## Political Connections and Carbon Emissions Disclosures: A Cross-Country Examination

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#### 2. Motivation

- Stakeholder appetite for environmental disclosure is growing rapidly
- Political connections present a hurdle to the disclosure of such information as they allow firms to avoid litigation, but only when their environmental performance isn't public information

## 3. Empirical Strategy

- Difference-in-differences around a firm becoming politically connected to observe the effect on their decision to voluntarily disclose carbon emissions
- Further, examine how the decision to disclose/withhold this information affects firms' future environmental performance when politically connected

#### 4. Data


- C# parsing program used to identify potential political connections from Capital IQ biographies of employees
- Political connection defined as an employee who is active in a political position in the national government or works directly for someone in such a position
- Flagged biographies verified by hand
- After merging, 241 politically connected individuals across 192 different firms in 37 countries
- Voluntary disclosure data from CDP

#### Sample Coverage



# 1. Paper in a Nutshell

When firms become politically connected, they disclose their carbon emissions less often



When these newly connected, non-disclosing firms are in countries with fewer environmental laws, they:

- 1) cause more environmental incidents
- 2) emit higher levels of greenhouse gas
- 3) raise environmental costs for society

Variable	Incidents	Emissions	Emissions Cost
_	(1)	(2)	(3)
Connected Firm	0.268**	0.285**	0.124*
	[0.021]	[0.049]	[0.086]
Controls	YES	YES	YES
Firm FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Clustering	Firm	Firm	Firm
Observations	1,062	1,029	1,029
R-squared	0.615	0.984	0.984

All while experiencing no change in governmental fines or penalties!

Variable	Environmental Litigation	
	(1)	
Connected Firm	0.135	
	[0.382]	
Controls	YES	
Firm FE	YES	
Year FE	YES	
Clustering	Firm	
Observations	360	
R-squared	0.804	

### 5. Further Findings

Our results are driven by countries where political connections are best able to shield firms from litigation, including:

- More corrupt countries
- Countries with fewer political parties
- Non-democratic countries
- Countries whose citizens prioritize the economy over the environment

Further, our results are driven by the types of connections that are strongest, including:

- Connections to a firm's home country government
- Connections to appointed rather than elected officials
- Connections through more powerful individuals within the firm

#### 6. Conclusion

- Becoming politically connected leads to lower carbon emissions disclosure
- This is driven by firms that can avoid government litigation if they obfuscate their environmental performance
- Such firms become worse environmental stewards while avoiding fines
- These findings shed light on the ways in which political connections sway firms' decisions to disclose environmental performance measures
- Highlights the ways in which politically connected firms may use non-disclosure of their environmental performance to become bad environmental stewards without consequence

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