American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India's Direct Benefit Transfer Policy
American Economic Review
vol. 114,
no. 12, December 2024
(pp. 3812–46)
Abstract
Targeted price subsidies create a gap between subsidized and unsubsidized prices. The resulting dual pricing can lead to arbitrage opportunities where intermediaries divert subsidized goods to unintended beneficiaries via the black market. I study India's Direct Benefit Transfer policy for cooking fuel subsidies, which altered the existing subsidy program by transferring subsidies directly to beneficiaries' bank accounts. The policy decreased subsidized fuel purchases, indicating a reduction in diversion to the black market. Changes in unsubsidized fuel sales and black market prices provide supporting evidence that leakage was reduced. These results suggest that addressing the underlying perverse incentives in welfare delivery can improve efficiency by curbing leakages.Citation
Barnwal, Prabhat. 2024. "Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India's Direct Benefit Transfer Policy." American Economic Review, 114 (12): 3812–46. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161864Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D73 Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Q41 Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
- Q48 Energy: Government Policy