Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions

Lambrecht, Marco; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis

doi:10.1257/mic.20220245

Abstract

How does the information on players’ intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that in the Prisoners’ Dilemma disclosure hampers cooperation; higher intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, disclosure disrupts coordination, as higher intelligence players try to force their most preferred outcome. Instead, with higher payoff inequality, behavior changes and higher intelligence players concede. We analyze the reasons for these patterns of behavior.

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Intelligence Disclosure and Cooperation in Repeated Interactions

Abstract

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