Reactionary Utopia

Political Radicalization and Violence in the Russian Empire

Julia Zimmermann* Theocharis N. Grigoriadis †

This version: December 17th, 2023

In this paper, we investigate the impact of tsarist repression on political preferences during the Russian Revolution of 1917, utilizing previously unexplored data from the operations of the Okhrana, imperial Russia's secret police, spanning from the late 1880s to the early 1900s. By constructing a measure of local repression intensity, we estimate the influence of surveillance on electoral outcomes during the 1917 Constituent Assembly. We measure political support for the radical left in terms of votes cast for the Bolsheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries and for the radical right in terms of votes cast for the Liberals and the Kadets. Our key findings are as follows: Firstly, heightened political instability within local communities led to a shift in electoral preferences toward the right side of the political spectrum. Secondly, the escalation of revolutionary activities in society dampened the popularity of both left- and right-wing parties, particularly moderate and conservative-right factions, setting the stage for the Civil War. Thirdly, contrary to common portrayals of the imperial bureaucracy in general and secret police in later decades in particular, the Okhrana displayed greater sophistication and efficiency, utilizing a strategic approach to enhance deterrent and preemptive capabilities. Our results further underscore how top-down repression can contribute to the formation of distinct national identities and their radicalization, as documented by the Okhrana.

JEL Classification: N33, N43, P20, P26, P37, P48, P51

* Center for Economics, Policy and History (CEPH), Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland. zimmerju@tcd.ie.

† Freie Universität Berlin, School of Business and Economics & Institute of East European Studies, Garystr. 55 14195 Berlin, theocharis.grigoriadis@fu-berlin.de. Theocharis Grigoriadis gratefully acknowledges funding from the German Academic Exchange (DAAD) and the German Research Foundation (DFG–GR 4781/3-1) for the collection of the Okhrana data at the Hoover Institution in 2016 and 2017. We are deeply grateful to Alexander Beider for sharing his naming lists, which saved us considerable effort, to Anna Bindler for her valuable insights and methodology, to Amanda Gregg, Tamri Matiashvili, Mihai Varga, Sebastian Hoppe, Riccardo Trucati and Marvin Suesse for their thorough and on point feeedback, greatly benefitting this project. We are further grateful for the valuable discussions during the Paris Workshop of the University of Chicago organized by Scott Gehlbach in 2023, the Max-Planck (PolEcCon) Summer School 2023 in Berlin, the World Annual Cliometrics Meeting in Dublin 2023, the EHES Annual meeting in Vienna 2023 and the EHA Annual Meeting 2023 in Pittsburgh.

1. Introduction

"Stuck around St. Petersburg
When I saw it was a time for a change
Killed the Tsar and his ministers
Anastasia screamed in vain"

Rolling Stones' "Sympathy For The Devil"

All regimes have political enemies. In modern democracies, these enemies usually emerge during times of war and major international crises, both at home and abroad. Specialized police and intelligence services, subject to judicial and parliamentary control, handle these threats instead of regular police forces. For example, in postwar Germany since the 1970s, these have dealt with challenges like left-wing terrorists (Red Army Faction), Stasi infiltration, and more recently, neo-Nazi groups (National Socialist Underground or NSU), using agencies such as the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and federal/state offices for constitutional protection (BfV and LfV). Authoritarian states also have political enemies, but their approach is different (Gregory 2009, pp. 3). Lacking a public sphere, they rely on extensive surveillance systems that operate outside of judicial and parliamentary oversight. These systems intrude deeply into the private lives of citizens, creating an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion (Arendt 1973). Surprisingly, there's a significant lack of empirical research on the effects of surveillance considering the use of tens of thousands of informal agents in former Eastern Bloc countries (Hager and Krakowski 2021).

This article examines the rise of left-wing terrorism in Imperial Russia from the 1880s to the 1900s through the workings of the Okhrana, the world's first professional political police force. During this period, radicals globally drew inspiration from Russia, embracing its ideology, including the revolutionary catechism of Sergei Nechaev and the anarchist writings of Mikhail Bakunin (Hilbrenner and Schenk 2010, p. 161). Moreover, they mimicked the methods of political warfare, including bombings and assassinations, which became known as the "Russian method" (Marks 2003, p. 17; Gerngroß 2009, p. 147 & 157).[1] Founded after the assassination of Tsar Alexander II on March 13, 1881 by the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), the Okhrana played a crucial role in maintaining the tsarist regime until its dissolution in March 1917. Its extraordinary powers allowed for the arrest and detention of individuals without judicial oversight, illustrating the central importance of surveillance in autocratic contexts. With its extensive network of agents inside and outside the organization, the Okhrana gathered extensive information about the Bolsheviks, making its archives a valuable source for understanding Lenin's party before 1917 (Leggett 1981, p. XXIV). Much like the Stasi, Okhrana earned a reputation as "the living symbol of everything that is most repressive, cruel, mean, and vile about autocracy," as noted by the terrorist and Okhrana agent Evno Azev (Nicolaievsky 1934, p. 129). Peter Struve, a former Marxist, postulated in 1903 that "the omnipotence of the political police" allowed tsarism to survive (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990, p. 21).

We utilize this previously untapped Okhrana surveillance data, sourced from the Hoover Archives at Stanford University, to investigate the impact of local-level political warfare on the political environment in the run-up to the Russian Revolution of 1917. To this end, we create localized indicators measuring radicalization tendencies in the European part of the Russian Empire. Building on Castañeda Dower and Markevich (2022), we analyze their influence on the electoral outcomes of the 1917 Constituent Assembly in more than 400 administrative districts based on data fromProtasov et al. (2014). Focusing on the Constituent Assembly lets us assess how revolutionary violence affects political preferences separately from any influence of repression on universal suffrage, whether from the Tsarist or Bolshevik authorities. We investigate whether and how forms of local intentional instability, which we measure as propaganda

[1] For more sources on Russian terrorism available to Western audiences in the 1880s, see Thun (1964).

dissemination, membership in anti-Tsarist organizations, incitement to riot, or conspiracy and execution of assassinations, affect election outcomes using Okhrana surveillance records. Specifically, we ask whether revolutionary violence helped nudge Russia further in the direction of a more liberal democracy, or whether it merely provoked a conservative backlash. We control for other factors that might account for Russian political development, such as the influence of land-related grievances (Buggle and Nafziger 2021), support for industrial workers, which Lenin considered essential for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution (Castañeda Dower and Markevich 2022), and the role of anti-Jewish violence (Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya 2020). The latter is of particular interest for us because both popular and state-sponsored anti-Semitism fueled the spread of Marxism among the Jewish artisan class, the proletariat, and the intelligentsia in the Pale of Settlement (Akhiezer 2013, p. 563).

Our study builds upon existing research on the factors contributing to the Russian Revolution. Closest to our paper is Castañeda Dower and Markevich (2022), who identify a positive correlation between the proportion of industrial workers in a region (instrumented by coal-bearing strata) and the success of the Bolsheviks. However, Kofanov (2020) highlights that the relationship between industrialization and peasant protests is complex; it can bring material benefits to peasants but also intensify competition for local resources. Additionally, Finkel, Gehlbach, and Kofanov (2017) examine peasant protest activity using provincial-level data and establishe a connection between peasant unrest, the tsar's abdication, and the October Revolution. Their findings suggest that rural discontent is positively linked to land quality and a higher historical density of serfdom. Furthermore, Hartwell (2022) investigates changes in Russia's formal political institutions from 1788 to 1914. He proposes that sporadic terrorism against the tsars may have contributed to a gradual regime liberalization, while major unrest and external conflicts were associated with increased political repression. In contrast, our research explores the socio-economic factors behind increased revolutionary violence, aiming to understand their impact on the 1917 Russian elections. Our results yield several insights: First, heightened political instability within local communities resulted in shift in electoral preferences to the right of the political spectrum. Second, the escalation of revolutionary activities in society damped the popularity of both left- and right-wing parties, particularly moderate and conservative-right factions, laying the groundwork for the Civil War. Third, contrary to common portrayals of secret polices in later decades and other regions, the Tsarist regime's coercive bureaucracy demonstrated greater sophistication and efficiency, employing a strategic approach that aimed to enhance deterrent and preemptive capabilities. Our findings further underscores how top-down repression can contribute to the formation of distinct national identities and its radicalization as recorded by the Okhrana (Beissinger and Kotkin 2014).

This project brings forward the literature on political preferences in industrializing economies (Galor 2011). More specifically, we extend the ongoing investigation into the intricate interplay of economic, ideological, and political transformations that fueled individual and collective radicalization in the first half of the 20th century (Voigtländer and Voth 2021; Castañeda Dower and Markevich 2022). We systematically test the efficacy of certain types of intentional instability on creating momentum for new political actors and unpredictable change in the long run. Our research shows that as the radicalization of the population increased in the 1880s to 1890s, support for the established left-radical alternative that actively attracted men and women to the 1917 constituency elections declined. This highlights the pivotal role played by a political party's capacity to establish a "viable social order that constrains violence," particularly in the face of substantial pressures for redistribution (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2023, p. 4; Keefer 2009).

The paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 discusses the historical background that led to the founding of the Okhrana, the rise of anti-Semitism, and the functioning of the 1917 Constituent Assembly during the Russian Revolution. Section 3 presents the data sources we used, while Section 5 explains our approach

to estimating the main results, which are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we summarize our main findings and suggest directions for future research.

2. Historical background

2.1. Political warfare in European Russia

It is the assassination of Tsar Alexander II by the Narodnaya Volya in 1881, that marked a decisive moment in the history of the Russian Empire, with particular impact on the Jewish minority. The imperial authorities blamed the Jews and their alleged involvement in capitalist exploitation for the assassination and made them the main target of the reactionary reaction that followed. During this period, a series of pogroms occurred in the southwestern regions of the Russian Empire from 1881 to 1882, which continued to shake the Pale of Settlement until 1884 and were accompanied by new decrees restricting the residence and employment of Jews (Hillis 2021, p. 38).

Tsar Alexander III clearly linked the regicide to his father's liberal policies and quickly took a series of measures to centralize power. Above all, he introduced special laws, such as the 'Law on Measures for the Protection of State Order and Public Tranquility' (*Polozhenie o merakh k okhraneniyu gosudarstvennago poriadka i obshchestvennago spokoistviya*). Originally intended as a temporary solution to combat seditious activities for a limited period of three years, these measures were repeatedly extended and remained in force until 1917 (Zuckerman 1996, p. 12). They introduced the 'aggravated' (*Usilennaya okhrana*) and 'reinforced' [martial law] (*Chrezvychajnaya okhrana*) states of emergency, allowing the police to make preventive arrests, detentions of up to two weeks, unrestricted house searches and the confiscation of materials related to political offenses. On September 4, 1881, a state of 'reinforced security' was declared in several regions, including:

- St. Petersburg, Moscow, Khar'kov, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev, Volyn', Podol'sk, Kherson, and Bessarabia Provinces.
- Simferopol', Evpatoriia, Yalta, Feodociia, and Perekop districts (uezdy).
- Berdiansk, Voronezh (with district), Rostov-na-Donu, Mariupol'.
- Odessa, Taganrog, and Kerch'-Enikale city governorships (gradonachal'stva).

These measures, including martial law, were extended to a considerable part of the empire and covered both central regions and the periphery, with notable expansions occurring during the revolutionary years (Daly 1995, p. 612). While pogroms had previously occurred in various provinces, especially in Kherson, Kiev, Ekaterinoslav, Taurida and to a lesser extent in Poltava, Chernigov, Volyn' and Podol'sk, anti-Jewish violence ceased after May 10, 1881 in all provinces except Poltava and Chernigov (Aronson 1990, pp. 50-54, 164–66 & 173). It is therefore conceivable that the Security Law was partly aimed at combating the anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine after the regicide. A more plausible explanation, however, is that officials sought to streamline existing emergency laws and "consolidate repressive measures against anti-government elements", as stated in an official report of 1895 (Daly 1995, p. 611).

In May 1882, additional 'provisional measures' restricted the right of Jews to settle outside urban and rural areas within the Pale of Settlement and to buy or lease land (Zuckerman 1996, p. 231). The suppression of Jewish rights was particularly evident in the strict measures taken from 1887 onwards to restrict Jewish access to higher education. To curb the number of Jewish students, an ethnic quota was introduced that limited their presence to 10% within the Pale of Settlement and 5% outside this

area, with quotas in cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow being even lower (3%) (Dubnow 1920, p. 29 & 157; Loewe 1978, p. 38). Other measures included the expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1892, restrictions on Jewish participation in stock exchanges in cities such as Baku, Odessa, Nikolayev and Rostov (Don) in 1887, the exclusion of Jews from local self-government and the ban on Jewish lawyers joining the bar association in 1889 (Loewe 1978, p. 32). These measures represented a clear departure from the previous official stance under Tsar Alexander II and promoted segregation between Jewish and non-Jewish communities. They had a profound impact on the economic opportunities of Jews relative to the non-Jewish population and their effects are described as similar to the decades of persecution under Jim Crow laws in the southern United States (Dubnow 1920; Boustan 2007, p. 3).

In the 1880s and 1890s, the cities of the Pale region, including Vilnius, Minsk, Odessa, Gomel and Warsaw, therefore saw an upsurge in revolutionary organizations. These movements were mainly supported by young people, including workers, intellectuals, high school and university students. Revolutionary activists developed from initial self-defense groups formed by students and intellectuals. They targeted those responsible for pogroms, police officers and officials who supported anti-Jewish violence, and resorted to tactics such as bombings and assassinations. By 1903/04, predominantly or exclusively Jewish anarchist groups had formed in major cities such as Bialystok, Nezhin, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav and Zhytomyr. The widespread support for terrorism and radicalism among intellectuals reflected the conviction that social problems could only be solved by eliminating the authorities, rather than by creating new mechanisms of interaction between the authorities and the various social groups (Akhiezer 2013, p. 563). While some members of monarchist and right-wing groups were involved in anti-Semitic violence, the radicals in the Pale often provoked retaliation from the Conservatives. Initially, these retaliations were directed against Jewish revolutionaries and not against the entire Jewish population. In cases where radicals used violence at patriotic or religious gatherings or against individual Christians, casualties occurred among innocent bystanders, including children and the elderly. These acts fueled anti-Semitic sentiments and led to confrontations and retaliation, often in the form of mob violence against peaceful Jewish communities. Jewish revolutionary tribunals passed sentences on local opponents, and radical individuals carried out armed attacks on private property. These extremist actions were met with criticism by many ordinary Jews, especially the elderly, as they often led to pogroms and exacerbated the already challenging situation of the community (Geifman 1993, p. 35).

Anti-Semitism, which encompassed both popular sentiment and state-sponsored discrimination, played a crucial role in the adoption of Marxism by the burgeoning Jewish artisan class, the smaller proletariat and the more radical segments of the Jewish intelligentsia in the Russian Empire. For example, the founders of the Vilna revolutionary cell, including Aron-Shmuel Lieberman (1844-80), Aron Zundelevich (1851-1923) and Vladimir Iokhelson (1855-1937), received their education at the State Rabbinical Seminary in Vilna. These individuals later became prominent figures in the Narodnaya Volya (People's Will), a group responsible for the assassination attempt on Alexander II. Around 1880, five of the seven leading members of the People's Will were of Jewish descent.[2] Moreover, from 1885 to 1890, one-fifth to one-third of the organization's membership in the south and southeast of the empire consisted of Jews (Haberer 1995, p. 46; Naimark 1983, pp. 92-5, 202–11).[3] Figure 1 illustrates the revolutionary activities within

[2] These people were Abram Bath, Boris Orzhich, Natan Bogoraz, Zacharii Kogan, Chaim Lev Shternberg (Haberer 1995, p. 46; Naimark 1983, pp. 92-5, 202–11). See also Schapiro (1961, pp. 148-67).

[3] Jewish leftists, including prominent figures such as Arkady Kremer, Lidia Akselrod, Leon Jogiches and Tzemach Kopelson, joined the growing Social Democratic movement. By 1917, the presence of Jews in the Russian political elite had increased considerably. The Jewish Federation (All-Jewish Labor Federation in Lithuania, Poland and Russia), founded in Vilnius in 1897, became the first influential Marxist party. Jews also played a key role in the founding of the All-Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1898, the leading Marxist faction, as well as the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1902 (Schneiderman 1976, pp. 212-7).

the Pale of Settlement in relation to previous encounters with pogroms. It emphasizes the emergence of revolutionary groups as a response to anti-Semitism in both public and bureaucratic domains.

Figure 1: Tsarist repression in the Pale of Settlement

(a) Progroms 1880-1913



Data source: Grosfeld et al. (2021), Kessler and Markevich (2017)

(b) Revolutionary activity 1886-1900



Data source: Grosfeld et al. (2022), Grigoriadis (2023), Kessler and Markevich (2017)

The political repression and Russification policies of minorities in the 1880s, combined with the rapid industrialization that was fundamentally transforming Russia, exacerbated tensions along various social fault lines, including those related to social class, ethnicity, religion and nationality, and led to a significant reshaping of the political landscape of Russian society (Morrissey 2012, p. 615; Gilbert 2014, p. 30). By 1905, political unrest had penetrated deep into all strata of society and produced a new generation of revolutionaries. While the 'first wave' of revolutionary activity (1866-81) ended with the crushing of the Narodnya Volya after the regicide of 1881, political violence resurged from 1901 onwards, with a marked increase in terrorist attacks and the emergence of new actors and groups such as the combat organizations of the Social Revolutionaries. In contrast to the first wave, which included many revolutionaries from the aristocratic upper class with considerable political experience, this 'second wave' (1901-07) of terrorists was characterized by their ideological inexperience, limited education, social marginalization and psychological instability (Hilbrenner 2022, pp. 18, 141, 190; Geifman 1993, p. 49).

Between 1901 and 1905, a series of dramatic assassinations significantly paralyzed the tsarist bureaucracy. High-profile prime ministers, police officers, and numerous lower-ranking officials became targets, leaving the entire system in a precarious state. In particular, three of the six interior ministers in office between 1902 and 1911 fell victim to terrorist attacks, and another minister, Durnovo, faced two assassination attempts in 1905 and 1906.[4] Between 1905 and 1907, there were over 9,000 victims of terrorist attacks in Russia, with 3,611 government officials and 2,180 private individuals either killed or injured. Even after the convening of the First State Duma in April 1906, terrorist activities continued, with almost 4,500 government officials killed or injured by the end of 1907. From January 1908 to mid-May 1910, 19,957 terrorist acts and revolutionary robberies were recorded, in which 732 government officials and 3,051 private individuals lost their lives, while 1,022 officials and 2,829 private individuals were injured. The total number of deaths caused by terrorism during this period amounted to 7,634 throughout the empire (Geifman 1993, p. 21).

The all-encompassing wave of revolutionary terrorism undeniably reached its goal of demoralizing the authorities and paralyzing their "strength and means to fight." Many officials were deeply distressed as they faced daily bombings, shootings, stabbings and other forms of violence because "every day there are several, either with a bomb or a revolver or a knife or with various other instruments; they do it somehow and with everyone ... and you wonder why they haven't done it yet. Many ordinary people, who had

[4] These included Sipiagin in 1902, Plehve in 1904 and Stolypin in 1911, the latter of whom was assassinated by an Okhrana agent (Leggett 1981, p. 358).

also suffered greatly at the hands of the revolutionaries, "began to confuse revolutionaries with common bandits" and hinted at violence, wishing that "the ministers ... all these ... rotten ones who knew how to throw bombs" (Geifman 1988, cited on p. 251).

2.2. Okhrana as coercive bureaucracy

The extensive authority granted to the police under the state of 'reinforced security' in various Russian provinces from September 4, 1881, was wielded by the Special Okhrana Department. This department, situated as one of nine secretariats within the police hierarchy, held a prominent position and maintained a direct connection to the police headquarters in St. Petersburg. Its primary focus was the investigation of political crimes, particularly those perpetrated by revolutionary groups employing terrorism and violence to achieve their objectives. Okhrana agents systematically gathered and analyzed information, generating weekly assessments, circulars, and directives that were then transmitted to the tsar. Subsequently, the tsar issued orders to counteract subversive activities (Lauchlan 2005).[5]

The centralized and specialized structure of the Okhrana allowed for exceptional efficiency with a relatively small staff. The pervasive secrecy that surrounded the Okhrana and its staff led revolutionaries to speculate about its size and nature, fostering the belief that Alexander III had created an all-powerful, all-knowing and omnipresent security apparatus (Zhilinskii 1917). The fetishization of secrecy is also underpinned by a remarkable incident in 1911, when a photograph of Okhrana workers was discovered by the revolutionary underground, leading to a general ban on group photographs (Lauchlan 2005, p. 9; Daly 2004, p. 112). In St. Petersburg, for example, the average revolutionary could not escape the political police for more than three months, and those involved in underground activities had to assume that their ranks were infiltrated by informants (Zuckerman 1996, p. 38, footnotes 45, 46, 47). Okhrana agents did indeed infiltrate the highest ranks of the Bolshevik leadership, including Lenin's close confidant Roman Malinovskij, which led to the arrest of Stalin, Sverdlov and Ordzhonikidze in February 1913. Remarkably, four out of five members of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks were in fact agents of the Okrana (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990, p. 33). The renowned Russian historian Richard Pipes commented on this phenomenon as follows (Pipes 1979, p. 317):

> *All of them had been shadowed, searched, arrested, kept in jail, and sentenced to exile by the political police of the imperial government. They had battled with the censorship. They had had to contend with agent provocateurs planted in their midst. They knew the system intimately, from the inside, which meant that they also knew its shortcomings and loopholes.*

The Okhrana adopted a "divide and conquer" strategy by infiltrating various factions across the political spectrum (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990, p. 35). To achieve this, they implemented carefully planned tactics and pioneered intelligence gathering, leveraging cutting-edge technologies (Lauchlan 2005, p. 51). Subversives were typically apprehended at night, deliberately in the absence of Okhrana officials. Often, multiple arrests occurred simultaneously, a practice known as 'liquidation', resulting in the abrupt disappearance of entire social circles overnight. One of the Okhrana's most covert operations involved the establishment of 'black cabinets', concealed offices in large postal depots. These offices provided Okhrana officials with unrestricted access to all postal and telegraph traffic in the Russian Empire. Despite routine denials by tsarist interior ministers regarding their involvement in intercepting and copying all correspondenc – a practice known as 'perlustration' – Lenin was well aware of the effectiveness of intercepting the mail (Lauchlan 2005, p. 50). Notably, the Okhrana uncovered Lenin's

[5] In our discussions, the term 'security apparatus and coercive bureaucracy' refers to the formal security organizations of the state, which included the intelligence services apart from the military police (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020, p. 792).

brother's participation in the attempted assassination of Tsar Alexander III, leading to his execution in 1887 (Burtsev 1927, p. 261).

Both the gendarmes and the bureaucrats within the Okhrana cultivated a sense of professional elitism within their educational and professional framework that made them a 'breed apart' within the police hierarchy (Lauchlan 2005). This was largely due to the inclusive recruitment practices and the generous meritocratic system that recognized "honest, dedicated, educated men motivated by monarchist principles" (Zuckerman 1996, p. 64 & 66-67, Table 5.6 p. 65; Ruud and Stepanov 1999, p. 217). The Okhranniki thus stand in contrast to the consistent portrayal of the secret police in historical analyses as only moderately competent and intellectually gifted (within their professional frame of reference). Thus, a significant proportion of Stalin's NKVD members had a relatively inadequate education and did not have the skills possessed by their colleagues in other branches of the Soviet bureaucracy(Gregory 2009).[6] Moreover, by recruiting also from among former dissidents, the Okhrana had the empathy and insight that enabled it to possess "the knowledge and temperament to successfully subdue the enemies of the tsarist empire by developing new methods of controlling individuals whose motivations they clearly understood" (Zuckerman 1996, p. 64). The Okhrana thus stands out as a highly efficient and smoothly functioning coercive bureaucracy, in stark contrast to the general criticism of the tsarist bureaucracy for its excessive size, inefficiency and susceptibility to abrupt policy changes driven by the tsar's personal preferences (Hartwell 2022, p. 710).[7] Regarding pure data collection, it is asserted that by 1917, the Okhrana gathered information on approximately three million individuals. This encompassed notable figures within the revolutionary underground, essentially compiling a comprehensive 'Who's Who' of the revolutionary movement. This compilation included virtually anyone who had contemplated politics, particularly in the period following 1905 (Lauchlan 2005, p. 51).

Although the Okhrana failed to suppress the revolutionary wave of 1905-07, as described in the Section 2.1, it was very successful in suppressing the revolutionary movements in the following decade (Leggett 1981, p. 358). During this period, the Okranniki uncovered the Bolsheviks' plans, forced Lenin into exile for the next decade from 1907, and prevented the Bolsheviks from playing a major role in the February Revolution. In addition, show trials and mass executions reduced the number of members of revolutionary groups from 100,000 to 10,000 by 1910 (Fischer 1997).[8] As the Okhrana exposed and removed revolutionaries from their ranks, so did the revolutionaries refine their methods of concealment, making their suppression an even greater challenge. In response to the shift of revolutionary activities from mainland Russia to Central Europe, the Okhrana opened its Paris office in 1883. Between 1910 and 1913, the organizational structure and activities of the "Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries", which had been responsible for the escalation of violence between 1905-07, were reduced to such an extent that by early 1914 there were no longer any party organizations in the proper sense in Russia. There were only scattered socialist-revolutionary cells in various cities that attempted to form organizations and participate in party work. Abroad, on the other hand, there were still party cadres who were prepared to initiate revolutionary activities according to a precisely defined plan (Spiridovich 1916, ch. 20).

While the Okhrana officials correctly informed their superiors that the tsarist regime had descended into chaos in the months leading up to the revolution, Nicholas II remained shielded from a realistic assessment of the desolate state of the country, which would mark the epilogue of both the Okrhana and

[6] Similar patterns emerge for Lenin's Cheka, Hitler's Security Service and the state security organs in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other organizations such as the Argentine Battalion 601 (Leggett 1981; Gieseke 2005; Pucci 2020; Dudek and Paczkowski 2005; Browder 1997; Scharpf and Gläßel 2020).

[7] See Castañeda Dower and Markevich (2019), which identifies bureaucratic red tape as a factor contributing to the slow implementation of Stolypin's land reform. See also Gregg (2020) and Gregg and Matiashvili (2022), who examine company-level perspectives, while Cheremukhin et al. (2017) discusses issues related to property rights.

