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Private Equity

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 3, 2027 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (EST)

Westin DC Downtown
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Chair: Ludovic Phalippou, University of Oxford

Private Equity and the Organization of Firms

Stefan Obernberger
,
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Stefan Weik
,
University of St. Gallen
Xiang Yin
,
Tsinghua University

Abstract

"Private equity (PE) buyouts are often associated with improvements in firms’ operating performance, implying that value creation under PE ownership is closely tied to changes in how firms are organized and managed. This paper examines how buyouts reshape organizational structures related to firms’ organizational capabilities, including hierarchical depth, managerial control spans, and the allocation of employment across organizational functions. We show that PE buyouts lead firms to develop deeper managerial hierarchies and narrower managerial control spans, making organizations more top-heavy even after accounting for firm growth. At the same time, employment shifts away from product-related functions toward specialized finance and management functions.

We document these patterns using a novel dataset combining 10,461 U.S. leveraged buyouts completed between 2008 and 2020 with worker-level resume information that allows us to reconstruct firms’ hierarchical structure, managerial control spans, job functions, and workforce composition at a monthly frequency. Using a difference-in-differences event-study design with matched control firms, we track how firms’ internal organization evolves around buyouts.

The organizational changes coincide with a substantial expansion of specialized executive roles, largely filled through external hires with prior senior leadership or private equity experience. Organizational restructuring is further reflected in elevated turnover among top managers and wage increases concentrated in higher hierarchical layers. Overall, the evidence points to a strengthening of firms’ organizational capabilities under PE ownership. Importantly, these organizational changes persist after PE exit, suggesting that buyouts leave durable organizational structures within firms."

Insider Alpha: Evidence from Private Foundation Portfolios

Zhongjin Lu
,
University of Georgia
Miguel Izquierdo Puertas
,
University of Georgia

Abstract

Using a novel dataset of private foundation returns and security-level holdings, we show that size and alternative-asset tilt generate no alpha once return smoothing is accounted for. Alpha is concentrated among foundations founded by hedge fund (HF) principals. Consistent with insider advantage rather than transferable skill, HF-affiliated foundation's outperformance arises primarily from highly concentrated portfolios; across HF- and private-equity-affiliated foundations, holdings concealed from regulators predict alpha more strongly than disclosed ones, related investments predict alpha whereas unrelated investments do not, and alpha persists after founders retire. These findings challenge the view that alternative alpha is available to investors with sufficient capital and patience.

When Investors Don’t Trust the NAV: Valuation Opacity, Runs, and “Retailization” of Privat

Mathias Awuni
,
Stevens Institute of Technology
Stefano Bonini
,
Stevens Institute of Technology

Abstract

"Information asymmetry creates coordination problems. When investors cannot assess
portfolio value, uncertainty about losses triggers redemption races during stress. I test
this mechanism using NAV opacity in illiquid alternative funds. Valuation opacity
drives discrete panic events, not just average redemptions. High-opacity interval funds
face a 60% quarterly probability of hitting redemption caps versus 22% for transparent
funds. Survival analysis shows high-opacity funds experience first panic events twice as
fast. The effect concentrates in crisis periods and disappears in normal times, confirming
information asymmetry drives fragility independent of structural illiquidity. Fund
structure amplifies the channel. Interval funds with rigid quarterly caps experience
panic rates of 45% (high opacity) versus 18% (low opacity). Tender-offer funds with
discretionary timing show the same opacity gradient but from a lower base (4% versus
0.5%). These results establish opacity as a distinct fragility source separate from
liquidity mismatch. Redemption safeguards should be calibrated to opacity levels, not
just structural features."

Democratizing Illiquid Assets: Liquidity Transformation and Performance in Interval Funds

Stefano Pegoraro
,
University of Notre Dame
Sophie Shive
,
University of Notre Dame
Rafael Zambrana
,
University of Notre Dame

Abstract

Interval funds are a rapidly growing semi-liquid investment vehicle that aims to expand retail access to private and illiquid assets by providing periodic liquidity. We study how the performance of these funds varies with asset liquidity and information sensitivity relative to investable benchmarks. We show that interval funds outperform in illiquid, information-insensitive markets such as private credit. This outperformance is driven by high distribution yields rather than NAV appreciation. In contrast, interval funds underperform in liquid, information-sensitive equity markets. This underperformance is concentrated in listed equities and is consistent with weaker flow-based managerial incentives. Our results are robust to multi-factor risk adjustment and to the unsmoothing of returns. Comparisons with semi-liquid vehicles that primarily serve sophisticated investors, including tender-offer funds and unlisted BDCs and REITs, confirm that interval funds deliver broadly comparable performance across information-insensitive asset classes but underperform in information-sensitive strategies. We also show that interval funds hold substantial shares of highly illiquid assets, far exceeding the limits typically faced by traditional retail-oriented funds. Consistent with our theoretical framework, higher portfolio illiquidity and leverage are associated with stronger performance in information-insensitive markets. Finally, retail investors benefit significantly from co-investing alongside sophisticated investors. This pattern reflects both the role of institutional capital in sustaining managerial incentives and its greater stability, which allows these funds to maintain higher exposure to illiquid assets while continuing to provide periodic liquidity.

Discussant(s)
Benjamin Friedrich
,
Northwestern University
Matteo Binfarè
,
University of Missouri
Hao Jiang
,
Michigan State University
Jules Van Binsbergen
,
University of Pennsylvania
JEL Classifications
  • G2 - Financial Institutions and Services