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Marriott Marquis, Del Mar
Hosted By:
American Economic Association
Liquidity Regulation
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 4, 2020 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PDT)
- Chair: Christa H.S. Bouwman, Texas A&M University
The Risk-Taking Channel of Liquidity Regulations and Monetary Policy
Abstract
We study the implications of liquidity regulations and monetary policy on deposit-making and risk-taking. Banks give risky loans by creating deposits that firms use to pay suppliers. Firms and banks can take more or less risk. In equilibrium, higher liquidity requirements always lower risk at the cost of lower investment. Nevertheless, a positive liquidity requirement is always optimal. Monetary conditions affect the optimal size of liquidity requirements, and the optimal size is countercyclical. It is only optimal to impose a 100% liquidity requirement when the nominal interest rate is sufficiently low.The Costs and Benefits of Liquidity Regulations: Lessons from an Idle Monetary Policy Tool
Abstract
We investigate how liquidity regulations affect banks by examining a dormant monetary policy tool that functions as a liquidity regulation. Our identification strategy uses a regression kink design that relies on the variation in a marginal high-quality liquid asset (HQLA) requirement around an exogenous threshold. We show that mandated increases in HQLA cause banks to reduce credit supply. Liquidity requirements also depress banks' profitability, though some of the regulatory costs are passed on to liability holders. We document a prudential benefit of liquidity requirements by showing that banks subject to a higher requirement before the financial crisis had lower odds of failure.Bank Liquidity Creation, Systemic Risk and Basel Liquidity Regulations
Abstract
We examine liquidity creation per unit of assets by banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) using the liquidity measures Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) (Bai et al., 2018) and BB (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). We identify the LCR effects through time and cross-section effects, specific LCR-constrained balance sheet categories, an economically similar asset pair with different LCR weights, and the differential implementation of LCR by the very large and less-large LCR banks. We find that, since 2013, there has been reduced liquidity creation by LCR banks compared to non-LCR banks, occurring mostly through greater holdings of liquid assets and lower holdings of illiquid assets. Trends in liquid asset holdings are driven by High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA), an LCR-defined category, particularly for assets where market and LCR liquidity weights are most similar. Of particular interest is a post-LCR shift in LCR bank portfolios to GNMA MBS rather than GSE MBS, economically similar assets with different LCR weights, that is not attributable to relatively greater issuances or relative price effects. We also find sharper declines of commercial and residential real estate loans by LCR banks relative to non-LCR banks post-2013. Finally, we find a decline in the high run-off category of LCR liabilities for LCR banks relative to non-LCR banks post-2013 for the largest LCR banks with greater than $250 billion in assets. Our results highlight the trade-off between lower liquidity creation and lower run risk from reduced liquidity mismatch of the largest banks.Discussant(s)
Morten L. Bech
,
Bank for International Settlements
Kinda Hachem
,
University of Virginia
Glenn Schepens
,
European Central Bank
Christa H.S. Bouwman
,
Texas A&M University
JEL Classifications
- G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
- E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit