American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment
American Economic Review
vol. 101,
no. 2, April 2011
(pp. 1029–40)
Abstract
Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 X 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.Citation
Brunner, Christoph, Colin F. Camerer, and Jacob K. Goeree. 2011. "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 X 2 Games: Comment." American Economic Review, 101 (2): 1029–40. DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.1029Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General