obtained very similar welfare results.

credit supply to the economy. That is, the second-best policy recapitalizes the banking sector by setting $\tau_{ss}^b = \tau_{ss}^g = -0.0018$. As a result, banks' net worth, aggregate investment, and output are all brought closer to their first-best levels. This second-best macroprudential policy, however, implies much higher emissions than the first best due to increased economic activity. The steady-state emissions are about 50% higher than their first-best level, implying more severe future climate damages.²⁷

In column 6, the regulator can set differentiated macroprudential policies and thus take environmental factors into account. Without an emissions tax, the planner subsidizes green assets more than brown assets; the second-best steady-state taxes on brown and green assets are $\tau_{ss}^b = -0.0014$ and $\tau_{ss}^g = -0.0021$, respectively. As a result, emissions are lower relative to the case with the uniform macroprudential policy, but the difference is small (0.7%). When only macroprudential policies are available, the gains from pushing economic activity closer to its first-best level largely outweigh the costs from increased climate damages. Macroprudential policies alone are not effective at tackling climate change.

To further illustrate the inefficiencies of using macroprudential policy for climate mitigation, we consider a policy experiment where the regulator tries to achieve a substantial emissions reduction using only differentiated macroprudential policies without an emissions tax. Suppose that the policymaker exogenously imposes a high tax on brown assets $\tau_{ss}^b = 0.0085$ and a high subsidy to green assets $\tau_{ss}^g = -0.005$. This policy reduces emissions by about 15% relative to the second-best level (equivalent to the simulation in column 6 of Table 2). While this yields a substantial emissions reduction, it is costly. The welfare loss associated with this policy is 2.3%, in terms of steady-state compensating consumption variation, even accounting for the

²⁷Using the atmospheric modeling module of DICE, we can translate these differences in steady-state emissions into temperature changes. We equate the unregulated simulation to DICE's baseline no-policy simulation. Under the first-best in our model, steady-state emissions are 31% lower than under the unregulated, so in DICE we exogenously reduce emissions in each period 31% lower than in the baseline. For each simulation, we calculate the peak temperature change given by DICE. Under our first-best simulation, the peak temperature is 1 °C lower than it is under the unregulated baseline. Under the second-best simulations with only macroprudential policies, emissions are 5 % higher than the unregulated baseline, and the peak temperature is 0.1 °C higher than the unregulated baseline.

welfare benefits of reduced pollution.²⁸

Appendix E describes a sensitivity analysis that varies two parameters which determine the magnitude of the financial frictions and explores their effect on the second-best carbon tax.

5.2 Dynamics

Next, we study the implications of pollution externalities and financial frictions for Ramsey-optimal dynamic policies in response to productivity shocks. We consider impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation negative shock to aggregate productivity.²⁹

Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of key variables in the economies with and without financial frictions under the efficient emissions tax policy (without macroprudential policies). Similar to the standard RBC model, a negative TFP shock has a contractionary effect on the economy: aggregate investment and output fall.³⁰

Consistent with the previous findings in the E-DSGE literature, the efficient emissions tax and emissions are both procyclical. Financial frictions affect the dynamics of the efficient carbon tax. In the economy with financial frictions, the efficient emissions tax falls by much more in response to the negative shock, so that emissions actually increase on impact (Figure 3, Panels (b) and (c)). The procyclicality of emissions is thus dampened.

The second-best emissions tax falls more with financial frictions because the financial frictions inefficiently amplify the macroeconomic aggregates' responses to the negative TFP shock via banks' net worth. A decline in productivity reduces banks' net worth by lowering the return on assets. Given the lower level of equity, the banking sector becomes more constrained in its

²⁸The intuition for why macroprudential policies alone cannot efficiently address the climate externality is the following. Efficiency requires that expected returns on two types of assets (capital) are equalized across sectors. When only differentiated macroprudential policies are available, fixing the climate externality would require these taxes to be very different from each other (i.e. big positive tax for brown vs. subsidy for green), which would impede the efficiency condition that returns to capital have to be equalized.

²⁹The reaction of our economy to negative and positive shocks is symmetric.

