American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Designing Incentives for Impatient People: An RCT Promoting Exercise to Manage Diabetes
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
(pp. 37–73)
Abstract
Many people are impatient. We introduce domain-specific discounting to a contracting model and test a strategy for improving incentives when people are impatient over effort: implement time-bundled contracts that make the payment for future effort increase in current effort. Using a randomized evaluation of an exercise incentive program among diabetics in India, we find that time-bundled contracts generate equivalent effort to time-separable contracts at 15 percent lower cost. Moreover, they perform 30 percent better among individuals with above-median effort impatience. Pooled across contracts, incentives increase steps by 20 percent and improve blood sugar relative to a control group.Citation
Aggarwal, Shilpa, Rebecca Dizon-Ross, and Ariel Zucker. 2026. "Designing Incentives for Impatient People: An RCT Promoting Exercise to Manage Diabetes." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 18 (4): 37–73. DOI: 10.1257/app.20240564Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D86 Economics of Contract: Theory
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
- I12 Health Behavior
- I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- O12 Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development