[8] By April 20, 1907, between 600 and 1,000 suspects had been sentenced to death and executed, some of them innocent (Hilbrenner 2022, p. 357; Geifman 1993, p. 346).

the tsarist government (Ruud and Stepanov 1999, p. 315). The Okhrana's agents foresaw an imminent popular uprising that posed a significant threat to the tsarist government. Through a network of secret agents and gendarmes as well as well-trained analysts in St. Petersburg, they had access to extensive information, all of which predicted revolutionary events. Already in 1905, an undercover Okhrana agent described clandestine meetings held by the Ivanovo workers as follows:

> *I am simply amazed at the local workers' mood. One can see a sea of discontent in their conduct durin out of town gatherings Women are no less active then men the way they go about organizing such meetings and expressing their protest (Hillyar and McDermid 2000, p. 118)*

These threats included widespread criticism of the Tsarina for her interference in political affairs and her association with Rasputin. However, the reports expressing these fears were deliberately downplayed by the director of the police department and further toned down in the reports of the Minister of the Interior, Protopopov. These officials, who controlled the flow of information to the Tsar, were themselves convinced of the people's unshakeable loyalty to the Tsar. In February 1917, they assured the Tsar that the military garrison in St. Petersburg could easily suppress all local unrest – a grave miscalculation. On February 27, 1917, a mob stormed the police building in St. Petersburg, heralding the end of the Okhrana and the tsarist regime (Ruud and Stepanov 1999, p. 315).

2.3. Russian Revolution & Political Transition

After the fall of Tsarism in March 1917, the Provisional Government formally assumed power as the legal successor to the Tsarist regime and dissolved the political police structures of the Tsarist Empire. The government announced general elections to the Constituent Assembly for November 25 and 27, 1917. However, the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government on November 7, 1917, in the middle of the election campaign that had begun in September. As the Bolsheviks wanted to legitimize their seizure of power, they allowed the elections to continue. Nevertheless, no majority coalition with Bolshevik participation emerged from the elections. The election results, which were seen as an expression of the will of the people, were declared invalid after just two days (Pipes 1990, pp. 546-7). Nonetheless, on January 18, 1918, the elected deputies set up the Constituent Assembly with almost a quarter of the votes, only to dissolve it again the next day by ratifying a resolution (Pipes 1990, p. 854). The historical significance of these elections is disputed, in part because of their impact on the course of Russian history (Rabinovitch 2009). In Lenin's own words:

> *The dispersal of the Constituent Assembly by Soviet authority [was] the complete and open liquidation of formal democracy in the name of the revolutionary dictatorship (Pipes 1990, p. 556, citing Trotzky's Lenin reference in Pravda No. 91, p. 1 on April 24th, 1918)*

However, the Electoral Act of 1917 is worth mentioning for several reasons. Firstly, it extended the right to vote to all male and female adults over the age of 20 and lowered the minimum voting age for soldiers by two years. It also introduced constituency-specific proportional representation, whereby different lists of candidates were drawn up in each of the 73 constituencies and seats were allocated according to the ratio reached. Political parties could form a coalition in one constituency and run independently or not at all in another. Although the elections in most districts took place as planned on November 25-27, 1917, in some areas they had to be postponed by up to three months, while in others they were canceled altogether. Nevertheless, the elections took place throughout the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Poland and the provinces on Russia's western and north-western borders, which

were occupied at the time. Despite some irregularities in some remote areas, the turnout was impressive, with 44.4 million votes cast. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, around 70% of eligible voters went to the polls, while in some rural areas the turnout reached 100% (Pipes 1990, p. 540).

According to Pipes (1990), the Bolsheviks had an average vote share of 24% at the district level, which increased to about 30% when combined with the Social Revolutionary deputies (see also Table B.4 in the Appendix). In the fifteen most developed industrial provinces between Moscow and St. Petersburg, however, the Bolsheviks did much better, averaging about 46% of the vote, while in the other parts of the country their vote share was generally below 20%. The Constitutional Democrats (the 'Kadets') surprised the Bolsheviks with their high turnout, although they received less than 5% of the vote. The Bolsheviks feared the Kadets because of their large and active following, superior organization and greater number of newspapers. The Kadets' superior financial resources and their lack of commitment to a common social ideal or fear of counter-revolution made them a serious opponent. At the national level, however, the Kadets did not fare well and, instead of a significant defeat, experienced a walloping 'washout' (Pipes 1990, p. 542, quoted on p. 338 in O.N. Znamenskii's "Vserossiiskoe Uchreditel'noe Sobranie"). In contrast, the cadets did well in the large urban centers, which the Bolsheviks saw as a decisive battleground to compensate for their poor performance in the countryside. Thus, in cities such as St. Petersburg and Moscow, the Kadets secured second place behind the Bolsheviks with 26.2% and 34.2% of the vote respectively. In addition, the Kadets outperformed the Bolsheviks in 11 of 38 provincial capitals, and in many others they were on the verge of victory (Pipes 1990, p. 542-3).

The Constituent Assembly elections of 1917 offer a fascinating insight into the prevailing public mood at the time, despite the ongoing war, increasing anarchy, civil unrest and internal migration. However, accurately determining regional turnout is challenging due to the challenges mentioned above and the difficulty of keeping accurate records (Rabinovitch 2009, pp. 206-7). In particular, between January 1, 1915 and July 1, 1917, the refugee population reached a total of 7.4 million, with annual increases of 2.4 and 2.8 million in 1915 and 1916 respectively (Gatrell 2005, p. 212). Although Russia had lost Poland, Lithuania and parts of Belarus in November 1917, a considerable number of Russian Jews remained within the country's borders. They had been forced to leave the front lines during the Russian retreat from Poland and Galicia in 1915, or they had been deported. The largest concentration of Russian Jews was in the Baltic States and Russian Poland (the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, after 1863 the Vistula region), where the emigration was relatively complete. Therefore, the available data on the Jewish population in these western provinces should be taken seriously, as shown in the Figure A.4 in the appendix, which illustrates the lost territories in the eastern part of the former empire.

The Jewish communities in Volhynia, in numerous Belarusian towns and in large parts of the Baltic states were forced to migrate eastwards after the collapse of the empire. In some areas, such as Kovno and many Courland provinces, the entire Jewish population had to move (Gatrell 2005, pp. 22-3 & 145-50). Despite the continuing restrictions, however, more than two-fifths of those expelled in 1915 settled in Russian regions that had previously been off-limits to them, such as Voronezh, Tambov or Penza (Gatrell 2005, p. 145). The lifting of all residence restrictions for Jews by the Provisional Government in March 1917 led to even more Jews moving to cities that had previously been subject to restrictions (Aust 2017, p. 114).[9]

[9] Despite the loss of these provinces to Russia, the mass relocation of civilians during the war and the interethnic dynamics in the new "polyglot" cities where the refugees lived may have strengthened group identities among minorities (Gatrell 2005, p. 200).

3. Data

3.1. Ethnicity Dataset

We collect information from the 1897 census of the Russian Empire, which is organized by province (guberniya) and comprises 89 volumes. We focus on the European region of the Russian Empire, which includes the Pale of Settlement, an area designated as a settlement area for European Jews in 1835. The Pale encompasses 15 provinces in western European Russia, including 10 provinces of the Polish Congress, parts of present-day Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, and all of present-day Belarus and Moldova. Although the inhabitants of the Pale region were also affected by events outside this area, part of our research focuses precisely on this particular region. Figure A.3 in the appendix illustrates the boundaries of the Pale area in present-day Eastern Europe, which we created based on information from Kessler and Markevich (2017) and Eurostat's GISCO database.

For our Pale subsample, which included provinces within the settlement area and neighboring regions, we collected data on 25 provinces. This sub-sample included provinces such as Livonia, Smolensk, Pskov, Orel, Kursk, Kharkov and Courland. Although Courland was not officially part of the Pale, it was considered as such in the early 19th century due to its significant Jewish population (Spitzer 2015, p. 53). The Pale was divided into four regions: Poland, Belorussia-Lithuania (including Courland), the Southwest and New Russia. The latter two regions bordered the Black Sea and were acquired by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 18th century. Originally, these regions were not subject to any restrictions on Jewish settlement, as they were not part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Later, however, they were incorporated into the palace. In our analysis, we used dummy variables to identify districts within the palace and neighboring provinces. Our sample consisted of 296 districts in the 26 provinces of European Russia, with 229 districts falling within the Pale.[10] By 1897, these districts had a sizable Jewish population, numbering over 700,000. Within the Pale region itself, however, there were differences. Two eastern provinces, Chernigov and Poltava, had relatively small Jewish populations, even though they were part of the Pale. These provinces were historically located on the border between Poland and Russia and were a semi-autonomous hetmanate under Russia before the partition of Poland. In our analysis, we distinguished between these areas within the Pale as the former provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which were characterized by dense Jewish settlement due to mobility restrictions, and the remaining provinces such as Courland, Left Bank Ukraine and New Russia, where the Jewish population was less numerous due to more recent settlements or settlement restrictions (Spitzer 2015, p. 53).

The Jewish population in the Pale region was divided into two groups according to their religious and linguistic affiliation. These two categories overlapped to a considerable extent, with almost all Yiddish speakers being religious Jews and vice versa. There were about 4.9 million religious Jews and 4.8 million Yiddish speakers (excluding Kurland) in the Pale. The slight difference between the two groups is due to the fact that some individuals who reported a language other than Yiddish as their native language were grouped under other nationalities for the analysis of occupational data. These languages included Polish, Russian, German, Tatar (spoken by the Krymchaki in Crimea), Lithuanian and others, resulting in the exclusion of 105,426 individuals from the total number of 4.9 million religious Jews (Kahan 1986, p. 4 & footnote 3). Even after this exclusion, the Yiddish-speaking population still made up the vast majority (99.8%) of all Jewish inhabitants in European Russia (as shown in Table 1). It is highly unlikely that non-observant Jews were not included in this category, unless they converted to another religion. The low number of religious conversions became apparent during the pogroms of the 1880s, which showed

[10] Rowland (1986) notes that 226 places in the 25 provinces of the Pale with more than 5,000 inhabitants had no Jewish community, and the Jews not included in this list lived either in villages or in larger towns where Jews were a small minority.

Jewish entrepreneurs that adopting a Russian cultural façade did not provide sufficient protection from persecution (Kahan 1986, p. 88). To identify the Jews in our study, we used their stated mother tongue.

Table 1: Language-Religion Difference in Jewish community in 1897

	By religion	By language	Difference	Correlation
Pale of Settlement	4,930,655	4,825,229	105,426	0.998
Adjacent to the Pale	72,564	64,821	7,743	0.997
Outside the Pale	143,366	123,372	19,994	0.996
Total European Russia	5,070,588	4,945,297	125,291	0.999

Data drawn from Kessler and Markevich (2017).

In an average province within or near the Pale area, Jews made up about 37.5% of the urban population and 12% of the total population. In the provinces outside the Pale border, the proportion of Jews was much lower. This meant that the Jews were primarily an urban minority, as required by law. Despite the general lack of literacy, the literacy rate among Jews in the Pale area was higher than among non-Jews: about half of the working-age population, including women, was classified as literate, which corresponded to a literacy advantage of 20% (Spitzer 2015). Jews in the Pale mainly worked in non-agricultural sectors, with only 2.7% employed in agriculture. In contrast, over 60% of non-Jews worked in agriculture, indicating that Jews were significantly underrepresented in this sector. The largest Jewish employment sector was manufacturing, which was mainly located in urban areas and employed 36.5% of the Jewish workforce, followed by trade with 30% Jewish workforce (Spitzer 2015).

As the Jewish population grew, they dispersed professionally as production workers and geographically as frontier workers in areas with fewer Jews (Spitzer 2019). Although very few Jews were directly employed as agricultural laborers, they were integrated into the rural economy through various commercial transactions, as Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020) confirms. However, the highly fluctuating crop yields posed a significant threat to Jewish merchants in agriculture, especially during crop failures such as the famine of 1891-92, which resulted in the deaths of half a million people. As a large proportion of their income was spent on food consumption, Jews were very vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of agricultural produce as a result of famine (Charnysh 2022).

3.2. Okhrana dataset

For our revolutionary dataset, we digitized the files from the Paris branch of the Special Section of the Okhrana, that are located at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University (Grigoriadis 2023). The archives were under lock and key for more than 30 years before they were unveiled in 1957. The extensive collection includes 200 boxes containing more than 97,000 documents, 164,000 identity cards, 287 scrapbooks and 1.5 meters of photographs. Despite some losses after the February Revolution, the remaining archives provide extensive details and have become one of the most important documentary sources for understanding the early history of the Bolsheviks. Figure 2 shows an example of our list of revolutionaries from the Hoover archives, in which the name Lev Davidovitch Bronstein, also known as Trotskij, is listed under number 352 in Cyrillic script.

Our dataset contains comprehensive information about people who were monitored in a specific province. It includes their names, surnames, religion, age and region of origin in European Russia from 1886 to 1900. This particular period covers a crucial two-decade period characterized by the suppression of the Narodnya Volya after the 1881 regicide and the subsequent rise of political violence in the early 20th century, which led to an intensification of terrorism (Hilbrenner 2022, p. 18). This data therefore

Figure 2: Archival material from the Okhrana Paris records at Hoover Institution



№№ стат. пол. карт.	Фамилія, имя и отчество.
15283	Бриндалонъ, Илья.
90	Бринманъ, Шмуль-Хаимъ Шимоновъ.
10205	Бриллiантонъ, Вячеславъ.
6112	Бриллiантщиконъ, Іосифъ.
12694	Брилль, Абрамъ-Лемель Ицковъ.
12695	Бримъ, Мошекъ Трателевъ.
11357	Бриневолъ-Тибо, Владимiръ Іосифовъ.
10020	Бринеръ-Суражскiй, Рахмiэль Фавелевъ.
16135	Брiонъ, Ицка-Мошка Вульфовъ.
13461	Брифъ, Оскаръ Шмулевъ. клч. „Мяхаль".
12907	Бричекъ, Бронiславъ Паклонъ.
10394	Бринъ, Ицекъ-Шаимъ Гершонъ.
7852	Бронкинъ, Владимiръ Петровъ.
16867	Бронко, Прохоръ Федоровъ.
15839	Бродацкiй, Иванъ Людвиговъ.
14785	Бродская, Екатерина.
91	Бродская, Рахиль Рувимова.
3606	Бродскiй, Валерiй Давидовъ.
2866	Бродскiй, Гиршъ Михель Рувимовъ.
12289	Бродскiй, Григорiй Гавриловъ.
3939	Бродскiй, Эммануилъ Израилевъ.
10395	Бродскiй, Исаакъ Ароновъ.
8015	Бродскiй, Францъ Людвиговъ.
15526	Бродъ, Августъ.
9932	Бродъ, Игнатiй Францевъ.
2867	Броновскiй, Антонъ Людвиговъ.
15527	Брокосъ, Юлiанъ Михайловъ.
10758	Бродь, Софiя-Ванда Матеушева.
7759	Бронцеосъ, Вѣра Эдуардова.
1228	Броновичъ, Михаилъ Алексѣевъ.
5346	Бронштейнъ, Абрамъ Моисѣевъ.
352	Бронштейнъ, онъ-же Яновскiй, Троцкiй, Лейба (Левъ) Давидовъ.
10206	Бронштейнъ, Моишше Альтеръ Шлемка Айзиковъ.

— 42 —

№№ стат. пол. карт.	Фамилія, имя и отчество.
4307	Бронштейнъ, Петръ Ильичъ.
7314	
11926	Бронштейнъ, Симонъ Юделевъ.
1229	Бронская, Клара, назвавш. (нелег.).
14786	Брочинеръ, Мордко.
14787	Брочинеръ, Хаимъ.
11960	Брошейтъ, Отто.
8521	Брошкевичъ, Романъ Юзефовъ.
92	Брудзинскiй, Болеславъ Игнатьевъ.
3485	Брудный, Янкель Іоселевъ.
1230	Бружель, Пейсахъ Янкелевъ.
10838	Бруверъ, Гершонъ Шмаевъ.
9375	Брукштейнъ, Гершъ Соломоновъ.
12696	
4425	Брукъ, Израиль-Неухъ Абрамовъ.
15297	Брукъ, Моисей Исаевъ.
9193	Брумбергъ, Фейга.
93	Брумеръ, Берекъ Мошковъ.
2870	Брумеръ, Паукъ Пейсаховъ.
94	Брумеръ, Шлема Мошковъ.
16072	Бруно, Фридрихъ.
8522	Брумеръ, Лейбъ Абрамовъ.
3873	Брунингъ, Эдуардъ Оттовъ.
4148	Брунковскiй, Янъ Яновъ.
7760	Брунотъ-де-Чонтради, Фердинандъ Эдуардовъ.
12188	Брунсъ, Михаилъ Григорьевъ.
12100	Брусоверъ, Михель Захаровъ.
4426	Брусина, Хая Хацкелева.
16528	Брусницынъ, Василiй Васильевъ.
5170	Бруштейнъ, Марiя Яковлева.
8017	Брыжко, Казимiръ Ивановъ шв.(нег.).
15309	Брюкъ, Янкель Мордуховъ.
1232	Брюмаръ, Гавриилъ Ивановъ.
2682	Брюховеръ, Ворухъ.
10651	Брюхановъ, Иванъ Ивановъ.
95	Брюхановъ, Николай Васильевъ.

— 43 —

Data source: Grigoriadis (2023).

offers valuable insights into these developments and the emergence of various underground movements, armed self-defense groups, and terrorist organizations with regard to the escalation of this very violence. It is important to emphasize that the left-wing terrorism we observe represents only one facet of the broader anti-Tsarist opposition, which is intertwined with national movements, urban and labor conflicts, peasant uprisings, and a spectrum of criminal activity. While the period following the events of Bloody Sunday on January 9, 1905 saw a significant expansion of revolutionary organizations in terms of their size and goals, our focus on the pre-1905 period allows us to explore the complicated dynamics and complex interrelationships that reached their peak during this crucial period (Hilbrenner and Schenk 2010, p. 165; Morrissey 2012). Table 2 gives an overview of our data on an annual basis. It can be seen that the number of individuals has increased considerably over time, demonstrating the emerging upheavals at the end of the 19th century.

Table 2: Temporal distribution of individuals under surveillance, by time period

	Frequency	Percentage	Cum. Percentage
1886	306	4.83	4.83
1889	449	7.09	11.92
1899	649	10.24	22.16
1900	4,932	77.84	100.00
Total	6,336	100.00	
N	6336		

3.2.1. Revolutionary characteristics

Given the various forms of deliberate political instability, the question arises as to whether acts of political violence or targeted actions can bring about institutional change. The heterogeneity of political violence as revealed by our data suggests that certain forms of collective revolutionary activity may play an important role in bringing about regime change. To address this question, categorized the level of violence into four different categories based on Okhrana's recorded offenses. These include (1) dissemination of propaganda, (2) membership in subversive organizations, (3) organization of and participation in riots, and (4) organization of and participation in assassinations. We code *assassination* offenses as those, which include the mentioning of Narodnaya Volya, the use or mention of bullets, bombs or explosives, and certain high-profile cases such as the Lopatin case, apart from direct references to assassinations or murders. We categorize as *riots* any mention of riots or strikes or related provocations. *Membership* is categorized as references to specific group or party affiliations or affiliations, as well as unreliable individuals. Propaganda includes references to literature, emigrants, newspapers and magazines or sticking up leaflets. Crimes such as theft, impersonation of high-ranking persons or deserters are categorized as "*other*."We further record the social status based on information about the origin of the individuals in our dataset. These are: (i) *unskilled*, which includes individuals who either cannot read and write or have received only minimal formal education, often limited to basic skills. These individuals typically held occupations that required only rudimentary literacy skills; (ii) *medium-skilled*, which includes individuals with technical and/or numerical skills, who work in occupations that required basic skills commonly associated with blue-collar or skilled trades occupations; (iii) *high-skilled*, which includes individuals in professions that required a higher level of education (lawyers) or those with an aristocratic background.

In particular, the gender aspect in the revolutionary movement is interesting, as during the 1870s and 1880s, there was a marked increase in the participation of women in extremist activities, especially women from the upper and middle classes. Although the Russian revolutionary movement attracted more members from the lower socio-economic classes as early as 1900, this trend was more pronounced among men than women. In particular, from the 1870s onwards, the Russian radical movement saw a sharp increase in the number of female participants compared to the 1860s. Not only did their numbers increase significantly in absolute terms compared to men, but they also progressed faster in their activities than men. Women made up almost a third of the SR combat organization and about a third of all Russian terrorists at the beginning of the twentieth century. This trend was also evident among Jewish women, who were subject to even greater constraints in their households and traditional social circles than their Russian counterparts. However, they showed a comparable propensity to participate in terrorism, as about 30 percent of female SR terrorists were Jewish (Geifman 1993, p. 12). In order to approximate the actual educational level of the women in our data set, we classified people with female first names and an aristocratic background as having a higher level of education. Table 3 reflects the overall share of crimes as well as social backgrounds in our dataset.[11]

We provide additional evidence supporting the strong association between Marxism and the Jewish community, manifested in the prevalence of Jewish names. In our dataset, we classified individuals as "Jewish" by identifying components in their first, middle, or last names using the dictionary of Ashkenazi Jewish names and their variations in Imperial Russia compiled by Beider (2008) and Beider (2009) and which the author generously provided to us. Our coding draws inspiration from Bindler et al. (2023), who

[11] Despite women's increasing mobility outside their homes, they continued to face obstacles in accessing higher education, participating in politics and pursuing their intellectual goals. Although women in the Russian Empire gained the right to higher education in the 1870s by attending women's higher education courses (since 1878), they still had to go abroad to attend university and gain formal qualifications (Hillyar and McDermid 2000). Nevertheless, over time they integrated into the Russian educational elite (Hillis 2021, p. 47; Dudgeon 1982).

Table 3: Social background and monitored crimes, all years (long)

			Freq.	Per.	Val. Per.	Cum. Per
		By crime				
Valid	0	Other	43	0.68	2.45	2.45
	1	Propaganda	259	4.09	14.75	17.20
	2	Membership	757	11.95	43.11	60.31
	3	Riots	102	1.61	5.81	66.12
	4	Assassinations	595	9.39	33.88	100.00
	Total		1756	27.71	100.00	
		By social origin				
Valid	2	Medium-skilled	2226	35.13	52.16	52.16
	3	High-skilled	1333	21.04	31.23	83.39
	1	Unskilled	709	11.19	16.61	100.00
	Total		4268	67.36	100.00	
		By gender				
Valid	1	Male	4870	76.86	76.86	76.86
	0	Female	1466	23.14	23.14	100.00
	Total		6336	100.00	100.00	

investigate biases against the Irish in 19th-century court cases at the Old Bailey. The proportion of Jews in our records is at least 26% when considering the father's name and at least 36% when recognizing Jewish components in the given name (see Table 4). This is in contrast to the 12% representation of the total population in the Pale provinces (Spitzer 2015). However, assessing the representativeness of this figure and its reflection of biases or institutionalized anti-Semitism within the police and bureaucracy is challenging. This difficulty arises because the overall representation of the urban population in revolutionary movements is notably high. Despite the Tsarist laws restricting Jewish residence, the number of revolutionaries with identifiable Jewish name components in our dataset (36% based on Jewish components in first names) almost precisely matches the share of Jews in the urban population (37.5% as mentioned in Spitzer (2015) and Spitzer (2019)). Yet, the significance of the activity of the Jewish Bund and Jewish revolutionaries is underscored by the fact that among the 7791 politically persecuted in Russia from 1901 to 1903, no fewer than 2269 were Jews (29.1%). This figure is seven times higher than their share in the overall population, as documented by (Loewe 1978, p. 71).

Table 4: Jewish background and monitored crimes, all years (long)

			Freq.	Per.	Val. Per.	Cum. Per
Valid	1	Jewish given name	2270	35.83	35.83	35.83
	0		4066	64.17	64.17	100.00
	Total		6336	100.00	100.00	
Valid	1	Jewish patronymic	1633	25.77	100.00	100.00
Missing	.		4703	74.23		
Total			6336	100.00		
Valid	1	Jewish surname	3306	52.18	52.18	52.18
	0		3030	47.82	47.82	100.00
	Total		6336	100.00	100.00	

Given the inadequate monitoring of female revolutionaries by the Okhrana, our findings support the bureaucratic inclination to predominantly surveil male individuals with a secondary education or

higher, and likely of Jewish heritage. These monitored subjects were primarily targeted due to their affiliations with subversive organizations, with a secondary focus on their roles in planning or participating in assassinations. To enhance the comprehensive representation of emerging revolutionaries throughout our observation period, we took several steps. These included removing duplicate entries, aligning with Grossman (1999), and refining our dataset to include only observations with geographic details regarding the city of arrest or birth location. As a result, we now have a dataset of 1,667 revolutionaries for whom we possess spatial information. Our data show that, on average, these revolutionaries were mostly active in Russia, Ukraine, or Poland, as outlined in Table 5, mirroring the contemporary borders. The focal point of revolutionary activities in major cities across European Russia gives rise to concerns about possible spillover effects. These include, for instance, refugee movements, covert meetings, and the economic and physical consequences resulting from bombings. This, in turn, would strengthen the presence and influence of the secret police. These repercussions might influence not only (1) the motivation of local groups contemplating revolutionary actions (contagion), but also (2) the transmission of information that could trigger similar actions among local actors (Danneman and Ritter 2014, p. 256). Recognizing the existence of spatial autocorrelation and its potential impact on our statistical analysis (Kelly 2019), we narrow our focus to the macro-regions of European Russia and the Vistula region, where the majority of revolutionary activity occurred. In subsequent analyses, we further explore the spillover effects of political warfare, considering factors such as 'no spectators, no terror.' Our estimates integrate spatial weighting matrices that account for both geographic proximity and neighborly connections.

Table 5: Geographic distribution of individuals under surveillance

	Frequency	Percentage	Cum. Percentage
Belarus	103	6.18	6.18
Georgia	1	0.06	6.24
Latvia	39	2.34	8.58
Lithuania	78	4.68	13.26
Moldova	42	2.52	15.78
Poland	337	20.22	35.99
Russia	683	40.97	76.96
Ukraine	384	23.04	100.00
Total	1,667	100.00	

Although we do not distinguish between transmission and contagion effects, we consider the underlying mechanisms to be crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of revolution and rebellion in general, and specifically for the Russian case. On one hand, political conflicts, like assassinations or riots, can catalyze changes in grievances and resources, such as local demographic shifts, escalating discontent, and limited resources, which can spark local revolutionary actions (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Moreover, neighboring regions, such as lecture halls in the Pale of Settlement, provide safe havens for revolutionaries to acquire expertise and weapons, likewise posing potential local threats (Gurr 1993; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). In this regard, Spiridovich (1914) underscores the significance of Jewish neighborhoods where intellectuals engage in propaganda, agitators address urgent problems, illegal literature is discreetly distributed, and socialist revolutionaries meet with their social democratic counterparts to discuss programs and tactics (Spiridovich 1914). Moreover, 'transnational rebels' from the periphery engage in the distribution of literature, the forging of travel documents, and the smuggling of weapons. These activities have the potential to instigate revolutionary actions in otherwise remote regions (Danneman and Ritter 2014, p. 256). Notable examples include Mikhail Frolenko from the

Buntari organization in Odessa, who later played a pivotal role in organizing Narodnaya Volya, as well as propaganda activities in 'European colonies' situated in Switzerland, Germany, and England (Hilbrenner 2022, p. 79; Hillis 2021, p. 92).

