



## Motivation: Treasury Convenience in Recessions

- Magnitude: convenience yield explains > 50% term structure changes.
- Direction: convenience ↑ in GFC, but ↓ in Covid-19.




Figure 1. GFC: Collapse of Bear Sterns Lehman Brothers





Figure 2. Covid-19: March 2020 Turmoil

## This Theory Paper

- Studies convenience yield in a Preferred Habitat New Keynesian framework with repo.
- Answers two questions:
  - How to explain the different convenience dynamics?
  - What are the macroeconomic implications?
- Key mechanisms:
  - Non-pecuniary trading cost ⇒ endogenous convenience yield.
  - Preference shifter ⇒ novel preference channel linking demand shock to consumption.
  - Limited access to the capital market ⇒ market returns shape overall borrowing cost.

## Model Overview



## Selected Agents' Problems

- Representative dealer's problem:

$$\max_{X_t(\tau), Q_t^d(\tau)} E_t [dW_t^d] - \frac{1}{2\rho d} \text{Var}_t [dW_t^d],$$

$$s.t.$$

$$dW_t^d - W_t^d r_t dt = \int_0^T \underbrace{X_t(\tau)}_{\text{direct holdings}} \underbrace{\left( \frac{dP_t(\tau)}{P_t(\tau)} - r_t dt - \frac{\Delta_t(\tau) dt}{P_t(\tau)} \right)}_{\text{excess return}} + \int_0^T \underbrace{Q_t^d(\tau)}_{\text{repo supply}} \left( \underbrace{\frac{\Delta_t(\tau)}{P_t(\tau)}}_{\text{repo wedge}} - \underbrace{\frac{\Delta_t(\tau)}{P_t(\tau)}}_{\text{non-pecuniary cost}} \right) dt d\tau.$$

Broker-dealers require compensation for non-pecuniary cost.

- Household  $j$ 's problem:

$$\max_{c_t(j), n_t(j), k_t(j)} \int_0^\infty e^{-(\rho+\varpi_t)t} \left( \log c_t(j) - \frac{n_t(j)^{1+\phi}}{1+\phi} \right) dt$$

$$s.t.$$

$$dk_t(j) = (i_t(j)k_t(j) + W_t n_t(j) - P_t c_t(j)) dt + dT_t$$

Demand shock affects intertemporal consumption decisions.

## Financial Market Equilibrium

- Bond Cash Market:

$$\underbrace{\mu_t(\tau) - r_t}_{\text{expected excess return}} = \underbrace{\lambda B_t(\tau)}_{\text{convenience yield}} + \underbrace{\rho A(\tau)' \Sigma \Sigma' \int_0^T B_t(\tau) A(\tau) d\tau}_{\text{risk premium}}$$

- Bond Repo Market:

$$\underbrace{R_t(\tau) - r_t}_{\text{excess repo return}} = \underbrace{\lambda B_t(\tau)}_{\text{Convenience yield}}$$

## Incorporating Macro Dynamics

- Innovative IS curve:  $dx_t = \varsigma^{-1} \left( \tilde{r}(s_t) + \overline{\varpi}(s_t) - \pi_t - \bar{r} \right) dt.$   
nominal rate preference
- Standard Phillips curve: inflation  $\pi_t \uparrow$  when output gap  $x_t \uparrow$ .
- Standard Taylor rule: short rate  $r_t \uparrow$  when output gap  $x_t \uparrow$  or inflation  $\pi_t \uparrow$ .

## Result 1: Applications to GFC and Covid-19




Figure 3. GFC: Instantaneous IRFs of Flight-to-Liquidity Shock




Figure 4. Covid-19: Instantaneous IRFs of Flight-from-Safety Shock

## Result 2: ↓ vs. ↑ Convenience in Recession




Figure 5. Recession with Lower Convenience




Figure 6. Recession with Higher Convenience

## Result 3: Monetary Policy Implications




Figure 7. IRFs of Monetary Policy Shocks in LIBOR and SOFR Regimes.

## Concluding Remarks

- This paper develops a New Keynesian Preferred-Habitat model with non-pecuniary trading cost, limited access to capital market, and preference shifter.
- I find:
  - Flight-to-liquidity drove up convenience in GFC; Flight-from-safety drove down convenience in Covid-19.
  - Demand shocks can originate real downturns with higher or lower convenience.
  - Compared to the LIBOR regime, SOFR regime features stronger conventional policy but weaker QE and forward guidance.