Is anyone interested in a simple bargaining model that gets a 1/N split as a unique Nash equilibrium? Or are Nash (1950) and Rubinstein (1982) enough for us?
I've written a first draft of a bargaining model in which the players choose toughness levels in [0, infinity) and being tougher increases your share but also increases the probability of breakdown and a payoff of zero. It works with risk aversion too, and with discounting if it's made multi-period. Is this of interest to anyone? Comments welcomed. The paper's at
http://rasmusen.org/papers/bargaining50.pdf.
I shoudl tell you that the risk aversion section is unfinished. I presented the paper internally, and found a math error that ruined my elegant functional form, so now I have to do numerical calculations, and I haven't had time. I told someone at the AEA I'd try starting a research discussion, though, so I'm posting this now.
