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  5. Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

  • Massimo Bordignon
  • Tommaso Nannicini
  • Guido Tabellini
American Economic Review
vol. 106, no. 8, August 2016
(pp. 2349–70)
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Abstract

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.

Citation

Bordignon, Massimo, Tommaso Nannicini, and Guido Tabellini. 2016. "Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule." American Economic Review, 106 (8): 2349–70. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131024

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior