American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics
ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)
Character Endorsements and Electoral Competition
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
vol. 8,
no. 2, May 2016
(pp. 277–310)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
When an elite-controlled media strategically endorses candidates in order to promote its own ideological agenda, office-seeking parties may completely pander to the media, under moderate ideological conflict between voters and the elite. Larger ideological conflict leads to polarization—parties either become media darlings or run populist campaigns. The welfare effects are: (i) delegation by the media owner to a more moderate editor is Pareto improving, (ii) the median voter is never better off delegating voting rights to the informed elite, (iii ) a majority of voters may be better off if the informed media did not exist. (JEL D72, D83, L82)Citation
Chakraborty, Archishman, and Parikshit Ghosh. 2016. "Character Endorsements and Electoral Competition." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8 (2): 277–310. DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140241Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L82 Entertainment; Media
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