³⁰Appendix Figure A8 presents the impulse responses of additional variables for this simulation. All sectoral variables get depressed as the shock symmetrically impacts both sectors.

ability to raise deposits and lend to firms. The tighter credit supply further amplifies the decline in investment and output. Since here the policymaker is equipped with only one instrument – the emissions tax – she uses this instrument to address both the pollution externality and the financial frictions. In response to the negative productivity shock, the planner cuts the emissions tax more aggressively to mitigate the fall in banks’ net worth and credit supply.

Figure 4 plots impulse responses when macroprudential policies are available. We consider the second-best policies when only a uniform macroprudential policy is available (solid lines), the second-best policies when differentiated macroprudential policy is available (dotted lines), and the first-best policies when both an emissions tax and macroprudential policies are available (dashed lines).³¹

For the two second-best policies, the responses to these policies are barely distinguishable from each other. In both cases, emissions fall by more than they do in the first best, while investment, output, and net worth dynamics closely replicate the first-best responses. This suggests that from the Ramsey-efficiency perspective, second-best macroprudential taxes do not address negative pollution externalities over the business cycle. The intuition behind this result is that climate damages, which affect net output, are driven by the pollution stock – a very slow-moving variable over the business cycle. Therefore, the Ramsey planner with only macroprudential taxes can let emissions fluctuate more than optimally in response to mean-reverting productivity shocks without incurring much efficiency losses in investment and output.

For the first-best policy, the planner uses the emissions tax to solely address the climate externality and the macroprudential policy to stabilize the banking sector. The efficient tax on banks’ assets is procyclical. When the economy is in a recession, the policymaker subsidizes banks’ asset purchases, thereby propping up asset prices and bank equity.³² On impact, the

³¹When an emissions tax is available, the macroprudential policies do not need to be differentiated to achieve the first best, so we consider just uniform macroprudential policies in this case. Appendix Figure A9 presents the impulse responses of additional variables for this simulation.

³²The procyclical nature of macroprudential tax levied on banks’ assets is similar in nature to countercyclical bank capital buffers advocated by the Basel III framework and adopted by financial regulators in many countries.

subsidy increases from its steady-state level of -0.22% to about -1.7% . As a result, banks' net worth is greatly stabilized, falling by only 9% versus 17% in the absence of the macroprudential policy.

6 Conclusion

Reaching the Paris Agreement's goal of keeping global warming within 2°C above pre-industrial levels requires aggressive policy action. Central banks and financial regulators have recently expressed concern that such a policy action could trigger transition risk, possibly leading to a policy-driven recession. To minimize this transition risk, regulators have started expanding their set of tools to include new macroprudential policies specifically tailored to green and brown assets. Preventing transition risk is important, as is preventing the risk that ambitious climate action is not implemented when the opportunity finally presents itself.

We develop a DSGE model of an economy with two key market failures: a climate externality and financial frictions. The model addresses the issues of transition risk and of the efficient design of climate and macroprudential policies in the long run and over business cycles. We simulate the transition in response to an exogenous carbon tax, both with and without macroprudential policies. We also simulate efficient climate and macroprudential policy. Our results show that macroprudential policies can reduce the risk of a recession following a major climate policy. Further, by addressing financial frictions, macroprudential policies can also support economic growth once climate policy is in place. However, macroprudential policies alone, without a climate policy, perform poorly in addressing the climate externality.

Like other DSGE models, ours makes several simplifying assumptions that could be relaxed in future work to address other questions. For example, our model contains a representative agent and thus does not address concerns about equity or distributional issues; instead, we could model heterogeneous agents or multiple sectors (as in Dissou and Karnizova 2016). Further,

our calibration is based on the DICE model, which may lead to policy shocks that are too conservative.

Important policy implications follow from our study. Introducing macroprudential policy today can prevent a potential recession tomorrow, or the need to forgo ambitious climate policy because of transition risks. Climate and macroprudential policies work best when used as complements, rather than substitutes. Each policy addresses a distinct market failure. Our paper can guide current efforts by central banks and financial regulators to minimize the transition risk from climate policy and ensure efficient outcomes in the long run and over business cycles.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Calibration


