American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Cooperation in Polygynous Households
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 11,
no. 2, April 2019
(pp. 266–83)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
Using a carefully designed series of public goods games, we compare, across monogamous and polygynous households, the willingness of husbands and wives to cooperate to maximize household gains. Compared to monogamous husbands and wives, polygynous husbands and wives are less cooperative, one with another, and co-wives are least cooperative, one with another. The husbands' and wives' behavior in a corresponding series of inter-household games indicates that these differences cannot be attributed to selection of less cooperative people into polygyny. Finally, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and less apparently altruistic.Citation
Barr, Abigail, Marleen Dekker, Wendy Janssens, Bereket Kebede, and Berber Kramer. 2019. "Cooperation in Polygynous Households." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11 (2): 266–83. DOI: 10.1257/app.20170438Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C93 Field Experiments
- D13 Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
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