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Many people are impatient. We introduce domain-specific discounting to a contracting
model and test a prediction for how to make incentives work well when people are im-
patient over effort: implement time-bundled contracts that make the payment for future
effort increase in current effort. Using a randomized evaluation of an exercise incentive
program among diabetics in India, we find that time-bundled contracts generate equiv-
alent e ort to time-separable contracts at 15% lower cost. Moreover, they perform 30%
better among individuals with above-median effort impatience. Pooled across contracts,
incentives increase steps by 20% and improve blood sugar relative to a control group.
