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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2017
  5. Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium

  • Shengwu Li
American Economic Review
vol. 107, no. 5, May 2017
(pp. 230–34)
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Abstract

I propose a new solution concept, obvious ex post (OXP) equilibrium. This is a formal standard of cognitive simplicity for mechanisms, in settings with interdependent values. Under some standard assumptions, the ascending auction has an efficient OXP equilibrium. I discuss a decision theoretic foundation for OXP mechanisms.

Citation

Li, Shengwu. 2017. "Obvious Ex Post Equilibrium." American Economic Review, 107 (5): 230–34. DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171029

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design