Parameter	Value	Description
<i>RBC parameters</i>		
β	0.995	Discount factor
η	2	Risk aversion
ξ	1	Frisch elasticity of labor hours
ϖ	8.3849	Labor disutility
ρ_L	1	Intrasectoral CES of labor hours
α^b	0.35	Capital share in ‘brown’ production
α^g	0.33	Capital share in ‘green’ production
δ^b, δ^g	0.025	Capital depreciation rate
ϕ^b, ϕ^g	10	Investment adjustment cost
ρ_A	0.95	Persistence of aggregate TFP shocks
σ_A	0.007	Std. dev. of innovations to TFP
<i>Environmental parameters</i>		
θ_1	0.0335	Abatement cost function parameters
θ_2	2.6	
d_0	-0.0076	Damage function parameters
d_1	$8.10e - 6$	
d_2	$1.05e - 8$	
δ_X	0.9965	Pollution decay
ϵ	1	Emissions elasticity parameter
e^{row}	3.1499	Emissions in the ROW
ρ_Y	2	CES between ‘green’ and ‘brown’ outputs
π^b	0.3326	Share of ‘brown’ output
<i>Banking sector parameters</i>		
κ	0.3409	Fraction of divertable assets
γ	0.972	Bankers’ survival rate
ζ	0.003	Proportional transfer to new bankers
ψ	10^{-4}	Banks’ portfolio management cost
\bar{s}^g	0.60	Portfolio share of green assets

Table 2: Steady state

	No financial frictions		Financial frictions				
	No policy	Emissions tax only	No policy	Emissions tax only	Uniform macro-prudential policies only ($\tau^b = \tau^g$)	Differentiated macro-prudential policies only ($\tau^b \neq \tau^g$)	Emissions tax and uniform macro-prudential policies
Emissions tax (\$ per ton)	0	30.5	0	24.2	0	0	30.5
Tax on brown assets (%)	-	-	0	0	-0.18	-0.14	-0.22
Tax on green assets (%)	-	-	0	0	-0.18	-0.21	-0.22
Emissions	0.676	0.432	0.630	0.433	0.668	0.663	0.432
Aggregate output	1.506	1.519	1.407	1.416	1.488	1.489	1.519
Banks' net worth	-	-	3.276	3.281	3.675	3.677	3.773
Welfare loss (% CV)	0.84	0	1.97	1.30	1.00	0.98	0


Note: This table shows the steady state values of selected variables in the economies with and without financial frictions under different policy scenarios. The units of the emissions tax are dollars per ton of CO₂, based on the calibration described in the text. Tax rates on banks' assets are in percentages. Welfare loss is in terms of compensating consumption variation relative to the first-best allocations. All other variables are in arbitrary model units.

Figure 1: Transition dynamics to a low carbon economy




Note: This figure shows the transition dynamics in response to an unanticipated introduction of the permanent emissions tax of about 30 dollars per ton of CO₂ in the economies with and without financial frictions.

Figure 2: Transition to a low carbon economy with macroprudential policy




Note: This figure plots the transition dynamics in the model with financial frictions to the same emissions tax shock as in Figure 1 under two scenarios: (i) No macroprudential policy (solid lines); (ii) with macroprudential policy (dashed lines). Macroprudential policy is such that it lowers banks' steady-state exposure to the brown sector from 40% (baseline calibration) to 32%. Deviations are calculated relative to the respective initial steady states.

Figure 3: The Ramsey-efficient dynamic emissions tax



Note: This figure plots the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation negative TFP shock under the Ramsey-efficient emissions tax policy in the economies (i) with financial frictions (solid lines) and (ii) without financial frictions (dashed lines).

Figure 4: Ramsey-efficient dynamic policies under different sets of instruments



Note: This figure plots the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation negative TFP shock in the baseline model with Ramsey-efficient policies when (i) only uniform tax on banks' assets ($\tau_t^b = \tau_t^g$) is available (solid lines); (ii) only differentiated taxes on banks' brown (τ_t^b) and green (τ_t^g) assets are available (dotted lines); (iii) emissions tax (τ_t^e) and a uniform tax on banks' assets ($\tau_t^b = \tau_t^g$) are available (dashed lines).

