American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Vol. 96, No. 4, September 2006
Find articles in this issue
An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima
(pp. 929–937)
Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market
(pp. 938–958)
Higher-Education Policies and the College Wage Premium: Cross-State Evidence from the 1990s
(pp. 959–987)
What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform Experiments
(pp. 988–1012)
Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and Smoking Intensity
(pp. 1013–1028)
The Speed of Learning in Noisy Games: Partial Reinforcement and the Sustainability of Cooperation
(pp. 1029–1042)
Costly Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model
(pp. 1043–1068)
Individual Preferences, Monetary Gambles, and Stock Market Participation: A Case for Narrow Framing
(pp. 1069–1090)
A Model of Forum Shopping
(pp. 1091–1113)
Cardinality versus Ordinality: A Suggested Compromise
(pp. 1114–1136)
Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations
(pp. 1137–1158)
Speculative Growth: Hints from the U.S. Economy
(pp. 1159–1192)
Shocks and Government Beliefs: The Rise and Fall of American Inflation
(pp. 1193–1224)
Traditional Institutions Meet the Modern World: Caste, Gender, and Schooling Choice in a Globalizing Economy
(pp. 1225–1252)
$1,000 Cash Back: The Pass-Through of Auto Manufacturer Promotions
(pp. 1253–1270)
A Theory of Participation in Elections
(pp. 1271–1282)
What is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association, 1935-2004
(pp. 1283–1292)
Stock Prices, News, and Economic Fluctuations
(pp. 1293–1307)
Life-Cycle Variation in the Association between Current and Lifetime Earnings
(pp. 1308–1320)
Choice Shifts in Groups: A Decision-Theoretic Basis
(pp. 1321–1332)
Good Principals or Good Peers? Parental Valuation of School Characteristics, Tiebout Equilibrium, and the Incentive Effects of Competition among Jurisdictions
(pp. 1333–1350)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment
(pp. 1351–1354)
Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
(pp. 1355–1360)
Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation: Comment
(pp. 1361–1366)
Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum
(p. 1367)