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  5. One Man, One Vote

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

One Man, One Vote

  • Romans Pancs
  • Tridib Sharma
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (Forthcoming)

Abstract

In the United States, electoral districts must be equipopulous. This requirement is known as the one man, one vote doctrine. We propose welfare-based justifications for this requirement under the economic view, according to which voters care about the policy, and under the political view, according to which voters care about representation. Both justifications assume that the districter is partisan. If the districter is benevolent, one man, one vote is harmless under the economic view but may reduce voter welfare under the political view by as much as the reduction from K to √K districts would.

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