Online Appendices

A Details on banks' optimization problem

We formulate the banker's optimization problem in terms of choosing the value of total portfolio, $\mathcal{W}_{j,t} \equiv Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g + Q_t^b S_{j,t}^b$, and the portfolio share of green assets, $s_t^g \equiv \frac{Q_t^g S_{j,t}^g}{\mathcal{W}_{j,t}}$. Using these definitions and the flow of funds constraint (5) to replace deposits $D_{j,t}$, we can express the evolution of bank's net worth (6) as

$$N_{j,t+1} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} [R_{k,t+1}^b - (1 + \tau_t^b) R_t] + \\ + [(R_{k,t+1}^g - R_{k,t+1}^b) - (\tau_t^g - \tau_t^b) R_t] s_t^g + \\ - \frac{\psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 R_t \end{array} \right\} \mathcal{W}_{j,t} + R_t N_{j,t}. \quad (\text{A1})$$

The banker's optimization problem in recursive form then becomes:

$$V_{j,t} = \max_{\mathcal{W}_{j,t}, s_t^g} \mathbb{E}_t \{ [(1 - \gamma) M_{t,t+1} N_{j,t+1} + \gamma M_{t,t+1} V_{j,t+1}] \}, \quad (\text{A2})$$

subject to the incentive constraint (7) and the evolution of net worth (A1).

We guess and later verify that the value function is linear in net worth $N_{j,t}$,

$$V_{j,t} = \varphi_t N_{j,t}, \quad (\text{A3})$$

where φ_t is the time-varying coefficient common across banks. It is convenient to define the variables:

$$\chi_t^b \equiv \mathbb{E}_t [\Omega_{t+1} (R_{k,t+1}^b - (1 + \tau_t^b) R_t)], \quad (\text{A4})$$

$$\chi_t^g \equiv \mathbb{E}_t \{ \Omega_{t+1} [(R_{k,t+1}^g - R_{k,t+1}^b) - (\tau_t^g - \tau_t^b) R_t] \}, \quad (\text{A5})$$

$$\nu_t \equiv \mathbb{E}_t [\Omega_{t+1} R_t], \quad (\text{A6})$$

where $\Omega_{t+1} \equiv M_{t,t+1} (1 - \gamma + \gamma \varphi_{t+1})$ can be interpreted as the banker's effective stochastic discount factor. χ_t^b is the expected discounted (tax adjusted) excess return on brown assets relative to deposits, and χ_t^g is the expected excess return on green assets relative to brown assets. ν_t is the expected discounted cost of raising an additional unit of deposits.

Using the definitions (A4)-(A6), the conjecture (A3), and (A1), we can rewrite the Bellman

equation (A2) as

$$V_{j,t} = \max_{\mathcal{W}_{j,t}, s_t^g} \left\{ \left[\chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \right] \mathcal{W}_{j,t} + \nu_t N_{j,t} \right\}. \quad (\text{A7})$$

The incentive constraint (7) then becomes,

$$\left[\chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \right] \mathcal{W}_{j,t} + \nu_t N_{j,t} \geq \kappa \mathcal{W}_{j,t}. \quad (\text{A8})$$

The Lagrangian function for this problem is

$$\mathcal{L}_t = \left(\left[\chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \right] \mathcal{W}_{j,t} + \nu_t N_{j,t} \right) (1 + \lambda_t) - \lambda_t \kappa \mathcal{W}_{j,t}, \quad (\text{A9})$$

where λ_t is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint (A8). The first order optimality conditions with respect to $\mathcal{W}_{j,t}$ and s_t^g are:

$$(1 + \lambda_t) \left[\chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \right] = \lambda_t \kappa, \quad (\text{A10})$$

$$(1 + \lambda_t) [\chi_t^g - \nu_t \psi (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)] \mathcal{W}_{j,t} = 0, \quad (\text{A11})$$

$$\lambda_t \left(\left[\chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \right] \mathcal{W}_{j,t} + \nu_t N_{j,t} - \kappa \mathcal{W}_{j,t} \right) = 0, \text{ with } \lambda_t \geq 0. \quad (\text{A12})$$

Denote by $\Upsilon_t \equiv \chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2$ the average excess return on bank's portfolio net of asset management costs. From (A10) we have $\lambda_t = \frac{\Upsilon_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t}$. The incentive constraint (A8) binds whenever $\lambda_t > 0$, or when $0 < \Upsilon_t < \kappa$. In our realistic parametrization of the model, the incentive constraint always binds in a local region of the steady state. Therefore, the amount of assets intermediated is limited by bank's equity capital,

$$\mathcal{W}_{j,t} = \frac{\nu_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t} N_{j,t}. \quad (\text{A13})$$

The first order optimality condition with respect to s_t^g determines the portfolio composition,

$$s_t^g = \frac{\chi_t^g}{\nu_t \psi} + \bar{s}^g. \quad (\text{A14})$$

Equation (A14) is the same as equation (12) in Section 2 of the main text. Note that since both χ_t^g and ν_t depend on aggregate variables, s_t^g is common across all banks; therefore, Υ_t does not depend on individual bank-specific characteristics either. Using (A13) we can then verify our

conjecture that

$$V_{j,t} = \varphi_t N_{j,t} = \Upsilon_t \frac{\nu_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t} N_{j,t} + \nu_t N_{j,t} = \frac{\kappa \nu_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t} N_{j,t}, \quad (\text{A15})$$

$$\Rightarrow \varphi_t = \frac{\kappa \nu_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t}. \quad (\text{A16})$$

Imposing (A16) in (A13) and aggregating over all banks yields equation (11) in the main text.

B Full set of equilibrium conditions

$$L_t = \left[(L_t^b)^{1+\rho_L} + (L_t^g)^{1+\rho_L} \right]^{\frac{1}{1+\rho_L}}, \quad (\text{B1})$$

$$M_{t,t+1} = \beta \frac{\left(C_{t+1} - \varpi \frac{L_{t+1}^{1+\xi}}{1+\xi} \right)^{-\eta}}{\left(C_t - \varpi \frac{L_t^{1+\xi}}{1+\xi} \right)^{-\eta}}, \quad (\text{B2})$$

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_t (M_{t,t+1} R_t), \quad (\text{B3})$$

$$w_t^i = \varpi L_t^{\xi - \rho_L} (L_t^i)^{\rho_L}, \quad \text{for } i = \{g, b\}, \quad (\text{B4})$$

$$\mathcal{W}_t = Q_t^b S_t^b + Q_t^g S_t^g, \quad (\text{B5})$$

$$s_t^g = \frac{Q_t^b S_t^b}{\mathcal{W}_t}, \quad (\text{B6})$$

$$\chi_t^b = \mathbb{E}_t [\Omega_{t+1} (R_{k,t+1}^b - (1 + \tau_t^b) R_t)], \quad (\text{B7})$$

$$\chi_t^g = \mathbb{E}_t \{ \Omega_{t+1} [(R_{k,t+1}^g - R_{k,t+1}^b) - (\tau_t^g - \tau_t^b) R_t] \}, \quad (\text{B8})$$

$$\nu_t = \mathbb{E}_t [\Omega_{t+1} R_t], \quad (\text{B9})$$

$$\Omega_{t+1} = M_{t,t+1} (1 - \gamma + \gamma \varphi_{t+1}), \quad (\text{B10})$$

$$\Upsilon_t = \chi_t^b + \chi_t^g s_t^g - \frac{\nu_t \psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2, \quad (\text{B11})$$

$$\varphi_t = \frac{\kappa \nu_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t}, \quad (\text{B12})$$

$$\mathcal{W}_t = \frac{\nu_t}{\kappa - \Upsilon_t} N_t, \quad (\text{B13})$$

$$s_t^g = \frac{\chi_t^g}{\nu_t \psi} + \bar{s}^g, \quad (\text{B14})$$

$$N_{t+1} = \gamma \left[\sum_{i=\{g,b\}} R_{k,t+1}^i Q_t^i S_t^i - R_t D_t \right] + \zeta \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} Q_t^i S_t^i, \quad (\text{B15})$$

$$D_t = (1 + \tau_t^b) Q_t^b S_t^b + (1 + \tau_t^g) Q_t^g S_t^g + \frac{\psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \mathcal{W}_t - N_t, \quad (\text{B16})$$

$$Y_t = \left[(\pi^b)^{\frac{1}{\rho_Y}} (Y_t^b)^{\frac{\rho_Y-1}{\rho_Y}} + (1-\pi^b)^{\frac{1}{\rho_Y}} (Y_t^g)^{\frac{\rho_Y-1}{\rho_Y}} \right]^{\frac{\rho_Y}{\rho_Y-1}}, \quad (\text{B17})$$

$$Y_t^i = [1 - d(X_t)] A_t (K_{t-1}^i)^{\alpha^i} (L_t^i)^{1-\alpha^i}, \text{ for } i = \{g, b\}, \quad (\text{B18})$$

$$p_t^b = \left(\frac{\pi^b Y_t}{Y_t^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_Y}}, \quad (\text{B19})$$

$$p_t^g = \left(\frac{(1-\pi^b) Y_t}{Y_t^g} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho_Y}}, \quad (\text{B20})$$

$$X_t = \delta_X X_{t-1} + e_t + e_t^{\text{row}}, \quad (\text{B21})$$

$$e_t = (1 - \mu_t) (Y_t^b)^\epsilon, \quad (\text{B22})$$

$$Z_t = \theta_1 \mu_t^{\theta_2} Y_t^b, \quad (\text{B23})$$

$$w_t^b = (1 - \alpha^b) \frac{Y_t^b}{L_t^b} \left[p_t^b - \theta_1 \mu_t^{\theta_2} - \tau_t^e (1 - \mu_t) \epsilon (Y_t^b)^{\epsilon-1} \right], \quad (\text{B24})$$

$$\tau_t^e = (Y_t^b)^{1-\epsilon} \theta_1 \theta_2 \mu_t^{\theta_2-1}, \quad (\text{B25})$$

$$R_{k,t}^b = \frac{\alpha^b \frac{Y_t^b}{K_{t-1}^b} \left[p_t^b - \theta_1 \mu_t^{\theta_2} - \tau_t^e (1 - \mu_t) \epsilon (Y_t^b)^{\epsilon-1} \right] + (1 - \delta^b) Q_{t-1}^b}{Q_{t-1}^b}, \quad (\text{B26})$$

$$w_t^g = (1 - \alpha^g) \frac{p_t^g Y_t^g}{L_t^g}, \quad (\text{B27})$$

$$R_{k,t}^g = \frac{\alpha^g \frac{p_t^g Y_t^g}{K_{t-1}^g} + (1 - \delta^g) Q_{t-1}^g}{Q_{t-1}^g}, \quad (\text{B28})$$

$$Q_t^i = 1 + \frac{\phi^i}{2} \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1 \right)^2 + \phi^i \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1 \right) \frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} + \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ M_{t,t+1} \phi^i \left(\frac{I_{t+1}^i}{I_t^i} - 1 \right) \left(\frac{I_{t+1}^i}{I_t^i} \right)^2 \right\}, \text{ for } i = \{g, b\}, \quad (\text{B29})$$

$$K_t^i = (1 - \delta^i) K_{t-1}^i + I_t^i, \text{ for } i = \{g, b\}, \quad (\text{B30})$$

$$Q_t^i S_t^i = Q_t^i K_t^i, \text{ for } i = \{g, b\}, \quad (\text{B31})$$

$$Y_t = C_t + \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} I_t^i + Z_t + \sum_{i=\{g,b\}} \frac{\phi^i}{2} \left(\frac{I_t^i}{I_{t-1}^i} - 1 \right)^2 I_t^i + \frac{\psi}{2} (s_t^g - \bar{s}^g)^2 \mathcal{W}_t. \quad (\text{B32})$$

Given government policies $(\tau_t^e, \tau_t^b, \tau_t^g)$ and exogenous total factor productivity (A_t) , a competitive equilibrium is described by the stochastic sequences of endogenous variables $\mathbf{J}_t \equiv [\{L_t^i, K_t^i, I_t^i, Y_t^i, S_t^i, w_t^i, R_{k,t}^i, Q_t^i, p_t^i\}_{i=g,b}, C_t, M_{t,t+1}, L_t, Y_t, Z_t, \mu_t, e_t, X_t, N_t, \mathcal{W}_t, s_t^g, D_t, R_t, \chi_t^b, \chi_t^g, \nu_t, \varphi_t, \Upsilon_t, \Omega_{t+1}]$ that satisfy the system of equations B1-B32.

C The Ramsey-efficient policy problem

For a given set of available instruments (e.g., only τ_t^e ; only $\tau_t^b = \tau_t^g$; τ_t^b and τ_t^g ; τ_t^e and $\tau_t^b = \tau_t^g$) the Ramsey planner solves:

$$\max_{\{\mathbf{J}_t, \text{ and a given set of instruments}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{1}{1-\eta} \left(C_t - \varpi \frac{[(L_t^b)^{1+\rho_L} + (L_t^g)^{1+\rho_L}]^{\frac{1+\xi}{1+\rho_L}}}{1+\xi} \right)^{1-\eta} \right\}, \quad (\text{C1})$$

subject to the constraints of the competitive equilibrium (i.e., equations B1-B32). As is common in the literature, we take the ‘timeless perspective’ approach to implement the solution to the Ramsey problem; The policymaker is able to commit to a state-contingent dynamic policy announced in time 0. We implement the solution in Dynare.

D Transition Risk – Alternate Policy Timing Assumptions

In this section, we present more simulations extending the simulations exploring transition risk from Section 4, though we vary the assumptions about the timing of the policies.

Appendix Figure A3 contrasts the abrupt implementation of an exogenous carbon tax to a gradual, ramp-up approach, which is typically recommended by IAMs like DICE. A surprise carbon tax is introduced in period 5. Under the gradual simulation, the tax rate starts low and increases linearly to the efficient level (30.5 dollars per ton) by period 25 and permanently stays at that efficient level thereafter. The experiment illustrates that gradual “ramp-up” causes a milder recession and avoids the sudden drop in output caused by the abrupt tax increase. The decrease in green capital is much less severe under the gradual tax, and the level of green capital rises above the original steady-state level much more quickly.

In the next simulation, presented in Appendix Figure A4, we consider how the preannouncement of a carbon tax, rather than its sudden implementation, affects the results. In these simulations, the carbon tax of 30.5 dollars per ton is announced in period 5 (unexpectedly), but it does not take effect until period 10. Because asset prices are forward looking, the negative effects of the announcement on asset prices, banks’ net worth, and investment are immediate, albeit milder than in the baseline scenario. The recession is milder with the pre-announcement, and green production and capital also fall by less.

Both of the previous sets of simulations explore how the timing of the carbon tax can affect the transition and possibly alleviate the threat of a recession. Of course, the timing of climate policy is often constrained by political economy elements, so a gradual implementation might be an inferior solution to implementing macroprudential policy, which allows for abrupt implementations as well. Climate damages are also higher with gradual implementation, in terms of eventual temperature increase.

In the final set of simulations that we explore here, we instead investigate the timing of the macroprudential policies. In the results presented in the main text and presented in Figure 2, the macroprudential policy is in place before the carbon tax is enacted, and the initial steady state of the simulations with the macroprudential policy is the steady state that includes that policy. In Appendix Figure A5 we instead introduce the macroprudential policies at the same time as the introduction of the carbon tax (period 5). In these simulations, the magnitudes of the macroprudential policies are identical to those in Figure 2, though the timing differs. These figures demonstrate that these simultaneous macroprudential policies do not have a substantial effect on alleviating a recession caused by a carbon tax – the change in aggregate output is barely moved by the introduction of these macroprudential policies, though the decrease in aggregate investment lasts for much less time. Because these simultaneous macroprudential policies are relatively ineffective, we also simulate an alternate set of simultaneous macroprudential policies, presented in Appendix Figure A6 in which the tax on brown assets is not as high as it is in the base case. Under this set of policies, Appendix Figure A6 demonstrates that the macroprudential policies are quite effective at ameliorating the recession – aggregate investment immediately increases, and aggregate output begins to rise immediately after its initial decline. These simulations suggest that even when macroprudential financial policies are implemented simultaneously as climate policy, they can still be designed in such a way that mitigate the transition risk.

E Sensitivity Analysis

Here we present the results from sensitivity analyses varying two parameters that control the degree of distortions due to financial frictions. Figure A7 shows how the second-best steady-state carbon tax varies when we exogenously change the parameters ζ (Panel (a)) and κ (Panel (b)). We vary banks' transfer parameter ζ from its baseline value to higher values and the agency problem parameter κ from its baseline to lower values. The parameter ζ is the banks' transfer parameter; a higher ζ means that exogenous transfers from households to banks increase, which directly increases banks' net worth. Banks can thus intermediate more capital to the economy.

