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  3. American Economic Review
  4. December 2007
  5. Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market

  • Paul J. Healy
American Economic Review
vol. 97, no. 5, December 2007
(pp. 1751–1773)
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Abstract

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputation-building models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)

Citation

Healy, Paul, J. 2007. "Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market." American Economic Review, 97 (5): 1751–1773. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.5.1751

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • J41 Labor Contracts