# **Financial Shock Transmission to Heterogeneous Firms:** The Earnings-Based Borrowing Constraint Channel

Livia Chițu	Magdalena Groth
uropean Central Bank	European Central Bank

Tatjana Schulze Grothe International Monetary Fund

### Ine Van Robays

European Central Bank

### Motivation

**Current environment:** US corporate sector is hit simultaneously by 2 large shocks: monetary policy (MP) tightening and global risk (GR) aversion What we know: Heterogeneity in firm fundamentals affects transmission of MP shocks to funding costs

What we understand less: how GR shocks may transmit heterogeneously, through which pricing channels, and due to which financial constraints

### This paper's contribution

- We disentangle MP and GR shocks in an **integrated daily BVAR** exploiting cross-asset price movements
- We study two interrelated dimensions:

### **Firm-level results**

Table 2: Sensitivity of asset prices of tail firms upon impact of shocks

	Spread	EBP	Default risk	In(Equity Price)
Panel (a): Monetary p	olicy shock			
$\epsilon_t^m$	7.422***	5.971***	0.027*	-0.033***
LowLEV $\times \epsilon_t^m$	-1.155	-1.264	-0.003	0.000
HighLEV $\times \hat{\epsilon}_t^m$	1.921	-0.402	0.044	-0.002
LowICR $\times \epsilon_{t}^{m}$	2.803	-0.984	0.071	-0.007*
HighICR $\times \epsilon_t^m$	-0.417	-0.191	-0.004**	0.001
LowEPSE $\times \epsilon_{\star}^{m}$	2.004	-0.488	0.048*	-0.004*
HighEPSE $\times \hat{\epsilon}_t^m$	0.057	0.480	-0.006	-0.001*
Panel (b): Global risk	shock			
$\epsilon_t^r$	18.628***	15.472***	0.056*	-0.069***
LowLEV $\times \epsilon_{t}^{r}$	-4.942	-5.107**	-0.006	-0.003
HighLEV $\times \epsilon_t^r$	10.456	5.000*	0.099	-0.002
LowICR $\times \epsilon_{\star}^{r}$	18.773**	9.504**	0.176*	-0.022*
HighICR $\times \epsilon_t^r$	-3.616**	-2.995*	-0.011**	0.002
Low EPSE $\times \epsilon'_{\star}$	15.194***	8.416***	0.126**	-0.019***
HighEPSE $\times \epsilon_t^r$	-1.695	-0.788	-0.013	-0.005
Observations	222,060	219,513	220,710	220,964



#### (2) the type of shocks (1) firm heterogeneity

to understand how shocks transmit to firms' funding costs (bonds & equity) and default prospects

We tease out mechanisms by contrasting asset-based with earnings-based **borrowing constraint** hypothesis, differentiating firms across **leverage** and earnings

### Hypotheses

Heterogeneous effects across firms depending on type of borrowing constraint: (1) Asset-based collateral constraint: Expect stronger responses of firms in upper tail of the leverage distribution (i.e. higher leveraged firms) (2) Earnings-based borrowing constraint: Expect stronger responses of firms in lower tail of the earnings distribution (i.e. less profitable firms)

### **Shock identification**

We exploit cross-asset price movements in a daily BVAR based on US financial conditions identified through sign, relative magnitude, and narrative restrictions:

- **US monetary tightening:** pushes up long-term yield (more than foreign monetary policy), depresses equity prices, USD appreciates
- **US positive macro risk:** supports long-term yield, boosts equity prices (more than foreign macro), compresses corp. spreads
- **Global risk shock:** flight to safety into bonds, out of equities, safe USD appreciates (more than foreign macro), as observed at Lehman collapse Foreign monetary tightening: spills over to US long-term yield, weighs on US equities, USD weakens

Note: Estimates at horizon h = 0, i.e. upon impact of the identified monetary policy  $\epsilon_t^m$  (global risk shock  $\epsilon_t^r$ ). Shocks are calibrated to a 10 bps increase (decrease) in the US 10y yield. Indicator variables for leverage (LEV), interest coverage ratio (ICR), and expected earnings (EPSE) are computed based on the tails of firms (20th and 80th percentiles). SEs are clustered along the time and industry dimension.



Figure 2: Cumulative responses to MP (GR) shock equiv. to 10 bsp increase (decrease) in US 10y yield

### In a nutshell

#### Shocks:

- Global risk shocks have stronger and more heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs, in particular for firms with low earnings/ cash flow coverage
- Foreign positive macro risk: akin to US macro shock, but USD depreciates

#### Table 1: Sign restriction identification US MP US macro risk global risk foreign MP foreign macro risk Short-term yield Long-term yield (> foreign MP) Equities > foreign macro Effective FX rate > foreign macro) Corporate spread

## **Historical decomposition (example 2020-2022)**



- Monetary policy shocks have homogeneous impact across weak/strong firms
- Both shocks have a stronger and more persistent effect on the excess bond premium reflecting risk that is unexplained by firm fundamentals

### **Channels:**

- Responses of firms' funding costs are not significant for the tails of firms with above and below average leverage ...
- ... but significant and pronounced for the tails of firms with below average earnings in the distribution of firms

### **Robustness tests**

- Modified sign restrictions in BVAR and model validation with other shocks
- Shorter sample period 2005-2021 to exclude years with fewer bonds
- Lagged dependent variables to account for autocorrelation in asset prices
- Week + week-industry FE  $\rightarrow$  time-varying macro & industry-exposure
- Alternative measures of firm profitability
- Alternative definition of tails of firms (15th, 85th pct)
- Spread decomposition with log-spread, firm fundamentals as controls, only senior unsecured bonds

### Conclusions

- We propose an integrated framework to identify MP and GR shocks
- We analyze to which extent these shocks affect corporate funding costs heterogeneously depending on the type of borrowing constraint Key Takeaway: **GR shocks** (relative to MP shocks) have **stronger** and **more** heterogeneous effects on corporate funding costs which depend on firms' position within the earnings distribution

Figure 1: Model-based drivers of US financial conditions (cumulated contributions of shocks to standardized index, rebased to Jan 2020 = 0). US financial condition index computed following Arrigoni et al. (2022).

### **Firm-level analysis**

- We decompose corporate bond spreads into expected default risk and excess bond premium (EBP) (Gilchrist & Zakrajsek 2012)
- We assess how funding costs of weak/strong firms (by leverage, interest rate coverage, earnings) react differently to MP and GR shocks using panel local projections à la Jordá (2005):

$$\Delta_{h} y_{j,t-1} = \beta_{h} \underbrace{\epsilon_{t}^{i}}_{\text{shock}} + \sum_{q \in \{H,L\}} \beta_{h,q} \epsilon_{t}^{i} \underbrace{\times \mathbb{1}_{j,q,t}}_{\text{tail firm}} + \underbrace{\phi_{j,h}(L) X_{j,t-1}}_{\text{controls}} + \epsilon_{j,t+h} \quad \text{for} \quad h = 1, \dots H$$
(3)

 $y_{j,t}$  : credit spread, EBP, EDF, equity price (CDS spread)

 $\epsilon_t^i$ : monetary policy shock  $\epsilon_t^m$ , global risk shock  $\epsilon_t^r$ 

 $1_{i,q,t}$ : dummy variable for  $q = \{20^{\text{th}}, 80^{\text{th}}\}$  pct. of weak/strong firms by leverage, interest coverage ratio, expected earnings

 $\phi_{i,h}(L)X_t$ : 4 lags of VIX, CESI, GFC dummy, Covid dummy, industry FE

 $\rightarrow$  the earnings-based borrowing constraint transmission channel

### References

Anderson, G., & Cesa-Bianchi, A. (2023). Crossing the Credit Channel: Credit Spreads and Firm Heterogeneity. AEJ: Macro. Antolin-Diaz, J., & Rubio-Ramirez, J. F. (2018). Narrative Sign Restrictions for SVARs. American Economic Review, 108 (10), 2802–29. Arrigoni, S., Bobasu, Al. & Venditti, F. (2022). Measuring Financial Conditions using Equal Weights Combination. IMF Economic Review: 1-30. Cieslak, A., & Schrimpf, A. (2019). Non-monetary news in central bank communication. Journal of International Economics, 118, 293–315. Drechsel, T. (2023). Earnings-Based Borrowing Constraints and Macroeconomic Fluctuations. AEJ:Macro. Gilchrist, S., & Zakrajsek, E. (2012). Credit Spreads and Business Cycle Fluctuations. American Economic Review, 102 (4), 1692–1720. Jorda, O. (2005). Estimation and inference of impulse responses by local projections. American Economic Review, 95(1), 161–182. Lian, C., & Ma, Y. (2020). Anatomy of Corporate Borrowing Constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(1), 229–291

### Contact

Tatjana Schulze <u>Tschulze@imf.org</u> International Monetary Fund Website: https://www.tatjanaschulze.com/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank nor of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF Management.