American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 16,
no. 3, July 2024
(pp. 323–53)
Abstract
Two years prior to elections, two-thirds of Delhi municipal councillors learned they had been randomly chosen for a preelection newspaper report card. Treated councillors in high-slum areas increased pro-poor spending, relative both to control counterparts and treated counterparts from low-slum areas. Treated incumbents ineligible to rerun in home wards because of randomly assigned gender quotas were substantially likelier to run elsewhere only if their report card showed a strong pro-poor spending record. Parties also benefited electorally from councillors' high pro-poor spending. In contrast, in a cross-cut experiment, councillors did not react to actionable information that was not publicly disclosed.Citation
Banerjee, Abhijit, Nils Enevoldsen, Rohini Pande, and Michael Walton. 2024. "Public Information Is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 16 (3): 323–53. DOI: 10.1257/app.20220088Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- J16 Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
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