
# "Dilutive Financing"

# Financial slack\* is firms' BARGAINING TOOL against financiers


\*'Financial slack': **unused capacity** for cheap internal funding (e.g. cash-holdings, room for short-term debt issuance, etc.)

# Main Analysis

Only friction: firms raise funds from financiers having bargaining power



# How do firms reduce financing rent?



#### Post-money value

: at target funding capacity

#### **Funds to raise**

: to restore target funding

#### Financing surplus

: split into rent & retention

#### Outside option

: when bargaining fails

Funding cushion (h): Strengthens firms' outside option at bargaining

- Gives firms time to find *alternative financiers* before bankruptcy
- Better outside option  $\rightarrow$  Less surplus from financing  $\rightarrow$  Less financiers' rent

### Core Mechanism

# Simple two-period setup

A *project* matures at the end, with *payoff*  $\overline{v}$  Requires a unit input per period,  $\overline{v} > 2$ 

- Two *outsiders*, one per period, can produce
- Nash bargaining splits surplus by  $(\theta, 1 \theta)$ Storage of input has a marginal carry cost  $\beta$

# I. Lumpy financing

| Twice  | Period 1          | Period 2                                   | Terminal       |
|--------|-------------------|--|----------------|
| Social | <b>-1</b>         | <b>-1</b>                                  | $\overline{v}$ |
| Equity | $\theta(v_0^2-1)$ | $v_0^2 \coloneqq \theta(\overline{v} - 1)$ | $\overline{v}$ |

| Once   | Period 1                       | Period 2       | Terminal       |
|--------|--------------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Social | $-2-\beta$                     | 0              | $\overline{v}$ |
| Equity | $\theta(\overline{v}-2-\beta)$ | $\overline{v}$ | $\overline{v}$ |

Bargain once, not twice, if 
$$(1-\theta)(\overline{v}-1) \geq \beta$$

# II. Early financing (i.e. 'cushion')

Given one input at beginning, when to bargain?

In second period: 
$$0 + \theta(\overline{v} - 0 - 1) =: v_0^2$$

- Outside option is losing the project


In first period: 
$$v_0^2 + \theta(\bar{v} - v_0^2 - 1 - \beta)$$

- Outside option is second-period bargaining

Bargain early, not later, if 
$$(1-\theta)(v_0^2-0) \ge \theta\beta$$

## Key Predictions

- 1. High 'price-earnings' → more financial slack
- More value is at stake upon bargaining
- 2. Counterintuitive effect of access to financing



- Robust access to financing induces funding cushion in *large excess* of *investment needs*  $\xi$ 



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