Furthermore, isolated political conflicts can wield influence over nonviolent diaspora groups, shedding light on the feasibility of revolutionary actions and tactics through interregional connections and communication within the same organization by demonstration. Prominent examples include the dissemination of revolutionary pamphlets like Sergej Kravchinskij's "A Death for a Death," which was circulated through official mail and eventually reached notable individuals such as the writer Turgenev (Hilbrenner 2022; Gurr 1993; Moore and Davis 1998; Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008, p. 86). In addition, the 1869 "Revolutionary Catechism" by Bakunin and Nechaev, emphasizing violence and destruction, served as an inspirational guide for terrorist organizations in Imperial Russia, setting a global standard for revolutionary action (Hilbrenner 2022, pp. 55-57). Probably, the most impactful 'demonstration effects' include Felice Orsini's 1858 assassination attempt on French Emperor Napoleon III in Paris and John Brown's raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859, which inspired figures like Oskar Wilhelm Becker, who attempted to assassinate Prussian King Wilhelm I in 1861, John Wilkes Booth, responsible for the assassination of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, and ultimately Dmitrij Vladimirovich Karakosov, who unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Russian Tsar Alexander II in 1866 (Dietze 2022). Lastly, the communicative space shaped by 19th century mass media, reporting on the success and failure of revolutionary acts across diverse regions, converts even indirect participants, like newspaper readers, into spectators and listeners.[12] An illustrative example is the media coverage of Vera Zasulevich's trial for the attempted assassination of General Fedor Trepov in January 1878. This involves the communication history between the government and the revolutionaries, along with detailed depictions in local and international newspapers that portrayed Zasulich as raging "revenge angel" (Hilbrenner 2022, pp. 72-73).

While our surveillance data operates at the province level, it suffers from partial incompleteness, particularly concerning social origin and the type of offense. To assess whether control variables predicted absenteeism in our surveillance data, we utilized logistic regression models that account for their missingness. Importantly, none of the control variables, including religious composition, the proportion of middle management, estate status, or education level as per the 1897 census, demonstrated a significant correlation with absenteeism (Kessler and Markevich 2017; Grosfeld, Rodnyansky, and Zhuravskaya 2013). The lack of correlation supports our assumption that our data is missing completely at random, likely stemming from copying errors during the data collection process, which allows us to impute these missing values. To address potential bias in parameter estimates, we performed twenty imputations for both the crime level and social strata information using ordered logistic regression methods (Rubin 1996; Buuren, Boshuizen, and Knook 1999). Subsequently, for our final district-level dataset, we generated (1) province-level sums based on our individual and then imputed surveillance data and (2) expanded this dataset to the district level by dividing the province-level sums by the share of the urban population in 1883, which we sourced from Buggle and Nafziger (2021).

3.2.2. Assessing Data Reliability

While we are in general confident in the accuracy of our Okhrana data, critical questions arise about Okhrana's activities, particularly regarding whether their focus was solely on documenting revolutionary activities, actively supporting the formation of revolutionary networks, or a combination of both. It is apparent that Okhrana not only contributed to the growth of internally monitored or partially controlled revolutionary organizations but also played a role in establishing covert counter-revolutionary networks

[12] Here, the term 'actor' encompasses not only the perpetrator and victim but now also the observer (Hilbrenner 2022, p. 26).

that might not have emerged otherwise (Leggett 1981, p. XXIV & 302). Nevertheless, the primary objective of Okhrana's surveillance activities was to identify and expose individuals opposing the Tsarist regime. Thus, we believe that our data provide accurate insights into the Okhrana's perspectives on citizens suspected of having committed or intending to commit anti-Tsarist crimes in the future.

we compiled a 'counter-factual' list of social revolutionaries, terrorists, and anarchists from various sources—individuals whom the Okhrana should have been aware of. These sources consist of scientific assessments, collective and individual biographies, and details about escaped terrorists who played a significant role in Russian terrorism from the 1870s to the 1890s. Among these are Sergej Kravchinskij's (Stepniak) description of the Russian revolutionary scene until the early 1880s, published in exile in 1882 in *La Russia Soutteranea* (Underground Russia). Another source is Boris Savinkov's biography "Memoirs of a Terrorist" and Alphons Thun's works on the "History of the Russian Revolutionary Movement" dated 1883, providing insights into the origins, motives and individual networks of Russian terrorism. Additionally, we reference Spiridovich (1916) for a description of the terrorist scene from a former Okhrana official, Sablin's accounts of trials in the 1870s and 1880s, including those of Sofiya Perovskaya. These accounts shed light on individuals who went "among the people," became radicalized, and were ultimately executed as terrorists. From these sources, we rigorously document and track every mentioned name. To examine the role of revolutionary women from 1870 to 1917 and uncover their potential underrepresentation, we further cross-referenced our list with collective biographies from Hillyar and McDermid (2000).[13]

Our compiled list consists of 888 surnames associated with terrorists active between 1870 and 1917. Details about their origins, birthplaces, and life spans were gathered through cross-referencing with biographical information from "Workers of the Revolutionary Movement in Russia: A Bio-Bibliographical Dictionary" by Vilensky-Sibiryakov, Kona, and Shilova (1927-1934). Published in multiple volumes from 1927 to 1933, this encyclopedia provides biographical data on Russian personalities involved in the revolutionary movement by decade starting from the 1860s to 1890s. However, it is only partially complete, covering only the first six letters of the alphabet for the 1890s. Our refined subset includes 410 individuals with known first and last names, born in 1880 or earlier. To construct a more precise representation of active individuals within our observation period, we excluded those who passed away before 1887 (such as Aleksander Ul'yanov, Lenin's older brother). We also omitted individuals who were acquitted, received severe sentences exceeding 15 years of hard labor or exile to Siberia, rendering them physically unable to partake in revolutionary activities, or lacked sufficient biographical information. Our subset of 'potential revolutionaries' comprises 221 males (53.8%) and 190 females (46.2%). It is important to note that while the sample is significant, it is incomplete and encompasses all reported individuals without differentiation based on activities.

Upon crosschecking with our Okhrana surveillance records, it became evident that the Okhrana has recorded approximately 10% of the 'Who is Who' in Russian revolutionary circles, encompassing both theorists and actively involved terrorists. Prominent figures within this dataset include Lev and Ksenia Zilberberg, Vera and Alexandra Zasulich, Boris Savinkov, Egor Sazonov, Leonid Shishko, Nadezhda Krupskaya, the surviving elder Ul'yanovs (Lenin and his sister Anna), Lev Dejtsch, Konstantin Boje, as well as anarchists Prince Peter Kropotkin, Mikhail Bakunin, and Ekaterina Konstantinovna Breshko-Breshkovskaya. Our findings support our contention that the Okhrana proficiently monitored notable figures from both the revolutionary and terrorist movements leading up to the eruption of severe violence in the early 20th century. Our matched sample further reveals a gender imbalance, with 72% identified as

[13] Our sources include Kravchinskij (1883), Sawinkow (1931), Thun (1964), Spiridovich (1916), Hillyar and McDermid (2000), Kallash (1906a), and Kallash (1906b), along with trial information on the 28, 16, 11, 20, 17, and 14.

male and 28% as female. This observation is exemplified in the Boje family, where Konstantin Boje is present in our dataset, while Mariya and Fedor Boje are not.

We further revisit the direct or indirect involvement of the Okhrana in anti-Semitic violence during our observation period, and place it in the historical debate. Although Jews did not play a significant role in the 1905 revolution, they faced severe violence between 1881 and 1905 (Shtakser 2014, p. 27). Early scholars like Simon Dubnow and Ilya Orshansky contended that the pogroms were orchestrated by central authorities to divert revolutionary sentiments. However, subsequent research by Hans Rogger, John Klier, and Shlomo Lambroza suggests that the pogroms primarily erupted spontaneously, driven by a reaction to the increasing social stratification in the countryside following the abolition of serfdom. It is crucial to note that the Okhrana, as an institution, recognized the futility of segregating the Jewish population. Contrary to popular belief, it also did not endorse the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to attribute the challenges of autocracy to the Jews. While we do not find evidence of institutionalized bias or anti-Semitism in our surveillance records, the Okhrana faced difficulties in controlling certain individuals within its ranks and other government offices who viewed anti-Semitism as a convenient means to channel public discontent towards a scapegoat (Ruud and Stepanov 1999, p. 224 & 230). Examples include St. Petersburg Okhrana official Komissarov, who officially received a reward of 10,000 rubles for inciting anti-Jewish riots using leaflets printed on police printing presses (Hingley 1970, pp. 92). Regarding the Chisinau pogrom of 1903, minister of the interior Plehve reported to Nicholas II that, "*Because of the disorganization of the rank and file of the police, who were not under authorized control, all these excesses were carried out with impunity. This further encouraged and incited the thugs. The police ranks, having not taken preventive measures, turned out to be completely powerless to oppose the disorders*" (Ruud and Stepanov 1999, p. 234).

Finally, we ask, whether our data truly capture the repressive character of the tsarist coercive bureaucracy (from top to bottom) and not the radicalizing tendencies in the population (from bottom to top), as we argue? A comparative analysis with its successor organization, the Cheka, may answer this question. While the Okhrana executed thousands of people after 1905 and sentenced many to penal labor and internal exile, it was clearly different from the Cheka. Unlike the Cheka, the Okhrana did not function as a fully integrated enterprise of violence, serving at the same time as enforcer, prison guard, investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner. Its main focus was on combating political subversion in Tsarist Russia and also extended to the Polish, Baltic and Finnish territories, often supported by the 15,000-strong Special Gendarmerie Corps. In contrast, the Cheka had around 250,000 members in mid-1921, resulting in a remarkable ratio of one Okhrannik to 17 Chekists (Leggett 1981, p. 359).[14]

While we do not deny that tsarist Russia was a despotic regime, it must be emphasized that there were about 14,000 executions in the last fifty years of the tsarist empire, mainly in response to political murders after the 1905 revolution, yet more than 200,000 executions took place during Lenin's six-year rule (Conquest 1971, p. 23 & 11).[15] Moreover, in the tsarist era, death sentences were imposed by courts or military district and field courts, not by the Okhrana. In contrast to the Cheka, the Okhrana had fewer extrajudicial powers, which were mainly limited to searches, preventive arrests and arrests as part of preliminary investigations.[16] This proto-police state undeniably exerted a significant influence on the ideologies and radicalization of prominent Bolshevik figures, including Dzerzhinsky, Lenin, and, most notably, Stalin. Even after the revolution, many high-ranking Bolshevik functionaries, such as Lenin

[14] This ratio becomes one to nine if one excludes the border troops and assumes a Cheka strength of 143,000 for the RSFSR in December 1921 (Gerson 1976, p. 228).

[15] Soviet sources mention 1,139 executions in 1907 and 1,340 in 1908; they also mention 6,000 executions in 1908-12 and 11,000 in the post-revolutionary period of 1905-7. The highest number that can be derived from these sources is about 14,000 out of a population of about 128 million according to the 1897 census (Conquest 1971, p. 23).

[16] The Okhrana could recommend administrative exile for a maximum of five years for people who were classified as a threat to the state.

(Vladimir Ilyich Ul'yanov) and Stalin (Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), continued to use their code names (Andrew and Mitrokhin 1999, p. 36). Additionally, at the time of the revolution, the typical Bolshevik had four years of imprisonment or exile under the tsarist regime, while the average Menshevik had five years of such imprisonment (Figes 1996, pp. 124). It's crucial to note that the Okhrana did not operate prisons, thus ruling out the use of torture. As the Okhrana was subordinate to the Minister of the Interior via the Ministry of Police, it operated within the limits of applicable laws. However, between 1918 and 1923, at least 140,000 people died in uprisings, prisons, and camps, surpassing the estimated 11,000 deaths in the last fifty years of Tsarist rule (Leggett 1981, App. C).

3.3. Constituency Assembly Dataset

After the Bolshevik coup d'état in 1917, violent clashes broke out in several cities, prompting the local electoral commissions to postpone or extend the elections. In some regions, elections were even postponed until December 1917 or 1918, while in other provinces no elections were held at all. To determine our primary dependent variable, we relied on a comprehensive volume authored by a group of Russian historians led by Lev Protasov, which meticulously documents the distribution of vote shares at the district (and in some cases city) level among different candidate lists in 18 major electoral units.

We obtained district-level vote shares from Protasov et al. (2014). For joint lists, we followed Protasov's order and attributed the vote shares of smaller parties within these lists to the dominant left, right, or center party in the coalition. So, when we mention 'Mensheviks' or 'Social Revolutionaries', we're referring to the combined vote share of their left, center, or right factions, respectively.

Likewise, we labeled a candidate list as 'Bolshevik' if the Bolsheviks held the leading position in it (Castañeda Dower and Markevich 2022). We introduced the category 'Jewish Lists' to encompass the aggregate vote share of ten Jewish political organizations, aiming to analyze the impact of violence experiences on political mobilization, as suggested by recent social science research (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009). These include: the Jewish List, the Jewish National Bloc, the Jewish National Electoral Committee, the Jewish National Lists, the Jewish Social Activists, the Folskpartei, Poalei Zion, the Zionists, Fareynikte, and the Bund. By analysing the share of votes for Jewish lists, we attempt to capture the effects of experiences of violence on political mobilization, as suggested by recent social science research (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009). We applied a similar procedure to lists with 'Muslim' or 'Islam', grouped under 'Muslim lists', including Alash Orda. 'Liberals' represented the combined vote share of commercial industrialists and landowners, while "Kadets" referred to the rightmost party (excluding Bolsheviks). All other (joint) lists were classified as 'Others', encompassing coalitions not meeting the criteria above. When county-level information was unavailable, we assumed vote shares for the largest city in each county. As our subsequent analysis focuses exclusively on the most relevant factions, it's important to note that our results do not capture the dynamics of electoral competition in the sense of 'your loss is our gain'. However, our underlying factions are constructed in that way, so that they mechanical link the above voting groups based on their vote shares.[17]

Our aim is to develop a comprehensive left-right index that captures a party's stance on fundamental issues such as free markets, traditional values, morality, the welfare state, public education, market regulation and workers' rights, similar to the indices proposed by Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006) in the *Manifesto Project Database*. This project has been analyzing the election manifestos of various parties since 2009 in order to understand their political preferences. Our argumentation is based on a two-dimensional framework for political competition, in which key issues are assigned to either

[17] See Table B.2 in the appendix.

the economic or the cultural dimension (Hillen 2022, p. 2). Left-wing positions are characterized by the fact that they advocate a redistribution of wealth, market regulation and a larger public sector, while the (conservative) right rejects a redistribution of wealth and any state intervention in the economy. Conversely, the cultural dimension distinguishes a libertarian attitude towards cultural, religious and ethnic diversity from an authoritarian rejection of this diversity (Kitschelt 1994).

To capture the political landscape, we focus specifically on five indicators: overall political polarization, ideological focus, left-right voter groups, the number of votes for each party that contributes to our voter group classification, and minimum and maximum left-right orientation.[18] To calculate these, we followed Castañeda Dower and Markevich (2022) and used the 1917 Arzamas project to position the parties along a left-right scale in terms of their economic stance. In this scale, zero represents the midpoint, while negative values indicate left-leaning parties with a preference for more communism and positive values indicate right-leaning parties with a preference for more capitalism.[19] The parties were categorized as follows: Left: Bolsheviks (-5.2), Socialist Revolutionaries (-4.9), Anarchists (-4.5); Center: Socialist Revolutionaries of the Center (-2.2), Menshevik Internationalists (-1.5), Menshevik Centrists (-1.1), Right Socialist Revolutionaries (-0.75), Menshevik Defensists (+1.25); Right: Black Hundreds (+5.75), Kadets (+6).[20]. We ranked the other voter groups based on their demand for redistribution as follows: Peasants (-4.5), Cooperatives (-3.0), Social Democrats (-2.2), Other Socialists (-2.2), Others (0), Jewish lists (+2.2), Muslim lists (+2.5), Other Minorities (+2.5), Orthodox (+4), and Liberals (+5.75).

To measure the overall polarization, we use Dalton (2008)'s approach, which factors in parties' positions on the left-right spectrum, weighting them by their electoral performance. Its scale ranges from 0 to 1, where values closer to 0 signify a less polarized system, while values nearer to 1 signify a more polarized electoral landscape. However, when political competition encompasses both social and economic dimensions, the connection between income and political inclination can become distorted (Finseraas 2010, p. 284). This means that some low-income voters may adopt conservative stances on social issues, while some affluent voters may embrace progressive views. Specifically, heightened political conflicts that threaten both the elite and the general populace have the potential to shift the Center of Gravity (COG) towards the right. Consequently, working-class voters with culturally authoritarian leanings might opt for nationalist or far-right parties, to the detriment of left-wing parties (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Finseraas 2010, p. 302). To determine the COG, we assess the parties' positions by weighting their vote shares and averaging their positions on a given dimension, using our own coding and the Arzamas project's data. The COG index is a standardized measure ranging from -6 to 6, with a left-to-right orientation based on the Arzamas framework. A value close to zero indicates a more centrist voting behavior, while extreme values at either end signify a shift toward the political extremes (Gross and Sigelman 1984; Rohlfing and Schafföner 2019, p. 3).

Moreover, parties with similar ideologies can also be influenced by the policy outcomes of other parties with similar ideologies (Williams, Seki, and Whitten 2016). Thus, we argue that left-wing and right-wing parties may lose votes after left-wing terrorist attacks due to the contagion effects of Tsarist exclusionary policies, even if they are not blamed for them. In such cases, differences between parties on social policy may become less important than open conflicts over the size of the welfare state, with right-wing governments reducing the generosity of welfare programs only when the degree of polarization is high (Finseraas and Vernby 2011). To further delineate the different groups of voters based on the vote shares of political parties within certain categories, we use the following classifications: (1) the 'far left' which includes the Bolsheviks and the Left Social Revolutionaries; (2) the 'moderate left' category,

[18] We use the hyperlinkhttps://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/datasets/mpeldsElection Level Do-file to create these indicators in STATA.
[19] See "Who are you in 1917 Russia?" at the link `https://arzamas.academy/materials/1269`, last accessed April 24, 2023.
[20] The Black Hundreds and the Anarchists were not eligible parties

which includes the Peasant and Cooperative lists; (3) the 'center' category, which includes the Mensheviks, (4) the Social Revolutionary Center, the Menshevik-Internationalists, the Right Social Revolutionaries, and the Menshevik-Defensists; (5) the 'moderate right' is represented by special interest groups such as Orthodox Muslims, Jews and other minority groups; and finally (6) the 'conservative right' category, which includes the Liberal and the Constitutional Democrats ('Kadets') votes.[21] Figure 3 shows that there are different regions with left, middle and right-wing orientations, with the left-wing constituency being strongly represented in urban centers such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, while the right-wing constituency is more likely to be found in southern areas.

Figure 3: Voting behavior in the 1917 Constituency Assemply



4. Hypothesis

We anticipate a positive correlation between the conservative right-wing electorate and local radicalization. Specifically, we predict that a rise in general radicalization will lead to an increase in the vote share of the conservative right, while an escalation in the violence of these incidents will result in greater support for centrist party lists. The political economy literature offers a robust theoretical framework in this context. It posits that voters often struggle to obtain comprehensive information about the government's provision of public goods, particularly in the realm of counterterrorism. In contrast, they can easily

[21] We recognize that the Kadets represent a liberal political party that supports a parliamentary system of government, the importance of the rule of law, and a national perspective rather than a class-based perspective. This distinguished the Kadets from the English Liberals, with whom they sometimes drew parallels. In the revolutionary events of 1917, the Kadets were not only composed of intellectuals and professors, but also had a significant following among the middle classes and professional groups in Russia's urban areas (Rosenberg 1974, ch. 7).

observe terrorist attacks. Consequently, the presence of terrorism in their vicinity serves as a signal to evaluate the competence of a potential governing party (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986).

However, the empirical literature exhibits two primary areas of disagreement. First, some studies indicate that established parties experience a decline in voter support after attacks and casualties (Campos and Gassebner 2013; Aldrich et al. 2006; Karol and Miguel 2007). However, Berrebi and Klor (2008) and Koch and Tkach (2012) argue, based on the Israeli context, that established parties are not disadvantaged by suicide attacks. Second, while some research suggests that right-wing parties increase their vote share after terrorist events (Berrebi and Klor 2008; Kibris 2011; Koch and Tkach 2012), others demonstrate that terrorism can shift the entire political spectrum to the left, as seen in the 2004 Madrid train attacks (Bali 2007; Gould and Klor 2010; Montalvo 2011). These contradictory results may be attributed to selection bias, making it challenging to assess the impact of past terrorism on electoral outcomes decades later. As terrorist attacks are strategic in terms of targets and timing, terrorists are more likely to focus on populations likely to respond in a way that aligns with their goals, whether by supporting right-wing parties (if the goal is to disrupt negotiations) or left-wing parties (if the goal is to secure concessions).

As regards the Russian case, the participation of minority groups, such as women, in the revolutionary cause could have had significant consequences if individuals were involved in peaceful or covert activities, such as membership in anti-Tsarist groups or the dissemination of anti-Tsarist propaganda. The extension of the right to vote to women in 1917 may have strengthened the already in the 1880s developed demand for democratization and redistribution of resources, facilitating the success of left-wing party lists. In situations where democratic redistribution seemed unlikely, growing inequality within society may have increased support for more radical alternatives, including the revolutionary actions advocated by the far left. The worsening of social injustices may have led to a belief that peaceful means were insufficient, encouraging a willingness to turn to more extreme ideologies. Conversely, the rise of right-wing conservative parties decades later can be attributed to a general shift in political preferences away from 'innovative' ideas, triggered by the general radicalization of society. This shift may have been prompted by the desire for greater public safety and the perceived need for stronger and more authoritarian measures to maintain social order.

Evidence from the historical case support this angle. Lauchlan (2002) argues, that civil servants supported right-wing terrorists not as opponents of society, but as collaborators with right-wing elements within society itself (Lauchlan 2002, pp. 275-81). In his description of the situation in Russia during our observation period, also Daly (2002) characterizes it as a quasi-civil war in which even reasonable people reluctantly and temporarily supported extremist political groups. Their motivations stemmed from the struggle to preserve or restore Russia, albeit with radically opposing visions (Daly 2002, p. 40). The complex and turbulent context of social upheaval led individuals to align themselves with extremist elements and their divergent goals. Consequently, if our measures of political violence yield a negative estimate for the conservative right, this would indicate a possible shift of the electorate to the left, as most viable alternatives tended to the left. Conversely, a zero or positive effect for the (conservative) left would indicate a resurgence of the conservatives in response to the political conflict with the left. Furthermore, a positive estimate for the moderate/conservative right would confirm the narrative of a more authoritarian electorate reacting to radical solutions in their environment.

5. Empirical Strategy

To examine the relationship between political preferences and the degree of radicalization in the Russian population, we use our set of political indicators and examine the votes of the main political parties from

the 1917 Constituent Assembly results. Our goal is to analyze these factors in the context of the degree of overall radicalization, which we measure using the number of people monitored and tracked by the Okhrana weighted by district's 1883 urban population. To ensure the accuracy of our analysis, we include constituency fixed effects and distinguish between competing political parties in each district. When we refer to a 'constituency,' we recognize that districts are administratively linked to a specific province, but it is important to note that this province may not necessarily align with a constituency. We then propose the following model:

$$\text{POL}_{ij} = \beta \times \text{Okhrana}_{ij} + X_{ij}\gamma + \phi_j + \epsilon_{ij} \tag{1}$$

We denote our set of political indicators in a given district i in constituency j as POL_{ij}. These indicators encompass overall political polarization, ideological focus, left-right voting groups, the number of votes for each party contributing to our voting group classification, and the minimum and maximum left-right orientation. The calculations for these indicators are based on Protasov et al. (2014), the *Manifesto Project Database*, and are detailed in section 3.3 (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). We suppose that left-wing parties are more inclined towards redistributive measures than right-wing parties when the economic dimension is emphasized. However, when the cultural dimension takes precedence, partisan effects are expected to diminish. To assess the relative importance of the degree of political instability emanating from revolutionary actions, we supplement our overall measure of local radicalization with our four-stage measures of violence, which we describe in Section 3.

Consequently, Okhrana_{ij} encompasses two variables. The first component gauges overall radicalization at the district level by quantifying the total number of individuals under surveillance for anti-Tsarist activities. For simplicity, we refer to this composite variable as Okhrana_{ij}. The second variable, labeled Crimes, assesses the intensity of local radicalization based on the severity of the crimes. This categorization includes (1) dissemination of propaganda, (2) membership in subversive organizations, (3) organization and participation in riots, and (4) organization and participation in assassinations. It is essential to note that, due to the absence of information on the intensity of coercive measures employed by the Okhrana, such as extrajudicial killings, actual arrests or detentions, or the use of torture, our two measures offer a broad evaluation of bottom-up local radicalization tendencies in European Russia, commonly known as the 'prison of the nation' (Greitens 2016, p. 65).

We further integrate geographic and demographic controls from the replication data of Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020), which we capture in the vector X_{ij}. It is important to consider the historical context of Russia, where violent political upheavals, including insurrections, assassinations, wars, invasions, political strikes and revolutions, have repeatedly triggered measures to restrict civil liberties by the political authorities. These events often coincided with changes in leadership and increasing uncertainty about the country's future. Notable examples include the assassination of Alexander II in 1881, the Manchurian conflict of 1903, the decisive Russo-Japanese War of 1904/5, widespread strikes and the First Russian Revolution of 1905, a series of defeats in World War II from 1916 to 1918, and the decisive February and October Revolutions, followed by the abdication of Nicholas II in 1907, which led to a severe civil war from 1918 to 1922. Therefore, the assassination of Alexander II (and later the abdication of Nicholas II) represents a key moment in history with the potential to either reverse or extend crucial social reforms, particularly those that affected former serfs and the Jewish communities (Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya 2020).

Concerning the former serfs, and notwithstanding earlier endeavors in industrialization, the Russian economy in the 1880s remained predominantly dependent on agriculture, particularly in the

cultivation of grains (Allen 2003). The transition of leadership from Alexander II to Alexander III sparked concerns among the former serfs, constituting 43% of the Russian rural population in 1858, regarding the potential reintroduction of serfdom, even though it did not materialize. This historical link between serfdom and peasant unrest, coupled with the lingering grievances and resistance forms as examined by Buggle and Nafziger (2021), forms a compelling rationale for our study. To investigate whether regions with a higher prevalence of serfdom showed stronger support for various political factions, we utilized the replication data from Buggle and Nafziger (2021). To account for potential claims for land redistribution and other regional influences on political support, we control for the share of former serfs in each district in 1858, considering both field and domestic serfs. Additionally, we incorporated geographical controls, such as latitude and longitude, the presence of coal territories, the podzolic land index, length of the growing season, as well as distances to St. Petersburg and the provincial capital.

Furthermore, during Alexander II's reign, certain restrictions on the residence and employment of Jews were eased, with many regulations being largely disregarded in practice. Specifically, Jews residing outside their designated settlement areas were no longer harassed by the police, and Jewish merchants of the highest commercial class, as well as Jews in the medical professions, were permitted to settle with their families in towns beyond the Pale. Additionally, compulsory military service for school leavers was reduced to just one year (Shtakser 2014). As a consequence of these relaxations, an increasing number of Jews began to engage in liberal professions, such as doctors, lawyers, midwives, editors of Russian-language newspapers, and journalists. This development gave rise to a significant segment of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia towards the end of the 19th century, integrating itself to varying degrees into Russian society, especially in rural communities (Akhiezer 2013, p. 562). However, under Alexander III, the government's policy towards Jews shifted, resulting in a series of economic disruptions in the employment structure of Jewish communities. To account for these changes, we rely on replication data from Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020), which includes ethnic composition by occupation and literacy rates among Jews and non-Jews (from 1897) in each district of the Pale of Settlement. To address the middlemen narrative presented by Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020), we aggregate their grid-level dataset at the district level and control for the share of Jews in craftsmanship, the credit sector, and the trading sector.

Moreover, we factor in the proportion of industrial workers in a given district based on the 1897 census data on dependent or self-employed workers by province. These data are then adjusted at the district level, considering the district's population. Our definition of industrial workers follows a methodology akin to that of Buggle and Nafziger (2021), encompassing individuals employed or self-employed in specific industries such as mining, metalworking, garment manufacturing, residential construction, and general construction (including categories 21 to 40 from Kessler and Markevich (2017)).[22] To further mitigate potential language barriers in political agitation, we also account for the proportion of speakers of East Slavic languages, encompassing Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian (Castañeda Dower and Markevich 2022). These controls are supplemented by district-level data on changes in the gender ratio in 1913 compared to 1917 resulting from the mobilization of men during the First World War, utilizing the Statistical Yearbook for population data at the district level `histmat.info`. Detailed correlations of the explanatory and control variables with political groups are presented in Tables B.6 to B.7 in the appendix, supplemented by descriptive statistics in Tables B.5 to B.4.

[22] Our categorization includes all persons employed or self-employed in mining and quarrying, metal smelting, fibre processing, processing of animal products, wood processing, metal processing, mineral processing, manufacture of chemical and allied products, distillation, brewing and honey fermentation, manufacture of other beverages and manufacture of fermented materials; Processing of plant and animal foods; manufacture of tobacco and tobacco products; printing; instrument making; jewelry making, painting, manufacture of cultural and luxury goods; clothing manufacture; construction, repair and maintenance of housing and general construction; construction of railroad carriages and wooden ships; other industrial workers.

We consistently observe a positive correlation between right-wing conservative political attitudes and the prevalence of overall local radicalization. This finding suggests that the increasing local radicalization within Russian society might serve as a motivating factor pushing voters toward the right side of the political spectrum. To avoid making broad generalizations about individual behaviors from aggregated data, we employ Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) in the subsequent analysis. Both PSM and CEM have been utilized in prior studies to address endogeneity in baseline Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models. CEM functions as a sensitivity analysis for PSM, grouping units based on covariate strata and matching within these strata to minimize imbalances between treatment and control groups, especially when a nonparametric estimation strategy is preferred (Datta 2015; Iacus, King, and Porro 2009). We conduct two sets of CEM estimations with different covariates. The first set includes variables such as latitude, longitude, distance to the provincial capital, and distance to St. Petersburg. The second set comprises factors like distance to the coast, a charcoal dummy, podzolic soil, and length of the growing season. To address the assumption of random assignment underlying the PSM method, we include Rosenbaum tests that calculate the critical level of hidden bias (Γ) concerning the significance levels of the reported average treatment effects (ATTs). Furthermore, our PSM estimates incorporate both Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) and Kernel-based Matching (KBM). NNM pairs a treated unit with a control unit based on an approximate propensity score, while KBM matches a treated unit with a weighted average of the control units to minimize the discrepancy between the propensity scores of the treated and control units (Chaudoin, Hays, and Hicks 2018).

To investigate the potential spread of political violence at the local level, possibly influenced by the cooperation of local dissidents or the expansion of revolutionary activities, we examine complex spatial correlation structures between our observation units (districts) using the Colella et al. (2020) approach. At a threshold distance of 100 kilometers, we assume that the spatial correlations will decrease beyond this threshold. To further assess the potential spread of political agitation among nonviolent revolutionary diaspora groups in districts of European Russia, we use two sets of spatial autoregressive models. The first is the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), which includes both exogenous and endogenous spatial lags, allows us to account for global spillover effects and to understand how political unrest may affect districts that are not in close proximity to active revolutionary districts. The second model is the Spatial Durbin Error Model (SDEM), which focuses exclusively on local spillover effects within districts and sheds light on why certain districts become engaged while others remain unaffected (Yesilyurt and Elhorst 2017, p. 782). This distinction between local and global spillover effects is crucial for our understanding of political agitation dynamics in European Russia. We explicitly define neighborhood relations using a binary contiguity matrix, a spatial weight matrix with few non-zero elements that assumes similarity only between immediately neighboring districts (Danneman and Ritter 2014, p. 256).

6. Results

6.1. Okhrana & Political Preferences

Table 6 displays our findings regarding three key indicators: ideological polarization, center of gravity, and the position of the most far-right party in both European Russia (Columns 1-3) and the Pale region (Columns 4-6). Our model includes diverse demographic and geographic controls, along with gender indicators (1 for male, 0 for female) for the individuals under scrutiny.

We find that districts with a history of significant radicalization during the tsarist rule, as indicated by our composite variable Okhrana, do not appear to significantly influence political polarization in the

1917 Constituency Assembly, whether in European Russia (Column 1) or the Pale of Settlement districts (Column 4). However, heightened revolutionary conflict in the vicinity, posing a threat to both elites and the general public, has the potential to shift the center of gravity (COG) toward the right. Consequently, working-class voters with culturally authoritarian views may opt for nationalist or moderate/conservative right-wing parties over left-wing ones (Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Finseraas 2010, p. 302).

Table 6: Center of gravity and relative polarization

	European Russia			Pale of Settlement		
	PolIndex	COG	Most right	PolIndex	COG	Most right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Radicalization:						
Okhrana	−0.012	0.245**	0.054	0.029	0.298	0.243**
	(0.011)	(0.110)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.438)	(0.110)
Male (1 if male)	0.016	−0.291**	−0.060	−0.037	−0.356	−0.304*
	(0.014)	(0.143)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.604)	(0.152)
By visibility:						
Assassinations	−0.007	−0.262	−0.244***	0.062	0.474	−0.069
	(0.020)	(0.212)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.654)	(0.144)
Riots	−0.437***	−3.717**	−1.294**	−0.166	−6.633**	−3.006***
	(0.157)	(1.635)	(0.529)	(0.258)	(3.106)	(0.699)
Membership	0.066**	0.812**	0.335***	0.014	1.096**	0.611***
	(0.031)	(0.328)	(0.105)	(0.042)	(0.508)	(0.115)
Propaganda	−0.048	−0.404	0.311**	−0.050	−0.931	−0.074
	(0.041)	(0.432)	(0.131)	(0.118)	(1.424)	(0.306)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Middlemen	—	—	—	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables are based on an electoral polarization index ranging from 0 to 1, as constructed by Dalton (2008) and utilized in the Manifesto project. The COG (Center of Gravity) variable used in this study represents the ideological center of gravity within a district, and is calculated as the average weighted mean left-right position of political parties based on their vote share, as proposed by Gross and Sigelman (1984) and utilized in the Manifesto project. The dependent variables refer to the district-level political spectrum is measured by calculating the most rightist parties at the election, based on their vote share and also utilized in the Manifesto project. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district.

In the final decades of the Russian Empire, marked by an increase in revolutionary groups and mass opposition movements, leading to expanded imperial security measures, we do find initial evidence of a significant rightward shift in the COG in the European part of Russia (Column 2). This shift is in response to inherited grievances stemming from autocratic policies in the last two decades of the 19th century. Notably, due to widespread anti-Semitism among the population and certain segments of the tsarist bureaucracy, the situation in the Pale of Settlement is of particular interest.

However, in the Pale, we do not identify a significant shift of the COG to the right. Instead, we observe an electorate response, supporting the most right-wing positions (Column 6). The statistical significance of our results (at the 5% level) suggests that the bottom-up radicalization documented by the Okhrana in the Pale influenced political outcomes after its fall, albeit in a direction different from what revolutionaries had initially intended. Our findings in the Pale also imply a gender bias in crime involvement decisions, possibly influenced by the distinct social roles and status of men and women

during the historical period under study, especially in the Pale region. The gender of revolutionaries, as documented in newspapers and reports, emerges as a decisive factor in the pre-revolutionary electorate, confirming a more favorable view of female revolutionaries.

When differentiated by the severity of deliberately induced political instability, we observe that riot organizing, in particular, shifts the COG in European Russia to the left, while organized membership shifts it to the right (Columns 2 and 5). Our results illustrate this rightward shift in the most affected districts in European Russia, even more so in our Pale subsample. In regions with greater membership organization, a 'moral polarization' phenomenon seemed to have pushed voters to the right, whereas in regions with more pronounced strike potential, the opposite effect is observed (Columns 2 and 5). We take this as evidence that with greater pressure for redistribution, there is a tendency to lean more to the left, possibly in response to curbing further violence. However, a shift to the right in the COG following collective action in memberships may be observed to prevent minority participation.

Columns 3 and 6 show which deliberately induced political instability benefited the conservative factions the most. We found that the dissemination of propaganda and party membership potentially benefited right-wing parties in European Russia the most (Column 3). While we categorize these state crimes as less violent, we continue to find a positive correlation between the threat of murder and riots that would more overtly threaten public order, benefiting left-wing rather than conservative positions. The results in Column 6 confirm our findings for riots and membership-related offenses in the Pale of Settlement. A pattern emerges: where public order is more overtly threatened by sedition and possible murder, more Conservative party lists lose (Column 3). In contrast, the electorate in Pale (Columns 5-6) responds more ambiguously. Although we had originally expected local radicalization to have a stronger effect in districts more affected by the murders, we observe a shift away from the most far-right party positions. However, the lack of a significant effect in the Pale regions is likely due to factors such as emigration, military mobilization, and territorial losses, which may have played a more important role in shaping electoral polarization in the Pale region than the originally expected local radicalization.

Furthermore, we provide initial evidence suggesting that experiences of opposition inherited from the imperial era can prompt a reconfiguration of social classes in subsequent post-imperial elections, as noted by Oesch and Rennwald (2018). This implies a potential transformation in the composition of political party electorates, challenging the conventional assumption that political parties primarily mold social policy according to their ideological stance and the material interests of their core supporters (Spies 2013; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015; Oesch and Rennwald 2018; Hibbs 1977; Schmidt 1996).

Tables 7 and B.8 now provides insights into the electoral outcomes of different political groups in the 1917 constituency assembly elections for both samples. Categorizing parties based on their economic policies and political orientation using the Arzamas classification and our independent coding, we classify the Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks as extreme left, while the Liberals (big landowners and industrialists) and the Constitutional Democrats ('Kadets') are considered right-wing conservatives. Centrist parties consistently holding centrist positions over time without aligning with a left or right wing were identified as such.

Our results confirm the moderating influence of local radicalization on the electoral outcomes of the conservative right in European Russia and even larger in magnitude in the Pale of Settlement. These first correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level for our European Russia sample and at the 1% level for our Pale subsample. For both regions we are once more able to observe that male revolutionaries contribute to greater support for the conservative right, possibly due to a cognitive barrier associating radicalism more with the male gender. Highlighting the crucial role of offense severity in shaping voters' policy preferences, especially within the context of non-economic party competition, our analysis reveals

distinct patterns. Specifically, non-violent offenses such as propaganda and membership tend to boost support for the conservative right (and the moderate left, as evident in Columns 5 and 2). Conversely, assassinations and riots have a centrist-shifting effect, adversely impacting both left and right factions. Notably, activities like student and worker incitement, coupled with the perceived threat of assassinations, do not favor any left-wing party list in the 1917 Constituent Assembly.

Table 7: Benefactors of Tsarist repression in European Russia, by faction

	Far Left (1)	Mod. Left (2)	Center (3)	Mod. Right (4)	Cons. Right (5)
Radicalization:					
Okhrana	0.024	−0.007	−0.031	−0.001	0.015***
	(0.021)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Male (1 if male)	−0.033	0.009	0.039	0.003	−0.018***
	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.035)	(0.015)	(0.006)
By visibility:					
Assassinations	−0.075**	−0.057***	0.214***	−0.031	−0.051***
	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.045)	(0.020)	(0.008)
Riots	0.060	−0.406***	0.806**	−0.077	−0.382***
	(0.284)	(0.138)	(0.361)	(0.160)	(0.064)
Membership	0.013	0.071**	−0.205***	0.038	0.083***
	(0.056)	(0.027)	(0.072)	(0.032)	(0.013)
Propaganda	0.207***	0.118***	−0.406***	0.030	0.051***
	(0.070)	(0.034)	(0.089)	(0.040)	(0.016)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district.

Expanding our exploration to include the Pale of Settlement, as detailed in Table B.8 in the Appendix, not only corroborates our initial findings but also unveils a significant mobilization potential around redistributive issues at the right end of the political spectrum. Specifically, grievances related to membership contribute to heightened electoral support for the moderate and conservative right, often at the expense of centrist parties. However, this expanded analysis of the electorate in the Pale region reveals a more polarized landscape, with districts displaying a pronounced inclination towards parties at either extreme of the political spectrum, particularly to the detriment of the center.

In interpretation, our results suggest that the severity and nature of political offenses play a pivotal role in shaping voter preferences for certain factions. Non-violent past offenses, such as propaganda and membership-related activities, appear to resonate more with conservative and moderate-left constituencies. In contrast, past violent actions, such as assassinations and riots, have a centrist-shifting effect, impacting both left and right-leaning factions. The unique dynamics observed in the Pale of Settlement highlight

the region's distinctive political landscape, characterized by a notable mobilization potential around redistributive concerns.

Taking into account the potential repercussions for parties sharing similar ideologies, we delve into the election outcomes for various political entities, including the Jewish lists, with the aim of discerning how experiences of violence shape political mobilization (Bellows and Miguel 2009). Examining the results for European Russia in Table 8, we observe that, excluding the Mensheviks and Jewish Lists, the Kadets stand out as the primary beneficiaries of prevailing local radicalization trends. Their share of the vote is significantly influenced by the two less violent categories of propaganda and membership. However, the intricate dynamics of political turmoil manifest varied effects on the electoral success of different parties. Notably, assassinations yield positive effects for the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries, while propaganda exhibits negative effects for the Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Kadets. On the other hand, membership shows positive effects for the Jewish Lists and the Liberals. Crucially, the Kadets, Liberals, and Jewish lists face severe backlash in response to assassinations and riots. In essence, our findings once again underscore a robust correlation between political mobilization for the Constituent Assembly and past grievances.

Table 8: Benefactors of Tsarist repression in European Russia, by party

	Mensheviks	SRevol	Bolsheviks	Jewish lists	Liberals	Kadets
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Radicalization:						
Okhrana	0.023*	−0.036	−0.001	0.007*	0.002	0.013***
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Male (1 if male)	−0.030*	0.042	0.003	−0.008*	−0.002	−0.015**
	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.006)
By visibility:						
Assassinations	0.050**	0.118***	−0.021	−0.036***	−0.006**	−0.045***
	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Riots	−0.015	0.576*	0.401	−0.225***	−0.078***	−0.304***
	(0.175)	(0.336)	(0.244)	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.061)
Membership	−0.026	−0.108	−0.077	0.063***	0.012***	0.072***
	(0.035)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.012)
Propaganda	−0.098**	−0.332***	0.230***	−0.002	0.007	0.044***
	(0.043)	(0.083)	(0.060)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.015)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables refer to different political factions. Mensheviks encompasses the vote share for the center, leftist, and rightist factions of the Menshevik party. SRevol represents the vote share for the Social Revolutionaries, while Bolsheviks refers to any list where the Bolsheviks were the leading party. Jewish lists refers to the vote share for Jewish lists, such as Fareynikte, the Bund, or the Zionists. Liberals denotes the vote share for the Commercial Industrialists and Landowners, and Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets') represents the vote share for the most conservative party electable in the 1917 assembly. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district.

Considering that the Constituent Assembly occurred almost two decades after our observation period, our results strongly indicate the presence of intergenerational effects, especially among individuals who either heard about or witnessed the violence and subsequently mobilized in response. This temporal span reinforces the idea that historical experiences of violence leave a lasting imprint on political behaviors,

contributing to a nuanced understanding of the enduring impact of past events on contemporary political landscapes. Table B.9 substantiates these findings. Notably, the most conservative right-wing party, the Kadets, emerges as the primary beneficiary of earlier radicalization trends in the Pale, as measured by `Okhrana`. Regarding the severity of offenses, we confirm the results observed in European Russia, but to an even greater extent. Once again, we find a robust negative correlation between the most serious crime categories – assassinations and riots – and the electoral success of the Constitutional Democrats. This further supports the notion that the enduring effects of historical violence extend beyond immediate repercussions, shaping the political landscape over an extended period.

Our findings align with established literature on the consequences of terrorist attacks. As emphasized by Friedland and Merari (1985), acts of terrorism lacking explicit political messages are more likely to solidify negative attitudes toward the perpetrators rather than garnering sympathy. Additionally, Gould and Klor (2010) illustrates that violence targeting civilian populations can strengthen a government's resolve, while military attacks may prompt concessions. The potential 'directional effects' of terrorist attacks become especially pertinent in the context of voting for or against parties suspected of perpetuating tsarist, non-equalitarian policies post-election. Theories of retroactive voting and political accountability suggest that citizens may either punish laeding parties after attacks or rally around them to oppose terrorists – a phenomenon known as 'rally around the flag' (Chowanietz 2010).

In line with this body of research, we offer preliminary evidence for Imperial Russia that underscores the nuanced influence of intentional political instability during the 1880s and 1890s on subsequent electoral behavior. This influence is particularly notable in the districts of European Russia and, significantly, in the districts of the Pale. The observed shifts in voting preferences are intricately linked to the degree of political turmoil, characterized by factors such as the dissemination of propaganda, violent murders, and the advocacy for redistribution through organized memberships or riots. Our findings highlight that past deliberate political instability had a substantial impact on the electoral behavior of conservative parties in the Constituent Assembly of 1917. Notably, when public security or elite interests were overtly threatened, we observed a significant decrease in votes for individual parties situated on the right side of the political spectrum. This suggests a discernible connection between the intensity of political instability and the electoral choices made by the electorate, particularly in favor of conservative parties during periods of heightened public security concerns or threats to elite interests. These dynamics are illustrated in Table B.9 respectively Table 8.

6.2. Robustness Checks: Revolutionary Spillovers

6.2.1. Spatial Correction

To substantiate our OLS analysis, we consider spatial factors and shed light on the influence of general radicalization on the electoral success of different political groups, focusing in particular on propaganda and membership. The observed impact is statistically significant for both propaganda and membership at the 1% level, as detailed in Table B.10. The escalation of radicalization, as measured by the severity of crimes, further supports our findings. Attacks and riots are causing voters to turn away from parties across the political spectrum, including the extreme and moderate left as well as the conservative right. Notably, centrist parties receive a disproportionate share of the vote in response to attacks. This pattern is also evident in Table B.11, which confirms a decline in the vote share of conservative factions, particularly the conservative right, which is made up of landowners and industrialists, in the Pale of Settlement. It further strengthens the electoral loss for the Jewish Lists.

Conversely, the fringe parties recorded a significant decline in response to the attacks. As shown in Table B.12, our analysis again shows that the political spectrum has widened following the attacks and unrest. In these districts, the Kadets, the Liberals and the Jewish List record significant losses in the wake of social radicalization, indicating an increase in inequality and discontent. On the other hand, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries gain support as a result of the assassinations, indicating a tendency to promote more equitable conditions in response to increased redistributive pressures.

Our results show that local radicalization tendencies have a more complex influence on the political landscape than previously assumed. They not only influence the political center towards moderate right-wing parties, but also play a role in shaping the dynamics of fringe parties. We argue that our analysis, which incorporates spatial data and takes into account the influence of transnational revolutionaries, contributes to a more nuanced understanding of how inherited local radicalization trends have influenced voting behavior decades later. The fact that these results emerged before the escalation of violence in the early 20th century underscores the widespread dissatisfaction with tsarist policies in the 1880s to 1890s.

6.2.2. Spatial Autocorrelation

To bolster the robustness of our spatial analysis, we employ two advanced models, the spatial Durbin model (SDM) and the spatial Durbin error model (SDEM), which offer significant advantages in accounting for spatial autocorrelation over the traditional linear regression model. As highlighted by Yesilyurt and Elhorst (2017) and Elhorst (2014), these models effectively incorporate spatial lags of the dependent variable, explanatory variables, the error term, or various combinations thereof, making them particularly adept at capturing potential spillover effects of revolutionary activity.

Our results for European Russia are detailed in Tables B.15 to B.16 and affirm that districts with higher occurrences of propaganda and membership offenses lean towards voting for the Constitutional Democrats ('Kadets'). Notably, Columns 5-6 in Table B.16 highlight the significant negative impact of various violent tactics of political warfare, including riots and assassinations, on the Kadets. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a distinct spatial interdependence in the error term, indicating a localized spread of revolutionary activity, specifically propaganda, across different districts.

Additionally, we confirm a positive correlation between the severity of crimes and a decrease in electoral support for conservative right factions. Riots and assassinations are shown to amplify support for the center at the expense of more moderate and conservative right positions, as detailed in Tables B.18 to B.19.[23]

Finally, our results underscore the varied effects of deliberate political instability on the left-right axis of the political spectrum, resulting in a shift to the right, particularly concerning the least visible crime categories, as demonstrated in Table B.21. Notably, the direct effect and its severity/visibility align consistently with the OLS estimates in all our models. Overall, our findings suggest that local radicalization effectively heightens electoral polarization and redirects voter support towards the right rather than the left side of the political spectrum.

6.3. Robustness Checks: Matching

To address potential biases in our observational study, we employed propensity score matching (PSM) to group observations based on similar propensity scores, considering observable characteristics that might influence treatment assignment. We applied two PSM methods, kernel-based matching (KBM, Panel A) and nearest neighbor matching (NNM, Panel B), to our general radicalization indicator Okhrana while

[23] Importantly, similar direct effects are observed when examining direct, indirect, and aggregate effects.

including geographic and demographic variables as control variables. The results support our hypothesis that political conflict resulting from reactions to tsarist repression likely contributed to the subsequent rise in support for conservative political groups on the opposite spectrum compared to the Bolsheviks several decades later. This suggests that political warfare played a central role in triggering a conservative reaction within Russian society, as shown in Table 9.

Table 9: ATT & Sensitivity Analysis: Benefactors by faction in European Russia

Variable	PolIndex	Far Left	Mod. Left	Center	Mod. Right	Cons. Right
	Panel A: Kernel-Based Matching					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATT – Okhrana	0.029	−0.013	0.004	0.006	−0.022	0.025***
	(0.023)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.005)
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Treated	179	159	159	159	159	159
Control	190	179	179	179	179	179
$\Gamma(sigm+ < 0.05)$	124	108	76	108	83	108
Observations	369	338	338	338	338	338
	Panel B: Neighrest-Neighbor Matching					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATT – Okhrana	0.046*	0.004	0.006	0.003	−0.036	0.023***
	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.019)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.007)
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Treated	179	159	159	159	159	159
Control	190	179	179	179	179	179
$\Gamma(sigm+ < 0.05)$	124	108	76	108	83	108
Observations	369	338	338	338	338	338

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard error in parentheses. NNM ==1. Common support is imposed. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district.

In Panel A of Table 10, our results consistently confirm a statistically significant relationship between overall revolutionary activity, as indicated by our `Okhrana` treatment variable, and an increased preference for the Kadets (and the Liberals), finding a significance level of 1% (resp. 10% level) with a coefficient size twice as large as in our OLS estimate. This aligns with the average treatment effect for the conservative right, as shown in Column 6 of Table 9. Notably, the radical left Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks did not capitalize on the prevailing discontent in the 1880s and 1890s. Instead, the centrist alternatives to the Kadets, the Mensheviks, as well as the Liberals (the industrialists and large landowners), profited from the great popular discontent. Moving to Panel B of Table 10, our NNM algorithm not only reiterates the magnitude and statistical significance of these effects but also affirms their impact on the Mensheviks and Liberals. To evaluate potential effects of unobserved factors on the statistical

significance of the average treatment effect (ATT), we conducted the Rosenbaum Bounds test. Our results indicate that Γ, the measure of hidden bias, lacks significance, thereby upholding the reported coefficients' significance. This trend holds true across both matching algorithms (NNM in Panel A and KBM in Panel B) and our Rosenbaum bounds (Γ at 0.05).[24]

Table 10: ATT & Sensitivity Analysis: Benefactors by party in European Russia

Variable	Mensheviks	SRevol	Bolsheviks	Jewish lists	Liberals	Kadets
	Panel A: Kernel-Based Matching					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATT – Okhrana	0.028*	−0.023	−0.012	0.000	0.004*	0.021***
	(0.017)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Treated	159	159	159	159	159	159
Control	179	179	179	179	179	179
$\Gamma(sigm+ < 0.05)$	108	108	107	40	82	108
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
	Panel B: Neighrest-Neighbor Matching					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ATT – Okhrana	0.032**	−0.024	0.005	0.001	0.005**	0.018***
	(0.015)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Treated	159	159	159	159	159	159
Control	179	179	179	179	179	179
$\Gamma(sigm+ < 0.05)$	108	108	107	40	82	108
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338

Our Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) results, presented in Tables B.14 and B.24, once more highlight that regions subjected to high levels of revolutionary activity are more inclined to support political parties on the opposite end of the spectrum from the Bolsheviks. Specifically, we observe statistically significant effects on conservative right-wing voters, notably at the 5% level. This trend is particularly pronounced in the statistically highly significant voter turnout for the Kadets. When examining the average Okhrana treatment effect (ATT) for relative radicalization, we identify a statistically significant positive effect on the preference for the furthest right party, also at the 5% level. Even with a more comprehensive set of covariates, the rightward effect of secret police surveillance remains apparent. Our results consistently demonstrate that the Kadets emerge as the primary beneficiaries of Okhrana repression, leading to a significant radicalization towards the extreme right, with a persistent preference for the farthest right political party in each district.

In summary, our research provides valuable insights into the lasting impact of tsarism's repressive strategies on revolutionary warfare, shaping the political landscape until the 1917 revolution. Additionally, it highlights the effectiveness of the Okhrana in quelling left-wing mobilization and amplifying electoral polarization. Furthermore, our findings indicate a noticeable trend towards heightened political radicalization, particularly favoring the conservative spectrum.

[24] We utilized the `rbounds` Stata module provided by Gangl (2004).

Table 11: Coarsened matching results – reduced set of covariates

Variables	Coefficient	Number of Obs.	R-Squared
Individual Parties			
Mensheviks	0.034**	228.000	0.019
	(0.016)		
SRevol	−0.041	228.000	0.007
	(0.033)		
Bolsheviks	−0.048	228.000	0.012
	(0.029)		
Jewish lists	0.016***	228.000	0.049
	(0.005)		
Liberals	0.000	228.000	0.000
	(0.002)		
Kadets	0.014**	228.000	0.024
	(0.006)		
General Radicalization			
Most left	0.066	228.000	0.002
	(0.102)		
Most right	0.078**	228.000	0.019
	(0.037)		
Left-right range	0.012	228.000	0.000
	(0.104)		
Relative Radicalization			
PolIndex	−0.019	276.000	0.005
	(0.016)		
Far Left	−0.055*	228.000	0.015
	(0.029)		
Mod. Left	0.015	228.000	0.010
	(0.010)		
Center	0.011	228.000	0.001
	(0.030)		
Mod. Right	0.015	228.000	0.008
	(0.011)		
Cons. Right	0.014**	228.000	0.024
	(0.006)		

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. Results for the Bolsheviks, Kadets and Liberals as median party in a given district are omitted.

7. Conclusion

Tsardom's response to escalating political discontent, marked by delayed reactions, failure to institute constitutional government, and neglect of political repression before World War I, set it apart from its European counterparts (Daly 2002, p. 80). This sluggish response was influenced by factors such as the devastating famine of 1891-92, Nicholas II's inertia, and disregard for public suffering, contributing to increased discontent, especially among the educated middle class. While the liberal opposition called for a constitution and parliamentary representation, peasants grew dissatisfied over agrarian reform, and industrial workers began organizing. Simultaneously, issues of national identity gained urgency in peripheral regions, with ethnic groups demanding self-determination amid revolutionary unrest (Hilbrenner, Lutes, and Zielinski 2008).

In this tense climate, Russian elites, fearing overwhelm by modernization forces, established modern political police forces, setting the tone for subsequent securitz apparatus. The Okhrana epitomized

the adversarial relationship between a coercive administration and citizens, reinforcing the image of an invincible, omnipresent, and unaccountable entity at the administration's discretion.

To assess revolutionary tactics' impact on the lead-up to the October Revolution, we used a unique dataset from the first professional political police in the Russian Empire, focusing on the 1917 Constituent Assembly. Our analysis explored individual party votes, polarization, and left-right divergence to understand revolutionary tactics' effects on political preferences. Our findings indicate a positive correlation between deliberate political instability and 1917 Constituent Assembly outcomes at the local level, revealing insights into the last free elections preceding the Communist Party's ascension. The positive impact of revolutionary warfare recorded by the Okhrana on the shift toward conservative solutions highlights the authoritarian secret police's efficacy as a survival strategy for the tsarist empire. Additionally, our analysis reveals a political system where cultural and economic inequalities, exacerbated by the Imperial Russian bureaucracy, bolstered specific parties at both ends of the political spectrum. Conservative parties found success in districts where elites and populations felt less overtly threatened. Overall, our study demonstrates how a robust security apparatus can temporarily garner political support, as seen in the Constituent Assembly—an unusual democratic experiment amidst two authoritarian regimes.

Our analysis underscores several significant implications. Firstly, in alignment with the findings of Scharpf and Gläßel (2020), we address the institutional underpinnings of authoritarian stability. Our findings indicate that a well-established, meritocratic bureaucracy, attracting exceptionally skilled individuals, plays a crucial role in sustaining autocratic regimes. The presence of hierarchical structures within an efficient coercive bureaucracy, coupled with robust systems of merit-based promotion and rewards, fosters incentives for unwavering loyalty. This loyalty, in turn, becomes a powerful tool for regimes to effectively counter social opposition groups. This discovery diverges from research on the Dirty War in Argentina by Scharpf and Gläßel (2020) and the Gestapo in Nazi Germany (Browder 1997, p. 22 & 83), underscoring the unique dynamics at play.

While the Okhrana achieved success in suppressing revolutionary activities within the Russian Empire post-1905, it could not entirely prevent the formation of subversive networks abroad or the erosion of hope among educated Russians (Fischer 1997; Hillis 2021). These successes and failures offer insights into the efficiency of the tsarist bureaucracy. Despite having only a few thousand employees in 1913 in a country with a population exceeding 160 million, the Okhrana maintained its power through a combination of centralized and specialized structures, coupled with highly efficient methods (Lauchlan 2005, p. 48). The Okhrana's independence from regular police and its far-reaching tactics positioned it as a precursor and prototype for political police organizations throughout the twentieth century (Pipes 1979, p. 302).

In conclusion, the historical events in Russia during the 19th and early 20th centuries exhibit striking parallels with the late 1980s in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The unintended consequences of modernization during the Great Reforms of Alexander II, including the radicalization of an educated youth and the emergence of radical intellectuals, resemble later events. Uprisings by non-Russian minorities and attempts by revolutionaries to challenge the Tsar's rule eventually led to his assassination and the subsequent establishment and expansion of the Okhrana under his successors. The failure of the Russian government to effectively manage the forces of social change by containing them rather than directing them led to the very results it had sought to prevent: widespread social unrest and organized 'incitement' (Morrissey 2012). The analysis of Alexander II's goals, strategies, and challenges foreshadows the obstacles that Gorbachev would face in the following decades. The lessons of the fall of the Tsarist regime serve as a stark warning of the dangers of suddenly unleashing pent-up popular sentiment after years of autocratic oppression, potentially leading to national mobilization and economic hardship (Zubok 2021).

References

[1] Golda Akhiezer. "Jewish Identity and the Russian Revolution: A Case Study of Radical Activism in the Russian Empire." In: *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25.4 (2013), pp. 561–575.

[2] John H. Aldrich et al. "FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION." In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 9.1 (2006), pp. 477–502.

[3] Robert C. Allen. *Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003.

[4] Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky. *KGB: The inside story of its foreign operations from Lenin to Gorbachev*. New York: Harpers Collins, 1990.

[5] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin. *The Mitrokhin archive*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 1999.

[6] Hannah Arendt. *The origins of totalitarianism*. Vol. 244. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.

[7] I. Michael Aronson. *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti Jewish Pogroms in Russia*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990.

[8] Martin Aust. *Die Russische Revolution: vom Zarenreich zum Sowjetimperium*. 1. Auflage. C.H.Beck Paperback 6264. München: C.H. Beck, 2017.

[9] Valentina A. Bali. "Terror and elections: Lessons from Spain." In: *Electoral Studies* 26.3 (2007), pp. 669–687.

[10] Robert J. Barro. "The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model." In: *Public Choice* 14 (1973), pp. 19–42.

[11] Alexander Beider. *A Dictionary of Jewish Surnames from the Russian Empire*. Avotaynu, 2008.

[12] Alexander Beider. *Handbook of Ashkenazic Given Names and Their Variants*. Avotaynu, 2009.

[13] Mark Beissinger and Stephen Kotkin. *Historical legacies of communism in Russia and Eastern Europe*. 1. publ. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014.

[14] John Bellows and Edward Miguel. "War and local collective action in Sierra Leone." In: *Journal of Public Economics* 93.11 (2009), pp. 1144–1157.

[15] Claude Berrebi and Esteban F. Klor. "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate." In: *American Political Science Review* 102.3 (2008), pp. 279–301.

[16] Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal-Querol. *The Colonial Origins of State Capacity: Evidence from Spanish Conquerors in Latin America*. Electronic Article. 2023.

[17] Anna Bindler et al. "Murphy's Law or Luck of the Irish? Disparate Treatment of the Irish in 19th Century Courts." In: *IZA Discussion Paper* 16071 (2023).

[18] Christopher Blattman. "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda." In: *American Political Science Review* 103.2 (2009), pp. 231–247.

[19] Leah Boustan. *Were Jews Political Refugees or Economic Migrants? Assessing the Persecution Theory of Jewish Emigration, 1881–1914*. Electronic Book Section. 2007.

[20] George C. Browder. *Hitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution*. Oxford University Press, 1997.

[21] Ian Budge et al. *Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and governments, 1945-1998*. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press, 2001.

[22] Johannes C. Buggle and Steven Nafziger. "The Slow Road from Serfdom: Labor Coercion and Long-Run Development in the Former Russian Empire." In: *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 103.1 (2021), pp. 1–17.

[23] Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space1." In: *International Studies Quarterly* 52.2 (2008), pp. 215–233.

[24] Vladimir Burtsev. "Police Provocation in Russia." In: *The Slavonic Review* 6.17 (1927), pp. 247–267.

[25] S. van Buuren, H. Boshuizen, and D. Knook. "Multiple imputation of missing blood pressure covariates in survival analysis." In: *Stat Med* 18.6 (1999), pp. 681–94.

[26] Nauro F. Campos and Martin Gassebner. "International Terrorism, Domestic Political Instability, and the Escalation Effect." In: *Economics & Politics* 25.1 (2013), pp. 27–47.

[27] Paul Castañeda Dower and Andrei Markevich. "Did Industrialization Increase Support for the Radical Left? Evidence from the 1917 Russian Revolution." Unpublished Work. 2022.

[28] Paul Castañeda Dower and Andrei Markevich. "The Stolypin reform and agricultural productivity in late imperial Russia." In: *European Review of Economic History* 23.3 (2019), pp. 241–267.

[29] Volha Charnysh. "Explaining Out-Group Bias in Weak States." In: *World Politics* 74.2 (2022), pp. 205–248.

[30] Stephen Chaudoin, Jude Hays, and Raymond Hicks. "Do We Really Know the WTO Cures Cancer?" In: *British journal of political science* 48.4 (2018), pp. 903–928.

[31] Anton Cheremukhin et al. "The Industrialization and Economic Development of Russia through the Lens of a Neoclassical Growth Model." In: *The Review of Economic Studies* 84.2 (299) (2017), pp. 613–649.

[32] Christophe Chowanietz. "Rallying around the flag or railing against the government? Political parties' reactions to terrorist acts." In: *Party Politics* 17.5 (2010), pp. 673–698.

[33] Fabrizio Colella et al. *ACREG: Stata module to perform Arbitrary Correlation Regression*. Computer Program. 2020.

[34] Robert Conquest. *The Human Cost of Soviet Communism*. Government Document. 1971.

[35] Russell J. Dalton. "The Quantity and the Quality of Party Systems." In: *Comparative Political Studies* 41.7 (2008), pp. 899–920.

[36] Jonathan W. Daly. "On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia." In: *Slavic Review* 54.3 (1995), pp. 602–629.

[37] Jonathan W. Daly. "Political Crime in Late Imperial Russia." In: *The Journal of Modern History* 74.1 (2002), pp. 62–100.

[38] Jonathan W. Daly. *The watchful state: Security police and opposition in Russia, 1906 - 1917*. 1. ed. DeKalb: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 2004.

[39] Nathan Danneman and Emily Hencken Ritter. "Contagious Rebellion and Preemptive Repression." In: *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58.2 (2014), pp. 254–279.

[40] Nirupam Datta. "Evaluating Impacts of Watershed Development Program on Agricultural Productivity, Income, and Livelihood in Bhalki Watershed of Bardhaman District, West Bengal." In: *World Development* 66 (2015), pp. 443–456.

[41] Carola Dietze. "The Invention of Terrorism in Nineteenth-Century Europe, Russia, and the United States." In: *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Terrorism*. Oxford University Press, 2022.

[42] Semen M. Dubnow. *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland: From the earliest times until the present day*. Vol. 3. From the accession of Nicholas II. until the present day. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1920.

[43] Antoni Dudek and Paczkowski. "Poland." In: *A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944-1989*. Ed. by Krzysztof Persak and Łukasz Kamínski. Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005. Chap. 6.

[44] Ruth A. Dudgeon. "The Forgotten Minority: Women Students in Imperial Russia, 1872-1917." In: *Russian History* 9.1 (1982), pp. 1–26.

[45] Paul Elhorst. *Spatial Econometrics: From Cross-Sectional Data to Spatial Panels*. SpringerBriefs in Regional Science. Berlin: Springer, 2014.

[46] John Ferejohn. "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control." In: *Public Choice* 50.1/3 (1986), pp. 5–25.

[47] Orlando Figes. *A people's tragedy : a history of the Russian revolution / Orlando Figes*. New York: Viking, 1996.

[48] Evgeny Finkel, Scott Gehlbach, and Dmitrii Kofanov. "(Good) Land and Freedom (for Former Serfs): Determinants of Peasant Unrest in European Russia, March–October 1917." In: *Slavic Review* 76.3 (2017), pp. 710–721.

[49] Henning Finseraas. "What if Robin Hood is a social conservative? How the political response to increasing inequality depends on party polarization." In: *Socio-Economic Review* 8.2 (2010), pp. 283–306.

[50] Henning Finseraas and Kåre Vernby. "What parties are and what parties do: partisanship and welfare state reform in an era of austerity." In: *Socio-Economic Review* 9.4 (2011), pp. 613–638.

[51] Ben Fischer. *Okhrana: the Paris operations of the Russian Imperial Police*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997.

[52] Nehemia Friedland and Ariel Merari. "The psychological impact of terrorism: A double-edged sword." In: *Political Psychology* 6.4 (1985), pp. 591–604.

[53] Oded Galor. *Unified growth theory*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.

[54] Markus Gangl. *RBOUNDS: Stata module to perform Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis for average treatment effects on the treated*. Computer Program. 2004.

[55] Peter Gatrell. *A whole empire walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I*. 1. paperback ed. Indiana-Michigan series in Russian and East European studies. Bloomington [u.a: Indiana Univ. Press, 2005.

[56] Anna Geifman. "The Kadets and Terrorism, 1905-1907." In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 36.2 (1988), pp. 248–267.

[57] Anna Geifman. *Thou Shalt Kill*. Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917. Princeton University Press, 1993.

[58] Aleksandr Vasil′evič Gerasimov. *Der Kampf gegen die erste russische Revolution: Erinnerungen*. Frauenfeld [u.a: Huber, 1934.

[59] Marcus Gerngroß. "Terrorismus im Zarenreich mit Vorbildfunktion: Die „Narodnaya Wolya"." In: *Sozialrevolutionärer Terrorismus: Theorie, Ideologie, Fallbeispiele, Zukunftsszenarien*. Ed. by Alexander Straßner. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, pp. 147–157.

[60] Lennard David Gerson. *The secret police in Lenin's Russia*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976.

[61] Jens Gieseke. "German Democratic Republic." In: *A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944-1989*. Ed. by Krzysztof Persak and Łukasz Kamínski. Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005. Chap. 4.

[62] George Gilbert. "Crisis and decline: The radical right movement in the Russian Empire, 1900-1914." Thesis. 2014.

[63] Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor. "Does Terrorism Work?" In: *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 125.4 (2010), pp. 1459–1510.

[64] Amanda Gregg. "Factory Productivity and the Concession System of Incorporation in Late Imperial Russia, 1894–1908." In: *American Economic Review* 110.2 (2020), pp. 401–27.

[65] Amanda Gregg and Tamar Matiashvili. "Modernization in Progress: Part-Year Operation, Mechanization, and Labor Force Composition in Late Imperial Russia." In: *The Journal of Economic History* 82.4 (2022), pp. 1143–1182.

[66] Paul R. Gregory. *Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (an Archival Study)*. The Yale-Hoover Series on Authoritarian Regimes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

[67] Sheena Chestnut Greitens. *Dictators and their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[68] Theocharis Grigoriadis. "The Okhrana Dataset." Unpublished Work. Stanford, 2023.

[69] Irena Grosfeld, Alexander Rodnyansky, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. "Persistent Antimarket Culture: A Legacy of the Pale of Settlement after the Holocaust." In: *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 5.3 (2013), pp. 189–226.

[70] Irena Grosfeld, Seyhun Orcan Sakalli, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. "Middleman Minorities and Ethnic Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in the Russian Empire." In: *The Review of Economic Studies* 87.1 (2020), pp. 289–342.

[71] Donald A. Gross and Lee Sigelman. "Comparing Party Systems: A Multidimensional Approach." In: *Comparative Politics* 16.4 (1984), pp. 463–479.

[72] Herschel I. Grossman. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions." In: *Oxford Economic Papers* 51.2 (1999), pp. 267–283.

[73] Ted Robert Gurr. "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945." In: *International Political Science Review* 14.2 (1993), pp. 161–201.

[74] Erich Haberer. *Jews and revolution in nineteenth-century Russia*. 1st pbk. ed. Jews & Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[75] Anselm Hager and Krzysztof Krakowski. "Does State Repression Spark Protests? Evidence from Secret Police Surveillance in Communist Poland." In: *American Political Science Review* (2021), pp. 1–16.

[76] Christopher A. Hartwell. "Shooting for the Tsars: Heterogeneous Political Volatility and Institutional Change in Russia." In: *Terrorism and Political Violence* 34.4 (2022), pp. 706–724.

[77] Silja Häusermann and Hanspeter Kriesi. "What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice." In: *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism*. Ed. by Hanspeter Kriesi et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 202–230.

[78] Douglas A. Hibbs. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." In: *The American Political Science Review* 71.4 (1977), pp. 1467–1487.

[79] Anke Hilbrenner. *Gewalt als Sprache der Strasse: Terrorismus und die Suche nach emotionaler Gemeinschaft im Russischen Reich vor 1917*. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europas. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2022.

[80] Anke Hilbrenner, Jonathan Lutes, and Luisa Zielinski. "Civil Rights and Multiculturalism: Simon Dubnov's Concept of Diaspora Nationalism." In: *Osteuropa* 58.8/10 (2008), pp. 101–116.

[81] Anke Hilbrenner and Frithjof Benjamin Schenk. "Introduction: Modern times? Terrorism in Late Tsarist Russia." In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 58.2 (2010), pp. 161–171.

[82] Sven Hillen. "Economy or culture? How the relative salience of policy dimensions shapes partisan effects on welfare state generosity." In: *Socio-Economic Review* (2022), mwac005.

[83] Faith Hillis. *Utopia's Discontents: Russian Émigrés and the Quest for Freedom, 1830s-1930s*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

[84] Anna Hillyar and Jane McDermid. *Revolutionary Women in Russia, 1870-1917: A Study in Collective Biography*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.

[85] Ronald Hingley. *The Russian secret police: Muscovite, imperial Russian and Soviet political security operations ; 1565-1970*. London: Hutchinson of London, 1970.

[86] Stefano Iacus, Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. "cem: Software for Coarsened Exact Matching." In: *Journal of Statistical Software* 30.9 (2009), pp. 1–27.

[87] Edward H. Judge and Arthur P. Mendel. *Modernization and revolution: dilemmas of progress in late imperial Russia*. East European monographs 336. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1992.

[88] Arcadius Kahan. *Essays in Jewish social and economic history*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr.ess, 1986.

[89] Vladimir V. Kallash. *THE PROCESS OF 50*. Moscow, 1906.

[90] Vladimir V. Kallash. *THE PROCESS OF THE 193S*. Moscow, 1906.

[91] David Karol and Edward Miguel. "The Electoral Cost of War: Iraq Casualties and the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election." In: *Journal of Politics* 69.3 (2007), pp. 633–648.

[92] Philip Keefer. "Inequality, Collective Action, and Democratization." In: *PS: Political Science and Politics* 42.4 (2009), pp. 661–666.

[93] Morgan Kelly. "The Standard Errors of Persistence." In: *CEPR Discussion Paper* No. DP13783 (2019).

[94] Gijs Kessler and Andrei Markevich. *Russian Empire Historical GIS Maps (1897)*. Dataset. 2017.

[95] Arzu Kibris. "Funerals and Elections: The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey." In: *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55.2 (2011), pp. 220–247.

[96] Herbert Kitschelt. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

[97] Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al. *Mapping policy preferences II: estimates for parties, electors, and governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003*. Vol. 2. Oxford University Press, 2006.

[98] Michael Koch and Benjamin Tkach. "Deterring or Mobilizing? The Influence of Government Partisanship and Force on the Frequency, Lethality and Suicide Attacks of Terror Events." In: 18.2 (2012).

[99] Dmitrii Kofanov. "Land Inequality, Industrialization and Unrest: Evidence from the Late Russian Empire." Thesis. 2020.

[100] Sergej (Stepniak) Kravchinskij. *Russia Underground*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

[101] Ian Lauchlan. *Russian Hide-and-Seek: The Tsarist Secret Police in Saint Petersburg, 1906–1914*. Vol. 67. Studia Historica. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2002, p. .

[102] Ian Lauchlan. "The Okhrana: Security Policing in Late Imperial Russia." In: *Late Imperial Russia: Problems and Prospects*. Ed. by Ian Thatcher. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005, pp. 44–63.

[103] George Leggett. *The Cheka : Lenin's political police. The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage (dec. 1917 to feb. 1922)*. Oxford: Clarendon Pr., 1981.

[104] Heinz-Dietrich Loewe. *Antisemitismus und reaktionäre Utopie: Russischer Konservatismus im Kampf gegen den Wandel von Staat und Gesellschaft, 1890–1917*. Historische Perspektiven. Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1978.

[105] Alexandr Lopukhin. *Iz itogov sluzhebnogo opyta: Nastoiashchee i budushchee russkoi politsii*. Moscow: Sablin, 1907.

[106] Steven G. Marks. *How Russia Shaped the Modern World From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism*. Princeton University Press, 2003.

[107] Ezra Mendelsohn. *Class struggle in the pale: the formative years of the Jewish worker's movement in Tsarist Russia*. Cambridge: Univ. Pr., 1970.

[108] José G. Montalvo. "VOTING AFTER THE BOMBINGS: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT ON THE EFFECT OF TERRORIST ATTACKS ON DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS." In: *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 93.4 (2011), pp. 1146–1154.

[109] Will H. Moore and David R. Davis. "CHAPTER FOUR Transnational Ethnic Ties and Foreign Policy." In: *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict*. Ed. by A. Lake David and Rothchild Donald. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 89–104.

[110] Susan K. Morrissey. "The Apparel of Innocence: Toward a Moral Economy of Terrorism in Late Imperial Russia." In: *The Journal of Modern History* 84.3 (2012), pp. 607–642.

[111] Norman Naimark. *Terrorists and Social Democrats : The Russian Revolutionary Movement Under Alexander III*. Russian Research Center Studies; 82. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983.

[112] Boris Nicolaievsky. *Aseff: The Russian Judas*. London, 1934.

[113] Daniel Oesch and Line Rennwald. "Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right." In: *European Journal of Political Research* 57.4 (2018), pp. 783–807.

[114] Richard Pipes. *Russia under the old regime*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979.

[115] Richard Pipes. *The Russian revolution: 1899 - 1919*. London: Collins Harvill, 1990.

[116] Lev Protasov et al. *Vserossijskoe uchreditelnoe sobranie. Entsiklopedia. [All-Russian Constitutional Assembly. Encyclopedia]*. Moscow: Rosspen, 2014.

[117] Adam Przeworski and John Sprague. *Paper stones : a history of electoral socialism / Adam Przeworski and John Sprague*. Chicago [u.a: Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1986.

[118] Molly Pucci. *Security Empire The Secret Police in Communist Eastern Europe*. Yale University Press, 2020.

[119] Simon Rabinovitch. "Russian Jewry goes to the polls: an analysis of Jewish voting in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly Elections of 1917." In: *East European Jewish Affairs* 39.2 (2009), pp. 205–225.

[120] Ingo Rohlfing and Tobias Schafföner. "The time-varying relationship between economic globalization and the ideological center of gravity of party systems." In: *PLOS ONE* 14.2 (2019), e0212945.

[121] William G. Rosenberg. *Liberals in the Russian Revolution: The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917-1921*. Princeton University Press, 1974.

[122] Richard Rowland. "Urbanization and Migration Data in Russian and Soviet Censuses." In: *Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses*. Ed. by Ralph S. Clem. Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 113–130.

[123] Donald Rubin. "Multiple Imputation After 18+ Years." In: *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 91.434 (1996), p. 473.

[124] Isaac Max Rubinow. *Economic Condition of the Jews in Russia*. Vol. 72. Bulletin of the United States Bureau of Labor. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1907.

[125] Charles A. Ruud and Sergej Aleksandrovič Stepanov. *Fontanka 16 : the tsars' secret police*. Montreal [u.a: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1999.

[126] Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Refugees and the Spread of Civil War." In: *International Organization* 60.2 (2006), pp. 335–366.

[127] Boris Sawinkow. *Erinnerungen eines Terroristen*. Berlin: Büchergilde Gutenberg Berlin, 1931.

[128] Leonard Schapiro. "The Role of the Jews in the Russian Revolutionary Movement." In: *The Slavonic and East European Review* 40.94 (1961), pp. 148–167.

[129] Adam Scharpf and Christian Gläßel. "Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina." In: *American Journal of Political Science* 64.4 (2020), pp. 791–806.

[130] Manfred G. Schmidt. "When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy." In: *European Journal of Political Research* 30.2 (1996), pp. 155–183.

[131] Jeremiah Schneiderman. *Sergei Zubatov and revolutionary Marxism: the struggle for the working class in tsarist Russia*. Ithaca, NY [u.a: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976.

[132] Inna Shtakser. *The Making of Jewish Revolutionaries in the Pale of Settlement: Community and Identity during the Russian Revolution and its Immediate Aftermath, 1905–07*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

[133] Dennis Spies. "Explaining working-class support for extreme right parties: A party competition approach." In: *Acta Politica* 48.3 (2013), pp. 296–325.

[134] Alexander I. Spiridovich. *Revolutionary movement in Russia*. Vol. Issue 1, "Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party". St. Petersburg, 1914.

[135] Alexander I. Spiridovich. *Revolutionary movement in Russia*. Vol. Issue 2, The Socialist-Revolutionary Party and its predecessors. Petrograd, 1916.

[136] Yannay Spitzer. "Essays on the Economics of the Jews and Their Migration." Thesis. 2015.

[137] Yannay Spitzer. "Pale in Comparison: Jews as a Rural Service Minority." In: *CEPR Discussion Paper* DP14262 (2019).

[138] Alphons Thun. *Geschichte der revolutionären Bewegungen in Russland*. [Nachdr. der Ausg.] Leipzig 1883. Burt Franklin research & source works series 67. New York: Franklin, 1964.

[139] Alexey T. Vassilyev. *The Ochrana: the Russian secret police*. London [u.a: Harrap, 1930.

[140] Vl. Vilensky-Sibiryakov, Felix Kona, and A. A. Shilova. *Деятели революционного движения в России : Био-библиографический словарь : От предшественников декабристов до падения царизма [Revolutionary Movement in Russia : A Bio-Bibliographical Dictionary : From the Decembrists' Predecessors to the Fall of Tsarism]*. Vol. 1-3. Moscow: Всесоюзное общество политических каторжан и ссыльно-поселенцев [All-Union Society of Political Convicts and Exiles], 1927-1934.

[141] Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth. "Highway to Hitler." In: *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series* No. 20150 (2021).

[142] Warren B. Walsh. *Russia and the Soviet Union: a modern history*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958.

[143] Laron K. Williams, Katsunori Seki, and Guy D. Whitten. "You've Got Some Explaining To Do The Influence of Economic Conditions and Spatial Competition on Party Strategy." In: *Political Science Research and Methods* 4.1 (2016), pp. 47–63.

[144] Ensar Yesilyurt and Paul Elhorst. "Impacts of neighboring countries on military expenditures: A dynamic spatial panel approach." In: *Journal of Peace Research* 54.6 (2017), pp. 777–790.

[145] V. Zhilinskii. "Organizatsiia i zhizn'okhrannago otdeleniia vo vremena tsarskoi vlasti." In: *Golos Minuvshago* 9/10 (1917), pp. 246–306.

[146] Vladislav Martinovič Zubok. *Collapse : the fall of the Soviet Union / Vladislav M. Zubok*. New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2021.

[147] Fredric Scott Zuckerman. *The Tsarist secret police in Russian society, 1880 - 1917*. 1. publ. Studies in Russia and East Europe. Basingstoke [u.a: Macmillan, 1996.

A. Contextual information

Origins & Activities of the Okhrana

The workforce at Fontanka steadily increased over several decades, with the number of full-time employees growing from 161 in 1895 to 387 in 1914 (Lauchlan 2005, p. 7). In 1883, the "special section" established its Paris office, known as the *Zagranichnaia agentura*, or "Foreign Agency" in English (Zuckerman 1996, p. xiv). This agency played a crucial role in gathering foreign intelligence, and was comprised of 15 intelligence officers who formed a small, elite group within the police (Lauchlan 2005, pp. 48). The personnel at Fontanka could be classified into three distinct categories:

1. The first category consisted of gendarmes and bureaucrats, who served as directors, case officers, interrogators, recruiters or recorders, clerks, and analysts. It is worth noting that the "okhranniki" were the pioneers of modern espionage and invented techniques that were carried forward into the Soviet successor institutions (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990).[25]

2. The second category comprised external agents who were responsible for surveillance. They were also referred to as "handlers" in modern times. They covertly monitored political dissidents and provided protection to government officials or members of the tsarist family. These agents were skilled in the art of surveillance and employed a variety of disguises, such as street vendors, doormen, or cab drivers (Vassilyev 1930, p. 42).

3. The third and final category of personnel at Fontanka were internal agents or "spies." These individuals were either in contact with or infiltrated the political opposition as informants. They represented the most valuable source of information for the political police.

The Okhrana were pioneers in intelligence gathering and developed various innovative methods and technologies. These included fingerprinting and the Bertillon anthropometric system for photographic identification of suspects, as well as code deciphering and phone wiretapping. They also introduced new tools like bulletproof vests, tear gas, and silencer guns, among others. With the convergence of unscrupulous agents and technological advancements, the Okhrana had a formidable arsenal of espionage, disinformation, and intimidation tactics. Regarding data collection, it is estimated that the Okhrana had recorded up to three million names by 1917, including the "Who is Who" in the revolutionary underground. Their list grew rapidly over the years, starting with only 221 names in 1889 and eventually encompassing 13,000 names by 1910. As a result, the Okhrana had intelligence on almost every person who had expressed political views or engaged in activism, making them a significant threat to political opposition (Lauchlan 2005, p. 51). The primary targets of the Okhrana included:

- Emigrants and revolutionary groups both in Russia and abroad, particularly those with ties to European socialist organizations;
- Conspiratorial activity, such as bomb-making factories and underground publishers and forgers of documents like passports and false identities;
- Individuals involved in smuggling weapons and explosives.

[25] The Soviet secret police underwent several name changes, although the organization remained consistent. These names include VChK (*Vserossijskaya Chrezvychajnaya komissuya po borbe s kontrrevolutsiej i sabotazhem*, 1917-22); GPU (*Gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie*, 1922-23); OGPU (*Obedinennoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskoe upravlenie*, 1923-34); NKVD (*Narodnij komissariat vnutrennikh del*, 1934-46); MGB (*Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti*, 1946-53); KGB (*Komitet gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti*, 1954-91).

The Okhrana's centralized and specialized structure allowed it to operate with remarkable efficiency, even with a relatively small staff. Their "divide and rule" strategy involved infiltrating radical groups, revolutionaries, and liberals alike. Rather than relying on loyal police officers, the Okhrana found it more effective to look for spies among members of the political opposition. This was part of Beletsky's aim of preventing the reunification of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks and his indirect support of Lenin (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990, p. 35). Once arrested, these spies would be recruited to convert committed radicals into loyal Okhrana servants. A series of meticulously coordinated seduction methods were employed for this purpose, including solitary confinement with tea and sympathy, threats of severe punishment (imprisonment, banishment, or execution), and promises of renewed service to a good cause, money, power, and prestige, among others (Lauchlan 2005, pp. 50). Moscow bureau chief Sergei Zubatov is believed to have been the most successful interrogator (Schneiderman 1976, pp. 51).

Furthermore, the Okhrana adopted a nuanced approach towards the opposition, recognizing that it was not a homogenous entity, but rather a collection of distinct factions with varying ideologies and agendas. This allowed them to tailor their tactics and strategies to the specific needs of each group. The socialist revolutionaries, for instance, were divided into sub-groups such as the Bolsheviks, the Mensheviks, the Russian Social Democrats, anarchist Communists, Jewish workers' parties, Polish Socialists, Latvian Social Democrats, Armenian nationalists (Droshak/Dashnaktsutiun), the Georgian Social Revolutionary Federalist Party (Sakartvelo), and the Party of Active Resistance in Finland, among others. The Okhrana's strategy was so effective that it even penetrated and neutralized the Liberal Union of Liberation in 1904-5 (Lauchlan 2005, p. 53). General Alexander Gerasimov, the St. Petersburg Okhrana chief from 1905-9, elaborated on this approach, noting that:

> *Without the Internal Agency, the director of the political police is blind. The internal life of a revolutionary organization, acting underground, is a wholly separate world, completely inaccessible to those who do not become members of the organization (Gerasimov 1934, p. 56).*[26]

Many Okhrana officers enjoyed this fearsome reputation:

> *scattered throughout the country, with its departments, investigation points, and gendarme directorates, patiently listening to the reports of countless spies and scouts, constantly arresting, hanging and deporting, strong in its fund of bottomless human baseness, strong in the amount of blood and tears shed, strong in the annual ten million ruble fund, the Okhrana affected directly and indirectly all the measures of the government ... The Okhrana set the tone ... (Walsh 1958, p. 395, quoting George Kennan)*

Contrary to popular belief, there were not numerous Okhranniki and surveillance centers in major cities of the Empire, as stated by Lauchlan (2005, p. 50). In reality, there were no more than a thousand trained Okhranniki in all of Russia, making contrary reports mere hallucinations. Nonetheless, the average revolutionary in St. Petersburg could still be apprehended by the political police within three months, and those operating underground had to assume that their ranks were infiltrated with traitors (Zuckerman 1996, p. 38, footnotes 45, 46, 47). According to former Tsarist Chief of Police Vassilyev:

> *Much that was mysterious, enigmatical, and dreadful was associated in the mind of the Russian people with the term Police Department. For great sections of the population this office signified*

[26] "The internal agency," concludes Okhrana Chief Vassilyev, "was much more dangerous for the enemies of the State than the open spy service of the Okhrana, for by means of it the authorities got to know of the most confidential happenings within the various revolutionary organizations" (Vassilyev 1930, p. 54).

frankly a phantom of terror, of which the most improbable tales were told. Many people seriously believed that in the Police Department the unhappy victims of the Okhrana were dropped through a hole in the floor into the cellar, and there tortured (Vassilyev 1930, p. 37).

Additionally, it's worth noting that the Okhrana's tactics and methods had a profound effect on the mindset and radicalization of key Bolshevik leaders, including Dzerzhinsky, Lenin, and especially Stalin. In fact, by the time of the revolution, the average Bolshevik activist had spent four years in Tsarist prisons or in exile, while the typical Menshevik had been imprisoned or exiled for five years (Figes 1996, p. 124-5). Russian historian Richard Pipes provides further insight on this topic:

All of them had been shadowed, searched, arrested, kept in jail, and sentenced to exile by the political police of the imperial government. They had battled with the censorship. They had had to contend with agent provocateurs planted in their midst. They knew the system intimately, from the inside, which meant that they also knew its shortcomings and loopholes. Their vision of a proper government was a mirror image of the imperial regime's to the extent that what the latter called 'subversion' they labeled "counter-revolution" (Pipes 1979, p. 317).

The government's attempts to eradicate dissidents often had the opposite effect, alienating even moderates like former police chief Lopukhin. He predicted that the government's growing reliance on the security police would only serve to estrange the Russian people from the Tsar.

When the whole political outlook of the ranks of Corps of Gendarmes boils down to the following propositions: that there are the people and there is the state authority, that the latter is under constant threat from the former, for which reason it is subject to protective measures, and that to execute these measures any means may be used with impunity...as a result [of this bipolar view], the protection of the state as carried out by the Corps of Gendarmes turns into a ***war against all of society****, and, in the final analysis, leads to destruction also of state authority, who inviolability can be assured only by a union with society. By widening the gulf between state authority and the people, the police engender a revolution. This is why the activity of the political police is inimical not only to the people; it is inimical to the state as well (Lopukhin 1907, pp. 32, emphasis added).*

Pogroms & the Pale of Settlement

After Alexander II was assassinated in the 1880s, the Okhrana was established and soon after, there were a series of massive social riots with strong anti-Semitic undertones. These events led to the looting of Jewish homes and businesses and the brutal massacre of Jews. The first of these incidents occurred on April 15, 1881, in Elizavetgrad, and quickly spread to other major cities, such as Kiev, Anan'ev, and Kishinev, before reaching the surrounding villages. In May 1881, pogroms took place in Odessa, Nikolayev, Aleksandrov, and Romny, while others followed in November 1881 in Odessa and in December in Warsaw. In the spring of 1882, there were signs of a repeat of the 1881 events, with a second wave in Anan'ev in March and in Borispol, Dubossary, and Pereiaslavl in June-July. Official data cited in Ruud and Stepanov (1999) shows that 259 pogroms occurred between 1881 and 1882, with 219 of them taking place in villages and hamlets. In 1883, further clashes took place in Rostov-on-Don, Ekaterinoslav, and Krivoy Rog, and in 1884, in Nizhniy Novgorod. In 1891, nearly thirty thousand Jews were suddenly expelled from Moscow for Passover, setting a precedent for Stalin's later deportations of other ethnic minorities on a larger scale (Schneiderman 1976, p. 210).

In April 1903, Kishinev experienced violent anti-Jewish attacks that resulted in 45 deaths, over 400 injuries, and the destruction of countless Jewish homes and businesses. The Okhrana's alleged complicity in the pogrom, coupled with the anti-Semitic views of the Minister of Interior Vyacheslav von Plehve, reinforced the belief of official involvement in the tragedy. The police officials often linked Jews with Freemasonry, either directly or indirectly (Judge and Mendel 1992, pp. 72; Daly 2004, p. 120). The Kishinev pogrom served as a reminder of the Jewish community's vulnerability to popular and official anti-Semitism (Shtakser 2014, p. 105). For both the organizers of the pogrom and the Jews who experienced it, along with the subsequent pogroms during the Revolution of 1905, it was an attempt to suppress the Jewish population's newfound political assertiveness and keep them subjugated. The widespread involvement of peasants and urban workers in the pogroms had a profound emotional impact on the political identity of Jewish revolutionaries (Shtakser 2014, p. 105). One Bundist, Solomon Gillerson, the son of a failed small merchant who became a quality examiner in a wood factory in Riga, described the Kishinev pogrom in vivid detail:

> *This pogrom shocked me profoundly. I saw that under conditions of lawlessness and oppression, I, being a Jew, had no moral right to start a family or to have children, since with the next Jewish pogrom organized by the State Police Department, my wife and children might be tortured and killed, like those 2000 women, children and old people who were victims of the Kishinev pogroms (Shtakser 2014, p. 58).*

Ezra Mendelsohn wrote about the conditions in the Pale of Settlement:

> *intellectuals [who] were no longer able to identify with the old Jewish culture, nor free to become assimilated into Russian life [. . .] could at least identify with 'the people', the peasantry or the proletariat (Mendelsohn 1970, p. 29)*

The last head of the Okhrana, A.T. Vassilyev, self-righteously condemned as "base slander" "excited newspaper articles" in the West that accused the Tsarist government and the Okhrana of conniving at the pogroms. He explained in his memoirs that the "core of the evil" was "unfortunate inaptitude of the Jews for healthy productive work:

> *The government would never have had the slightest reason to adopt measures directed against the Jews had not these been rendered imperative by the necessity for protecting the Russian*

population, and especially the peasants .... There was a certain kind of of oppression of the Jews in Russia, but, unfortunately, this was far from being as effective as it ought to have been. The Government did seek to protect the peasants from ruthless exploitation of the Jews, but it action bore only too little fruit (Vassilyev 1930, ch. 6)

A.1. Figures

Figure A.1: Distribution of Jews per province as per 1897 census



Figure A.2: Arzamas project: Whom would you have voted for?



Figure A.3: Pale of Settlement in contemporary borders

Figure A.4: Eastern Front at the time of Russian Revolution 1917



B. Tables

Table B.1: Data Description and Sources

Variable	Description	Source
Dependent variables and political relevant variables		
`rile_wmin`	The left-right position of the most leftist party at the election.	Manifesto Project Election Level Do-file Documentation, version 1.0, Protasov et al. (2014).
`rile_wmax`	The left-right position of the most rightist party at the election.	Manifesto Project Election Level Do-file Documentation, version 1.0, Protasov et al. (2014).
`rile_wmean`	The mean left-right position weighted by the parties' vote share (also known as the ideological center of gravity (Gross and Sigelman 1984)). It is calculated according to the following formula: $wmean = \sum_{i=1}^{n}(\frac{V_i}{T} * p)$, with T as the sum of vote share at the election (`sum_pervote`), V_i a party's vote share and p_i a party's left-right position.	Manifesto Project Election Level Do-file Documentation, version 1.0, Protasov et al. (2014).
`rile_polarization`	The left-right polarization of the party system calculated according to the formula by Dalton (2008): $polarization = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left(\frac{p_i - wmean}{100}\right)^2 * \frac{V_i}{T}}$, where pol is the polarization index ranging from 0 to 1, p_i is a party's left-right position, V_i is a party's vote share and $wmean$ the weighted left-right mean (`rile_wmean`.	Manifesto Project Election Level Do-file Documentation, version 1.0, Protasov et al. (2014).
`pervote_*`	Percentage of votes gained by each party. In the case of mixed electoral systems with a proportional and majoritarian component, pervote indicates the vote share in the proportional component. In the case of an electoral coalition where programs for all members of the coalition and the coalition were coded, -pervote- was coded MISSING if the dataset includes entries for all seat-winning members of the coalition. If the data set includes, however, only the programs of some coalition members, pervote reports the vote share gained by the alliance and pervote is set to MISSING for the coalition members. As a result, the sum of pervote is not higher than 100%	Manifesto Project Election Level Do-file, version 1.0, Protasov et al. (2014).
`constituency`	The names of the constituencies in the 1917 Constituency Assembly, that we encode for statistical analysis	Protasov et al. (2014).

continued ...

Continuation of table B.1

Variable	Description	Source
sum_pervote	The sum of vote shares won by the parties covered in the 1917 Constituency Assembly	Protasov et al. (2014).
Okhrana variables		
investigated_sumdis	This is our overall radicalization index, that we label "Okhrana". It is calculated from individual level data on the province level, that we weight with district level population data from www.demoscope.ru.	Based on Grigoriadis (2023), www.demoscope.ru
male_sumdis	Share of individuals under investigation in a given district, that are male. This indicator is a dummy variable, that takes on the value of 1 if monitored individual is male, 0 otherwise. It is calculated from individual level data on the province level, that we weight with district level population data from www.demoscope.ru.	Based on Grigoriadis (2023), www.demoscope.ru
propaganda_sumdis	Share of individuals under investigation for distributing anti-governmental propaganda. Anti-government propoganda is defined as the non-violent printing and distributing of any such material as recorded by the Okhrana. It is calculated from the total number of individuals surveilled for distributing propaganda at the province level and weighted with the district level population data from www.demoscope.ru.	Based on Grigoriadis (2023), www.demoscope.ru
membership_sumdis	Share of individuals under investigation for membership in anti-governmental organization. Anti-government membership is defined as the non-violent participation in nationalist or labor movements as recorded by the Okhrana. It is calculated from the total number of individuals surveilled for membership in anti-Tsarist organizations at the province level and weighted with the district level population data from www.demoscope.ru.	Based on data from Grigoriadis (2023), www.demoscope.ru
riots_sumdis	Share of individuals under investigation for inciting riots. Riots are defined as the violent participation in anti-governmental demonstrations as recorded by the Okhrana. It is calculated from the total number of individuals surveilled for inciting riots at the province level and weighted with the district level population data from www.demoscope.ru.	Based on data from Grigoriadis (2023), www.demoscope.ru

continued ...

Continuation of table B.1

Variable	Description	Source
assassinations_sumdis	Share of individuals under investigation for participation in the planning and executing of assassintions of governmental members or the Tsarist family as recorded by the Okhrana. It is calculated from the total number of individuals surveilled for their participation in planning and executing assassinations at the province level and weighted with the district level population data from www.demoscope.ru.	Based on Grigoriadis (2023), www.demoscope.ru
Demographic, geographic and middlement control variables		
sh_ind_workers_1897	Share of individuals employed or self-employed in mining and quarrying, metal smelting, fiber processing, animal products processing, wood processing, metal processing, mineral processing, chemical and allied products manufacturing, distilling, brewing and honey fermentation, other beverages manufacturing, and fermented materials manufacturing; vegetable and animal food processing; tobacco and tobacco products manufacturing; printing; instrument making; jewelry making, painting, cultural and luxury goods manufacturing; garment manufacturing; housing construction, repair and maintenance, and general construction; wagon building and wooden ship building; other industrial workers	Similar to Buggle and Nafziger (2021), categories 21 to 40 from Kessler and Markevich (2017) after district population weighting.
sh_slavsl_1897	Share of speakers of East Slavic languages (Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian)	Kessler and Markevich (2017)
educ_*_1897	Share of individuals either with primary, secondary or tertiary education. It is calculated from the provincial level data from Kessler and Markevich (2017) and weighted by the district-level population from histmat.info.	Kessler and Markevich (2017), www.demoscope.ru
gender_balance_1913_7	It is the change in the sex ratio between 1913 and 1917 in order to account for the mobilization of males in World War I, that is calculated as the difference in the number of males relative to females in 1913 (sex ratio 1913) less the change in the males relative to females in 1917 (sex ratio 1917) over the sex ratio in 1917 & 1913 and 1917	Statistical Yearbooks obtained from histmat.info.

continued ...

Continuation of table B.1

Variable	Description	Source
sh_jews_crafts, sh_jews_credit, sh_jews_trd, sh_jews_trns	These are variables, that we obtained from the replication data set of Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020). They describe the integration of Jews in Imperial Russia into the countryside.	Data set taken: *complete_data_grid from Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020)
latitude, longitude, coal_terr, podzol_soil, distance_coastline, length_gs globdist_provcapital, globdist_stpetersburg, serf_100	These are variables, that we obtained from the replication data set of Buggle and Nafziger (2021). They describe the integration of Jews in Imperial Russia into the countryside.	Data set taken: *district_level from Buggle and Nafziger (2021)

Table B.2: Party lists and party grouping

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
”Возрождение свободной России”	Revival of Free Russia	Rightist
”Земля и воля трудовому народу”Совет крестъянских депутатов, солдат	Soviet of PD	Soviet of PD
”Земля и воля”Партия социалистов/революционеров, Совет крестъянских депутатов	SRs, Soviet of PD	SRs, Soviet of PD
”Собружество народов”	Community of Peoples	Popular Socialists
Амурское и Уссурийское казачество	Amur, Ussuri Cossacks	Cossacks
Армянская народная партия	Armenian Nat. Party	Armenian Populists
Армянская революционная партия ”Дашнакцутюн”	Dashnaks	Armenian SRs
Башкиры/федералисмы	Bashkir Federalists	Bashkir Federalists
Без названия	Unknown	Unknown
Безпартийные крестъянский союз	Non-partisan Peas. Union	Peasant lists
Белоруссказе народная громада в Калуге	Belorussian Socialist Gromada	Belorussian Socialist Gromada
Белорусские огранизации	Belorussian Socialist Gromada	Belorussian Socialist Gromada
Беспартийные служащих и служивших в правителъственных и общественных учреждениях	Non-partisan Group of Public Servants	Non-partisan Group of Public Servants
Беспартнийная группа земелъных собственников	Non-partisan Landowners	Non-partisan Landowners
Беспартнийные крестъяне/хлеборобы	Non-partisan Peas.-Farmers	Peasant lists
Бессарабская Трудовая народно/социалистическая партия	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Блок ”Селянской спилки Крестъянский союз, Совет крестъянских депутатов, Украинский социал/демоктратическуй рабочая партия	Peas. Union, Soviet of PD, Ukrainian SDs	Peas. Union, Soviet of PD, Ukrainian SDs
Блок Иркутской группы сибирских областников/автономистов и Иркутской группы Трудовой народно/социалистической партии	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Блок Киргизской партии ”Алаш>, дгугие мусулъмансие области, Казачъе войско	Bloc of the Kirghiz Party Alash, other Muslims (Alash-Semirechie Cossack Host)	Alash Orda

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Блок Кооператоры, Всероссийская социал/деморкатическая организования "Единство Народные социалисты Валковского уезда	Cooperatives, SDs, Popular Socialists	Right-wing socialist bloc
Блок Партии трудовиков/народных социалистов, Украинская партия социалистов/федералистов	SRs, Ukrainian SRs	SRs, Ukrainian SRs
Блок Партия народной свободы, Торгово/промышленная группа	Kadets	Kadets
Блок Союз земелъных собственников, Группа старообрядцев всех согласий	Bloc of Landowners, Old Believers	Landowners
Блок Трудовой народно/социалистической партии, Украинской партии социалистов/федералистов	SRs, Ukrainian SRs	SRs, Ukrainian SRs
Блок Украинской партии социалистов/революционеров, Украинской селянской спилки, Украинской социал/демократической рабочей партии	Ukrainian SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Блок болъшевиков, социал/демокраии Полъшии Литвы	Bolsheviks	Bolsheviks
Блок кооператоров, Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия	Bloc of cooperatives, popular socialists	Bloc of cooperatives, popular socialists
Блок националъностей	Nat.ist Bloc	Other
Блок объединенных кредитных и потребипелъных кооперативов, Союз земских служащих, Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия	Bloc of United Credit, Consumer Cooperatives, Union of Zemstvo Employees, Popular Socialists	Right-wing socialist bloc
Блок социалистов	Socialist Bloc	Right-wing socialist bloc
Блок социалистов города Верного всех партий, Совет крестъянских депутатов, Совет солдатских и рабочих депутатов, Киргизская социалистическая партия	Bloc of Socialists of Vernogo Town, Soviet of PD, Soviet of Soldiers, Workers Deputies, Kirghiz Socialist Party "Fukhara" (SRs, Mensheviks)	SRs
Блок украинскох националъно/репсубликанских групп и организаций	Ukrainian Nat. Republican Group	Ukrainian non-socialists
Бунд	Bund	Bund
Бурятский националъный комитет в Забайкалъской области	Buryat Nat. Committee, SRs	Buryat Nat. Committee
Бурятский националъный список	Buryat Nat. List	Buryat Nat. List

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Витебский Белорусский народны союз и Союз православных и едиоверческих приходов Полоцкой губернии	Vitebsk Belorussian People's Union, Orthodox Parishes of the Faith of the Polotsk Diocese	Orthodox
Вологодский губернский комитет Российской социал/демократической рабочей партии и социал/демократическая фракция Вологдского	Mensheviks-Centrists	Mensheviks-Centrists
Временный крымско/мусулъманский исполнителъный комитет	Interim Crimean/Muslim Executive Committee executive committee	Other Muslim lists
Всероссийская социал/деморкатическая организования "Единство"	Unity	Unity
Всероссийская социал/деморкатическая организования "Единство Союз кооператоров и народные социалисты	Unity	Unity
Всероссийская социал/деморкатическая организования "Единство Союз кредитных и ссудо/сберегателъных товариществ	Unity, Union of Credit, Savings Associations	Unity, Union of Credit, Savings Associations
Всероссийская союз земельных собственников	Union of Landowners	Union of Landowners
Всероссийская союз торговлъ и промышленностъ	Comm.-Indust. Union	Comm.-Indust. Union
Всероссийский крестъянский союз	All Russian Peas. Union	Peasant lists
Всероссийской лиги равноправия женщин	All-Russian League for Women's Equality	All Russian League for Women's Equality
Вятский мусулъманский съезд	Muslim Union of Vyatka Governorate	Muslim Union of Vyatka Governorate
Глазовский уездный съезд Совета рабочих, солдатских и крестъянских депутатов	Congr. of the Council of Workers', Soldiers', Peas.' Deputies, Glazovsky u.	Dissident leftist SR lists
Горцы и казаки	Cossacks	Cossacks
Граждане Болецкой волости Городоксого уезда	Citiz. of Boletskii v., Gorodsky u.	Citiz. of Boletskii v., Gorodsky u.
Граждане Важинской волости Олонецкая уезда	Citiz. of Vazhinskaya v., Olonets u.	Citiz. of Vazhinskaya v., Olonets u.

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Граждане Йозефдорфской волости Аккерманского уезда	Citiz. of Josephdorf v., Akkerman u.	Citiz. of Josephdorf v., Akkerman u.
Граждане/хлебообы Отрадовский волости Эмиевского уезда	Citiz. of Otradovo v., Emeevsky u.	Citiz. of Otradovo v., Emeevsky u.
Грузинская национал/демократиыечская партия	Georgian Nat. Democrats	Georgian Nat. Democrats
Грузинская революционная партия социалистов/федералистов	Georgian Socialist-Federalists	Georgian Socialist-Federalists
Группа "Селъские кандидаты в единенуу сила"	Peas. List	Peas. List
Группа безпартийных избрателей Спасского уезда	Non-partisan voters in Spassky uezd	Old Believers
Группа внепартийных общественных деятелей	Non-partisan Group of Public Figures	Ukrainian non-socialists
Группа граждан Кушебской волости Холмогроского уезда	Citiz. of Kushebskaya v., Kholmogro u.	Citiz. of Kushebskaya v., Kholmogro u.
Группа граждан народа Вятский губернии, Яранского уезда, Пачинской волости	Citiz. of Pachin v., Yaransk u.	Citiz. of Pachin v., Yaransk u.
Группа еврейских общественных деятелей	Jewish Social Activists	Jewish Social Activists
Группа забайкалъских казаков	Cossacks	Cossacks
Группа земских деятелей	Employees of Government Agencies	Employees of Government Agencies
Группа избирателей	Unknown	Unknown
Группа избирателей, сочувствующих Народно/социлистической трудовой партии	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Группа кооператоров Бессарабской губернии	Cooperative Group	Cooperatives
Группа крестъян Воробъевского избирателъного участка Сумского уезда	Peas. of Sumy u.	Peas. of Sumy u.
Группа крестъян/земледелъцев безпартийных	A group of nonpartisan Peas., landowners	Landowners
Группа левых социалистов/революционеров интернационалистов	Leftist SRs	Dissident leftist SR lists
Группа мусулъман девяти уездов	Muslim Group	Muslim Group

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Группа населения Старобелъского уезда	Citiz. of Starobel u.	Citiz. of Starobel u.
Группа нишеоднисавшихся заявителей по Южновскому уезды Смоленской губернии, Крестъянская народно/социалистическая партия	Group of niche applicants, Popular Socialists	Group of niche applicants, Popular Socialists
Группа обзщественных деятелей	Group of Public Figures	Rightist
Группа ревнителей православия	Group of Orthodox zealots	Orthodox
Группа старообрядцев всех согласий	Old Believers	Old Believers
Группа старообрядцев всех согласий, город Новочеркасска	Old Believers	Old Believers
Группа украинцев	Ukrainians	Other Ukrainians
Группа христианского единния за веру и родину	Christian Union for Faith, Fatherland	Rightist
Группа церковно/народная	Church/Popular Group	Orthodox
Губернский съезд крестъянских, рабочих и солдатских депутатов, Партия социалистов/революционеров, Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия	Congr. of Peas., Soldiers, Workers Deputies, SRs, SDs	Dissident leftist SR lists
Дагестанская социалистическая группа	Dagestan Socialists	Dagestan SDs
Девлеправославные христиане старообрядцы Калужской губернии	Old Orthodox Christians of the Kaluga Province	Orthodox
Демократические везпартийная группа районных комитетов Сергиева Посада	Democratic Non-partisan Group of Members of District Committees of Sergiev Posad	Democratic Non-partisan Group of Members of District Committees of Sergiev Posad
Домовладелъцы и землевладелъцы Новгородской губернии	Landowners	Landowners
Донской союз собственников	Union of Landowners	Union of Landowners
Еврейская социал/демократическая рабочая партия "Идише Фолкспартей"	Folkspartei	Folkspartei
Еврейская социал/демократическая рабочая партия "Идише Фолкспартей Внепартийный демократический комитет	Folkspartei	Folkspartei
Еврейская социал/демократическая рабочая партия "Поалей Цион"	Poalei Zion	Poalei Zion

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Еврейский насионалъный блок	Jewish Nat. Bloc	Jewish Nat. Bloc
Еврейский насионалъный избирателъныи комитет	Jewish Nat. Electoral Committee	Jewish Nat. Electoral Committee
Евречцкий список	Jewish List	Jewish List
Кабардинский и балкарский народы и русские население Налъчикского округа	Kabardian, Balkarian people, the Russian population of the Nalchik u.	Kabardian, Balkarian people, the Russian population of the Nalchik u.
Казаки/социалисты	Cossacks, Socialists	Cossacks, Socialists
Казанское губернское мусулъманское собрание	Cossacks	Cossacks
Казачий список	Cossacks	Cossacks
Казачъе войско	Cossacks	Cossacks
Казачъе войско	Cossacks	Cossacks
Киевский военно/репсубликанский союз	Military Revolutionary Union	Military Revolutionary Union
Киргизская партия "Алаш"	Alash Orda	Alash Orda
Киргизские социалисты	Kirgiz Socialists	Kirgiz SRs
Комитет внепартийного влока русских избирателей	Committee of non-partisan Russian voters	Committee of non-partisan Russian voters
Комитет православных и единоверческих проходов Болынской епархии	Committee of Orthodox, Unified Faith Passages of the Bolyn Diocese	Orthodox
Кооперативная группа	Cooperative Group	Cooperatives
Кооперативная группа, Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия	Cooperatives, Popular Socialists, SR Defencists	Right-wing socialist bloc
Кооперативные союзы Новгородской губернии	Union of Cooperativists	Cooperatives
Кооперативы Владимирской губернии	Cooperatives	Cooperatives
Кооперативы Екатеринославской губернии и Трудовая народно/социалистическая партия, "Земля и воля"	Cooperatives, Popular Socialists, SR Defencists	Right-wing socialist bloc

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Кооператоры Симбирской губернии	Cooperatives	Cooperatives
Кооператоры и независимые социалисты	Cooperatives	Cooperatives
Коопертивные объединения Оренбургской губернии	Cooperative Organizations	Cooperatives
Кравеой полъский список	Polish List	Polish lists
Красноярский отдел Централъного Сибирского областного комитета	Siberian Autonomist	Popular Socialists, Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists
Крестъяне Битебской губернии	Peas. of Vitebsk Governorate	Peas. of Vitebsk Governorate
Крестъянский союз "Крестъянская сила Скбирского уезда	Peas. Union	Peas. Union
Крестъянский список	Peas. List	Peas. List
Крестъянский съезд, Партия социалистов/революционеров	SRs, Peas. Union	SRs, Peas. Union
Крестъянство Мглинского уезда	Peas. of Mglin u.	Peas. of Mglin u.
Крестьяне Бердянского уезда	Peas. of Berdyansk u.	Peas. of Berdyansk u.
Крестьяне Пермского уезда и мордовское население Саратовской губерний	Peas. of Petrovsk u., Mordva Population	Peas. of Petrovsk u., Mordva Population
Латгалъский народний комитет и Ламгалъская социалистическая партия трудового народа	Latgalian Popular Committee, Latgalian Socialist Party of Working People	Latgalian Popular Committee, Latgalian Socialist Party of Working People
Латышские демогкаты/националисты	Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory	Latvian SD's
Латышские крестъянские союз	Lettish Peas. Union	Lettish Peasant Union
Латышские крестъянские союз, Латышская радикалъно/демократическая партия	Lettish Peas. Union, Lettish Radical Democrats	Rightist
Левые эсеры	Leftist SRs	Dissident leftist SR lists
Мазурское общество Новохоперского уезда Воронежской губернии	Mazury Society of Novokhopersky u.	Other
Могилевская губернская полъская рада	Polish Rada	Polish lists

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Молдавская националъная партия, Союз кредитных и ссудо/сберегателъных товариществ	Moldovan Nat. Party, Union of Credit, Savings, Loan Associations	Comm.-Indust. list
Мусулъмане башкиро/татарской группы Пермской губернии	Bashkir-Tatar group	Bashkir-Tatar group
Мусулъмане/демократы	Muslim Democrats	Muslim Democrats
Мусулъмане/социалисты	Muslim Socialists	Muslim Socialists
Мусулъманские Западного Завкавказъя	Muslim Group	Muslim Group
Мусулъманские националъные комитеты	Muslim Nat. Committee	Muslim Nat. Committee
Мусулъманские националъные комитеты и Тюркская демократическая партия федералистов "Мусавет"	Turkic Democratic Federalist Party - Musavat, Muslim Nat. Committee	Turkic Democratic Federalist Party - Musavat and Muslim Nat. Committee
Мусулъманские националъные совет	Muslim Nat. Council	Muslim Nat. Council
Мусулъманские организации	Muslims	Muslims
Мусулъманские социалистический блок	Muslim Socialist Bloc	Muslim Socialist Bloc
Мусулъманские социалистический совет	Muslim Socialists	Muslim Socialists
Мусулъманские социалистический список	Muslim Socialists	Muslim Socialists
Мусулъманский список	Muslims	Muslims
Мусулъманское шуро	Muslim Shuro-Islamia	Muslim Shuro-Islamia
Народная трудовая партия Ушицкого уезда	SRs of Ushitzk	SRs of Ushitzk
Националъные блок украинцы, мусулъмане, поляки, литовцы	Nat. Bloc (Ukrainians, Muslims, Poles, Lithuanians)	Nat. Bloc
Нижегородский политический союз старообрядческих согласий	Union of Old Believer Accord	Old Believers
Общегубернский старообрядческий объединенный комитет	Old Believers' Joint Committee	Old Believers
Общемусулъманский демократический социалистический блок	All Muslim Socialist Bloc	Muslim Socialists
Общественные деятели земцы/государственники прогрессисты/демократы	Landowners, Non-partisan Progr.	Landowners

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Общество ”За верз у порядок”	Society for Faith, Order	Rightist
Общество ”Муинулъ/Ислам”	Muinil Islam Society	Muinil Islam Society
Общеферганский	All Fergana List of Soviet of Deputies of Muslim Organizations	Muslim Socialists
Объединенная демократическая группа гогожан, крестъян и рабочих	United Democratic Groups of Townspeople, Peas.,, Workers	Peasant lists
Объединенная еврейская социалистическая рабочая партия	Fareynikte	Fareynikte
Объединенние беспартийных союзов	Unknown	Unknown
Объединенное духовенство и миряне Костромской епархии	Orthodox Clergy, Laymen	Orthodox
Объединенные полъские организации	United Polish Organizations	Polish lists
Объединенные полъские список	United Polish Organizations	United Polish Organizations
Объединенные приходских советов церквей города Ставрополъ	United Orthodox Parishes	Orthodox
Объединенные социалисты	United Socialists	Right-wing socialist bloc
Объединенный областной прогрессивный блок	United Regional Progressive Bloc	Right-wing socialist bloc
Огранизация российских граждан немецкой националъности	Russian Citiz. of German Nat.ity	German lists
Партиз соцуалистов/революционеров и советы Алтайской губернии	SRs, Soviet of PD, left fraction of the Muslim Nat. Soviet	SRs, Soviet of PD, left fraction of the Muslim Nat. Soviet
Партия Мусулъманской России	Party of Muslims in Russia	Party of Muslims in Russia
Партия избирателей украинцев	Ukrainians	Other Ukrainians
Партия мусулъманско/социалистическо/демократическо блока	Party of the Muslim Socialist-Democratic Bloc	Muslim Socialists
Партия народной свободы	Kadets	Kadets
Партия народной свободы, Беспартийные хлеборобы	Kadets, Non-partisan landowners	Kadets
Партия соицалистов/революционеров, Совет крестъянских депутатов	SRs, Soviet of PD	SRs, Soviet of PD
Партия социалистов/революционеров	SRs	SRs
Партия социалистов/революционеров (Тула)	SRs of Tula	SRs of Tula

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Калужский общегубернский съезд советов кестъянских депутатов	SRs, Soviet of PD	SRs, Soviet of PD
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Крестъянская союз	SRs	SRs
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Селянская спулка, Украинская социал/демократическая рабочая партия	SRs, Selyanska Spilka, Ukrainian SDs	SRs
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Совет крестъянских депутатов	SRs, Soviet of PD	SRs, Soviet of PD
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Совет крестъянских депутатов, Левая фракция Мусулъманского националъного совета, Мусулъманский совет	SRs, Soviet of PD, left fraction of the Muslim Nat. Soviet	SRs, Soviet of PD, left fraction of the Muslim Nat. Soviet
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Совет крестъянских депутатов, Трудовой казачество	SRs, Soviet of PD, Socialist Cossacks	SRs, Soviet of PD, Socialist Cossacks
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Совет крестъянских депутатов, Украинская партия социалистов/революционистов, Объединенная еврейская социалистическая рабочая партия	SRs, Soviet of PD, United Jewish Socialist Labour Party (S.S., E.S.)	SRs, Soviet of PD, United Jewish Socialist Labour Party (S.S., E.S.)
Партия социалистов/революционеров, Съезды крестъянских, солдатских и рабочих депутатив, Коопертивы	SRs	SRs
Партия социалистов/революционеров, город Владивостока, Николъско/Уссурийского, Спасска Приморской области	SRs of Vladivostok, Nikolayevsk-on-Amur, Spassk (leftist SRs)	Dissident leftist SR lists
Партия хлеборобов/собственников	Party of Farmers, Landowners	Landowners
Петропавловский отдел Всероссийского крестъянского уезда, Пачинской волости	All-Russian Peas. Union, Pachin v.	Peasant lists
Полномочный общечувашский нациоиналъный съезд, чувашские военные комитеты, Партиа социалистиов/революционеров	The All Chuvash Nat. Congr., the Chuvash Military Committees, the Chuvash Organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party	Chuvash
Полъский избирателъный комитет	Polish Electoral Committee	Polish lists

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Полъский краевой список	Polish List	Polish lists
Поселяне/греки Мариополъцкогро уесда	Greek Settlement of Mariupol u.	Other
Православно/проходской демократический союз	Orthodox Parish Democratic Union	Orthodox
Православие о хлеборобы	Orthodox-Farmers alliance	Orthodox
Православно/народная партия	Clerical People's Party	Orthodox
Православное приходы	Orthodox parishes	Orthodox
Приходская беспартийная группа	Orthodox Followers	Orthodox
Приходские советы, Объединяющие русское православоное население	United Orthodox Parishes	Orthodox
Рабочий комитет суконной фабрика Протопопова	Working Committee of the Protopopov cloth factory	Other
Радикалъно/демократическая партия	Radical Democrats	Rightist
Республиканская демократическая партия	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия	Mensheviks	Mensheviks
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, Бунд, Полъские "Единение"	Mensheviks-Centrists, Bund	Mensheviks-Centrists, Bund
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, Мусулъманская организация "Гуммет"	Mensheviks	Mensheviks
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, болшевиков и интернационалистов	Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Int.	Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Int.
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, болшевиков и интернационалистов, Совет крестъянских депутатов	Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Int.	Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Int.
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, болшевиков и менъшевиков/интернационалистов	Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Int.	Bolsheviks, Menshevik-Int.
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, болъшевиков	Bolsheviks	Bolsheviks

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, болъшевиков, Тулъская комитет поссийская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, Тулъская военная организация российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, Тулъская организация социал/демократическии Полъшии и Литвы, Тулъская организация социал/демократии Литовского края, Тулъская огранизация социал/демократии Латышского края	Bolsheviks	Bolsheviks
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, болъшевиков, Эстляндский исполнителъный комитет безземельных и малоземелъных крестъян	Bolsheviks	Bolsheviks
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, интерналистов	Mensheviks-Int.	Mensheviks-Int.
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, интерналистов	Menshevik-Int.	Mensheviks
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, менъшевиков	Mensheviks-Centrists	Mensheviks-Centrists
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, менъшевиков и Бунд	Mensheviks-Bund	Mensheviks-Bund
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, менъшевиков/объединенцев	Mensheviks-Centrists	Mensheviks-Centrists
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, менъшевиков/оробонцев	Menshevik-Oborons	Mensheviks
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, объединная	Mensheviks-Centrists	Mensheviks-Centrists
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, объединная, Бунд	Mensheviks-Bund	Mensheviks-Bund
Российская социал/демократическая рабочая партия, объединные интерналистов	Menshevik-Int.	Mensheviks
Русская демократическая партия	Russian Democratic Party	Rightist
Русский народно/государственный союз	Russian Popular State Union	Rightist

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Русско/народная партия христиан/старообрядцев всех согласий	Russian People's Party of Christians-Old Believers	Old Believers
Сверхпартийны союз киевлян/прогрессистов	Superpartisan Union of Kievites/Progr.	Superpartisan Union of Kievites/Progr.
Селъскохозяйственная торгово/промышленная группа	Comm.-Indust.	Comm.-Indust.
Селъскохозяйственно/ремесленно/торгого/промышленная группа	Comm.-Indust.	Comm.-Indust.
Сионистская партия	Zionists	Zionists
Сионистская партия	Zionists	Jewish Nat. lists
Совет крестъян местечка Смелого Роменского уезда	Soviet of PD	Soviet of PD
Совет крестъянских депутатов	Soviet of PD	Soviet of PD
Социал/демократия Латвии	Social-Democracy of the Latvian Territory	Latvian SD's
Социалистиеские партии союхз служащих Юга/Западной железной догоги	Socialist Parties of the Southern/Western Railway Workers' Unions	Bolsheviks
Социалистический блок, Украинская партия социалистов/революционеров и Группа сочуствующая Полъской Партии социалистов, Левица	Socialist Bloc: Ukrainian SRs, Polish Party of Socialists, Levica	Ukrainian SRs
Социалисты/федералисты и крестъяне Латгалии, Режицкого/Люцинского и Двинсцкого уехдов	Socialist-Federalists, Peas. of Latgale	Socialist-Federalists and Peasants of Latgale
Союз домовляделъцев Елъца	Landowners	Landowners
Союз забайкалъских старообрядцев	Union of Transbaikal Old Believers	Orthodox
Союз земелъных собственников	Union of Landowners	Union of Landowners
Союз земелъных собственников, Беспартмийные пргогрессисмы	Landowners, Non-partisan Progr.	Landowners
Союз земелъных собственников, Общество старообряд/рабочая партия, объединенная, и Бунд	Union of Landowners, Old Believers, Bund	Landowners
Союз земелъных собственников, Хлеборобы	Union of Landowners, Farmers	Union of Landowners, Farmers
Союз землевладелъцев	Union of Landowners	Union of Landowners

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Союз землевладелъцев Минской губернии	Union of Landowners	Union of Landowners
Союз крестъян/украинцев, беженцев/уркраинцев, Организация социалистов/революционеров татар	Union of Ukrainian Peas., Ukrainian Refugees, the Organization of Tatar Socialist Revolutionaries	Tatar Socialists
Союз православноро духовенства и мирян	Orthodox Clergy, Laymen	Orthodox
Союз селъских хозяев и посевщиков	Union of Landowners	Union of Landowners
Союз селъских хозяев, Союз земелъных собственников	Homeowners, Landowners	Landowners
Союз селъских хозяев, крестъян/собственников, хуторян и отрубщиков	Union of Landowners, Farmers	Union of Landowners, Farmers
Союз социалистов немцев Поволъжя	Union of Socialists of the Volga German Region	Union of Socialists of the Volga German Region
Союз торговцев, промышленников, ремесленникоф и домовладелъцев Симбирской губернии	Comm.-Indust. Union	Comm.-Indust. Union
Список, название которого не установлено	Unknown	Unknown
Старообрядцы, Беспартийные крестъяне и хлебопашцы	Old Believers, Non-Partisan Peas., Farmers	Old Believers
Таранчинское население Джаркентского уезда	Tarchin population of Jarkent u.	Other
Торгово/промышленная группа	Comm.-Indust. Group	Comm.-Indust. Group
Торгово/промышленная и ремесленный классы и домовладелъцы	Bloc of Traders, Industrialists, Artisans, Homeowners	Comm.-Indust. list
Трети участок Телицкой волости Бендерского уезда	Citiz. of the Third Precinct of Telitskaya v., Bender u.	Citiz. of the Third Precinct of Telitskaya v., Bender u.
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия совместно с националъным Союзм черемисов Вятской губернии	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия, Баргузинского уезда	Popular Socialists of Bargusinskiy uezd	Popular Socialists of Bargusinskiy uezd
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия, Всероссийский крестъянский союз	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия, Забайкалъцкий отдел	Popular Socialists of Zabaikalskiy otdel	Popular Socialists of Zabaikalskiy otdel
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия, Общегубернский сьезд всех объединенных коопертивных организаций Тамбовской губернии	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия, Трудовое крестъяне	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Трудовая народно/сосиалистийеская партия, деятели украинской кооперации	Popular Socialists	Popular Socialists
Трудовое крестъянство	Labor Peasantry	Other
Трудовой список	Labor list	Other
Украинская партия социалистов/революционеров	Ukrainian SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Украинская партия социалистов/революционеров совместно с Волынской радой селянских депутатов	Ukrainian SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Украинская партия социалистов/революционеров, Украинская селянская спилка	Ukrainian SRs, Selianska Spilka	Ukrainian SRs, Selianska Spilka
Украинская партия социалистов/революционеров, Украинская социал/демократичесткая рабочая партия, Объединенные еврейская социалистическая рабочая партия	Ukrainian SRs, SRs, the United Jewish Socialist Labour Party (S.S., E.S.)	Ukrainian SRs
Украинская партия социалистов/федералистов	Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists	Popular Socialists, Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists
Украинская партия социалистов/федералистов, Партия социалистов/революционеров	Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists, Ukrainian SRs	Popular Socialists, Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Украинская партия социалистов/федералистов, Селяне/хлеборобы	Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists	Popular Socialists, Ukrainian Socialist-Federalists
Украинская рада	Ukrainian SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Украинская социал/демократическая рабочая партия	Ukrainian SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Украинские социалистические организациий Бессарабской гурбернии	Ukrainian Socialist Organizations	Ukrainian SRs
Украинцы	Ukrainians	Other Ukrainians
Украинцы, левые	Leftist SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Украинцы, правые	Ukrainian Right	Rightist
Украиская социал/демократическая рабочая партия	Ukrainian SRs	Ukrainian SRs
Уралъский областной киргизский комитет	Ural Regional Kirghiz Committee	Alash Orda
Финны/социалисты	Finnish Socialists	Finnish SRs
Централъный комитет Черноморского флота, Севастополъский отдел Всероссийского союза моряков и речников	Tsentroflot, the Sevastopol Branch of the Union of Sailors	Chuvash
Централъный комитет объединенного духовенства и мирян	Clergy, Laymen	Clergy, Laymen
Централъный комитет объединенного духовенства и мирян, город Петропавловск	Clergy, Laymen of Petropavlovsk	Clergy, Laymen of Petropavlovsk
Четвертый участок Телицкой волости Бендерского уезда	Citiz. of the Fourth section of Telitskaya v., Bender u.	Citiz. of the Fourth section of Telitskaya v., Bender u.
Чеченский и ингушский народы Грозненского, Беденского и Назрановского округоб	Chechen-Ingush Peoples	Other
Чувашский военный комитет	The All Chuvash Nat. Congr.	Chuvash
Эстонская радикалъно/демократическая партия, Крестъянский союз	Estonian Radical Democratic Party	Rightist
Эстонская социал/демократическая рабочая партия	Estonian SDs	Estonian SDs
Эстонская трудовая партия	Estonian Labour Party	Estonian SRs

continued ...

Continuation of table B.2

Party (Russian)	Party (English)	Group assignment
Эстонский демократической партии, Эстонского земелъного союза	Estonian Democratic Party, Estonian landowner union	Estonian Popular Socialists
Эстонский список	Estonian SDs	Estonian SDs
Якутский трудовой союз федералистов	Yakutia federalist labor union	Other

Table B.3: Occupational specialization of Jews – disaggregated descriptive statistics

Rank	Occupation	Category	Perc. in category		Perc. Jews	Over-rep. Jews
			Jews	Non-Jews		
1	Trade: Grain	Commerce	3.32	0.05	0.899	62.489
2	Clergymen, non-Christian	Prof. Services	0.39	0.01	0.851	39.889
3	Trade: Furs, Leather, etc.	Commerce	0.83	0.03	0.820	32.025
4	Trade: Structural Material and Fuel	Commerce	1.84	0.06	0.809	29.713
5	Trade: Textile and Clothing	Commerce	2.78	0.10	0.797	27.590
6	Commercial Middlemen	Commerce	1.06	0.04	0.775	24.154
7	Trade: Metal Goods, Machinery, Arms	Commerce	0.45	0.02	0.773	23.802
8	General Commerce	Commerce	6.36	0.27	0.772	23.716
9	Peddlers and Hucksters	Commerce	1.27	0.06	0.762	22.440
10	Trade: Cattle	Commerce	1.09	0.05	0.750	20.998
11	Trade: other Agricultural Products	Commerce	9.74	0.49	0.739	19.809
12	Tobacco, and Tobacco Manufactures	Manufacturing	0.53	0.03	0.733	19.205

The table is obtained from Spitzer (Table 6.2 2015, p. 200) and reports statistics over the entire population of (language defined) Jews and non-Jews within the Pale, including Courland province. It lists the 12 most typically-Jewish occupations out of a total list of 65. Columns 1 and 2 report percentages of occupation indicators within each ethnic group. The percentages are from among the labor force, not the total population. Column 3 reports the share of Jews within each category. Column 4 reports the over-representation of Jews within each category. The ranking is according to the order in columns 3 and 4. Source: 1897 Russian Census, provincial volumes, Tables XXI and XXII. The categorization to occupation groups and the translated English titles are from Rubinow (1907, pp. 498).

Table B.4: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables (imputed values)

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
	Panel A: Individual Parties				
Mensheviks	0.042	0.120	0.00	0.95	391
SRevol	0.568	0.250	0.00	0.97	391
Bolsheviks	0.234	0.214	0.00	0.78	391
Jewish lists	0.016	0.042	0.00	0.38	391
Liberals	0.008	0.014	0.00	0.10	391
Kadets	0.047	0.045	0.00	0.29	391
	Panel B: By Faction				
Far Left	0.249	0.226	0.00	0.89	391
Mod. Left	0.019	0.088	0.00	0.74	391
Center	0.608	0.243	0.00	0.99	391
Mod. Right	0.068	0.136	0.00	0.90	391
Cons. Right	0.055	0.046	0.00	0.29	391
	Panel C: By Party Position				
Most left	−1.918	0.799	−4.36	0.00	391
Most right	0.381	0.355	0.00	2.24	391
Left-right range	2.299	0.792	0.74	5.22	391
COG	−1.829	1.285	−4.18	2.05	449

Table B.5: Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables (imputed values)

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	Observations
	Panel B: Geographic control variables				
Latitude	54.02	3.85	44.60	69.58	449
Longitude	37.94	7.97	24.30	63.29	449
Coal Territory 0/1	0.41	0.49	0.00	1.00	449
Podzol Soil	0.36	0.37	0.00	1.00	449
Length Growing Period	156.95	32.86	69.86	213.32	449
Distance to St. Petersburg	9.43	3.84	0.32	20.02	449
Distance Provincial Capital	1.25	0.98	0.00	8.65	449
	Panel C: Demographic control variables				
Number of teriary educated 1897	179.92	671.36	13.00	12447.00	438
Sh. Eastern Slavic language speakers 1897	0.85	0.20	0.05	1.00	438
Share industrial workers 1897	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.27	438
Serfs % (1858)	0.40	0.25	0.00	0.85	449
Change in gender ratio 1913-17	−0.08	0.68	−9.31	0.90	379
	Panel D: Middlemen control variables				
Sh. Jews among craftsmen	0.45	0.21	0.04	0.80	121
Sh. Jews among creditors	0.59	0.26	0.05	1.00	121
Sh. Jews among traders	0.79	0.21	0.08	0.98	121

Table B.6: Correlation results with relative radicalization in European Russia (Part A)

	PolIndex	Far Left	Mod. Left	Center	Mod. Right	Cons. Right
	Panel A: Tsarist repression (explanatory variables)					
Assassinations	-0.004^{**}	0.011^{**}	-0.000	-0.016^{***}	-0.000	0.005^{***}
Riots	-0.052^{**}	0.060	-0.021	-0.119^{**}	0.042	0.038^{***}
Membership	-0.005^{**}	0.007	-0.000	-0.014^{**}	0.003	0.005^{***}
Propaganda	-0.010	0.024	0.004	-0.047^{**}	0.005	0.014^{***}
	Panel B: Geographic control variables					
Latitude	0.004^{*}	0.027^{***}	-0.005^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.009^{***}	0.004^{***}
Longitude	0.010^{***}	-0.001	-0.001^{**}	-0.002	0.004^{***}	0.000
Coal Territory 0/1	0.031^{*}	-0.046^{**}	0.013	0.027	0.026^{*}	-0.020^{***}
Podzol Soil	-0.102^{***}	0.285^{***}	-0.040^{***}	-0.201^{***}	-0.076^{***}	0.032^{***}
Length Growing Period	-0.002^{***}	0.002^{***}	-0.000^{***}	-0.001^{**}	-0.001^{***}	0.000^{*}
Distance to St. Petersburg	0.019^{***}	-0.032^{***}	0.004^{***}	0.015^{***}	0.017^{***}	-0.003^{***}
Distance Provincial Capital	0.083^{***}	-0.028^{**}	-0.003	0.023^{*}	0.020^{***}	-0.012^{***}

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The correlations refer to the imputed dataset with 20 imputations. The matrix is calculated with an imputed regression of the dependent variables on each explanatory variable invidually. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The explanatory variables include Tsarist repression, geographic and demographic controls from Kessler and Markevich (2017) and Buggle and Nafziger (2021) as well as the middlemen controls obtained from Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020).

Table B.7: Correlation results with relative radicalization in European Russia (Part B)

	PolIndex	Far Left	Mod. Left	Center	Mod. Right	Cons. Right
	Panel C: Demographic control variables					
Number of teriary educated 1897	-0.000^{**}	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Sh. Eastern Slavic language speakers 1897	0.110^{***}	0.448^{***}	-0.112^{***}	-0.022	-0.347^{***}	0.033^{**}
Share industrial workers 1897	-0.900^{***}	1.900^{***}	0.033	-1.640^{***}	-0.412^{***}	0.119^{***}
Serfs % (1858)	-0.237^{***}	0.240^{***}	-0.044^{**}	0.002	-0.177^{***}	-0.022^{**}
Change in gender ratio 1913-17	-0.020	0.008	0.003	-0.020	0.006	0.003
	Panel D: Middlemen control variables					
Sh. Jews among craftsmen	-0.057	-0.246^{***}	-0.071	0.222^{*}	0.139^{***}	-0.045^{**}
Sh. Jews among creditors	-0.059	-0.145^{***}	-0.086	0.302^{***}	-0.004	-0.067^{***}
Sh. Jews among traders	-0.042	-0.157^{**}	-0.123	0.462^{***}	-0.103^{**}	-0.080^{***}

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. The correlations refer to the imputed dataset with 20 imputations. The matrix is calculated with an imputed regression of the dependent variables on each explanatory variable invidually. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The explanatory variables include Tsarist repression, geographic and demographic controls from Kessler and Markevich (2017) and Buggle and Nafziger (2021) as well as the middlemen controls obtained from Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020).

Table B.8: Benefactors of Tsarist repression in the Pale, by faction

	Far Left (1)	Mod. Left (2)	Center (3)	Mod. Right (4)	Cons. Right (5)
Radicalization:					
Okhrana	0.092*	−0.031	−0.173**	0.069**	0.044**
	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.069)	(0.034)	(0.017)
Male (1 if male)	−0.119*	0.046	0.211**	−0.083*	−0.056**
	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.095)	(0.046)	(0.023)
By visibility:					
Assassinations	−0.089	−0.009	0.190*	−0.049	−0.043**
	(0.074)	(0.043)	(0.099)	(0.045)	(0.019)
Riots	−0.023	0.491**	0.798	−0.758***	−0.508***
	(0.358)	(0.207)	(0.481)	(0.217)	(0.091)
Membership	0.036	−0.063*	−0.254***	0.171***	0.109***
	(0.059)	(0.034)	(0.079)	(0.036)	(0.015)
Propaganda	0.305*	0.009	−0.412*	0.062	0.036
	(0.156)	(0.091)	(0.211)	(0.095)	(0.040)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Middlemen	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. . Moreover, middlemen controls from Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020) reflect the Jewish minority's integration into the countryside, including the proportion of Jews among craftsmen, creditors, transport, and grain trade. These controls were obtained by collapsing a grid-level dataset.

Table B.9: Benefactors of Tsarist repression in the Pale, by faction

	Mensheviks (1)	SRevol (2)	Bolsheviks (3)	Jewish lists (4)	Liberals (5)	Kadets (6)
Radicalization:						
Okhrana	−0.058	−0.123	0.092*	0.033	−0.012*	0.056***
	(0.068)	(0.093)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Male (1 if male)	0.083	0.138	−0.119*	−0.038	0.017*	−0.073***
	(0.093)	(0.128)	(0.065)	(0.039)	(0.009)	(0.020)
By visibility:						
Assassinations	0.312***	−0.106	−0.089	−0.037	0.010	−0.053***
	(0.096)	(0.136)	(0.074)	(0.039)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Riots	−0.344	1.242*	−0.023	−0.551***	−0.031	−0.477***
	(0.467)	(0.660)	(0.358)	(0.188)	(0.053)	(0.077)
Membership	−0.065	−0.215*	0.036	0.120***	0.002	0.107***
	(0.077)	(0.109)	(0.059)	(0.031)	(0.009)	(0.013)
Propaganda	0.047	−0.462	0.305*	0.074	−0.002	0.038
	(0.204)	(0.289)	(0.156)	(0.082)	(0.023)	(0.034)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Middlemen	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables refer to different political factions. Mensheviks encompasses the vote share for the center, leftist, and rightist factions of the Menshevik party. SRevol represents the vote share for the Social Revolutionaries, while Bolsheviks refers to any list where the Bolsheviks were the leading party. Jewish lists refers to the vote share for Jewish lists, such as Fareynikte, the Bund, or the Zionists. Liberals denotes the vote share for the Commercial Industrialists and Landowners, and Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets') represents the vote share for the most conservative party electable in the 1917 assembly. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. . Moreover, middlemen controls from Grosfeld, Sakalli, and Zhuravskaya (2020) reflect the Jewish minority's integration into the countryside, including the proportion of Jews among craftsmen, creditors, transport, and grain trade. These controls were obtained by collapsing a grid-level dataset.

Table B.10: Spatial Correction with Arbitrary Clustering: Factions in European Russia (50 km cutoff)

	Far Left (1)	Mod. Left (2)	Center (3)	Mod. Right (4)	Cons. Right (5)
Radicalization:					
Okhrana	0.024	−0.007	−0.031	−0.001	0.015**
	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Male (1 if male)	−0.033	0.009	0.039	0.003	−0.018**
	(0.030)	(0.007)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.009)
By crime:					
Assassinations	−0.075*	−0.057**	0.214***	−0.031	−0.051***
	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.012)
Riots	0.060	−0.406**	0.806**	−0.077	−0.382***
	(0.277)	(0.191)	(0.352)	(0.285)	(0.088)
Membership	0.013	0.071*	−0.205***	0.038	0.083***
	(0.060)	(0.038)	(0.073)	(0.066)	(0.020)
Propaganda	0.207***	0.118**	−0.406***	0.030	0.051***
	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.095)	(0.028)	(0.015)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table B.11: Spatial Correction with Arbitrary Clustering: Factions in the Pale (50 km cutoff)

	Far Left (1)	Mod. Left (2)	Center (3)	Mod. Right (4)	Cons. Right (5)
Radicalization:					
Okhrana	0.092***	−0.031*	−0.173**	0.069	0.044
	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.081)	(0.044)	(0.027)
Male (1 if male)	−0.119***	0.046**	0.211**	−0.083	−0.056
	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.108)	(0.059)	(0.036)
By crime:					
Assassinations	−0.089**	−0.009	0.190**	−0.049	−0.043**
	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.083)	(0.050)	(0.021)
Riots	−0.023	0.491***	0.798*	−0.758***	−0.508***
	(0.222)	(0.138)	(0.451)	(0.285)	(0.137)
Membership	0.036	−0.063***	−0.254***	0.171***	0.109***
	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.093)	(0.062)	(0.031)
Propaganda	0.305***	0.009	−0.412***	0.062	0.036
	(0.088)	(0.147)	(0.133)	(0.052)	(0.027)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables refer to different political factions. Mensheviks encompasses the vote share for the center, leftist, and rightist factions of the Menshevik party. SRevol represents the vote share for the Social Revolutionaries, while Bolsheviks refers to any list where the Bolsheviks were the leading party. Jewish lists refers to the vote share for Jewish lists, such as Fareynikte, the Bund, or the Zionists. Liberals denotes the vote share for the Commercial Industrialists and Landowners, and Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets') represents the vote share for the most conservative party electable in the 1917 assembly. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.12: Spatial Correction with Arbitrary Clustering: Individual Parties in European Russia (50 km cutoff)

	Mensheviks (1)	SRevol (2)	Bolsheviks (3)	Jewish lists (4)	Liberals (5)	Kadets (6)
Radicalization:						
Okhrana	0.023**	−0.036*	−0.001	0.007**	0.002	0.013**
	(0.010)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.007)
Male (1 if male)	−0.030**	0.042	0.003	−0.008*	−0.002	−0.015*
	(0.013)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.009)
By crime:						
Assassinations	0.050*	0.118**	−0.021	−0.036**	−0.006**	−0.045***
	(0.027)	(0.054)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.012)
Riots	−0.015	0.576	0.401*	−0.225*	−0.078***	−0.304***
	(0.161)	(0.389)	(0.206)	(0.117)	(0.021)	(0.087)
Membership	−0.026	−0.108	−0.077*	0.063**	0.012***	0.072***
	(0.039)	(0.084)	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.020)
Propaganda	−0.098*	−0.332***	0.230***	−0.002	0.007	0.044***
	(0.054)	(0.077)	(0.064)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.016)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Table B.13: Spatial Correction with Arbitrary Clustering: Individual Parties in the Pale (50 km cutoff)

	Mensheviks (1)	SRevol (2)	Bolsheviks (3)	Jewish lists (4)	Liberals (5)	Kadets (6)
Radicalization:						
Okhrana	−0.058	−0.123	0.092***	0.033	−0.012**	0.056**
	(0.048)	(0.089)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.005)	(0.024)
Male (1 if male)	0.083	0.138	−0.119***	−0.038	0.017**	−0.073**
	(0.064)	(0.121)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.007)	(0.032)
By crime:						
Assassinations	0.312**	−0.106	−0.089**	−0.037	0.010*	−0.053***
	(0.129)	(0.112)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.006)	(0.018)
Riots	−0.344	1.242**	−0.023	−0.551**	−0.031	−0.477***
	(0.452)	(0.608)	(0.222)	(0.224)	(0.030)	(0.117)
Membership	−0.065	−0.215*	0.036	0.120**	0.002	0.107***
	(0.050)	(0.117)	(0.036)	(0.049)	(0.006)	(0.027)
Propaganda	0.047	−0.462**	0.305***	0.074*	−0.002	0.038
	(0.178)	(0.227)	(0.088)	(0.045)	(0.016)	(0.023)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Middlemen	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables refer to different political factions. Mensheviks encompasses the vote share for the center, leftist, and rightist factions of the Menshevik party. SRevol represents the vote share for the Social Revolutionaries, while Bolsheviks refers to any list where the Bolsheviks were the leading party. Jewish lists refers to the vote share for Jewish lists, such as Fareynikte, the Bund, or the Zionists. Liberals denotes the vote share for the Commercial Industrialists and Landowners, and Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets') represents the vote share for the most conservative party electable in the 1917 assembly. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.14: Coarsened matching results – reduced set of covariates

Variables	Coefficient	Number of Obs.	R-Squared
Individual Parties			
Mensheviks	0.062*	57.000	0.055
	(0.035)		
SRevol	−0.044	57.000	0.009
	(0.061)		
Bolsheviks	−0.068	57.000	0.027
	(0.055)		
Jewish lists	0.012**	57.000	0.075
	(0.006)		
Liberals	0.008*	57.000	0.058
	(0.005)		
Kadets	0.020*	57.000	0.058
	(0.011)		
General Radicalization			
Most left	0.313*	57.000	0.049
	(0.185)		
Most right	0.141**	57.000	0.098
	(0.057)		
Left-right range	−0.172	57.000	0.013
	(0.200)		
Relative Radicalization			
PolIndex	−0.022	68.000	0.005
	(0.037)		
Far Left	−0.068	57.000	0.027
	(0.055)		
Mod. Left	−0.005	57.000	0.007
	(0.008)		
Center	0.020	57.000	0.002
	(0.056)		
Mod. Right	0.025**	57.000	0.096
	(0.010)		
Cons. Right	0.028***	57.000	0.114
	(0.011)		

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. Results for the Bolsheviks, Kadets and Liberals as median party in a given district are omitted.

Table B.15: Spatial autoregression: Individual Parties (Part A)

	Mensheviks		SRevol		Bolsheviks	
	(1) SDM	(2) SDEM	(3) SDM	(4) SDEM	(5) SDM	(6) SDEM
By Observables						
Assassinations	0.044	0.041	0.081	0.094*	−0.030	−0.010
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Riots	0.067	0.172	0.363	0.395	0.282	0.254
	(0.202)	(0.164)	(0.410)	(0.382)	(0.197)	(0.200)
Membership	−0.035	−0.048	−0.058	−0.101	−0.045	−0.044
	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Propaganda	−0.045	−0.044	−0.252***	−0.205***	0.214***	0.123**
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.059)	(0.050)
Spatial Lags						
Propaganda	−0.459	−0.599	0.006	−0.252	0.818**	0.244
	(0.299)	(0.481)	(0.543)	(0.652)	(0.340)	(0.335)
Dependent Variable	7.871***		0.753***		0.852***	
	(1.158)		(0.186)		(0.149)	
Error Term		7.660***		3.415**		3.377
		(2.959)		(1.617)		(2.102)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Chi-squared	101.160	86.717	663.543	138.774	932.777	246.590
Model significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables refer to different political factions. Mensheviks encompasses the vote share for the center, leftist, and rightist factions of the Menshevik party. SRevol represents the vote share for the Social Revolutionaries, while Bolsheviks refers to any list where the Bolsheviks were the leading party. Jewish lists refers to the vote share for Jewish lists, such as Fareynikte, the Bund, or the Zionists. Liberals denotes the vote share for the Commercial Industrialists and Landowners, and Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets') represents the vote share for the most conservative party electable in the 1917 assembly. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.16: Spatial autoregression: Individual Parties (Part B)

	Jewish lists		Liberals		Kadets	
	(1) SDM	(2) SDEM	(3) SDM	(4) SDEM	(5) SDM	(6) SDEM
By Observables						
Assassinations	−0.036**	−0.036**	−0.007***	−0.005*	−0.047***	−0.049***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Riots	−0.238**	−0.235**	−0.067***	−0.055***	−0.322***	−0.318***
	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.087)	(0.091)
Membership	0.065**	0.064**	0.012***	0.010**	0.075***	0.075***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Propaganda	0.005	0.006	0.007*	0.004	0.052***	0.053***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Spatial Lags						
Propaganda	−0.218**	−0.238**	0.008	0.052*	−0.086	−0.038
	(0.090)	(0.108)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.117)	(0.159)
Dependent Variable	−0.565		3.058***		0.630	
	(0.896)		(0.439)		(0.418)	
Error Term		2.906		5.590**		3.393***
		(2.626)		(2.555)		(1.074)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Chi-squared	266.685	287.172	185.266	232.361	307.640	161.956
Model significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables refer to different political factions. Mensheviks encompasses the vote share for the center, leftist, and rightist factions of the Menshevik party. SRevol represents the vote share for the Social Revolutionaries, while Bolsheviks refers to any list where the Bolsheviks were the leading party. Jewish lists refers to the vote share for Jewish lists, such as Fareynikte, the Bund, or the Zionists. Liberals denotes the vote share for the Commercial Industrialists and Landowners, and Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets') represents the vote share for the most conservative party electable in the 1917 assembly. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.17: Spillover effects: Individual parties

	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
		Mensheviks	
SDM	−0.032	0.134	0.102
	(0.138)	(0.085)	(0.076)
SDEM	−0.037	−0.727*	−0.764*
	(0.044)	(0.424)	(0.434)
		SRevol	
SDM	−0.251***	−0.331	−0.582
	(0.073)	(1.817)	(1.818)
SDEM	−0.209***	−0.108	−0.317
	(0.075)	(0.585)	(0.589)
		Bolsheviks	
SDM	0.248***	8.811	9.059
	(0.074)	(11.179)	(11.218)
SDEM	0.116**	0.422	0.539*
	(0.054)	(0.298)	(0.300)
		Jewish lists	
SDM	0.006	−0.132*	−0.126*
	(0.012)	(0.069)	(0.070)
SDEM	0.006	−0.216**	−0.209**
	(0.012)	(0.097)	(0.095)
		Liberals	
SDM	0.006	−0.029	−0.023
	(0.009)	(0.064)	(0.072)
SDEM	0.004	0.066**	0.069**
	(0.004)	(0.029)	(0.029)
		Kadets	
SDM	0.052***	−0.054	−0.002
	(0.016)	(0.266)	(0.266)
SDEM	0.053***	−0.009	0.044
	(0.018)	(0.147)	(0.146)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.18: Spatial autoregression: Polarization & General Radicalization (Part A)

	PolIndex		Far Left		Mod. Left	
	(1) SDM	(2) SDEM	(3) SDM	(4) SDEM	(5) SDM	(6) SDEM
By Observables						
Assassinations	−0.019	−0.013	−0.084**	−0.050	−0.057**	−0.036*
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Riots	−0.478***	−0.313**	−0.081	−0.089	−0.341**	−0.233*
	(0.156)	(0.122)	(0.301)	(0.269)	(0.161)	(0.135)
Membership	0.081***	0.058**	0.048	0.038	0.068**	0.042
	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Propaganda	−0.040	−0.044	0.202***	0.087	0.113**	0.073*
	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.044)	(0.041)
Spatial Lags						
Propaganda	0.263*	0.211	0.495	−0.185	−0.131	0.001
	(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.369)	(0.348)	(0.131)	(0.176)
Dependent Variable	0.322**		0.957***		4.845**	
	(0.130)		(0.194)		(1.889)	
Error Term		4.588***		3.394*		9.057**
		(0.843)		(1.887)		(4.458)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	369	369	338	338	338	338
Chi-squared	731.459	529.662	914.047	185.577	19.037	100.702
Model significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.454	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.19: Spatial autoregression: Polarization & General Radicalization (Part B)

	Center		Mod. Right		Cons. Right	
	(1) SDM	(2) SDEM	(3) SDM	(4) SDEM	(5) SDM	(6) SDEM
By Observables						
Assassinations	0.175***	0.171***	−0.031	−0.039	−0.053***	−0.054***
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Riots	0.600*	0.773**	−0.075	−0.063	−0.396***	−0.375***
	(0.344)	(0.341)	(0.284)	(0.288)	(0.089)	(0.094)
Membership	−0.153**	−0.206***	0.039	0.046	0.087***	0.085***
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Propaganda	−0.331***	−0.234***	0.023	0.021	0.057***	0.059***
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Spatial Lags						
Propaganda	0.299	−0.297	0.257	0.657**	−0.045	−0.043
	(0.543)	(0.533)	(0.227)	(0.324)	(0.116)	(0.164)
Dependent Variable	0.753***		0.266		0.609*	
	(0.196)		(1.089)		(0.362)	
Error Term		3.417**		9.518**		6.146***
		(1.593)		(4.732)		(0.993)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Chi-squared	439.896	129.900	149.484	423.925	277.306	200.773
Model significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variables were categorized into five political party groups using the Arzamas method and our own coding. The groups were based on cumulative vote shares and included far/conservative left (right), moderate left (right) and center. The far left comprised Social Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks, moderate left included Peasant and Cooperative parties, the center included Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and other socialists, moderate right included Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, and minority parties, and the conservative right included Commercial industrialists, landowners (referred to as 'Liberals"), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (referred to as 'Kadets). The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.20: Spillover effects: Relative radicalization

	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
		PolIndex	
SDM	−0.043	0.316	0.273
	(0.034)	(0.232)	(0.239)
SDEM	−0.043	0.185	0.141
	(0.028)	(0.138)	(0.146)
		Far Left	
SDM	0.350	42.715	43.065
	(1.311)	(396.127)	(397.436)
SDEM	0.078	0.152	0.229
	(0.069)	(0.324)	(0.328)
		Mod. Left	
SDM	0.108	−0.085*	0.024
	(0.098)	(0.049)	(0.095)
SDEM	0.072*	−0.101	−0.029
	(0.041)	(0.149)	(0.153)
		Center	
SDM	−0.339***	−0.674	−1.013
	(0.090)	(1.837)	(1.825)
SDEM	−0.231**	−0.459	−0.689
	(0.092)	(0.464)	(0.470)
		Mod. Right	
SDM	0.021	0.219	0.240
	(0.029)	(0.468)	(0.469)
SDEM	0.025	0.549*	0.574*
	(0.028)	(0.293)	(0.297)
		Cons. Right	
SDM	0.059***	0.128	0.187
	(0.015)	(0.333)	(0.334)
SDEM	0.058***	−0.004	0.054
	(0.018)	(0.148)	(0.148)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.21: Spatial autoregression: Relative Radicalization

	Most left		Most right		Left-right range	
	(1) SDM	(2) SDEM	(3) SDM	(4) SDEM	(5) SDM	(6) SDEM
By Observables						
Assassinations	0.226	0.051	−0.268***	−0.285***	−0.478**	−0.301*
	(0.211)	(0.179)	(0.091)	(0.108)	(0.196)	(0.162)
Riots	−0.524	−0.076	−1.483**	−1.334	−0.832	−1.062
	(1.507)	(1.257)	(0.676)	(0.818)	(1.438)	(1.192)
Membership	−0.002	0.035	0.379**	0.371**	0.350	0.293
	(0.345)	(0.287)	(0.153)	(0.184)	(0.317)	(0.256)
Propaganda	−0.681***	−0.247	0.350***	0.338**	1.012***	0.570*
	(0.238)	(0.253)	(0.098)	(0.132)	(0.235)	(0.299)
textbfSpatial Lags						
Propaganda	−2.393	−1.499	0.362	0.680	2.306	1.872
	(1.708)	(2.100)	(0.955)	(1.096)	(1.660)	(1.752)
Dependent Variable	0.512***		1.091*		0.484***	
	(0.161)		(0.623)		(0.140)	
Error Term		4.200*		8.153***		3.641**
		(2.196)		(3.039)		(1.794)
Constituency FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Demographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Geographics	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	338	338	338	338	338	338
Chi-squared	486.313	130.048	181.319	524.952	580.184	151.203
Model significance	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The demographic controls came from two sources: Buggle and Nafziger (2021) and Kessler and Markevich (2017) and include district location factors, such as latitude, longitude, and global distance to St. Petersburg and to the provincial capital. Other factors are the length of the growing season, presence of coal territories, and type of soil. Additionally, we account for the proportion of individuals with tertiary education, the proportion of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorusians, and the proportion of workers in industrial sectors. These factors are measured based on the 1897 population levels and weighted by district population levels. We further include the share of serfs in 1858 and the missing men due to World War I as controls for each district. We introduce Stata's Bartlett test for the correlation structure. Latitude and longitude are included in the spatial environment argument of the model.

Table B.22: Spillover effects: General radicalization

	Direct Effects	Indirect Effects	Total Effects
		Most left	
SDM	−0.706***	−6.078	−6.785
	(0.243)	(4.223)	(4.231)
SDEM	−0.233	−1.842	−2.076
	(0.262)	(1.893)	(1.926)
		Most right	
SDM	0.283	−19.957	−19.674
	(1.329)	(393.417)	(394.743)
SDEM	0.338***	0.631	0.969
	(0.131)	(0.995)	(0.995)
		Left-right range	
SDM	1.036***	5.839	6.875*
	(0.241)	(3.633)	(3.631)
SDEM	0.558*	2.092	2.650*
	(0.307)	(1.543)	(1.575)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table B.23: Matching Results for Okhrana Coarsening: Reduced Set of Covariates

```
Matching Summary:
-----------------
Number of strata: 173
Number of matched strata: 48
             0    1
      All  223  226
  Matched  129  147
Unmatched   94   79

Multivariate L1 distance: .79130224

Univariate imbalance:
                            L1     mean      min      25%      50%      75%      max
             latitude   .10677  -.03795  -.23435  -.19374  -.18371  -.07988  -.90262
            longitude   .10181  -.27863  -1.6127  -.62381  -.76774  -.89668  -.12943
 globdist_provcapital   .24739  -.13255  -.32192  -.12327   .03368  -.03556  -.62385
globdist_stpetersburg   .09223  -.07338  -1.6429  -.16129  -.16082  -.06419   .91083
```

Table B.24: Matching Results for Okhrana Coarsening: Expanded Set of Covariates

```
Matching Summary:
-----------------
Number of strata: 363
Number of matched strata: 24
             0    1
      All  223  226
  Matched   32   36
Unmatched  191  190

Multivariate L1 distance: .75

Univariate imbalance:
                            L1     mean      min      25%      50%      75%      max
             latitude   .05556  -.05407   -.4319  -.21187   .37856  -.15448   -.5508
            longitude   .23611  -.06094  -.86047  -1.3609   .29345  -.44141   .16526
            coal_terr  5.6e-17        0        0        0        0        0        0
          podzol_soil  5.6e-17   .00803        0        0    .0339  -.21085   .06122
   distance_coastline   .20833  -.06766  -.92799  -.35301  -.16441   .26797   .54349
            length_gs   .05556   1.0385   6.2112  -.24286   6.9436   .44444   .85654
 globdist_provcapital   .30556  -.13989  -.32192  -.50566   .00431  -.05688  -.06968
globdist_stpetersburg   .06944   .06528   .45959  -.10608    .1312  -.06642   .21273
```