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Hosted By:
American Economic Association
Search, Bargaining, and Experimentation
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 3, 2021 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM (EST)
- Chair: Can Urgun, Princeton University
Search and Efficient Bargaining Dynamics
Abstract
TBDLearning and Corruptive Bargaining along Monitoring Chains
Abstract
“But Who Will Guard the Guardians?” I revisit this age-old question under the following assumptions: (i) guardians are devoid of ethical motives and have quasilinear preferences, (ii) guardians monitor one another through a monitoring chain, (iii) any two consecutive guardians in the chain can bargain away “inefficient” punishments through corruptive arrangements. Under these assumptions, monitoring is impossible unless rewards or punishments are unbounded. When material incentives are bounded and local corruption is feasible, the answer to the initial question is: “No one.”Constrained Retrospective Search
Abstract
The search for good outcomes---be it government policies, technological breakthroughs, or a lasting purchase---takes time and effort. At times, the decision process is unconstrained: an individual seeking a well-priced product determines her search scope and time as she wishes. At times, search is constrained, either through institutions or through cognitive limitations. We consider retrospective search in both settings: an agent chooses the search scope and time, selecting the best observed outcome upon stopping. We analyze the impacts of constraints when observed samples are independent and correlated over time.JEL Classifications
- D3 - Distribution