


Ceren Baysan


Persistent Polarizing Effects of Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from Turkey

Figure A1. Media Censorship and State Repression




Source: These figures show time series plots of indicators relating to media censorship and state repression from the V-Dem database. Access to alternative information is defined as the extent to which the media is (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives. Equal protection of social groups is defined as the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state. Repression of CSOs is defined as the degree to which the government attempts to repress civil society organizations. Physical violence index is defined as the degree to which physical integrity is respected, where physical integrity is the freedom from political killings and torture by the government. I restrict the time series to after 1946 because this is the year when Turkey transitioned to a multi-party democracy. In each figure, the dashed vertical green line indicates the year that the AK Party came into power and the solid blue vertical line indicates the year of the constitutional referendum. For all variables, lower numbers indicate worse outcomes. A specific example of censorship is that the highest number of jailed journalists across all countries ever recorded since the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) started tracking such incidents in 1992 was between 2015 and 2018 (Beiser, 2018). For those three years, Turkey was the leading jailer in the world in absolute numbers. According to a report by the Media Ownership Monitor, 7 out of 10 news portals and 9 out of 10 of the most watched television channels belonged to owners that were affiliated to the Turkish government (Media Ownership Monitor, 2019). (Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2021))

Figure A2. National Security and the Economy




Note: The figure on the left shows the number of terrorist attacks in Turkey using data from the Global Terrorism Database (Global Terrorism Database, 2021). According to Global Terrorism Database (2021), a terrorist attack is defined as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. The figure on the right shows the exchange rate between the Turkish Lira and US Dollar (OECD, 2021).

Figure A3. Features of Democracy



Note: This figure shows a time series plot of macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest level from the V-Dem database. The green vertical line indicates the year that the AK Party came into power and the blue vertical line indicates the year of the referendum. (Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al., 2021)).

Figure A4. “No” Vote Share Distribution Across Country and Sample




Note: This figure shows the distribution of the neighborhood-level “No” vote share for Turkey in blue and for the experimental sample among the control group. The distributions are weighted by the number of registered voters in a neighborhood.

Figure A5. Map of Sample Within Turkey and with Province Borders



Figure A6. Map of Sample Within Izmir and with District Borders



Note: Figure A5 shows the location of the neighborhoods in the experimental sample within Turkey. Figure A6 shows the location of neighborhoods in each treatment group within the province of Izmir.

Figure A7. Pamphlets




(a) Policy Outcomes



(b) Checks and Balances


Note: These are copies of the original pamphlets that were used in the information campaigns. I have pasted English translations over the original Turkish text. The graphic in Figure A7b says "For my future, No (Hayir)."

Figure A8. Treatment Effects on Vote Share by Quantile Across the Distribution




Note: These figures show the estimation results for different numbers of quantiles of the stratifying variable (the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections). The dependent variable is at the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for the 2017 referendum is the “No” vote share. The outcome variable for the 2018 presidential election is the vote share for all candidates other than Erdoğan. In the 2018 general election, the outcome variable is the vote share for all opposition parties. Election fixed effects and pre-specified control variables are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Figure A9. Residuals vs. Neighborhood Size




Note: This figure shows the residuals from regressing the “No” vote share on the November 2015 vote share for the opposition party plotted against neighborhood size, which is defined as the number of registered voters in a neighborhood.

Figure A10. Distribution of Neighborhood Size



Note: This figure shows the distribution of registered voters in a neighborhood for each strata. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections.

Figure A11.
Treatment Effects on Voter Turnout by Quantile Across the Distribution



Note: These figures show the estimation results for different numbers of quantiles of the stratifying variable (the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections). The dependent variable is at the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for each election from 2017 to 2018 is voter turnout. Election fixed effects and pre-specified control variables are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A1— Number of Neighborhoods
Reached and Share of Conversations
Completed (Weighted)

Quartiles	All		Not Threatened	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
1	0.08	25	0.10	21
2	0.10	25	0.10	20
3	0.09	25	0.10	20
4	0.06	25	0.07	19
Total		100		80

Note: Quartiles refers to the four quantiles of the variable used for stratification (the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections). Column 1 shows the average share of registered individual voters who opened their doors and completed a conversation with the canvassers (conversation completion rate) in neighborhoods assigned to the treatment group. Column 2 shows the total number of neighborhoods assigned to the treatment group. Column 3 also shows the mean conversation completion rate, but excludes neighborhoods where the party volunteers faced threat and aggression. Canvassers did not share information on the number of voters they completed a conversation in these neighborhoods. Column 4 shows the number of neighborhoods assigned to the treatment group, but excluding neighborhoods where canvassers faced threat and aggression. Estimates are weighted by the number of registered voters in a neighborhood. In a previous version of this paper, I reported unweighted averages and a higher conversation completion rate in the fourth quartile. This was because the conversation completion rate was above 100% in one of the neighborhoods and I had capped it at 100%. I now replace the conversation completion rate as “missing” for this neighborhood, but include this neighborhood in columns 2 and 4.

Table A2— Balance on Pre-Specified Variables

	Aggregate		
	Control Mean	Coefficient	Standard Error
Reg Voters Nov	5486.421	-37.853	547.182
Valid Casts Nov	4759.285	-29.280	473.658
Opp Votes June	2079.003	38.123	220.028
Opp Votes Nov	2199.444	31.146	235.802
Opp Share June	0.440	0.000	0.008
Opp Share Nov	0.452	-0.003	0.009
Turnout Nov	0.866	0.001	0.003
N	550		

Note: Balance test across the treatment and control groups on all pre-specified variables. These variables are measured at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Balance is tested across the whole sample. Strata fixed effects are included and observations are weighted by the number of registered voters. Strata are the quartile of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections.

Table A3— Balance on Pre-Specified Variables by
Campaign and Quartiles 1 and 2

<i>PO Campaign</i>	Q1			Q2		
	Control Mean	Coef	SE	Control Mean	Coef	SE
Reg Voters Nov	5121.790	604.328	2434.540	5439.362	-532.754	903.217
Valid Casts Nov	4407.089	516.021	2107.968	4718.222	-504.082	769.782
Opp Votes June	1005.546	278.290	563.432	1779.321	-197.514	281.252
Opp Votes Nov	1056.871	290.866	608.838	1868.805	-266.754	267.848
Opp Share June	0.235	0.027	0.015	0.388	0.007	0.018
Opp Share Nov	0.237	0.024	0.018	0.395	-0.003	0.018
Turnout Nov	0.859	-0.006	0.007	0.867	-0.004	0.012
<i>CB Campaign</i>	Q1			Q2		
	Control Mean	Coef	SE	Control Mean	Coef	SE
Reg Voters Nov	5121.790	-1609.801	1076.551	5439.362	1040.344	1897.910
Valid Casts Nov	4407.089	-1387.595	952.384	4718.222	773.720	1602.391
Opp Votes June	1005.546	-362.629	279.670	1779.321	369.106	668.856
Opp Votes Nov	1056.871	-368.183	324.895	1868.805	396.283	739.312
Opp Share June	0.235	-0.031	0.031	0.388	0.004	0.013
Opp Share Nov	0.237	-0.035	0.033	0.395	-0.000	0.018
Turnout Nov	0.859	-0.004	0.012	0.867	-0.015	0.006

Note: Balance test across the treatment and control groups across all pre-specified variables. These variables are measured at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Balance is tested by strata (quartile of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections). Observations are weighted by the number of registered voters in a neighborhood.

Table A4— Balance on Pre-Specified Variables by
Campaign and Quartiles 3 and 4

<i>PO Campaign</i>	Q3			Q4		
	Control Mean	Coef	SE	Control Mean	Coef	SE
Reg Voters Nov	5734.712	449.155	1440.571	5614.352	610.983	1323.919
Valid Casts Nov	4994.065	441.799	1287.778	4883.714	566.586	1150.964
Opp Votes June	2388.448	120.587	542.656	3053.813	507.839	817.930
Opp Votes Nov	2528.924	108.614	579.450	3248.519	527.718	866.490
Opp Share June	0.492	-0.007	0.013	0.629	0.020	0.016
Opp Share Nov	0.506	-0.012	0.012	0.654	0.020	0.019
Turnout Nov	0.871	0.007	0.008	0.867	0.009	0.006
<i>CB Campaign</i>	Q3			Q4		
	Control Mean	Coef	SE	Control Mean	Coef	SE
Reg Voters Nov	5734.712	-1200.008	1256.877	5614.352	23.680	573.495
Valid Casts Nov	4994.065	-1077.271	1070.367	4883.714	109.233	522.961
Opp Votes June	2388.448	-582.050	459.287	3053.813	12.402	333.531
Opp Votes Nov	2528.924	-646.357	480.524	3248.519	39.103	367.210
Opp Share June	0.492	-0.016	0.011	0.629	-0.003	0.026
Opp Share Nov	0.506	-0.024	0.012	0.654	0.005	0.031
Turnout Nov	0.871	-0.003	0.005	0.867	0.015	0.010

Note: Balance test across the treatment and control groups across all pre-specified variables. These variables are measured at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Balance is tested by strata (quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections). Observations are weighted by the number of registered voters in a neighborhood.

Table A5—
Treatment Effect on Vote Share Overall and by Quartile

<i>Panel A</i>		Referendum 2017 “No”			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.000 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.034 (0.010)	0.012 (0.006)	0.008 (0.004)
Mean	0.675	0.523	0.635	0.713	0.819
N Ballot	3992	919	983	1058	1032
R squared	0.785	0.279	0.416	0.409	0.664
<i>Panel B</i>		Presidential 2018			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.018)	-0.034 (0.012)	0.017 (0.007)	0.007 (0.004)
Mean	0.658	0.510	0.612	0.693	0.809
N Ballot	4406	1015	1093	1160	1138
R squared	0.769	0.281	0.441	0.430	0.626
<i>Panel C</i>		Metropolitan Mayor 2019			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.028 (0.011)	0.014 (0.009)	0.006 (0.006)
Mean	0.602	0.459	0.555	0.626	0.759
N Ballot	4793	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.757	0.199	0.325	0.321	0.666
N Nbhd	550	138	137	138	137

Note: All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The dependent variable for Panel A is the 2017 “No” vote share. The outcome variable for the 2018 presidential election is the vote share for all candidates other than Erdoğan. In the 2019 local election, the outcome variable is the vote share for all opposition parties. I show the estimated treatment effect across all strata (“Overall”) and by stratum (Q1-Q4). Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Strata fixed effects are included in the regression for “Overall.” Pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A6—
Treatment Effect on Neighborhood-Level 2017 “No” Vote Share by Quartile

<i>Panel A</i>	Referendum 2017				
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.000 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.035 (0.011)	0.013 (0.006)	0.008 (0.004)
Mean	0.677	0.526	0.635	0.714	0.820
R squared	0.867	0.358	0.625	0.679	0.842
<i>Panel B</i>	Referendum 2017: Unweighted				
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.008 (0.007)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.027 (0.012)	0.020 (0.009)	0.013 (0.007)
Mean	0.654	0.496	0.628	0.694	0.798
R squared	0.782	0.402	0.398	0.489	0.682
N	550	138	137	138	137

Note: The dependent variable in each column is the “No” vote share at the neighborhood level. I show the estimated treatment effect across all strata (“Overall”) and by stratum (Q1-Q4). Strata are the quartile of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Strata fixed effects are included in the regression for “Overall.” Pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. In Panel A, observations are weighted by the number of registered voters in a neighborhood. In Panel B, observations are not weighted.

Table A7— Randomization Inference Based
P-values

Table 1 Panel A p-values				
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
p-values (Table 1)	0.764	0.001	0.031	0.042
RI p-values (Young)	0.782	0.006	0.058	0.058
RI p-values (Hess)	0.752	0.005	0.061	0.112

Note: This table shows p-values calculated with and without using randomization inference exercises for the results shown in Table 1 Panel A (Referendum 2017). The calculations using randomization inference are under the sharp null of no treatment effect and without making assumptions on the distribution of errors. To implement these randomization inference exercises, I run 10,000 permutations of the treatment on the full sample of neighborhoods within each quartile to generate a distribution of coefficients and calculate the p-values. I run two programs to calculate randomization inference based p-values using STATA: `randcmd` (Young, 2019) and `ritest` (Hess, 2017). For `randcmd` (Young, 2019), I report the p-values calculated using the “randomization-t based” statistic.

Table A8—
Treatment Effect on Vote Share and Voter Turnout:
2017 Referendum With and Without Controls

	No Vote Share		Voter Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.0063 (0.0090)	0.0002 (0.0062)	0.0025 (0.0032)	0.0017 (0.0011)
Mean	0.675	0.675	0.872	0.872
N Ballot	3992	3992	3992	3992
N Nbhd	550	550	550	550
R squared	0.673	0.785	0.069	0.401
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variables are at the ballot-box level. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the “No” vote share. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is voter turnout. Pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization, in columns 2 and 4. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. Strata fixed effects are included in all specifications. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections.

Table A9— Treatment Effect on Vote Share
by Quartile and Campaign With and
Without Controls

	Q1		Q2		Q3		Q4	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Policy Outcomes	0.027 (0.022)	0.013 (0.028)	-0.057 (0.030)	-0.038 (0.011)	0.006 (0.013)	0.017 (0.007)	0.016 (0.015)	0.004 (0.004)
Checks & Balances	-0.036 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.028)	-0.025 (0.032)	-0.030 (0.014)	-0.024 (0.011)	0.007 (0.007)	0.026 (0.022)	0.013 (0.006)
Mean	0.523	0.523	0.635	0.635	0.713	0.713	0.819	.819
N Ballot	919	919	983	983	1058	1058	1032	1032
N Nbhd	138	138	137	137	138	138	137	137
R squared	0.016	0.284	0.040	0.416	0.015	0.410	0.019	0.665
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: The dependent variable is the “No” vote share and is observed at the ballot-box level. In columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. I show the estimated treatment effect within each strata (Q1-Q4). Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A10—
Treatment Effect on Vote Share Overall and by Quartile

<i>Panel A</i>		General 2018			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.018)	-0.037 (0.012)	0.016 (0.007)	0.007 (0.004)
Mean	0.652	0.512	0.604	0.682	0.803
N Ballot	4406	1015	1093	1160	1138
R squared	0.753	0.260	0.423	0.419	0.637
<i>Panel B</i>		Municipal Mayor 2019			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.017)	0.018 (0.013)	0.019 (0.008)
Mean	0.595	0.463	0.544	0.614	0.753
N Ballot	4793	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.713	0.142	0.157	0.239	0.641
<i>Panel C</i>		Municipal Councillors 2019			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.005 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.014)	0.017 (0.012)	0.016 (0.007)
Mean	0.604	0.471	0.554	0.623	0.761
N Ballot	4793	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.726	0.145	0.208	0.280	0.651
N Nbhd	550	138	137	138	137

Note: The dependent variable for all elections is the ballot box-level vote share for the opposition parties. I show the estimated treatment effect across all strata (“Overall”) and within each strata (Q1-Q4). Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Strata fixed effects are included in the regression for “Overall.” Pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A11—
Treatment Effects on Vote Share by Quartile
and Campaign

<i>Panel A</i>	General 2018			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Policy Outcomes	0.006 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.012)	0.019 (0.010)	0.004 (0.004)
Checks & Balances	-0.038 (0.025)	-0.037 (0.017)	0.013 (0.007)	0.011 (0.006)
Mean	0.512	0.604	0.682	0.803
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138
R squared	0.267	0.423	0.420	0.637
PO=CB p-value	0.231	0.989	0.637	0.354
<i>Panel B</i>	Municipal Mayor 2019			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Policy Outcomes	-0.017 (0.026)	0.011 (0.022)	0.015 (0.021)	0.016 (0.009)
Checks & Balances	0.003 (0.027)	-0.043 (0.016)	0.022 (0.010)	0.021 (0.011)
Mean	0.463	0.544	0.614	0.753
N Ballot	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.143	0.170	0.239	0.641
PO=CB p-value	0.578	0.045	0.745	0.714
<i>Panel C</i>	Municipal Councillors 2019			
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Policy Outcomes	-0.015 (0.027)	0.004 (0.017)	0.013 (0.019)	0.013 (0.007)
Checks & Balances	-0.003 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.018)	0.021 (0.009)	0.019 (0.009)
Mean	0.471	0.554	0.623	0.761
N Ballot	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.146	0.216	0.280	0.651
PO=CB p-value	0.742	0.075	0.695	0.568
N Nbhd	138	137	138	137

Note: The dependent variable for all elections is the ballot box-level vote share for the opposition parties. I show the estimated treatment effect by stratum (Q1-Q4). Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A12—
Treatment Effects on Voter Turnout by Quartile and Election

<i>Panel A</i>		General 2018			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.002 (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	0.007 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
Mean	0.870	0.853	0.865	0.878	0.881
N Ballot	4406	1015	1093	1160	1138
R squared	0.323	0.341	0.310	0.209	0.248
<i>Panel B</i>		Municipal Mayor 2019			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.006)	0.015 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.003)
Mean	0.813	0.808	0.814	0.821	0.811
N Ballot	4793	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.358	0.373	0.394	0.339	0.331
<i>Panel C</i>		Municipal Councillors 2019			
	Overall	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Treatment	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.015 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.003)
Mean	0.810	0.804	0.810	0.819	0.807
N Ballot	4793	1096	1191	1274	1232
R squared	0.349	0.367	0.374	0.335	0.325
N Nbhd	550	138	137	138	137

Note: The dependent variable in each column is voter turnout at the ballot-box level. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Pre-specified controls are included at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A13— Vote share versus Voter turnout

	Referendum 2017			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
T (1) Turnout	-0.000 (0.003)	0.006 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
T (2) Vote share	-0.005 (0.016)	-0.026 (0.009)	0.012 (0.006)	0.009 (0.004)
Ratio (1/2)	0.026	0.225	0.075	0.240
p-value	0.785	0.043	0.027	0.040
F-stat	0.08	4.16	4.97	4.32
N Ballot	919	983	1058	1032
	Presidential 2018			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
T (1) Turnout	0.003 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)
T (2) Vote share	-0.011 (0.015)	-0.026 (0.010)	0.012 (0.006)	0.007 (0.004)
Ratio (1/2)	0.269	0.251	0.318	0.107
p-value	0.610	0.109	0.286	0.063
F-stat	0.26	2.61	1.14	3.51
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138
	General 2018			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
T (1) Turnout	0.004 (0.003)	0.007 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)
T (2) Vote share	-0.012 (0.015)	-0.028 (0.010)	0.012 (0.006)	0.008 (0.004)
Ratio (1/2)	0.343	0.243	0.208	0.251
p-value	0.625	0.053	0.220	0.094
F-stat	0.24	3.80	1.52	2.85
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138

Note: This table compares the effect of the campaign on voter turnout and a different measure of vote share. The denominator for vote share is the number of registered voters instead of the number of valid votes. The two effects are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. The table also includes the ratio between the effects on turnout and on vote share. The results for p-value and F-statistic are from a test of the null hypothesis that the two effects are equal. All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for the 2017 referendum is the “No” vote share. The outcome variable for the 2018 presidential election is the vote share for all candidates other than Erdogan. In the 2018 general election, the outcome variable is the vote share for the opposition parties. Pre-specified controls are included in all regressions at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A14— Vote share versus Voter turnout

<i>Panel A</i>	Metropolitan Mayor 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
T (1) Turnout	0.001 (0.006)	0.016 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.003)
T (2) Vote share	-0.008 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.008)	0.014 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)
Ratio (1/2)	0.070	1.080	0.308	4.510
p-value	0.631	0.916	0.222	0.224
F-stat	0.23	0.01	1.51	1.49
<i>Panel B</i>	Municipal Mayor 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
T (1) Turnout	0.000 (0.006)	0.015 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.003)
T (2) Vote share	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.012)	0.017 (0.010)	0.008 (0.007)
Ratio (1/2)	0.021	4.045	0.219	1.033
p-value	0.680	0.412	0.262	0.975
F-stat	0.17	0.68	1.27	0.00
<i>Panel C</i>	Municipal Councillors 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
T (1) Turnout	-0.001 (0.006)	0.015 (0.007)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.003)
T (2) Vote share	-0.008 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)	0.007 (0.006)
Ratio (1/2)	0.143	2.969	0.251	0.978
p-value	0.685	0.411	0.274	0.984
F-stat	0.17	0.68	1.21	0.00
N Ballot	1096	1191	1274	1232

Note: This table compares the effect of the campaign on voter turnout and a different measure of vote share. The denominator for vote share is the number of registered voters instead of the number of valid votes. The two effects are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. The table also includes the ratio between the effects on turnout and on vote share. The results for p-value and F-statistic are from a test of the null hypothesis that the two effects are equal. All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for all 2019 local elections is the vote share for the opposition parties. Pre-specified controls are included in all regressions at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A15— Vote share versus Voter turnout for PO campaign

<i>Panel A</i>	Referendum 2017			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
PO (1) Turnout	0.004 (0.002)	0.004 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
PO (2) Vote share	0.013 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.011)	0.016 (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)
Ratio	0.278	0.124	0.029	0.396
p-value	0.694	0.029	0.120	0.817
F-stat	0.16	4.89	2.44	0.05
N Ballot	919	983	1058	1032
<i>Panel B</i>	Presidential 2018			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
PO (1) Turnout	0.006 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)
PO (2) Vote share	0.006 (0.023)	-0.032 (0.012)	0.012 (0.009)	0.005 (0.004)
Ratio	0.932	0.029	0.702	0.034
p-value	0.986	0.019	0.737	0.438
F-stat	0.00	5.64	0.11	0.61
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138
<i>Panel C</i>	General 2018			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
PO (1) Turnout	0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
PO (2) Vote share	0.008 (0.024)	-0.031 (0.011)	0.012 (0.009)	0.005 (0.004)
Ratio	0.840	0.063	0.648	0.383
p-value	0.957	0.020	0.708	0.410
F-stat	0.00	5.53	0.14	0.68
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138

Note: This table compares the effect of the campaign on voter turnout and a different measure of vote share. The denominator for vote share is the number of registered voters instead of the number of valid votes. The two effects are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. The table also includes the ratio between the effects on turnout and on vote share. The results for p-value and F-statistic are from a test of the null hypothesis that the two effects are equal. All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for the 2017 referendum is the “No” vote share. The outcome variable for the 2018 presidential election is the vote share for all candidates other than Erdogan. In the 2018 general election, the outcome variable is the vote share for the opposition parties. Pre-specified controls are included in all regressions at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A16— Vote share versus Voter turnout for PO Campaign

<i>Panel A</i>	Metropolitan Mayor 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
PO (1) Turnout	-0.000 (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.004)
PO (2) Vote share	-0.006 (0.022)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.012 (0.010)	-0.012 (0.006)
Ratio	0.074	1.041	0.115	1.290
p-value	0.814	0.977	0.401	0.535
F-stat	0.06	0.00	0.71	0.39
<i>Panel B</i>	Municipal Mayor 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
PO (1) Turnout	0.001 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.008)	-0.015 (0.004)
PO (2) Vote share	-0.015 (0.020)	0.014 (0.018)	0.013 (0.016)	0.001 (0.007)
Ratio	0.062	0.534	0.019	14.362
p-value	0.489	0.715	0.427	0.083
F-stat	0.48	0.13	0.63	3.05
<i>Panel C</i>	Municipal Councillors 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
PO (1) Turnout	-0.001 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.014 (0.004)
PO (2) Vote share	-0.013 (0.021)	0.008 (0.013)	0.012 (0.015)	-0.001 (0.006)
Ratio	0.040	1.045	0.071	20.068
p-value	0.587	0.979	0.535	0.034
F-stat	0.30	0.00	0.39	4.60
N Ballot	1096	1191	1274	1232

Note: This table compares the effect of the campaign on voter turnout and a different measure of vote share. The denominator for vote share is the number of registered voters instead of the number of valid votes. The two effects are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. The table also includes the ratio between the effects on turnout and on vote share. The results for p-value and F-statistic are from a test of the null hypothesis that the two effects are equal. All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for all 2019 local elections is the vote share for the opposition parties. Pre-specified controls are included in all regressions at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A17— Vote share versus Voter turnout for CB Campaign

<i>Panel A</i>	Referendum 2017			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
CB (1) Turnout	-0.004 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.002)
CB (2) Vote share	-0.022 (0.022)	-0.021 (0.012)	0.007 (0.007)	0.017 (0.006)
Ratio	0.172	0.374	0.349	0.339
p-value	0.450	0.277	0.420	0.014
F-stat	0.57	1.19	0.65	6.18
N Ballot	919	983	1058	1032
<i>Panel B</i>	Presidential 2018			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
CB (1) Turnout	-0.000 (0.005)	0.012 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
CB (2) Vote share	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.020 (0.015)	0.013 (0.008)	0.009 (0.007)
Ratio	0.002	0.627	0.109	0.188
p-value	0.202	0.657	0.072	0.138
F-stat	1.64	0.20	3.30	2.23
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138
<i>Panel C</i>	General 2018			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
CB (1) Turnout	0.001 (0.004)	0.012 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
CB (2) Vote share	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.015)	0.013 (0.007)	0.011 (0.007)
Ratio	0.045	0.474	0.271	0.191
p-value	0.092	0.411	0.091	0.075
F-stat	2.88	0.68	2.90	3.21
N Ballot	1015	1093	1160	1138

Note: This table compares the effect of the campaign on voter turnout and a different measure of vote share. The denominator for vote share is the number of registered voters instead of the number of valid votes. The two effects are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. The table also includes the ratio between the effects on turnout and on vote share. The results for p-value and F-statistic are from a test of the null hypothesis that the two effects are equal. All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for the 2017 referendum is the “No” vote share. The outcome variable for the 2018 presidential election is the vote share for all candidates other than Erdogan. In the 2018 general election, the outcome variable is the vote share for the opposition parties. Pre-specified controls are included in all regressions at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.

Table A18— Vote share versus Voter turnout for CB Campaign

<i>Panel A</i>	Metropolitan Mayor 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
CB (1) Turnout	0.001 (0.009)	0.022 (0.011)	0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)
CB (2) Vote share	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.021 (0.012)	0.017 (0.008)	0.009 (0.008)
Ratio	0.162	1.089	0.476	0.065
p-value	0.656	0.913	0.176	0.194
F-stat	0.20	0.01	1.85	1.70
<i>Panel B</i>	Municipal Mayor 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
CB (1) Turnout	-0.001 (0.010)	0.024 (0.011)	0.009 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.004)
CB (2) Vote share	0.002 (0.020)	-0.021 (0.013)	0.023 (0.010)	0.016 (0.010)
Ratio	0.424	1.116	0.382	0.054
p-value	0.966	0.893	0.101	0.219
F-stat	0.00	0.02	2.73	1.53
<i>Panel C</i>	Municipal Councillors 2019			
	(1) Q1	(2) Q2	(3) Q3	(4) Q4
CB (1) Turnout	-0.002 (0.009)	0.022 (0.011)	0.008 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)
CB (2) Vote share	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.018 (0.013)	0.022 (0.009)	0.016 (0.008)
Ratio	0.538	1.216	0.373	0.051
p-value	0.947	0.822	0.086	0.042
F-stat	0.00	0.05	2.99	4.22
N Ballot	1096	1191	1274	1232

Note: This table compares the effect of the campaign on voter turnout and a different measure of vote share. The denominator for vote share is the number of registered voters instead of the number of valid votes. The two effects are estimated using a seemingly unrelated regressions framework. The table also includes the ratio between the effects on turnout and on vote share. The results for p-value and F-statistic are from a test of the null hypothesis that the two effects are equal. All dependent variables are the ballot-box level. The outcome variable for all 2019 local elections is the vote share for the opposition parties. Pre-specified controls are included in all regressions at the neighborhood level, which is the level of randomization. Each column shows the estimation result by stratum. Strata are quartiles of the average vote share for the main opposition party in the 2015 elections. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level.