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  3. American Economic Review
  4. June 2009
  5. Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future

  • Gabriele Camera
  • Marco Casari
American Economic Review
vol. 99, no. 3, June 2009
(pp. 979–1005)
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Abstract

We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment. (JEL C71, C73, D12, Z13)

Citation

Camera, Gabriele, and Marco Casari. 2009. "Cooperation among Strangers under the Shadow of the Future." American Economic Review, 99 (3): 979–1005. DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.3.979

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C71 Cooperative Games
  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
  • D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
  • Z13 Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology