American Economic Review: Insights
ISSN 2640-205X (Print) | ISSN 2640-2068 (Online)
Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule
American Economic Review: Insights
vol. 2,
no. 4, December 2020
(pp. 459–74)
Abstract
We show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles.Citation
Dasgupta, Partha, and Eric Maskin. 2020. "Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule." American Economic Review: Insights, 2 (4): 459–74. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200178Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior