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Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction
Ulrich Doraszelski
Katja Seim
Michael Sinkinson
Peichun Wang
American Economic Review (Forthcoming)
Abstract
We explore the implications of ownership concentration for the recently
concluded incentive auction that re-purposed spectrum from
broadcast TV to mobile broadband usage in the U.S. We document
significant multi-license ownership of TV stations. We show that
in the reverse auction, in which TV stations bid to relinquish their
licenses, multi-license owners have an incentive to withhold some
TV stations to drive up prices for their remaining TV stations.
Using a large-scale valuation and simulation exercise, we find that
this strategic supply reduction increases payouts to TV stations by
between 13.5% and 42.4%.