American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
American Economic Review
vol. 95,
no. 1, March 2005
(pp. 347–373)
Abstract
Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.Citation
Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane, and Antonio Merlo. 2005. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers." American Economic Review, 95 (1): 347–373. DOI: 10.1257/0002828053828464Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J45 Public Sector Labor Markets