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  4. December 2005
  5. Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Journal of Economic Literature

ISSN 0022-0515 (Print) | ISSN 2328-8175 (Online)

Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions

  • Daron Acemoglu
Journal of Economic Literature
vol. 43, no. 4, December 2005
(pp. 1025–1048)
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Abstract

In this essay, I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.

Citation

Acemoglu, Daron. 2005. "Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini's The Economic Effects of Constitutions." Journal of Economic Literature, 43 (4): 1025–1048. DOI: 10.1257/002205105775362069

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • E62 Fiscal Policy
  • K10 Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)