The base case calibrated value of ζ is 0.003. As we increase this parameter, it reduces the steady-state distortion in allocations coming from the financial frictions. When ζ is about 0.008, the second-best emissions tax is the same as the first-best tax (\$30.5 per ton), meaning that the inefficiencies from the financial friction have been eliminated.

The parameter κ is the agency problem parameter; a lower κ means that incentives to divert funds for banks are lower, so depositors are willing to lend more to the banks. As a result, banks can extend more credit to the economy. The base case calibrated value of κ is 0.3409. As we reduce this parameter, it reduces the distortion from financial frictions. Again, there is a low enough value for κ (about 0.13) for which the second-best emissions tax is the same as first-best tax.


Additional Tables and Figures

Table A1: Steady state: Additional variables

	No financial frictions		Financial frictions				
	No policy	τ^e	No policy	τ^e	$\tau^b = \tau^g$	$\tau^b \neq \tau^g$	τ^e & $\tau^b = \tau^g$
Consumption	1.082	1.093	1.038	1.046	1.075	1.075	1.093
Green output	0.850	0.862	0.795	0.804	0.840	0.845	0.862
Brown output	0.676	0.675	0.630	0.629	0.668	0.663	0.675
Green investment	0.254	0.257	0.221	0.223	0.248	0.251	0.257
Brown investment	0.170	0.168	0.147	0.146	0.166	0.163	0.168
Labor in green prod.	0.272	0.273	0.263	0.264	0.270	0.271	0.273
Labor in brown prod.	0.212	0.211	0.205	0.204	0.211	0.211	0.211
Climate damages	0.053	0.047	0.052	0.047	0.053	0.053	0.047


Note: This table shows the steady state values of selected variables in the economies with and without financial frictions under different policy scenarios. All variables are in arbitrary model units, except for climate damages are a fraction of output.

Figure A1: Transition to a low carbon economy: Additional variables




Note: This figure plots the transition dynamics of additional variables in response to the same path of the emissions tax as in Figure 1.

**Figure A2: Transition to a low carbon economy with macroprudential policy:
Additional variables**




Note: This figure plots the transition dynamics of additional variables in response to the emissions tax introduction in the economies with and without macroprudential policy.

Figure A3: Transition dynamics: Abrupt versus gradual “ramp-up” approach




Note: This figure plots the transition dynamics in response to an unanticipated introduction of the permanent emissions tax of about 30 dollars per ton of CO₂, gradually introduced over 20 periods, in the economy with financial frictions.

Figure A4: Transition dynamics: Immediate versus pre-announced implementation




Note: This figure shows the transition dynamics in response to an introduction of a permanent emissions tax of about 30 dollars per ton of CO₂, which is announced in period 5 but does not go into effect until period 10, in the economy with financial frictions.

Figure A5: Transition dynamics: Simultaneous macroprudential policies




Note: This figure plots transition dynamics in response to an unanticipated introduction of the permanent emissions tax of about 30 dollars per ton of CO₂, along with a simultaneous introduction of macroprudential policies of the same magnitude as those presented in Figure 2.

Figure A6: Transition dynamics: Simultaneous macroprudential policies – Alternate magnitudes




Note: This figure plots transition dynamics in response to an unanticipated introduction of the permanent emissions tax of about 30 dollars per ton of CO₂, along with a simultaneous introduction of macroprudential policies of the magnitudes $\tau^b = 0.0022$ and $\tau^g = -0.0022$.

**Figure A7: Second-best steady-state emissions tax:
Sensitivity to parameters controlling financial frictions**




Note: This figure plots the second-best steady-state value of the emissions tax when varying either the banks' transfer parameter (ζ) or the agency problem parameter (κ) from their base-case values of 0.003 and 0.3409, respectively.

**Figure A8: The Ramsey-efficient dynamic emissions tax:
Additional variables**



Note: This figure plots the impulse responses of additional variables to the same TFP shock as in Figure 3 under the Ramsey-efficient emissions tax policy in the economies (i) with financial frictions (solid lines) and (ii) without financial frictions (dashed lines).

**Figure A9: Ramsey-efficient dynamic policies under different sets of instruments:
Additional variables**



Note: This figure plots the impulse responses of additional variables to the same TFP shock as in Figure 4 under Ramsey-efficient policies with different sets of available instruments.