American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
no. 1, February 2022
College admissions in the United States are decentralized, creating frictions that limit student choice. We study the Common Application (CA) platform, under which students submit a single application to member schools, potentially reducing frictions and increasing student choice. The CA increases the number of applications received by schools, reflecting a reduction in frictions, and reduces the yield on accepted students, reflecting increased choice. The CA increases out-of-state enrollment, especially from other CA states, consistent with network effects. Entry into the CA changes the composition of students, with evidence of more racial diversity and more high-income students and imprecise evidence of increases in SAT scores.
Knight, Brian, and Nathan Schiff.
"Reducing Frictions in College Admissions: Evidence from the Common Application."
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Education: Government Policy